Chapter 8: Investigative Detentions

[1] CAL: P v.
McLean (1970) 6 CA3 300, 306 ["The purpose of temporary
detention for questioning is to enable law enforcement officers to
determine whether to make an arrest, investigate further or take
no action because they are satisfied with the explanation
given."]; P v. Manis (1969) 268 CA2 653, 665 [detention
"essentially amounts to a halfway house between the station of
arrest on probable cause and that of official inaction"];
P v. Haugland (1981) 115 CA3 248, 255 ["The whole purpose
of a detention… is to enable the police to quickly
determine whether they should allow the suspect to go about his
business or hold him to answer charges."].

[2] USSC: Terry v.
Ohio (1968) 392 US 1, 23 ["The officers were authorized to
take such steps as were reasonably necessary to… maintain
the status quo during the course of the stop."];
Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 US 491, 500 ["carefully
tailored"]. CAL: P v. Manis (1969) 268 CA2
653, 665 ["The purpose of detention is to keep things as they are
during the investigation"]; P v. Gentry (1992) 7 CA4 1225,
1267 ["focused"]. 9th CIR: Gallegos v.
Los Angeles (9C 2002) 308 F3 987, 991 [court will consider
"whether the methods used by police were reasonable given the
specific circumstances"].

[3] USSC: Terry v.
Ohio (1968) 392 US 1, 28 ["The manner in which the seizure
and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the
inquiry as whether they were warranted at all."]; Hayes
v. Florida (1985) 470 US 811, 815-16 ["at some point
in the investigative process, police procedures can qualitatively
and quantitatively become intrusive with respect to a suspect's
freedom of movement and privacy interests as to [require probable
cause]"]. CAL: P v. Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96, 101
[detention is unlawful "when extended beyond what is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation
permissible"]; P v. Gorrostieta (1993) 19 CA4 71, 83
["When the detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible
investigative stop, the detention becomes a de facto arrest
requiring probable cause."]; P v. Espino (2016) 247 CA4
746, 760 ["defendant was under de facto arrest when officers
handcuffed him, requiring probable cause for the arrest'];
P v. Rivera (1992) 8 CA4 1000, 1007 ["what started as a
detention may be converted into an arrest, which must then be
justified by probable cause"]; P v. Harris (1975) 15 C3
384, 390 ["A detention of an individual which is reasonable at its
inception may exceed constitutional bounds when extended beyond
what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances."];
P v. Gomez (2004) 117 CA4 531, 537 ["a detention will be
deemed unconstitutional when extended beyond what is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation
permissible"]; P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499, 1520 [30
minute detention OK because the investigating officer "fully
accounted for this period of time"];
Ingle v. Superior Court (1982) 129 CA3 188, 196 ["Each step
in the investigation conducted by [the officers] proceeded
logically and immediately from the previous one."];
In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 CA3 372, 382, fn.4 ["nothing
suggests [the officer] dallied"]. 9th CIR: Meredith
v. Erath (9C 2003) 342 F3 1057, 1062 ["the
reasonableness of a detention depends not only on if it is
made, but also on how it is carried out"];
Orhorhaghe v. INS (9C 1994) 38 F3 488, 494
["When an encounter between a law officer and another person
escalates to the point where it is considered a 'seizure,' the
officer must have a reasonable, articulable basis for his
actions."]; US v. Torres-Sanchez (9C 1996) 83 F3 1123, 1127
["There is no bright-line for determining when an investigative
stop crosses the line and becomes an arrest, and this
determination may in some instances create difficult line-drawing
problems."]. OTHER: US v. Rasberry (1C 2018) 882 F3
241, 246-47 ["Probable cause is a prerequisite not only for a
formal arrest but also for a de facto arrest."];
US v. Shabazz (5C 1993) 993 F2 431, 436 ["A prolonged
investigative detention may be tantamount to a de facto arrest, a
more intrusive custodial state which must be based upon probable
cause rather than mere reasonable suspicion."]. ALSO SEE:
US v. Tilmon (7C 1994) 19 F3 1221, 1224 ["Subtle and
perhaps tenuous distinctions exist between a Terry stop, a
Terry stop rapidly evolving into an arrest and a de facto
arrest."]

[4] CAL: P v.
Hubbard (1970) 9 CA3 827, 833 ["Nevertheless the violator
is, during the period immediately preceding his execution of the
promise to appear, under arrest."]. OTHER: US
v. Garcia (7C 2004) 376 F3 648, 650 ["the traffic
stop was itself an arrest on probable cause"]; US
v. $404,905 (8C 1999) 182 F3 643, 648 [traffic stop
"is a form of arrest, based upon probable cause"].

[5] USSC: US v.
Place (1983) 462 US 696, 706. 9th CIR: US
v. Hernandez (9C 2002) 313 F3 1206. OTHER:
US v. Babilonia (2C 2017) 854 F3 163, 180 ["Seizure of
everyday objects in plain view is justified where the officers
have probable cause to believe that the objects contain or
constitute evidence."]; US v. McBride (4C 2012) 676 F3 385,
392-93; US v. Marrocco (7C 2009) 578 F3 627.

[6] CAL: P v. Tran (2019) 42 CA5
1, 36. 9th CIR: US v. Molina-Gomez (9C 2015) 781 F3
13, 21 [22-day seizure of computer was reasonable because of
difficulties in conducting computer searches]. OTHER:
US v. Mays (8C 2021) 993 F3 607, 617 [the complexity of the
investigation is a factor that may warrant a longer seizure, so
long as the officers were diligent; court notes "the complexity of
the nearly year-long investigation" and "there were four
investigative teams here working on two distinct tracks"];
US v. Burgard (7C 2012) 675 F3 1029, 1032
["When officers fail to seek a search warrant, at some point the
delay becomes unreasonable and is actionable under the Fourth
Amendment."].

[7] 9th CIR: US v.
Hoang (9C 2007) 486 F3 1156, 1162 ["no seizure occurs if a
package is detained in a manner that does not significantly
interfere with its timely delivery in the normal course of
business"].

[8] USSC:
California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 US 621, 626 [the term
"seizure" "does not even remotely apply to the prospect of a
policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing
form that continues to flee"];
Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 US 249, 254 ["but there
is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise, there is at
most an attempted seizure"]. COMPARE:
P v. Brown (2015) 61 C4 968, 977 ["Brown submitted to the
deputy's show of authority by staying in his car"].

[9] QUOTE FROM:
Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 US 249, 262.
OTHER: US v. Mabry (DCC 2021) 997 F3 1239, 1246 ["By
staying where he was even as [the officer's] questioning grew more
persistent and not leaving though he clearly wanted to, Mabry
submitted to [the officer's] show of authority."].

[10] OTHER: US v. Seymour (6C
2014) 739 F3 923, 928 ["Because Defendant ran before the Impala
came to a complete stop, he did not submit to the show of police
authority at that time. He therefore was not seized until he was
tackled"].

[11] USSC: County of Sacramento
v. Lewis (1998) 523 US 833, 844 ["a police pursuit
in attempting to seize a person does not amount to a 'seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"]. OTHER:
US v. Griffin (7C 2011) 652 F3 793, 801
["Griffin discarded the drug during a low-speed police chase
before he submitted to the officers' show of authority"].
CAL: P v. Green (1994) 25 CA4 1107, 1110 ["Unlawful
orders will not be deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the
exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed."].

[12] OTHER: US v. Baldwin (2C
2007) 496 F3 215.

[13] 9th CIR: US v.
Caseres (9C 2008) 533 F3 1064, 1069 ["Caseres continued to
walk toward his home and then threatened to fight Lt. Murphy,
saying 'I'm gonna kick your fuckin ass.' It was not until Caseres
threatened to fight Lt. Murphy, which in and of itself provided a
valid basis for arrest"]. OTHER: US v. Veney (DCC
2022) 45 F4 403, 406 ["Veney has failed to identify any circuit
case in which a suspect submitted to a show of authority while
walking away from the police."]; US v.
Martin (10C 2010) 613 F3 1295, 1301-1302 [detention did not
result because the suspect did not comply with an officer's
command to place his hands on a wall].

[14] 9th CIR: US v.
Smith (9C 2011) 633 F3 889, 893 ["Smith turned toward the
officer, asked some questions, took a few steps toward the patrol
car, but then backed away"]; US v. Hernandez (9C 1994) 27
F3 1403, 1407. OTHER: US v. Huertas (2C 2017) 864 F3
214, 218 ["submission is questionable when a suspect remains out
of reach and takes flight when police move to lay hands on him"];
US v. Mosley (10C 2014) 743 F3 1317, 1327 ["but
Defendant—although he may have frozen momentarily out of
confusion—did not immediately manifest compliance with their
orders"]; US v. Jeter (6C 2013) 721 F3 746, 752 ["Jeter
paused briefly when [officers] approached him, but then proceeded
to discard his bicycle and flee on foot."]; US v.
Salazar (10C 2010) 609 F3 1059 [backing a vehicle away from
a police car with flashing lights was not a submission to
authority]; US v. Holloway (5C 1992) 962 F2
451, 455-58 [defendant stopped, then rammed a police car].
BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Brodie (DCC 2014) 743 F3 1058,
1061 ["the short duration of Brodie's submission means only that
the seizure was brief, not that no seizure occurred"].

[15] OTHER: US v. Johnson (DCC
2000) 212 F3 1313, 1316.

[16] USSC:
Flores v. Madrid (2021) __ US __ [141 S.Ct. 989].

[17] USSC: California v.
Hodari D. (1991) 499 US 621.

[18] USSC:
Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 US 386, 396 ["the right to make
an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the
right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to
effect it"]. CAL: P v. Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 13
[the right to detain "is meaningless unless officers may, when
necessary, forcibly detain the suspect"]. OTHER:
US v. Lopez (7C 2018) 907 F3 472, 478 ["With the authority
to stop comes the authority to require the subject to submit, and
to use reasonable force to make him submit."].

[19] CAL: Pen. Code§ 148(a)(1);
P v. Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 13, fn. 2 ["Given
their right to forcibly detain, California precedent arguably
would have allowed the officers to arrest for flight which
unlawfully delayed the performance of their duties."].

[20] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Washington (DCC 2009) 559 F3 573, 576.

[21] QUOTE FROM: Pennsylvania
v. Mimms (1977) 434 US 106, 110. USSC:
Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 US 323, 331 [the risk of a
violent encounter "stems not from the ordinary reaction of a
motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that
evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the
stop"]; Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 356 ["Traffic
stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers."];
Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 US 1032, 1052 [an officer who
is conducting a traffic stop is "particularly vulnerable in part
because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the
officer must make a quick decision as to how to protect himself
and others from possible danger"];
Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 US 408, 413 ["Regrettably,
traffic stops may be dangerous encounters."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Reilly (9C 2000) 224 F3 986, 993 ["It is a difficult
exercise at best to predict a criminal suspect's next move"].
OTHER: US v. Washington (DCC 2009) 559 F3 573, 576
["a car stop is one of the more perilous duties imposed on law
enforcement officers"]; US v. Holt (10C 2001) 264 F3 1215.
1223 [The "terrifying truth" is that "officers face a very real
risk of being assaulted with a dangerous weapon each time they
stop a vehicle]. NOTE: In Rodriguez v. US (cited
above) the Supreme Court suggested that such precautions must not
be "negligibly burdensome." The word "negligibly" was a poor
choice of words because it is incomprehensible that an officer
would violate the Fourth Amendment if he took precautions that,
although reasonably necessary, were "negligibly" burdensome.

[22] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Meza-Corrales (9C 1999) 183 F3 1116, 1123.
USSC: Muehler v. Mena (2005) 544 US 93, 99 [officers
may "use reasonable force to effectuate the detention"];
Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 US 386, 396 ["the right to make
an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the
right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to
effect it"]; Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 US 47, 50-51
[determining the constitutionality of detentions "involves a
weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty"]. CAL: P v. Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 12
["The right to verify or dispel suspicion is meaningless unless
officers may, when necessary, forcibly detain a suspect."].
9th CIR: US v. Buffington (9C 1987) 815 F2 1292,
1300 ["use of force during a stop does not convert the stop into
an arrest if it occurs under circumstances justifying fears for
personal safety"]; US v. Willis (9C 2005) 431 F3 709, 716
["Our cases have justified the use of force in making a stop if it
occurs under circumstances justifying fear for an officer's
personal safety."]; US v. Del Vizo (9C 1990) 918 F2 821,
825 ["an investigatory stop will not be converted into an arrest
simply when the officers take reasonable measures to neutralize
the risk of physical harm and to determine whether the person in
question is armed"]. OTHER: US v. Chaney (1C 2011)
647 F3 401, 409 ["Where an investigatory stop is justified at its
inception, it will generally not morph into a de facto arrest as
long as the actions undertaken by the officers following the stop
were reasonably responsive"]; US v. Pontoo (1C 2011) 666 F3
20, 30 ["Sometimes, the line can be drawn by asking whether a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation as being an arrest. But it is an oversimplification to
suggest that every case will fall along this continuum.
Terry stops must be tailored to fit the exigencies of
particular situations, and the mere presence of arrest-like
features is not fatal to the validity of a particular stop."].
NOTE: In the past, the courts would routinely say that
officer-safety precautions that were too closely associated with
arrests would automatically convert the encounter into a de facto
arrest. See, for example, Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 US
491, 499 (plurality decision) ["Nor may the police seek to verify
their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of
arrest."]; Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 US 692, 700
["every seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest
is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause"]. This
is no longer the rule because of changes in our culture,
especially the prevalence of weapons and violence among the
criminal element. See Matz v. Klotka (7C 2014) 769 F3 517,
526] ["Although the hallmarks of formal arrest such as applying
handcuffs, drawing weapons, and placing suspects in police
vehicles should not be the norm during an investigatory detention,
all of those measures have been recognized as appropriate in
certain circumstances."]; US v. Vega (7C 1995) 72 F3 507,
515 ["we have over the years witnessed a multifaceted expansion of
Terry. For better or for worse, the trend has led to
permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of suspects in
police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures of
force more traditionally associated with arrest than with
investigatory detention"]; US v. Tilmon (7C 1994) 19 F3
1221, 1228 ["handcuffing—once problematic—is becoming quite
acceptable in the context of Terry analysis"];
US v. Stewart (7C 2004) 388 F3 1079, 1084 ["The permissible
scope of a Terry stop has expanded in recent years to
include the use of handcuffs"].

[23] QUOTE FROM:
Miller v. Clark County (9C 2003) 340 F3 959, 964.
USSC: Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 540 US 419 [felony
hit-and-run]; Michigan State Police v. Sitz (1990) 496 US
444, 451 ["No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the
drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating
it."]; Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 US 386, 396. CAL:
Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 C3 1321, 1338 ["Deterring
drunk driving and identifying and removing drunk drivers from the
roadways undeniably serves a highly important governmental
interest."]; P v. Herrera (1975) 52 CA3 177, 182 ["The more
serious the crime under investigation, the greater the
governmental interest in its prevention and detection."].
9th CIR: Green v. City of San Francisco (9C 2014)
751 F3 1039, 1049.

[24] USSC:
Utah v. Strieff (2016) 136 US 2056, 2063 ["The officer's
decision to run the warrant check was a negligibly burdensome
precaution for officer safety."]; Rodriguez v. US (2015)
575 US 348, 349 [typical duties include "determining whether there
are outstanding warrants against the driver"];
US v. Hensley (1985) 469 US 221, 229 [checking detainee's
ID "promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and
bringing offenders to justice"]. CAL:
P v. Stoffle (1991) 1 CA4 1671, 1679 [warrant check OK
because the detention "was based on a misdemeanor committed in
[the officer's] presence, it lasted only three to four minutes,
and [the officer] ran the warrant check pursuant to standard
police procedure while he checked the driver licenses and the car
registration"]; P v. McGaughran (1979) 25 C3 577, 583 ["the
right to custody manifestly includes the right to detain for a
warrant check"]; Carpio v. Superior Court (1971) 19 CA3
790, 792-93 [40-minute delay for warrant check OK because detainee
was stopped for speeding, "evasive action," and driving on an
expired temporary permit; the officer testified that "in his
experience, the failure of the DMV to issue a permanent license
usually indicated that traffic tickets or warrants were
outstanding"]; P v. Herrera (1975) 52 CA3 177, 182 [warrant
check during detention of suspected burglar OK]. 9th CIR:
US v. Hylton (9C 2022) 30 F4 842, 847 ["Given the Supreme
Court's reliance on this principle, it is unsurprising that
several other circuits have held that criminal history checks are
permissible post-Rodriguez," citations omitted.];
US v. Christian (9C 2004) 356 F3 1103, 1107 ["This [warrant
check] information could be as important to an officer's safety as
knowing that the suspect is carrying a weapon."];
US v. Evans (9C 2015) 786 F3 779, 786 ["vehicle records and
warrant checks" are "tasks that are ordinary inquiries incident to
the traffic stop"]; US v. Mayville (10C 2020) 955 F3 825,
830 ["This court has routinely permitted officers to conduct
criminal-history checks during traffic stops in the interest of
officer safety."]; US v. Young (6C 2012) 707 F3 598, 606
["the officers here did not exceed the reasonable scope of a
Terry stop by running a warrant check"];
Klaucke v. Daly (1C 2010) 595 F3 20, 26 ["most circuits
have held that an officer does not impermissibly expand the scope
of a Terry stop by performing a background and warrant
check, even where that search is unrelated to the circumstances
that initially drew the officer's attention."];
US v. Villagrana-Flores (10C 2006) 467 F3 1269, 1277
["permitting a warrants check during [detentions] promotes the
strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing
offenders to justice"]; US v. Holt (10C 2001) 264 F3 1215,
1221-22 ["By determining whether a detained motorist has a
criminal record or outstanding warrants, an officer will be better
apprized of whether the detained motorist might engage in violent
activity during the stop."]; US v. Rice (10C 2007) 483 F3
1079, 1084 ["Obvious precautions [during traffic stops] include
running a background check on the driver"]. BUT ALSO SEE:
US v. Evans (9C 2015) 786 F3 779, 786 [traffic stop became
unlawful because the officers conducted "an ex-felon registration
check and a dog sniff, both of which were unrelated to the traffic
violation"].

[25] CAL: In re Frank V. (1991)
233 CA3 1232, 1239 ["merely asking a suspect to take his hands out
of his pockets is not a detention"]; P v.
Padilla (1982) 132 CA3 555, 558 [the officer "could merely
have asked defendant 'to keep his hands in sight'"].

[26] QUOTE FROM: Brendlin
v. California (2007) 551 US 249, 258.

[27] USSC: Arizona v.
Johnson (2009) 555 US 323, 333 [a passenger is not free to
"move about at will"]; Brendlin v.
California (2007) 551 US 249, 250 [it would be unreasonable
to expect officers "to allow people to come and go freely from the
physical focal point of [a detention]"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Williams (9C 2005) 419 F3 1029, 1034
["Giving officers the authority to control all movement in a
traffic encounter is sensibly consistent with the public interest
in protecting their safety."]. ALSO SEE: P
v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 369 [court notes the
need to control the movements of people at drug houses during the
execution of search warrants so that they cannot "come up behind
the officers"].

[28] USSC: New York v.
Class (1986) 475 US 106, 115 ["Keeping the driver of a
vehicle in the car during a routine traffic stop is probably the
typical police practice."]. CAL: P v.
Vibanco (2007) 151 CA4 1, 9-10 [officers may, "as a matter
of course," order the occupants "to remain in the car during a
lawful traffic stop if the officers deem it necessary for officer
safety"]; P v. Castellon (1999) 76 CA4 1369, 1374
["whether the passenger is ordered to stay in the car or get out
of the vehicle is a distinction without a difference"].
OTHER: US v. Prigmore (6C 2021) 15 F4 768, 778
["asking a passenger to remain inside the vehicle invades his
personal liberty no more than ordering him out"].

[29] USSC: Pennsylvania
v. Mimms (1977) 434 US 106, 111, fn.6 ["officers may
order the driver to get out of the vehicle"]; Maryland
v. Wilson (1997) 519 US 408, 415 [officers "may
order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the
stop"]; Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 US 33,
38 [officer lawfully ordered the driver to exit even though he had
already decided not to cite him]; New York v.
Class (1986) 475 US 106, 115 [officers may "exercise their
discretion to require a driver who commits a traffic violation to
exit the vehicle even though they lack any particularized reason
for believing the driver possesses a weapon"]. CAL:
P v. Lomax (2010) 49 C4 530, 564 ["officers
may order the driver and passengers out of the car pending
completion of the [traffic] stop"]; In re Frank V. (1991)
233 CA3 1232, 1238 ["even an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion that it would be better for the officer's safety for the
passenger to alight is sufficient"]; P v.
Hoyos (2007) 41 C4 872, 892 ["an officer making a traffic
stop may order the driver and passengers to exit a car"];
P v. Vibanco (2007) 151 CA4 1, 9-10 [officers may,
"as a matter of course," "order a passenger or passengers either
to get out of the car… during a lawful traffic stop if the
officers deem it necessary for officer safety"].

[30] CAL: P v. McDaniel (2021)
12 C5 97, 131 [the officer "surely was not constitutionally
required to give [the passenger] an opportunity to depart the
scene after he exited the vehicle without first insuring that, in
doing so, the officer was not permitting a dangerous person to get
behind him."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Williams (9C 2005) 419 F3 1029, 1032, 1033 ["We think the
difference in ordering the passenger back inside the car is
immaterial."]. OTHER: US v.
Sanders (8C 2007) 510 F3 788, 790 [officer "did not violate
the Fourth Amendment when he ordered [the passenger] to reenter
the car"]; US v. Clark (11C 2003) 337 F3
1281.

[31] CAL: P v.
Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676 [ordering detainee to sit on
the ground for a "few minutes" "did not turn [the detainee's]
investigative detention into an arrest"]; P v.
Vibanco (2007) 151 CA4 1, 12 [officers were justified in
ordering the passengers to "sit on the curb for officer safety
reasons"].

[32] CAL: P v.
Maxwell (1988) 206 CA3 1004, 1010 ["upon affecting the
early morning stop of a vehicle containing three occupants, the
officer was faced with the prospect of interviewing the two
passengers in an effort to establish the identity of the driver.
His decision to separate them for his own protection, while
closely observing defendant as he rummaged through his pockets for
identification, was amply justified."].

[33] 9th CIR: US v.
Taylor (9C 1983) 716 F2 701, 709 [detainee was "extremely
verbally abusive" and "quite rowdy"]; US v.
Buffington (9C 1987) 815 F2 1292, 1300 [detainee "had been
charged in the ambush slaying of a police officer and with
attempted murder"]; US v. Jacobs (9C 1983)
715 F2 1343, 1345 [ordering bank robbery suspects to "prone out"
was justified]. OTHER: Courson v.
McMillian (11C 1991) 939 F2 1479, 1496 [detainees were
"uncooperative" and intoxicated, one was "unruly and verbally
abusive," officer was alone late at night]; US v.
Tilmon (7C 1994) 19 F3 1221, 1227 ["it may even be
acceptable to make him lie prone on the ground"]; US
v. Sanders (5C 1993) 994 F2 200, 207 ["ordering a
person whom the police reasonably believe to be armed to lie down
may well be within the scope of an investigative detention."].

[34] CAL: P v.
Natale (1978) 77 CA3 568, 572 ["A suspect's mere presence
in a patrol car does not unambiguously state that the elements of
an arrest have been satisfied."]; P v.
Craig (1978) 86 CA3 905, 913 [OK to detain in patrol while
awaiting the arrival of the victim for a showup]; P
v. Gorak (1987) 196 CA3 1032, 1038 [OK to detain in
patrol car while waiting for backup]; P v.
Lloyd (1992) 4 CA4 724, 734 ["Once it was discovered that
someone was still inside the business, it was reasonable for the
police to temporarily detain Lloyd in the car until they could
stabilize the situation"]. 9th CIR: Haynie
v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2003) 339 F3 1071, 1077
["Because Haynie was uncooperative and continued to yell, Deputy
Mertens placed him the back of the patrol car"]. OTHER:
US v. Goodwill (7C 2022) 24 F4 612, 615 ["A police officer
can ask a driver to sit in the police car for the duration of a
traffic stop without any particularized suspicion of
dangerousness."]; US v. Rodriguez (7C 1987)
831 F2 162, 166 ["sitting in a patrol car for several minutes was
merely a normal part of traffic police procedure for identifying
delinquent drivers"]; US v. Stewart (7C 2004)
388 F3 1079, 1084 ["The permissible scope of a Terry stop
has expanded in recent years to include… temporary
detentions in squad cars"]; US v. Jackson (7C
2004) 377 F3 715, 717 [it was "proper" to "detain Jackson in the
cruiser after he did not hand over a driver's license, and
information from the police database raised doubts about his
identity"].

[35] CAL: P v.
Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 675 ["stopping a suspect at
gunpoint, handcuffing him, and making him sit on the ground for a
short period, as occurred here, do not convert a detention into an
arrest"]; P v. Rivera (1992) 8 CA4 1000, 1008 ["case
law teaches that physical restraint does not convert a detention
into an arrest if the restraint is reasonable under the
circumstances"]; P v. Osborne (2009) 175 CA4 1052,
1062 ["a police officer may handcuff a detainee without converting
the detention into an arrest if the handcuffing is brief and
reasonably necessary under the circumstances"]. 9th CIR:
Haynie v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2003) 339
F3 1071, 1077 ["A brief, although complete, restriction of
liberty, such as handcuffing, during a Terry stop is not a
de facto arrest, if not excessive under the circumstances."].
OTHER: Matz v. Klotka (7C 2014) 769 F3 517, 527 [we
remind law enforcement that using handcuffs generally signifies an
arrest, which requires probable cause and not the less demanding
reasonable suspicion standard that permits only a brief and
minimally intrusive detention."]; US v. Meadows (1C 2009)
571 F3 131, 141 ["police officers may not use handcuffs as a
matter or routine"]; US v. Rabbia (1C 2012) 699 F3 85, 92
["there was good reason for [the officer] to fear that Rabbia was
armed and dangerous, and to neutralize the risk of harm by drawing
his weapon, applying handcuffs, and conducting a pat-frisk"];
US v. Pontoo (1C 2011) 666 F3 20, 30 ["When
officer safety is a legitimate concern, a Terry stop
appropriately may involve the application of handcuffs; or
effecting a stop at gunpoint; or ordering a suspect to the ground.
In an appropriate case, such prophylactic measures can be employed
in combination."]; US v. Acosta-Colon (1C
1998) 157 F3 9, 18 ["officers engaged in an otherwise lawful stop
must be permitted to take measures—including the use of
handcuffs—they believe reasonably necessary to protect themselves
from harm, or to safeguard the security of others."].

[36] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of circumstances that are relevant in determining whether
handcuffing was reasonably necessary:

Suspect was detained during execution of a search warrant:
See P v. Castillo (2014) 228 CA4 414, 423 ["Searching a
suspected drug house is inherently dangerous and the use of
handcuffs for the duration of the search prevented flight,
minimized the harm to the officers and did not turn a routine
detention during execution of a search warrant into an arrest."].

Detention for crime in which weapons or violence are common: See P v. Turner (2013) 219 CA4 151, 163 [detention for
possession of a handgun on school property]; P v.
Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676 [handcuffing "may be
appropriate when the stop is of someone suspected of committing a
felony"]; P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499, 1517
[murder suspect]; P v. Brown (1985) 169 CA3
159, 166 [bank robbery suspect]; US v.
Stewart (7C 2004) 388 F3 1079, 1085 [bank robbery];
US v. Johnson (9C 2009) 581 F3 993 [bank
robbery]; Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9C
2002) 308 F3 987, 989 [burglary]; US v. Salas-Garcia (10C
2012) 698 F3 1242, 1251 ["The officers in the present case knew
that the drug transaction was to involve one kilogram of cocaine,
and given the large amount and value of drugs to be exchanged, it
was reasonable for the officers to believe that the parties may be
armed."]; Matz v. Klotka (7C 2014) 769 F3 517, 526
[plaintiff and others were standing on a porch with a murder and
robbery suspect; everyone fled; plaintiff was stopped and
handcuffed while officers' questioned him about suspect's
whereabouts; Court: "everyone else in the vicinity had already
made it patently clear that they did not intend to remain where
they were and speak to the police, and so [the officers] could
reasonably have believed handcuffing the occupants of the car was
the most safe and efficient way to ascertain Salazar's whereabouts
and any pertinent information about his suspected crimes"].
Compare In re Antonio B. (2008) 166 CA4 435, 442
[handcuffing unreasonable based on possession of a joint].

Suspect was detained for armed bank robbery.
US v. Smith (7C 2012) 697 F3 625, 633 ["The totality of
these facts easily established a reasonable suspicion that Smith
was involved in the bank robbery. Accordingly, Agent Stover was
entitled to effectuate a Terry stop and pat down Smith upon
Smith's exit from the Cadillac."].

Detainee attempted to flee, or appeared ready to do so. See
P v. Brown (1985) 169 CA3 159, 167 [detainee
"started to run"]; US v. Wilson (7C 1993) 2
F3 226, 232 ["Mr. Wilson was certainly very actively evading an
officer, and showed every indication that he would again attempt
to do so."]; US v. Meadows (1C 2009) 571 F3
131, 142 [the detainee "had fled from a traffic stop"]; US
v. Bautista (9C 1982) 684 F2 1286, 1289 [detainee
"kept pacing back and forth and looking, turning his head back and
forth as if he was thinking about running"].

Detainee was hostile. See P v.
Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 14 ["defendant struggled
violently with the officers for five minutes [and so] the need for
handcuffing was patently justified by concern for officer
safety"]; Haynie v. County of Los Angeles (9C
2003) 339 F3 1071, 1077 ["Haynie became belligerent"].

Detainee became agitated. See US v.
Smith (8C 2011) 645 F3 998, 1002-3 [detainee became
agitated to the extent that the officer "feared he might begin
fighting"].

Onlookers were hostile. See US v.
Meza-Corrales (9C 1999) 183 F3 1116, 1123 ["uncooperative
persons were inside the residence, and uncertainty prevailed"].

Detainee pulled away from officers. See US
v. Purry (DCC 1976) 545 F2 217, 219-20.

Detainee tensed up during pat search. P
v. Osborne (2009) 175 CA4 1052, 1062 [detainee
tensed up "as if he were attempting to remove his hand" from the
officer's grasp].

Detainee refused to keep in hands in sight. See US
v. Dykes (DCC 2005) 406 F3 717, 720 ["Dykes had kept
his hands near his waistband" and refused "to remove his hands
into plain view"].

Detainee repeatedly attempted to reach inside his clothing.
See US v. Thompson (9C 1979) 597 F2 187, 190.

Circumstantial evidence that the detainee was armed. See
US v. Meadows (1C 2009) 571 F3 131, 142;
US v. Meza-Corrales (9C 1999) 183 F3 1116,
1123 ["weapons had been found (and more weapons potentially
remained hidden"]; US v. Glenna (7C 1989) 878
F2 967, 973 [ammunition plus tip that detainee was armed];
US v. Johnson (9C 2009) 581 F3 993 [detention
of suspected bank robbers]; US v.
Robinson (8C 2012) 670 F3 874, 877 ["officers had specific
information that Robinson possessed a firearm just minutes
earlier, and they knew that Robinson was potentially intoxicated
or hostile"].

Need to transport: It was necessary to transport the
detainee to another location, and there was no reason to believe
the detainee did not pose a threat.
See In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 CA3 372, 385;
Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9C 2002) 308
F3 987, 991; US v. Bullock (7C 2011) 632 F3
1004.

Showups: It was necessary to await the arrival of the
victim for a showup. See P v. Bowen (1987)
195 CA3 269, 274 ["The fact that appellant [a suspect in a purse
snatch] was handcuffed while detained awaiting the victim's
arrival does not mean that appellant was under arrest during this
time."].

Officers were outnumbered. See P v.
Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676 [suspected drug dealers,
officers out numbered]; US v.
Meza-Corrales (9C 1999) 183 F3 1116, 1123 ["A relatively
small number of officers was present"]; US v. Fiseku (2C
2018) 915 F3 863, 873 [the officer "made the cautious choice to
restrain Fiseku in handcuffs at the outset of the investigatory
stop so he could safety turn his attention to the two suspects in
the vehicle"].

Officers could see weapon: US v. Harris (8C 2014)
747 F3 1013, 1016 [the suspect fell asleep in Greyhound depot,
officers saw a handgun "sliding out of his right front pants
pocked].

[37] CAL: In re Carlos M. (1990)
220 CA3 372, 385 ["a patdown search is not an infallible method of
locating concealed weapons"]. OTHER:
US v. Eatman (7C 2019) 942 F3 344, 348 [with grounds to
believe that the detainee had been armed with a firearm,
handcuffing was permissible even though officers had already
seized one gun].

[38] 9th CIR: US v.
Bravo (9C 2002) 295 F3 1002, 1011 [the officer's
"statements that the handcuffs were only temporary are a factor
helped negate the handcuffs' aggravating influence and suggest
mere detention, not arrest," edited].

[39] 9th CIR: Palmer v.
Sanderson (9C 1993) 9 F3 1433, 1436 ["abusive application
of handcuffs" was unlawful]; Meredith v.
Erath (9C 2003) 342 F3 1057. OTHER:
McGrew v. Duncan (6C 2019) 937 F3 664, 668 [no qualified
immunity because suspect "complained about the tightness of the
handcuffs, the officers ignored her complaint, and the handcuffs
caused a physical injury [bruising]"];
Baynes v. Cleland (6C 2015) 799 F3 600, 610 ["the Fourth
Amendment prohibits unduly tight or excessively forceful
handcuffing in the course of an arrest"]; Stainback
v. Dixon (7C 2009) 569 F3 767, 772 ["an officer may
not knowingly use handcuffs in a way that will inflict unnecessary
pain or injury on an individual who presents little or no risk of
flight or threat or injury"]; Burchett v.
Kiefer (6C 2002) 310 F3 937, 944 ["applying handcuffs so
tightly that the detainee's hands become numb and turn blue
certainly raises concerns of excessive force"].

[40] USSC: Muehler v.
Mena (2005) 544 US 93, 100 ["the 2- to 3-hour detention in
handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the government's
continuing safety interests"]. CAL:
P v. Espino (2016) 247 CA4 746, 759 [a detention was
converted into a de facto arrest when officers kept the detainee
handcuffed for two to three minutes after discovering they lacked
probable cause to arrest him and that there was no further
officer-safety need to keep him handcuffed]. 9th CIR:
US v. Hernandez (9C 2002) 322 F3 592, 597
[detainee was "temporarily placed in handcuffs"]; Haynie
v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2003) 339 F3 1071, 1077
[handcuffing for 16-20 minutes not unreasonable]. OTHER:
US v. Fiseku (2C 2018) 906 F3 65, 75 ["the record does not
suggest that the officers were at all dilatory in questioning the
three men"]; US v. Rabbia (1C 2012) 699 F3 85, 93 ['"The
handcuffs remained on him for only five minutes."];
US v. Salas-Garcia (10C 2012) 698 F3 1242, 1252 [detainee
"was only handcuffed for four to ten minutes, and he was
subsequently released when the officers discovered that he was not
armed and was cooperating with the police investigation"];
US v. Campbell (5C 1999) 178 F3 345, 349
[handcuffing OK "during the time it took to investigate [his
associate's] alibi and the serial numbers on the $20 bills"].

[41] CAL: P v. Soun (1995) 34
CA4 1499 [based on reasonable suspicion that the occupants
committed robbery-murder]; P v. Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676
[drug trafficking]; P v. Anthony (1970) 7 CA3 751, 761
[armed robbery]. 9th CIR:
Gallegos v. Los Angeles (9C 2002) 308 F3 987, 991
[burglary]; US v. Alvarez (9C 1990) 899 F2 833, 838
[possession of explosives]; US v. Buffington (9C 1987) 815
F2 1292, 1300 [bank robbery]. OTHER: US v. Jones (1C
2012) 700 F3 615, 625] ["the stop was a high risk operation
involving armed drug traffickers"]; US v. Johnson (3C 2010)
592 F3 442 [shooting]; US v. Shareef (10C 1996) 100 F3
1491, 1506 [drug trafficking]; US v. Tilmon (7C 1994) 19 F3
1221, 1227 [bank robber]y. COMPARE:
Green v. City of San Francisco (9C 2014) 751 F3 1039, 1048
[possible stolen car did not automatically justify certain
intrusive felony-stop procedures]; US v. Del Vizo (9C 1990)
918 F2 821, 825 [drug sales, but precautions too intrusive in
light of circumstances]. ALSO SEE:
P v. Saldana (2002) 101 CA4 170, 173 [a "felony extraction"
"involves stopping all other traffic and ordering the driver out
of the vehicle at gunpoint. Appellant was directed to stop the
station wagon, throw the keys out, get out, back up with his hands
in the air, and get down on his knees"].

[42] 9th CIR:
Allen v. City of Los Angeles (9th CIR. 1995) 66 F3 1052
[felony extraction of passenger was warranted because the officers
"could not have known the extent of [the passenger's involvement
until after they questioned him"].

[43] CAL: P v. Turner (2013) 219
CA4 151, 163 [detention at gunpoint justified because officers
reasonably believed the suspect possessed a firearm on school
property]; P v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 366 [the
issue is whether "detention at gunpoint [was] justified by the
need of a reasonably prudent officer"]; P v.
Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676 ["Faced with two suspects, each
of whom might flee if Detective Strain stopped one but not the
other, it was not unreasonable for him to draw his gun to ensure
that both suspects would stop."]; P v. Taylor (1986)
178 CA3 217, 227, fn.7 ["police officers have a right to use
force, including the blocking of a vehicle and the display of a
weapon, to accomplish an otherwise lawful investigatory stop or
detention provided the force is reasonable in the circumstances"];
P v. Campbell (1981) 118 CA3 588, 595 ["When
appellant did not react violent to be accosted, [the officer]
immediately replaced his gun in his belt"]; P v.
McHugh (2004) 119 CA4 202, 211 ["A police officer may use
force, including… displaying his or her weapon, to
accomplish an otherwise lawful stop or detention as long as the
force used is reasonable under the circumstances to protect the
officer or members of the public or to maintain the status quo."];
P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499, 1513, 1519
[robbery-murder]. 9th CIR: US v. Edwards (9C 2014)
761 F3 977, 982 ["The officers' legitimate safety concerns
justified their on-the-spot decision to use intrusive measures to
stabilize the situation before investigating further."];
Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9C 2002) 308
F3 987, 991 ["Our cases have made clear that an investigative
detention does not automatically become an arrest when officers
draw their guns."]. OTHER:
Baker v. Monroe Township (3C 1995) 50 F3 1186, 1193 ["There
is no per se rule that pointing guns at people, or handcuffing
them, constitutes an arrest."]; US v. Hood (10C 2014) 774
F3 638, 643 ["The officers also saw Hood frantically fumbling in
his pockets, which they believed might indicate he was attempting
to remove a weapon."]; US v. Smith (7C 2012) 697 F3 625,
630 ["it was entirely reasonable for officers to approach the
Cadillac with guns drawn because they had been directed to
consider the bank robbers "armed and dangerous" and because they
knew the bank robbery had involved a gun"]; US v.
Sanders (5C 1993) 994 F2 200, 205 ["the mere act of drawing
or pointing a weapon during an investigatory detention does not
cause it to exceed the permissible founds of a Terry stop
or to become a de facto arrest"]. ALSO SEE: US
v. Serna-Barreto (7C 1988) 842 F2 965, 968 ["we are
unwilling to hold that an investigative stop is never lawful when
it can be effectuated safely only in that manner. It is not nice
to have a gun pointed at you by a policeman but it is worse to
have a gun pointed at you by a criminal, so there is a complex
tradeoff involved"].

[44] OTHER: US v.
Ramos (1C 2010) 629 F3 60, 64 ["the nature of the intrusion
in opening the front passenger door was minimal"]; US
v. Newell (8C 2010) 596 F3 876, 880 [the officers
"could not see inside because of the heavily-tinted windows"];
US v. Meredith (5C 2007) 480 F3 366, 369-70.
ALSO SEE: US v. Stanfield (4C
1997) 109 F3 976, 981 ["whenever, during a lawful traffic stop,
officers are required to approach a vehicle with windows so
heavily tinted that they are unable to view the interior of the
stopped vehicle, they may, when it appears in their experienced
judgment prudent to do so, open at least one of the vehicle's
doors and, without crossing the plane of the vehicle, visually
inspect its interior in order to ascertain whether the driver is
armed, whether he has access to weapons, or whether there are
other occupants of the vehicle who might pose a danger to the
officers."].

[45] USSC: Texas v.
Brown (1983) 460 US 730, 740; US v.
Dunn (1987) 480 US 294, 305. CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Mata) (1970) 3 CA3 636, 639.

[46] CAL: P v.
McGaughran (1979) 25 C3 577, 584;
P v. Miranda (1993) 17 CA4 917, 927.

[47] USSC:
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 355 [duties typically
include "checking the driver's license"];
Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 US 648, 659 [licenses "are
subject to inspection"]; New York v. Class (1986) 475 US
106, 115 ["a demand to see license and registration papers is
within the scope of police authority pursuant to a traffic
violation stop"]; Hayes v. Florida (1985) 470
US 811 ["if there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that
person may be stopped in order to identify him"]. CAL:
P v. McKay (2002) 27 C4 601, 623 [driver had burden to
provide "satisfactory" ID"]; In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 C4
60, 78 ["When the officer prepared to cite Arturo for a Vehicle
Code violation, he had both a right and an obligation to ascertain
the driver's true identity"; reversed on other grounds in
P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353]; P v. Webster (1991) 54
C3 411, 430 ["The law [requires] the driver of a motor vehicle to
produce his or her license and registration for examination upon a
peace officer's demand."]; P v. Loudermilk (1987)
195 CA3 996, 1002 ["Without question, an officer conducting a
lawful [detention] must have the right to [ask the suspect to
identify himself], otherwise the officer's right to conduct an
investigative detention would be a mere fiction…. As part
of this inquiry, the police officer may require the suspect to
produce proof of identification, if he has it."]; P v.
Long (1987) 189 CA3 77, 87 ["To accept the contention that
the officer can stop the suspect and request identification, but
that the suspect can turn right around and refuse to provide it,
would reduce the authority of the officer ... to identify a person
lawfully stopped by him to a mere fiction. Unless the officer is
given some recourse in the event his request for identification is
refused, he will be forced to rely either upon the good will of
the person he suspects or upon his own ability to simply bluff
that person into thinking that he actually does have some
recourse."]; P v. Hart (1999) 74 CA4 479, 488 ["Once
detained, the defendant was obligated to identify herself."];
P v. Valencia (1993) 20 CA4 906, 919 [the officer
"was within his discretion in insisting on documentation of who
[the driver] was, rather than simply relying on the word of [his
passengers]."]. 9th CIR: US v. Christian (9C 2004)
356 F3 1103, 1107 ["Narrowly circumscribing an officer's ability
to persist [in determining the detainee's ID] until he obtains the
identification of a suspect might deprive him of the ability to
relocate the suspect in the future."]. OTHER:
US v. Martin (7C 2005) 422 F3 597, 602 ["failure to produce
a valid driver's license necessitated additional questioning"].

[48] QUOTE FROM:
Hiibel v. Nevada (2004) 542 US 177, 186.

[49] OTHER: US v. Clark (1C
2018) 879 F3 1, 4 [a brief request for ID is "one of these
negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission
safely"].

[50] 9th CIR: US v. Landeros (9C
2019) 913 F3 862; 868 ["A demand for a passenger's identification
is not part of the mission of a traffic stop."],

[51] CAL: P v. Miranda (1993) 17
CA4 917, 930 ["it was reasonable for [the officer] to speak with
the passengers to determine if they could assume responsibility
for driving Lucero's car"]; P v. Grant (1990) 217 CA3 1451,
1459 [OK to attempt "to secure proof of the driver's identity by
questioning [the passenger]"]; P v. Maxwell (1988) 206 CA3
1004, 1010 [OK to ask passenger to exit so that officers could
question him about driver's ID where the driver had no ID or
registration]; In re Gregory S. (1980) 112 CA3 764, 777
[officers "should be afforded reasonable latitude" in confirming
detainee's ID].

[52] CAL: P v.
McKay (2002) 27 C4 601, 620; P v.
Monroe (1993) 12 CA4 1174, 1186.

[53] CAL: P v.
McKay (2002) 27 C4 601, 620-22; P v.
Monroe (1993) 12 CA4 1174, 1187.

[54] CAL: P v.
McKay (2002) 27 C4 601, 622 [we do not intend to foreclose
the exercise of discretion by the officer in the field in deciding
whether to accept or reject other evidence—including oral
evidence—of identification"].

[55] USSC:
Hill v. California (1971) 401 US 797 803 ["But aliases and
false identifications are not uncommon."]. CAL:
P v. McKay (2002) 27 C4 601, 622 ["the driver is
expected to surrender the specified document to the peace officer
for examination, not merely to recite the information contained
therein"].

[56] CAL: P v.
Grant (1990) 217 CA3 1451, 1459; P v.
Spicer (1984) 157 CA3 213.

[57] CAL: P v.
Vibanco (2007) 151 CA4 1, 14 ["police do not need to have a
reasonable suspicion in order to ask questions or request
identification. We see no reason not to apply these rules to a
passenger who has been detained during a lawful car stop,"
edited]; P v. Grant (1990) 217 CA3 1451, 1461-62.
OTHER: US v. Rice (10C 2007) 483 F3
1079, 1084 ["because passengers present a risk to officer safety
equal to the risk presented by the driver, an officer may ask for
identification from passengers and run background checks on them
as well"]; US v. Chaney (1C 2009) 584 F3 20,
26 [officer's inquiries about a passenger's ID "did not measurably
extend the duration of the stop"]; US v. Roberts (8C 2012)
687 F3 1096, 1100 [detention of passenger did not become unlawful
because "the stop was extended due to the uncertainty that arose
regarding [the passenger's] warrant status"].

[58] OTHER: US v.
Rivera (8C 2009) 570 F3 1009, 1013 [license and
registration check "was a permissible incident of the traffic
stop, and did not unreasonably prolong it"]; US v.
Anderson (10C 1997) 114 F3 1059, 1064 ["An officer
conducting a routine traffic stop may perform a computer check on
the driver's license and the vehicle registration papers."];
US v. Shabazz (5C 1993) 993 F2 431, 437 ["the
law enforcement interest to be served by running a computer check
on the license of someone stopped for a traffic violation is
unquestioned"]; US v. Brigham (5C 2004) 382
F3 500, 507-8 ["Like other circuits, this court has found no
constitutional impediment to a law enforcement officer's request
to examine a driver's license and vehicle registration or rental
papers during a traffic stop and to run a computer check on both."
Citations omitted].

[59] CAL: P v.
Loudermilk (1987) 195 CA3 996, 1002-4; P v.
Rios (1983) 140 CA3 616, 621;
Ingle v. Superior Court (1982) 129 CA3 188;
P v. Faddler (1982) 132 CA3 607. NOTE: This rule may
have been called into question in P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5
353.

[60] USSC: Hiibel v.
Nevada (2004) 542 US 177, 186 ["Our decisions make
clear that questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine
and accepted part of many Terry stops."];
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 US 420, 439 [officers
"may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine
his identity"]. CAL: P v. Rios (1983) 140 CA3 616,
621 ["And where there is such a right to so detain, there is a
companion right to request, and obtain, the detainee's
identification."].

[61] CAL: Pen. Code§§ 853.5,
853.6(i)(5); Veh. Code§§ 40500(a), 40504(a).

[62] CAL: P v.
Grant (1990) 217 CA3 1451, 1459. OTHER:
US v. Clark (1C 2018) 879 F3 1, 4 ["Although the Supreme
Court has not explicitly held that an inquiry into a passenger's
identity is permissible, its precedent inevitably leads to that
conclusion," Citations omitted.].

[63] OTHER: US v.
Garcia (7C 2004) 376 F3 648, 651 ["Yet, increasing a
suspect's options cannot harm him; additional options provide
benefits, and as long as suspects are free to refuse they cannot
be made better off by a rule forbidding the offer [to drive the
suspect home to obtain his ID]."].

[64] USSC:
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 355 ["Typically such
inquiries involve checking the driver's license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of
insurance."]; Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440
US 648, 659 ["registration papers are subject to inspection"];
New York v. Class (1986) 475 US 106, 115
[demand to see registration papers "is within the scope of police
authority pursuant to a traffic violation stop"]. CAL: Veh.
Code§ 4462; P v. Lingo (1970) 3 CA3 661, 664
[officers may "continue that detention while they satisfied
themselves as to its registration"].

[65] CAL: In re
Arturo D. (2002) 27 C4 60, 86 ["Limited warrantless
searches for required registration and identification documents
are permissible when, following the failure of a traffic offender
to provide such documentation to the citing officer upon demand,
the officer conducts a search for those documents in an area where
such documents reasonably may be expected to be found."], reversed
on other grounds in P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353];
P v. Vermouth (1971) 20 CA3 746, 752 ["When the
driver was unable to produce the registration certificate and said
the car belonged to someone else, it was reasonable and proper for
the officers to look in the car for the certificate."].
NOTE: The California Supreme Court's decision in
P v. Lopez did not affect searches for registration.
P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 384-85, fn.2

[66] CAL: P v. Rios (1983) 140
CA3 616, 621 ["And where there is such a right to so detain, there
is a companion right to request, and obtain, the detainee's
identification."]. 9th CIR:
Vanegas v. City of Pasadena (9C 2022) 46 F4 1159, 1166
["Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has said that arresting
a person for failing to provide an identification violates the
Constitution. In fact, we have both said the opposite. [Citations
omitted]; US v. Christian (9C 2004) 356 F3 1103, 1106
["while officers cannot demand ID from people who have not been
lawfully detained or arrested, nothing in our case law prohibits
officers from asking for, or even demanding, a suspect's
identification. Instead, our cases, as well as those of the
Supreme Court, suggest that determining a detainee's identity is
an important aspect of police authority."]. OTHER:
US v. Wilson (11C 2020) 979 F3 889, 909 ["Because Wilson
repeatedly refused to produce his driver's license, [the officer]
had a reasonable belief that Wilson was committing the offense of
refusing to comply with a lawful order"]; US v. Jackson (7C
2004) 377 F3 715, 717 ["Once Jackson failed to produce a driver's
license, the police could not put him back in the car and watch
him motor off."].

[67] CAL: P v.
Christopher (2006) 137 CA4 418, 429 ["Christopher's
postarrest act of willfully obstructing the police by misleadingly
identifying himself with a false name was a criminal offense under
either statute," edited.].

[68] CAL: In re Ivan J.
(2001) 88 CA4 27.

[69] USSC: Hiibel v.
Nevada (2004) 542 US 177, 185 ["Asking questions is
an essential part of police investigations."]; Berkemer
v. McCarty (1984) 468 US 420, 439 ["the officer may
ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling
the officer's suspicions"]. CAL: P v.
Manis (1969) 268 CA2 653, 665 ["When circumstances demand
immediate investigation by the police, the most useful, most
available tool for such investigation is general on-the-scene
questioning"]; P v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 CA3 996, 1002
["Inquiries of the suspect's identity, address and his reason for
being in the area are usually the first questions to be asked"].

[70] 9th CIR: Ganwich v.
Knapp (9C 2003) 319 F3 1115, 1120 [unreasonable "to
condition the plaintiffs' release on their submission to
interrogation"].

[71] CAL: P v.
Bell (1996) 43 CA4 754, 768 [discussing such small talk,
the court said, "We are loath to hold such efforts
unconstitutional. We believe they are reasonably related to the
purposes of a traffic stop."]; P v. Brown (1998) 62
CA4 493, 499 ["One minute of generalized questioning during a
routine traffic stop is not unreasonable."].

[72] 9th CIR: US v.
Chavez-Valenzuela (9C 2001) 268 F3 719, 724, fn.4
["inquiries about Chavez-Valenzuela's starting point,
destination and general travel plans were probably justifiable"].
OTHER: US v. Yang (7C 2022) 39 F4 893, 903 [the
officer's first four questions—"What are you guys doing tonight?",
"What were you doing parked over on Kellogg and Ashland there?",
"Where were you at before then?", and "What's going on tonight? Is
there some occasion?"—all relate to where the truck's occupants
had driven from and where they were headed, which are permissible
travel-plan questions"]; US v. Campbell (11C 2022) 26 F4
860, 885] ["Generally speaking, questions about travel plans are
ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop."];
US v. Cortez (10C 2020) 965 F3 827, 839 ["Sergeant
Alvarez's questions regarding where Cortez and Reyes-Moreno were
coming from, where they were going, and how long they had stayed
in Douglas are permissible as they fit into the travel plans
rubric and relate to the mission of the stop."];
US v. Latorre (10C 2018) 893 F3 744, 751 ["we have
consistently held that implausible travel plans can contribute to
reasonable suspicion"]; US v. Suitt (8C 2009)
569 F3 867, 871-72 [OK to ask about travel plans while writing a
warning]; US v. Nassar (8C 2008) 546 F3 569,
570 ["The sergeant's questions about Nassar's destination and
vehicle were routine, within the scope of a valid traffic stop."];
US v. Hunnicutt (10C 1998) 135 F3 1345, 1349
[permissible to question suspects about inconsistent statements
about their destination]; US v. Peralez (8C
2008) 526 F3 1115, 1119 [permissible questions include "inquiring
about the occupants' destination, route, and purpose"]; US
v. Alcaraz-Arellano (10C 2006) 441 F3 1252, 1258
["It is reasonable for an officer to ask questions about the
motorist's travel plans and authority to operate the vehicle."];
US v. Holt (10C 2001) 264 F3 1215, 1221
["Travel plans typically are related to the purpose of a traffic
stop because the motorist is traveling at the time of the stop.
For example, a motorist's travel history and travel plans may help
explain, or put into context, why the motorist was weaving (if
tired) or speeding (if there was an urgency to the travel)."];
US v. Williams (10C 2001) 271 F3 1262, 1267
["we have repeatedly held (as have other circuits) that questions
relating to a driver's travel plans ordinarily fall within the
scope of a traffic stop"]; US v. Brigham (5C
2004) 382 F3 500, 508 ["An officer may also ask about the purpose
and itinerary of a driver's trip during the traffic stop."];
US v. Ellis (6C 2007) 497 F3 606, 613-14
["Trooper Topp was justified in asking the occupants general
questions of who, what, where, and why regarding their 3:23 a.m.
travel."].

[73] USSC:
Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 US 429, 434 ["even when
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual,
they may generally request consent to search his or her luggage,"
edited]; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218,
231-32 ["Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory
techniques of law enforcement agencies."];
Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 250-1 ["we have long
approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for
the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do
so"]; US v. Drayton (2002) 536 US 194, 207 ["In a society
based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given
a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full
accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent."].
CAL: P v. Gallardo (2005) 130 CA4 234, 239 [traffic
stop was not unduly prolonged when the request for consent was
made about two minutes after the stop]. 9th CIR:
US v. Turvin (9C 2008) 517 F3 1097.

[74] USSC: Indianapolis
v. Edmond (2000) 531 US 32, 40 ["The fact that
officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of
each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the
seizure into a search."]; Florida v.
Royer (1983) 460 US 491, 505-6 ["The courts are not
strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the presence of
controlled substances in luggage. If it had been used, Royer and
his luggage could have been momentarily detained while this
investigative procedure was carried out," edited]. CAL:
P v. Bell (1996) 43 CA4 754, 769 ["A 'sniff' by a
trained drug-sniffing dog in a public place is not a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."]; P v.
Daugherty (1996) 50 CA4 275, 281, fn.1. OTHER:
US v. Grant (8C 2012) 696 F3 780, 784 ["a law enforcement
officer need not obtain consent to conduct a dog sniff during an
otherwise lawful encounter"]; US v.
Claude X (8C 2011) 648 F3 599, 602 [K9 sniff occurred
before officers had completed their duties pertaining to the
arrest of an occupant of the vehicle]; US v.
Mohamed (8C 2010) 600 F3 1000, 1005 [traffic stop not
unlawful when it was extended for five minutes for canine sniff];
US v. Rivera (8C 2009) 570 F3 1009, 1014
["such a brief detention for a dog sniff at the end of a traffic
stop is de minimis"]. ALSO SEE:
Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 US 491, 505-6
["The courts are not strangers to the use of trained dogs to
detect the presence of controlled substances in luggage. If it had
been used, Royer and his luggage could have been momentarily
detained while this investigative procedure was carried out,"
edited.]. BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Place (1983) 462 US
696, 709 [90-minute delay for arrival of dog was unreasonable
under the circumstances];

[75] USSC:
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 349 ["Lacking the same
close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a
dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's
traffic mission."]. NOTES: A vehicle "search" does not
result merely because the dog put his paws on the vehicle.
P v. Stillwell (2011) 197 CA4 996, 1007. The Tenth Circuit
has ruled that the instinctive action of a dog jumping into an
open part of a car he is sniffing did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. US v. Stone (10C 1989) 866 F2 359, 364.

[76] CAL: P v.
Harness (1983) 139 CA3 226, 233 ["Field identification
cards perform a legitimate police function. If done expeditiously
and in an appropriate manner after a lawful stop and in response
to circumstances which indicate that a crime has taken place and
there is cause to believe that the person detained is involved in
same, the procedure is not constitutionally inform."].

[77] USSC: Hayes v.
Florida (1985) 470 US 811, 817 ["the Fourth Amendment would
permit seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is
reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal
act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that
fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection
with that crime, and if the procedure is carried out with
dispatch"]; Davis v. Mississippi (1969) 394
US 721, 727-28.

[78] USSC: Hayes v.
Florida (1985) 470 US 811, 817 [under circumscribed
procedures, the Fourth Amendment might permit the judiciary to
authorize the seizure of a person on less than probable cause and
his removal to the police station for the purpose of
fingerprinting."]. CAL: Virgle v.
Superior Court (2002) 100 CA4 572, 574.

[79] CAL: P v.
Marquez (1992) 1 C4 553, 578 [there was "no impropriety in
asking defendant for his permission to be photographed, edited"].

[80] USSC: Hayes v.
Florida (1985) 470 US 811, 816-17. CAL: P v.
Rodriguez (1993) 21 CA4 232 [photo taken during illegal
detention]. ALSO SEE: P v. Thierry (1998) 64
CA4 176, 184 [court notes that the officers "merely used the
occasion of appellant's arrest for that crime to take a photograph
they would have been entitled to take on the street or elsewhere
without an arrest"].

[81] USSC: Michigan v.
Summers (1981) 452 US 692, 700, fn.12.

[82] USSC: Michigan v.
Summers (1981) 452 US 692, 700, fn.12. OTHER:
US v. Watts (8C 1993) 7 F3 122.

[83] USSC: New York v.
Class (1986) 475 US 106, 115 ["a demand to inspect the VIN,
like a demand to see license and registration papers, is within
the scope of police authority pursuant to a traffic violation
stop"]. ALSO SEE: P v. Davitt (1976)
56 CA3 845 [in older cars in which the VIN is on the door jamb,
officers may open the door for the limited purpose of inspecting
the VIN]. NOTE: What is a VIN number? "The VIN consists of
more than a dozen digits, unique to each vehicle and required on
all cars and trucks. The VIN is roughly analogous to a serial
number, but it can be deciphered to reveal not only the place of
the automobile in the manufacturer's production, run, but the
make, model, engine type, and place of manufacture of the
vehicle." New York v. Class (1986) 475
US 106, 111.

[84] USSC: Kaupp v.
Texas (2003) 538 US 626, 629 ["we have never sustained
against Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary removal of a
suspect from his home to a police station and his detention there
for investigative purposes absent probable cause or judicial
authorization"]; Hayes v. Florida (1985) 470
US 811, 816 ["Such involuntary transport to a police station for
questioning is sufficiently like arrest"]; Dunaway
v. New York (1979) 442 US 200, 212 [de facto arrest
occurred when the suspect "was taken from a neighbor's home to a
police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an
interrogation room"]. CAL: P v. Boyer (1989)
48 C3 247, 268 ["The manner in which officers arrived at
defendant's house, accosted him, and secured his 'consent' to
accompany them [to the police station for questioning] suggested
they did not intend to take 'no' for an answer."]. OTHER:
US v. Wrensford (3C 2017) 866 F3 76, 87 ["There is no doubt
that Wrensford was subjected to a de facto arrest when the police
transported him from the place he was stopped to the police
station and placed him in a cell."].

[85] USSC:
US v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 US 544, 557-58 ["respondent was
not told that she had to go to the office, but was simply asked if
she would accompany the officers"]. CAL:
In re Gilbert R. (1994) 25 CA4 1121, 1125 ["In a thoroughly
motley array of circumstances, appellate courts have held that
when a person agrees to accompany the police to a station for
interrogation or some other purpose, the Fourth Amendment is not
violated."]; P v. Singer (1990) 226 CA3 23, 48 [the
officers "seemed to act cordially, used no force or threats, and
[the suspect], in addition to consenting to go [to the station]
said he welcomes the partial ride home."];
Ford v. Superior Court (2001) 91 CA4 112, 125 ["The Fourth
Amendment does not prevent a person from agreeing to accompany
officers to the police station and remain there for
interrogation."].

[86] USSC: Florida v.
Royer (1983) 460 US 491, 504 ["there are undoubtedly
reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect
from one location to another during an investigatory detention"].
CAL: P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499, 1519-20
["A three-block transportation to an essentially neutral site for
these rational purposes did not operate to elevate [the suspects']
custodial status from detention to arrest."]; P v.
Harris (1975) 15 C3 384, 391 ["If, for example, the victim
of an assault or other serious offense was injured or otherwise
physically unable to be taken to promptly view the suspect, or a
witness was similarly incapacitated, and the circumstances
warranted a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was indeed the
offender, a 'transport' detention might well be upheld."];
In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 CA3 372, 382 [permissible
to transport a rape suspect to a hospital for a showup because the
victim was undergoing a "rape-victim examination" which officers
believed would take about two hours]; Ford v.
Superior Court (2001) 91 CA4 112, 125 ["The Fourth
Amendment does not prevent a person from agreeing to accompany
officers to the police station and remain there for
interrogation."]; In re Gilbert R. (1994) 25 CA4 1121, 1225
["when a person agrees to accompany the police to a station for
interrogation or some other purpose, the Fourth Amendment is not
violated"]; In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 CA3 1087, 1094
[transport a half block away OK when "the victim is injured and
physically unable to be taken promptly to view the suspects"];
P v. Courtney (1970) 11 CA3 1185, 1192
["Certainly there was no Fourth Amendment compulsion on the police
to choose between an on-the-spot continuation of their
investigation at the probable cost of their own safety, or
abandoning the investigation"]; P v. Gatch (1976) 56
CA3 505, 510 ["this case is one in which it was less of an
intrusion to convey the defendant speedily a short distance to the
crime scene" for a showup]. 9th CIR: US v.
Charley (9C 2005) 396 F3 1074, 1080 ["the police may move a
suspect without exceeding the bounds of an investigative detention
when it is a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate goals of
the detentions given the specific circumstances of the case"].
OTHER: US v. Foster (3C 2018) 891 F3 93, 107 [OK to
transport suspect a short distance for showup because it was the
"most likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly"];
US v. Bullock (7C 2011) 632 F3 1004, 1015-16
[transporting a detainee a short distance to a house to be
searched pursuant to warrant was justified because grounds to
arrest the detainee would exist if evidence had been found];
US v. Meadows (1C 2009) 571 F3 131, 143
[person detained inside his house could be transported outside
because of "the threat of enclosed spaces and secret compartments
to officers who are legitimately in a home and are effecting a
[detention]"]; US v. Garcia (7C 2004) 376 F3
648 [cited driver consented to be driven home to look for ID].
COMPARE: In re Dung T. (1984) 160 CA3 697, 714 ["the
police simply 'loaded up the occupants, put them in police cars,
transported them to the police facility"]; US v. Shaw (6C
2006) 464 F3 615, 622 ["Although he did not express any resistance
to going with SA Ford, neither was he given the option of choosing
not to go."].

[87] CAL: P v.
Harris (1975) 15 C3 384, 391 ["the surrounding
circumstances may reasonably indicate that it would be less of an
intrusion upon the suspect's rights to convey him speedily a few
blocks to the crime scene, permitting the suspect's early release
rather than prolonging unduly the field detention"]; P
v. Daugherty (1996) 50 CA4 275, 287 [detention at
airport, OK to walk the detainee 60 yards to the police office for
canine sniff of luggage]. 9th CIR: US v.
Holzman (9C 1989) 871 F2 1496, 1502 ["the movement of
Holzman from the open floor to the more private counter area" is
"not the sort of transporting that has been found overly
intrusive"]; US v. Bravo (9C 2002) 295 F3
1002, 1011 [30-40 yard walk to border patrol security office];
US v. $109,179 (9C 2000) 228 F3 1080, 1085
["only a short distance down the hall"]. OTHER:
Pliska v. City of Stevens Point (7C 1987) 823
F2 1168, 1176 ["The mere fact that [the officer] drove the squad
car a short distance does not necessarily convert the stop into an
arrest."].

[88] USSC: US v. Sharpe (1985)
470 US 675, 686 ["In assessing whether a detention is too long in
duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it
appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly."]. CAL: In re Carlos M. (1990)
220 CA3 372, 382, fn.4 ["nothing suggests [the officer] dallied"];
Ingle v. Superior Court (1982) 129 CA3 188, 196 [the
officers had acted diligently because "each step in the
[detention] proceeded logically and immediately from the previous
one"]. US v. Santillan (2C 2018) 902 F3 49, 62 ["At all
times, [the officers] were engaged in steps to dispel or confirm
their reasonable suspicions. Although those steps prolonged the
stop, they did not do so unreasonably."]. OTHER:
US v. Goebel (10C 2020) 959 F3 1259, 1268 [officer
"accomplished a great deal in a relatively short time"].

[89] USSC:
Hayes v. Florida (1985) 470 US 811, 815-16 ["at some point
in the investigative process, police procedures can qualitatively
and quantitatively become intrusive with respect to a suspect's
freedom of movement and privacy interests as to [require probable
cause]"]. CAL: P v. Ayon (2022) 80 CA5 926, 936-37
[example of unrestrained pretext traffic stop]. OTHER:
US v. Reedy (7C 2021) 989 F3 548, 553] ["Three things must
happen during a [detention]: (1) the police gather enough
information to develop probable cause and allow for continued
detention: (2) the suspicions of the police are dispelled and they
release the suspect; or (3) the suspicions of the police are
not dispelled, yet the officers have not developed probable
cause but must release the suspect because the length the length
of the stop is about to become unreasonable."].

[90] USSC:
US v. De Hernandez (1985) 473 US 531, 543 ["common sense
and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid [time]
criteria"]. CAL: P v. Gorak (1987) 196 CA3
1032, 1037 ["The US Supreme Court has refused to adopt any outside
time limitation on a lawful detention."];
P v. Dasilva (1989) 207 CA3 43, 50 ["no rigid time
limitation"]; P v. Gallardo (2005) 130 CA4 234, 238
["There is no hard and fast limit as to the amount of time that is
reasonable"]. 9th CIR:
Haynie v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2003) 339 F3 1071, 1076
["An investigative stop is not subject to strict time limitations
as long as the officer is pursuing the investigation in a diligent
and reasonable manner."].

[91] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Hernandez (11C 2005) 418 F3 1206, 1212, fn.7. OTHER:
US v. Cortez (10C 2020) 965 F3 827, 837 ["Although it is
appropriate to consider police diligence, the mere fact that an
officer could, conceivably, have performed a task more quickly
than he did fails, on its own, to generate a Fourth Amendment
violation."]; US v. Harrison (2C 2010) 606 F3
42, 45 [no requirement to terminate "at the earliest possible
moment"].

[92] USSC: City of Ontario
v. Quon (2010) 560 US 746, 763 ["This Court has
repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive'
search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."]; Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 US 318, 350 [the
"least-restrictive-alternative limitation" is "generally thought
inappropriate in working out Fourth Amendment protection"];
US v. Sokolow (1989) 490 US 1, 11 ["The
reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect does
not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory
techniques."]; US v. Sharpe (1985) 470 US
675, 694-95 9 [conc. opn. of Marshall, J.] ["defining what means
are 'least intrusive' is a virtually unmanageable and unbounded
task"]. CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 374 ["The
Fourth Amendment does not, of course, require law enforcement to
employ the least intrusive means of achieving its objectives."];
P v. Williams (2006) 145 CA4 756, 761 ["a police officer is
not required to adopt the least intrusive course of action in
deciding whether to impound and search a car"]; P v.
Bell (1996) 43 CA4 754, 761, fn.1 ["The question is not
simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether
the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or pursue
it."]. 9th CIR: Gallegos v.
City of Los Angeles (9C 2002) 308 F3 987, 992 ["The Fourth
Amendment does not mandate one and only one way for police to
confirm the identity of a suspect. It requires that the government
and its agents act reasonably."].

[93] USSC: US v.
Sharpe (1985) 470 US 675, 686 ["the question is not simply
whether some other alternative was available, but whether the
police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue
it"].

[94] 9th CIR:
US v. Torres-Sanchez (9C 1996) 83 F3 1123, 1129 ["'Brevity'
can only be defined in the context of each particular case."];
Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9C 2002) 308
F3 987, 991 ["We look at the situation as a whole; we do not
isolate each fact in a vacuum."]; US v.
Charley (9C 2005) 396 F3 1074, 1080 ["we examine the
totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an investigative
detention has ripened into an arrest"].

[95] USSC:
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 354 ["a traffic stop can
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete the mission" of issuing a warning ticket"];
Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 US 323, 333
["Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to
control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are
free to leave."]. CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 C3 186, 199 [traffic
violator must be released "forthwith" when he gives "his written
promise that he will appear"]; P v. Grace (1973) 32
CA3 447, 451 ["the officer's] right to detain the driver ceased as
soon as he discovered the brakelight was operative"]; Veh.
Code§ 40504. 9th CIR: US v.
Washington (9C 2004) 387 F3 1060, 1070 [after completing
their duties, officers persisted in obtaining the suspect's
consent to search his room]. OTHER: US v. Lopez (7C
2018) 907 F3 472, 478 ["When the reasonable suspicion justifying
the stop evaporates, the stop must end."]; US v.
Watts (8C 1993) 7 F3 122, 126 ["an investigative stop must
cease once reasonable suspicion or probable cause dissipates"];
US v. Pena-Montes (10C 2009) 589 F3 1048,
1055 [the "investigation was complete when [the officer] saw that
the vehicle actually had a plate"]; US v.
Blair (6C 2008) 524 F3 740, 752 ["Once the purpose of a
traffic stop is completed, a police officer may not further detain
the vehicle or its occupants"]; US v.
Sullivan (4C 1998) 138 F3 126, 131 ["when the
purpose justifying the stop is exceeded, the detention becomes
illegal unless a reasonable suspicion of some other crime
exists"]; US v. Childs (7C 2002) 277 F3 947,
952 ["A person stopped on reasonable suspicion must be released as
soon as the officers have assured themselves that no skullduggery
is afoot."]; US v. Winters (6C 2015) 782 F3 289, 297 ["Once
the original purpose of the traffic stop—here, investigating a
speeding violation—has been completed, the occupants cannot be
further detained unless something that occurred during the stop
caused the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that criminal activity was afoot."].

[96] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Sharpe (1985) 470 US 675, 686-67. CAL: In re
Joseph F. (2000) 85 CA4 975, 989 ["The reasonableness of a
particular use of force is judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, not by the 20/20 vision of
hindsight."]. OTHER: US v. Winters (6C 2015) 782 F3
289, 302 ["it is not the role of this court to dictate the precise
methods of investigation to be pursued by police officers"];
US v. Childs (7C 2002) 277 F3 947, 953
["reasonableness depends on what the police do, not on what
they might have done," edited]; US v.
Ruidiaz (1C 2008) 529 F3 25, 29 ["the requisite objective
analysis must be performed in real-world terms…
reasonableness requires a practical, commonsense determination"].

[97] USSC:
US v. Montoya De Hernandez (1985) 473 US 531, 543 ["Our
prior cases have refused to charge police with delays in
investigatory detention attributable to the suspect's evasive
actions."]. CAL: P v. Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96, 102
["Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide
reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention."];
P v. Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 13 ["Levels of force and
intrusion in an investigatory stop may be legitimately escalated
to meet supervening events"]; P v. Huerta (1990) 218 CA3
744, 751 ["We had a lot of things going on."]. 9th CIR:
Haynie v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2003) 339 F3 1071, 1076
["An investigative stop is not subject to strict time limitations
as long as the officer is pursuing the investigation in a diligent
and reasonable manner."]; Gallegos v. Los Angeles (9C 2002)
308 F3 987, 992 ["While the length of Gallegos's detention [45
minutes] remains relevant, more important is that [the officers']
actions did not involve any delay unnecessary to their legitimate
investigation."]. OTHER: US v. Orth (1C 2017) 873 F3
349, 354 ["the circumstances and unfolding events during a traffic
stop allow for an officer to shift his focus and increase the
scope of his investigation by degrees with the accumulation of
information"]; US v. Dion (1C 2017) 859 F3 114, 125 ["as an
investigation unfolds, an officer's focus can shift, and he can
increase the scope of his investigation by degrees when his
suspicions grow during the stop]; US v. Stepp (6C 2012) 680
F3 651, 661 ["the police may extend a stop beyond the scope of
what was originally permissible if something happened during the
stop to cause the officer to have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot"];
US v. Ruidiaz (1C 2008) 529 F3 25, 29 ["A Terry stop
is not necessarily a snapshot of events frozen in time and place.
Often, such a stop can entail an ongoing process. [Thus, the
officer's] ensuing actions must be fairly responsive to the
emerging tableau."]; US v. Stepp (6C 2012) 680 F3 651, 661
["the police may extend a stop beyond the scope of what was
originally permissible if something happened during the stop to
cause the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot"]; US v. Shareef (10C 1996)
100 F3 1491, 1501 ["When a defendant's own conduct contributes to
a delay, he or she may not complain that the resulting delay is
unreasonable."]. NOTE: The Tenth Circuit noted that was
unable to find a case upholding a detention that lasted over 90
minutes. Manzanares v. Higdon (10C 2009) 575 F3 1135, 1148.

[98] USSC:
Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 US 1032 [officer saw a knife in
the car]; Muehler v. Mena (2005) 544 US 93, 100 ["this case
involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a
search of a gang house for dangerous weapons"];
P v. Castellon (1999) 76 CA4 1369, 1374 ["At the point
where Castellon failed to follow [the officer's] order to remain
in the car [the] focus shifted from a routine investigation of a
Vehicle Code violation to officer safety."].

[99] CAL: P v. Grant (1990) 217
CA3 1451, 1459 ["the officer needed to exhaust all avenues to
reliably identify the driver"]; P v. Valencia (1993) 20 CA4
906, 918 [no driver's license or "satisfactory" ID];
P v. Huerta (1990) 218 CA3 744, 750 ["Once defendant had
provided false information which needed to be checked further, the
officers had reason to extend the detention"]. OTHER:
US v. Callison (8C 2021) 2 F4 1128, 1131 ["But it is clear
from the facts that [the driver] was still searching for proof of
his insurance at that point."]; US v. Navarette (8C 2021)
996 F3 870, 874 ["While it may not always take and officer 21
minutes to address a traffic violation, the detention here was
justified by Navarette's inability to produce the basic
identifying information"]; US v. Ellis (6C 2007) 497 F3
606, 614 ["Defendant Ellis gave Trooper Topp a false alias that
Top was unable to confirm"]; US v. Brigham (5C 2004) 382 F3
500, 508 [OK to "verify the information provided by the driver"];
US v. Long (7C 2005) 422 F3 597, 602 ["failure to produce a
valid driver's license necessitated additional questioning"];
US v. Clark (1C 2018) 879 F3 1 [prolonging a traffic stop
was permitted because a passenger provided inconsistent
birthdates]; COMPARE: US v. Clark (3C 2018) 902 F3
404, 411 [insufficient reason to question vehicle passenger [i.e.,
to test "his candor"] to confirm the vehicle belonged to driver's
mother].

[100] CAL: P v. James (1969) 1
CA3 645, 648-49 [driver said his cousin owned the car but he did
not know her name]; P v. Webster (1991) 54 C3 411, 430-1
["Defendant had disclaimed ownership of the car, stating that it
belonged to a passenger, but also said the passengers were
hitchhikers"]; P v. Huerta (1990) 218 CA3 744, 751.
OTHER: US v. Callison (8C 2021) 2 F4 1128, 1132
["the driver said they were dropping off a friend, but the two
passengers gave different names for that friend"];
US v. Mouscardy (1C 2013) 722 F3 68, 74-75 ["Mouscardy's
unresponsiveness to Officer Selfridge's reasonable inquiries
prevented the officers from completing their investigation more
quickly. Mouscardy cannot profit from the delay he himself
caused."]; US v. Sullivan (4C 1998) 138 F3 126, 132-33;
US v. Suitt (8C 2009) 569 F3 867, 872 ["Suitt repeatedly
gave hesitant, evasive, and incomplete answers"].

[101] USSC: US v. Sharpe (1985)
470 US 675, 688, fn.5 [officers could not utilize the usual
procedure in stopping two cars because the drivers stopped at
different locations]. CAL: P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4
1499 [six detainees]. 9th CIR: US v. Holzman (9C
1989) 871 F2 1496, 1501 [delay of 5-7 minutes was reasonable
because officer was busy with defendant's accomplice].
OTHER: US v. Reedy (7C 2021) 989 F3 548, 554
[90-minute detention lawful because officers searched for
suspected accomplice]; Courson v. McMillian (11C 1991) 939
F2 1479, 1493 [single officer detained three suspects, one of whom
was unruly]; US v. Shareef (10C 1996) 100 F3 1491, 1506
[six detainees].

[102] CAL: P v. Avalos (1996)
47 CA4 1569, 1577 [delay of 15-20 minutes was necessary to await a
Spanish-speaking officer]; P v. Garcia (2007) 145 CA4 782,
788 [the officer "should have called for assistance from a Spanish
speaking officer"]. OTHER: US v. Rivera (8C 2009)
570 F3 1009, 1013 ["the extra time can largely be attributed to
Rivera's confused answers and language difficulties"]; US v. Mendoza
(8C 2012) 677 F3 822, 828 [delay of 20-25 minutes for interpreter
OK].

[103] USSC: US v. Sharpe (1985)
470 US 675, 687-88 ["The delay in this case was attributable
almost entirely to the evasive actions of [a second suspect], who
sought to elude the police"]. CAL: P v. Allen (1980)
109 CA3 981, 987 ["The actions of appellant (running and hiding)
caused a delay"].

[104] CAL:
Carpio v. Superior Court (1971) 19 CA3 790, 792 [40-minute
delay not unreasonable because detainee had told the officer that
he had an "unpaid traffic ticket"]. OTHER:
US v. Rutherford (10C 1987) 824 F2 831, 834 ["the computer
problem causing a delay of 25 minutes does not transform this
admittedly legal initial detention into an unlawful de facto
arrest"].

[105] USSC: US v. Sharpe (1985)
470 US 675, 687, fn.5 ["as a highway patrolman, he lacked Cooke's
training and experience in dealing with narcotics
investigations"]. CAL: P v. Gorak (1987) 196 CA3
1032, 1038 [inexperienced officer awaited arrival of officer with
experience in DUI-drugs].

[106] OTHER: US v. Salkil (8C
2021) 10 F4 897; US v. Cash (10C 2013) 733 F3 1264, 1276
[delay for arrival of suspect's probation officer who, because he
was the only person in the office at the time, had to shut down
the computers, set the alarm, and lock up "which took 10 to 15
minutes."].

[107] USSC: US v. Riley (8C
2012) 684 F3 758, 766 [officer "had to call an off-duty drug dog
to come to the scene"]. OTHER: US v. Bloomfield (8C
1994) 40 F3 910, 917 [the officer "radioed for the drug dog only
about six minutes after stopping Bloomfield, and specifically
requested that a dog be sent as soon as possible from the closest
possible location"].

[108] CAL: P v. Bowen (1987)
195 CA3 269, 273-74.

[109] OTHER: US v. Soderman (8C
2020) 983 F3 369, 374 [the "discovery that Soderman's driver's
license had been suspended justifiably expended the lawful scope
of the traffic stop"].

[110] CAL: P v. Russell (2000)
81 CA4 96, 102 ["Circumstances which develop during a detention
may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention."].
9th CIR: US v. Mayo (9C 2005) 394 F3 1271, 1276
["The period of detention was permissibly extended because new
grounds for suspicion of criminal activity continued to unfold."];
US v. Torres-Sanchez (9C 1996) 83 F3 1123, 1129 ["numerous
suspicious factors" that required [the officer] to further
investigate whether the occupants were participating in criminal
activity"]. OTHER: US v. Pacheco (8C 2021) 996 F3
508, 512 [nervousness, "odd answers" about travel plans plus
"incongruity between [suspect's] short [vehicle] rental period and
his described travel plans, among other things];
US v. Jordan (4C 2020) 952 F3 160, 167 [officers had
reasonable suspicion that the violator was a drug trafficker];
US v. Vazquez (10C 2009) 555 F3 923, 929 ["But the officer
may delay the driver for further investigation if the officer has
an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of some illegal
activity beyond the traffic violation."]; US v. Sowers (1C
1998) 136 F3 24, 27 ["Based on unfolding events, the trooper's
attention shifted away from the equipment violations that prompted
the initial stop toward a belief that the detainees were engaged
in more serious skullduggery. Such a shift in focus is neither
unusual not impermissible."].

[111] NOTE: In March 2021, the Seventh
Circuit filed a published opinion in which it did not mention the
Supreme Court's three nonsensical "tests" (discussed below) which
the Court announced in Arizona v. Johnson,
Rodriguez v. U.S, and Illinois v. Caballes (cited
elsewhere herein). The case was US v. Reedy (7C 2021) 989
F3 548. We suspect that the Seventh Circuit, which may be the most
respected of the circuit courts, realized that there is no way to
reconcile these three tests and, therefore, it ignored them. This
takes guts. Kudos. ALSO NOTE: In US v. Green (3C
2018) 897 F3 173 the Third Circuit took a critical look at these
rulings and provided a penetrating example of how the Supreme
Court has utterly failed to adequately address this issue, even
though it has had several opportunities to do so. Specifically, it
pointed out the blatant ambiguity of the following adjoining
sentences in Rodriguez v. US: "An officer may conduct
certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.
But he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop." "Left
unexplained," said the court in Green, is how a police
officer could possibly perform multiple tasks simultaneously
without adding any time to a stop." Kudos to the Third Circuit.
NOTE: In US v. Harry (8C 2019) 930 F3 1000, 1005 the
Eighth Circuit cited Rodriguez as authority for applying
the "reasonably required" test; i.e., the court did not even
mention the reference in Rodriguez to an "adds time" test.
We believe that the Eighth Circuit realized that the Supreme Court
had issued inconsistent tests on duration of detentions and,
rather than trying to resolve them (which would have been
impossible), it applied the test that made the most sense:
"reasonably required."

[112] USSC:
Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333. Edited.
Emphasis added. ALSO SEE: US v. Goodwill (7C 2022)
24 F4 612, 616 ["Officers may investigate unrelated matters that
do not prolong the stop beyond the time reasonably required to
complete the mission."]; US v. Magallon (DCC 2021) 984 F3
1263, 1278 [court applies the "reasonably required" test].
NOTE: In Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 355 the
Court said "the seizure remains lawful only so long as unrelated
inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop."
Thus, it would be error to interpret Rodriguez as
undermining or overruling Johnson.

[113] CAL: P v. Vera (2018) 28
CA5 1081 [concurrent actions]; P v. Espino (2016) 247 CA4
746, 762 [delay of 2-3 minutes in releasing a handcuffed detainee
rendered the detention illegal because officers knew they lacked
probable cause to arrest him, that he did not pose a threat to
them, and that there was no need to continue a traffic stop
because he had already signed the ticket]. 9th CIR:
US v. Landeros (9C 2019) 913 F3 862, 867 [court notes that
asking questions that were unrelated to the stop is permissible if
it merely prolonged the detention "slightly"]. OTHER:
US v. Peralez (8C 2008) 526 F3 1115, 1121 ["The off-topic
questions more than doubled the time Peralez was detained."].
COMPARE: US v. Clark (1C 2018) 879 F3 1, 5 ["Asking
a passenger, for one minute, to confirm identifying information is
one of these negligibly burdensome precautions justified by the
unique safety threat posed by traffic stops," edited.].

[114] OTHER: US v. Childs (7C
2002) 277 F3 947, 954. Edited. ALSO SEE:
US v. Clark (1C 2018) 879 F3 1, 5 ["Asking a passenger, for
one minute, to confirm identifying information ... is one of these
negligibly burdensome precautions justified by the unique safety
threat posed by traffic stops."]. COMPARE:
US v. Peralez (8C 2008) 526 F3 1115, 1121 ["The off-topic
questions more than doubled the time Peralez was detained."].

[115] QUOTE FROM:
Illinois v. Caballes (2005) 543 US 405, 407.
NOTE: The "reasonably necessary" test had been applied by
California Courts prior to Caballes. See
P v. Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96, 101 [detention is unlawful
"when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances that made its initiation permissible"];
P v. Harris (1975) 15 C3 384, 390 ["A detention of an
individual which is reasonable at its inception may exceed
constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances."]; P v. Gomez (2004) 117
CA4 531, 537 ["a detention will be deemed unconstitutional when
extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances that made its initiation permissible"].

[116] USSC:
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 354.

[117] NOTE: The test is unworkable for
three reasons. First, there is no way—other than to guess—for the
courts to determine the amount of time that was "reasonably
necessary" to respond to the various and changing circumstances
that occurred in the course of every detention. Second, it
requires that judges engage in judicial second-guessing which is
something they are not supposed to do. As the Supreme Court has
observed, a "creative" judge "can almost always imagine some
alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have
been accomplished." US v. Sharpe (1985) 470 US 675, 686-67.
Third, the "reasonably required" test the result would often
depend on the efficiency and experience of the officer who
happened to detain the suspect. This is because experienced
officers can usually carry out their duties faster than rookies.
As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Rodriguez, "If a driver is stopped by a particularly
efficient officer, then he will be entitled to be released from
the traffic stop after a shorter period of time than a driver
stopped by a less efficient officer…. I cannot accept that
the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are so
variable and can be made to turn upon such trivialities."
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 361 (dis. opn. of
Thomas, J.).

[118] QUOTE FROM:
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 357. OTHER:
US v. Gomez (2C 2017) 877 F3 76, 90 ["unrelated inquiries
that prolong or add time to a traffic stop violate the Fourth
Amendment absent reasonable suspicion of a separate crime"].

[119] OTHER:
US v. Campbell (11C 2020) 970 F3 1342, 1353 [the "adds
time" test "seems counterintuitive: how could an officer conduct
unrelated inquiries without adding at least some time to the
stop?"].

[120] OTHER: US v. Hayes (10C
2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 2542654] ["Regardless of how long the
delay is that purportedly renders a traffic stop unconstitutional,
the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the seizure.

[121] OTHER: US v.
Anderson (10C 1997) 114 F3 1059, 1064 ["if the encounter
between the officer and the driver ceases to be a detention, but
becomes consensual, and the driver voluntarily consents to
additional questioning, no further Fourth Amendment seizure or
detention occurs"].

[122] USSC: Florida v.
Royer (1983) 460 US 491 504 ["by returning his ticket and
driver's license, and informing him that he was free to go if he
so desired, the officers might have obviated any claim that the
encounter was anything but a consensual matter"]. OTHER:
US v. Mercado-Gracia (10C 2021) 989 F3 829, 837 [the
officer "returned his driver's license, the vehicle's registration
and proof of insurance, and told [defendant], 'OK. You're free to
go"]; US v. Clariot (6C 2011) 655 F3 550, 554
["any seizure became consensual once they returned the
identifications and commenced a conversation that had no
threatening or incriminating overtones to it"];
US v. Farrior (4C 2008) 535 F3 210, 219 ["The fact that
Officer Morris had returned Farrior's license and registration
also strongly indicates that the encounter was consensual and that
no seizure occurred."]; US v. Alcaraz-Arellano (10C 2006)
441 F3 1252, 1259 [after returning the driver's license, the
officer asked if he would be willing to answer some questions];
US v. Sullivan (4C 1998) 138 F3 126, 133 ["[The officer]
did not question Sullivan until after he had returned Sullivan's
license and registration, thus ending the traffic stop and
affording Sullivan the right to depart."]; US v. White (8C
1996) 81 F3 775, 779 ["White was no longer seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment after [the officer] returned
White's identification and issued a warning ticket."];
US v. Werking (10C 1990) 915 F2 1404, 1409 [Before [the
officer] asked Werking any further questions, he returned
Werking's driver's license and registration papers"];
US v. Holt (10C 2000) 229 F3 931, 936, fn.5 ["This circuit
has consistently applied at least one bright-line rule in
determining whether an officer and driver are engaged in a
consensual encounter: an officer must return a driver's
documentation before the detention can end."]. COMPARE:
US v. Lopez (7C 2018) 907 F3 472, 487 ["while one officer
was assuring Lopez that he was free to go, the other officers
still had Lopez's keys, van, and cellphone."];
US v. Latorre (10C 2018) 893 F3 744, 751 [encounter became
a detention "once [the officer] kept Latorre's pilot's license and
registration"]; US v. Walker (10C 1991) 933
F2 812, 817 [traffic stop not converted into a contact because the
officer "retained defendant's driver's license and registration
during the entire time he questioned the defendant."]; US
v. Sandoval (10C 1994) 29 F3 537, 540 ["no
reasonable person would feel free to leave without such
documentation"]; US v. Elliott (10C 1997) 107
F3 819, 814 ["we have consistently concluded that an officer must
return a driver's documentation before a detention can end"].
BUT ALSO SEE: P v. Terrell (1999) 69 CA4
1246, 1254 [no seizure even though officer did not return ID where
the suspect spontaneously handed it over and did not ask to have
it back, the encounter was otherwise plainly a contact, and the
encounter was brief].

[123] USSC: Ohio v.
Robinette (1996) 519 US 33, 39-40 [it "would it be
unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees
that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed
voluntary"]; US v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 US
544, 555. CAL: P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3
849, 877. OTHER: US v. Anderson (10C
1997) 114 F3 1059, 1064 ["While [the officer] did not specifically
tell [the suspect] that he was free to leave, that is not required
for an encounter to be consensual."]; US v.
Sullivan (4C 1998) 138 F3 126, 132 ["The mere fact
that [the officer] did not affirmatively advise Sullivan that he
could refuse to answer [the officer's] questions or that he was
free to go did not transform the encounter into a custodial
interrogation."].

[124] USSC: Berkemer v.
McCarty (1984) 468 US 420, 436 ["Certainly few motorists
would feel free [to] leave the scene of a traffic stop without
being told they might do so."]. CAL: P v.
Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849, 877 ["delivery of such a warning
weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent"];
P v. Daugherty (1996) 50 CA4 275, 280 [officer
"advised Daugherty she was not under arrest, she was free to go at
any time, and she did not have to speak with him"].
9th CIR: Morgan v. Woessner (9C 1993)
997 F2 1244, 1254 ["Although an officer's failure to advise a
citizen of his freedom to walk away is not dispositive of the
question of whether the citizen knew he was free to go, it is
another significant indicator of what the citizen reasonably
believed."]. OTHER: US v. Farrior (4C
2008) 535 F3 210, 218 ["the traffic stop ended once Officer Morris
returned his license and registration, orally warned him to fix
his tag light, and told him that he was free to go"]; US
v. Ledesma (10C 2006) 447 F3 1307, 1315 ["Although
[the officer] did not explicitly inform [the driver] and her
passenger that they were free to leave, [the officer's] words of
farewell suggested that any subsequent discussion was
consensual."]; US v. Beck (8C 1998) 140 F3 1129,
1134 ["After running his background checks, [the officer] promptly
returned Beck's license and rental agreement, and informed Beck
that he was free to leave."].

[125] OTHER: US v. Bowman (4C
2018) 884 F3 200, 212 [after telling the suspect he was free to
leave, the officer said "just hang tight right there" while he
spoke with a passenger in the vehicle];
US v. Rodriguez-Escalera (7C 2018) 884 F3 661, 671 ["The
government asserts that the detention had ceased because Patterson
told Moran she was 'free to go and everything.' But in the same
breath he continued to interrogate her."]; US v.
McSwain (10C 1994) 29 F3 558, 563 [although the officer
returned the driver's ID, he kept "leaning over and resting his
arms on the driver's door when he asked for consent to search" and
did not tell the driver he was free to go]; US v.
Ramos, (8C 1994) 42 F3 1160, 1162-64 [although the driver's
license was returned to him, he was asked to remain in the patrol
car while the officer spoke with the passenger]; US
v. Sandoval (10C 1994) 29 F3 537, 540 ["After
the point at which the driver has his or her other documentation
back, the touchstone of our analysis is simply whether… the
driver has an objective reason to believe that he was not free to
end his conversation with the law enforcement officer and proceed
on his way."].