Chapter 9: Special Needs Detentions

[1] NOTE: Although the Supreme Court
ruled that special needs detentions must not be based on a
"general interest in crime control" (Indianapolis v. Edmond
(2000) 531 US 32, 41), it subsequently ruled that special needs
detentions will be invalidated only if their "primary" purpose was
to determine whether the detainee had committed a crime. (Illinois v. Lidster
(2004) 540 US 419, 423 ["The stop's primary law enforcement
purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were
committing a crime"].

[2] USSC:
Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 331 ["we balance
the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to
determine if the intrusion was reasonable"]; Illinois
v. Lidster (2004) 540 US 419, 427 ["in judging
reasonableness, we look to the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty"]; Indianapolis v.
Edmond (2000) 531 US 32, 47 ["The constitutionality of such
checkpoint programs still depends on a balancing of the competing
interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program."].
CAL: P v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 365
["we balance the extent of the intrusion against the government
interests justifying it"]; In re Randy G. (2001) 26 C4 556,
566 ["there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search or seize against the invasion
which the search or seizure entails"]. 9th CIR:
Ganwich v. Knapp (9C 2003) 319 F3 1115, 1120
["We balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related
concerns to determine if the [detention] was reasonable."].

[3] QUOTES FROM:
Batts v. Superior Court (1972) 23 CA3 435, 439.
COMPARE: Stevens v. Rose (9C 2002) 298 F3 880, 884
[detention unlawful because its purpose was to obtain a set of
keys that were the subject of a civil dispute];
US v. Dunbar (D.Conn. 1979) 470 F.Supp. 704, 708 [the need
to detain a motorist because he appeared to be lost was
negligible].

[4] CASE REFERENCED:
Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 US 648, 659-60.
COMPARE: Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 540 US 419, 427
[roadblock to locate witnesses to felony hit-and-rung was
warranted because it "took place about one week after the
hit-and-run accident, on the same highway near the location of the
accident, and at about the same time of night"].

[5] USSC: US v. Sharpe (1985) 470
US 675, 687 ["The question is not simply whether some other
alternative was available, but whether the police acted
unreasonably in failing to recognize and pursue it."].

[6] USSC:
Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 540 US 419, 427 [the detention
was "minimally" intrusive as it lasted "a very few minutes at
most"]; Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 331 ["the
restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in
time and scope"]. CAL: P v. Hannah (1996) 51
CA4 1335, 1344 [detention was by means of "moral suasion rather
than any threat of force"]; P v. Matelski (2000) 82
CA4 837, 849-50 [officer "explained the purpose of the contact"];
In re K.J. (2018) 18 CA5 1123, 1132 [handcuffing a student
who was reportedly carrying a gun];
Ford v. Superior Court (2001) 91 CA4 112, 128 [detainee
"was never handcuffed, and was left in the unlocked backseat of
the police car"]; P v. Samples (1996) 48 CA4 1197, 1207;
Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 C3 1321, 1333 [the detention
"entailed only a brief detention, requiring no more than a
response to a question or two and possible production of a
document."]; P v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 366 ["Several
circumstances diminish the intrusiveness of the initial detention
here. First and foremost, it was extremely brief."];
P v. Dominguez (1987) 194 CA3 1315, 1318 ["brief stop at
the side of a public roadway"]. COMPARE:
P v. Spicer (1984) 157 CA3 213, 219 ["It is especially
pertinent to this case that the officer did not explain to Ms.
Spicer his reason for requesting her driver's license."].

[7] QUOTE FROM: Corbin v.
State (Tex. App. 2002) 85 SW3 272, 277. CAL:
P v. Bellomo (1984) 157 CA3 193, 197 [a man who was in a
car stopped at a traffic light was leaning his head against the
window "and his eyes were—appeared to be closed. Said the court,
"The operation of a motor vehicle by a driver disabled for any
reason is manifestly a serious event and the need for swift action
is clear beyond cavil," edited.]; US v. Garner (10C 2005)
416 F3 1208 [officers detained a man who was "unconscious in a
half-sitting, half-slumped-over position so that the fire
department personnel could examine him," edited].

[8] QUOTES FROM:
P v. Madrid (2008) 168 CA4 1050, 1060.

[9] CAL: P v.
Ellis (1993) 14 CA4 1198, 1202 [an officer stopped a car at
2 a.m. in a parking lot to warn the driver that his lights were
off. Said the court, the officer was "not required to wait until
appellant actually drove upon a public street to stop appellant";
P v. Williams (2007) 156 CA4 949, 959 [an officer stopped a
motorcyclist who was about to enter a rural area containing
marijuana fields that the officers were about to raid].

[10] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of community caretaking detentions because of apparent
mental health issues:

• A middle school student told her principal that she had
been having suicidal thoughts when she saw guns and knives in her
home. An officer took her into protective custody and transported
her to a hospital for a mental health evaluation.
Machan v. Olney (6C 2020) 958 F3 1212, 1214-15.

• Detainee was walking down the street at 1 a.m. "crying and
talking really loudly or shouting," "his hands were over his
face," he appeared "unsteady on his feet." Gallegos
v. City of Colorado Springs (10C 1997) 114 F3 1024.

• Detainee had reportedly taken "some pills," and was
"agitated," was "physically aggressive," and "confused, stating
that he did not know where he was." State v.
Crawford (Iowa 2003) 659 NW2 537, 543.

• Before driving off in a car, the detainee went "ballistic,"
screaming and banging her head on the car. State v.
Litschauer (Mont. 2005) 126 P3 456.

[11] OTHER: State v.
Diloreto (N.J. 2004) 850 A2 1226 [car stop warranted
because, per NCIC, a possible occupant of the vehicle was an
"endangered missing person"].

[12] OTHER:
In re Kelsey C.R. (Wis. 2001) 626 NW2 777, 789 [detention
of suspected runaway "was reasonable under the police community
caretaker function"].

[13] QUOTE FROM: Brendlin
v. California (2007) 551 US 249, 258 [reasonable to
expect officers "at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation
will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his
safety"]. USSC: Arizona v.
Johnson (2009) 555 US 323, 333 [officer was "not
constitutionally required to give Johnson an opportunity to depart
the scene after he exited the vehicle without first ensuring that,
in doing so, she was not permitting a dangerous person to get
behind her"]. OTHER: US v. Walker (10C
2006) 451 F3 1139, 1149 ["detention or control of both suspects
and non-suspects may be necessary to insure officer safety and to
maintain the officers' control over a crime scene"];
Hudson v. Hall (11C 2000) 231 F3 1289, 1297
["a police officer performing his lawful duties may direct and
control—to some extent—the movements and location of persons
nearby"].

[14] USSC: Bailey v. US (2013)
568 US 186, 195 [securing premises "may include detaining current
occupants"]; Muehler v. Mena (2005) 544 US
93, 100 ["An officer's authority to detain incident to a search is
categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying
detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the
seizure."]; Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 US 692,
705 ["a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted"].
CAL: P v. Gabriel (1986) 188 CA3 1261, 1264
["a search warrant carries with it limited authority to detain
occupants of a residence while a proper search is conducted"];
P v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 368 [there is a
legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the
event incriminating evidence is found and if "there is reason to
suspect the person of involvement in the criminal activities on
the premises"]; P v. Thurman (1989) 209 CA3
817, 823 ["That appellant's posture, at that moment, was
nonthreatening does not in any measure diminish the potential for
sudden armed violence that his presence within the residence
suggested."]. 9th CIR: Ganwich v.
Knapp (9C 2003) 319 F3 1115, 1120 [detention of employees
"prevented any of [them] from fleeing in the event that
incriminating evidence was found."]; US v.
Davis (9C 2008) 530 F3 1069, 1081 [because of the visitor's
apparent connection to the premises, his detention was justified
"in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is
found"]. OTHER: US v. Fountain (6C
1993) 2 F3 656, 663 [the concerns that justify the detention of
people inside a house being searched for drugs "are the same
regardless of whether the individuals present in the home being
searched are residents or visitors."]; US v.
Sanchez (10C 2009) 555 F3 910, 918 ["the authority to
detain relates to all persons present on the premises"];
US v. Johnson (8C 2008) 528 F3 575, 579
["Because a neutral magistrate has already found probable cause to
search the home, there is naturally an articulable and
individualized suspicion of criminal activity that justifies the
detention of the home's occupants."]; Burchett v.
Kiefer (6C 2002) 310 F3 937, 943 ["the Supreme Court's
discussion of 'occupants' in Summers [see above] included
nonresidents who are present at the scene of a search when police
arrive"].

[15] CAL: P v.
Hannah (1996) 51 CA4 1335, 1346 [the officers "were
entering a residence, the exact floor plan of which they were
unaware, to arrest a juvenile"].

[16] CAL: P v. Rios (2011) 193
CA4 584, 595. ALSO SEE: P v. Hannah (1996) 51 CA4
1335, 1343-44.

[17] CAL: P v. Matelski (2000)
82 CA4 837, 841-42; P v. Rios (2011) 193 CA4 584.

[18] USSC:
Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249.

[19] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples in which the court addressed the likelihood that the
detainee was a witness:

• Two men armed with handguns and wearing Halloween masks
robbed a jewelry store in Little Rock at about 4 p.m. Witnesses
said the men ran into nearby Kanis Park. The first officer at the
park saw one car leaving from the direction of the jewelry store,
so the officer stopped him to determine if he "had seen anybody."
It turned out that he was the getaway driver.
Baxter v. State (Ark. 1982) 626 SW2 935. Compare
State v. Dorey (Wash. App. 2008) 186 P3 363, 368 ["there
was no reason to believe that [the detainee] could assist in the
investigation"].

• A man robbed a 7-Eleven store in Fairbanks at about 2:50
a.m. The robber was last seen on foot, running in the direction of
a campground. Within a minute of receiving the call, an officer
arrived at the only entrance to the campground, planning to "stop
any moving vehicle, under the assumption that, while most people
would be sleeping at 3 a.m., anyone who was awake might have seen
something." The first car he saw was a Corvette occupied by two
men, so he stopped it and quickly determined that one of the men
was the robber. In ruling that the detention was lawful, the court
said, "It was reasonable to suspect that the occupants of the
Corvette had been awake in the campground when the robber came
through, and that they might have seen something. Under these
circumstances, and especially given the recency and the
seriousness of the crime, prompt investigative efforts were
justified." Also see Beauvois v.
State (Alaska App. 1992) 837 P2 1118 ["It was reasonable to
suspect that the occupants of the Corvette had been awake in the
campground when the robber came through, and that they might have
seen something."]; Williamson v. US (D.C.
App. 1992) 607 A2 471 [officers heard gunshots and immediately saw
a vehicle leaving the scene]. Compare P v.
Spencer (N.Y. App. 1995) 646 NE2 785 ["Considered
objectively, the law enforcement benefits that would accrue to the
government on these facts by stopping an individual vehicle on the
ground that its occupants might know the whereabouts of an
individual suspected of past criminal activity are marginal."];
State v. Wixom (Idaho 1997) 947 P2 1000 [car
stop unlawful when officer at the scene of a vehicle accident
stopped a motorist approaching the scene to determine if the
occupants "had any information regarding the accident."].
NOTE: In Maxwell v. County of San Diego (9C 2013)
708 F3 1075, 1084 the Ninth Circuit said that "in the hierarchy of
state interests justifying detention, the interest in detaining
witnesses for information is of relatively low value." Most
people, however, would probably disagree with the idea that
solving crimes and bringing criminals to justice (which
necessarily requires witnesses) is of "relatively low value."
Although the court's language is categorical in nature, we think
it meant that a detention to speak with possible witnesses would
not qualify as a special needs detention if the information from
witnesses was not urgently needed.

[20] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of how the courts determined the importance of
information that the witness might have been able to provide:

• Officers were dispatched at about 11 p.m. to a stabbing
that had just occurred on a street. When they arrived, they
noticed that two men were arguing or shouting at the paramedics
who were treating the unconscious victim. So the officers detained
the men and, as things progressed, determined that one of them,
Wold, was the perpetrator. On appeal, the court ruled that the
officers had good reason to detain the men because, as the only
people on the scene, they might have seen what had happened.
Wold v. Minnesota (Minn. 1988) 430 NW2 171.

• Officers were dispatched to a report of a stabbing at a
bar. One of the patrons, Barnhard, told them that he knew where
the knife had been discarded, but he then started to leave so the
officers detained him, apparently for the purpose of determining
his identity. In ruling that the detention was lawful, the court
pointed out that, "since Barnhard had indicated that he possessed
material information relating [to the stabbing], the officers had
the right and the duty to seek his identification."
Barnhard v. Maryland (Md. App. 1992) 602 A2
701.

[21] 9th CIR:
Maxwell v. County of San Diego (9C 2013) 708 F3 1075, 1083
["Although detention of witnesses for investigative purposes can
be reasonable in certain circumstances, such detentions must be
minimally intrusive."].

[22] USSC: Illinois v.
Lidster (2004) 540 US 419, 425 ["information-seeking
highway stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove
intrusive"]; US v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428
US 543, 557-58 ["brief detention of travelers" was a "quite
limited" detention]; Michigan State Police v.
Sitz (1990) 496 US 444, 451 ["the measure of the intrusion
on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints is slight"].
CAL: Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 C3
1321, 1341-47. OTHER: US v. Bernacet (2C 2013) 724
F3 269, 273 ["In this case, the traffic safety checkpoint was
conducted at an 'accident prone location in the impact zone,' and
officers processed 49 cars in two hours. The waiting times that
each car experienced are fairly characterized as brief and no more
onerous than delays that typically accompany normal traffic
congestion."].

[23] OTHER: US v. Paetsch (10C
2015) 782 F3 1162, 1174-75 [tracker secreted in bank bait money
alerted officers that the perpetrator was in one of 20 cars
stopped at the roadblock]. ALSO SEE:
P v. Manis (1969) 268 CA2 653, 666 ["The temporary loss of
personal mobility which accompanies detention may be deemed part
payment of the person's obligation as a citizen to assist law
enforcement authorities in the maintenance of public order."].
NOTE: Roadblocks will be invalidated if they were set up as
a matter of routine to stop and question drivers to determine if
an occupant of the vehicle happened to be involved in criminal
activity; e.g., drug interdiction checkpoint, checkpoint outside
housing project to apprehend people who were generally causing
problems. See Illinois v. Edmond (2000) 531 US 32
[checkpoint to determine if motorists were carrying drugs
(utilizing K9s); US v. Soto-Zuniga (9C 2016) 837 F3 992;
State v. Hayes (Tenn. 2006) 188 SW3 505 [the roadblock was
described as "an entry checkpoint for the purpose of excluding
trespassers"; although the ultimate goal of the checkpoint was "to
help people's quality of life issues in there," the court ruled it
did not qualify as a special needs detention essentially because
its direct purpose was to apprehend or exclude the people who were
thought to be causing the problem].

[24] CAL: P v. Turner (2013) 219
CA4 151, 171 ["we cannot ignore that the reported crime her of
carrying a concealed, loaded firearm serves as a grim reminder of
the numerous mass shootings that occurred in schools in the past
decade or so"]. OTHER: Wofford v.
Evans (4C 2004) 390 F3 318, 321 ["School officials must
have the leeway to maintain order on school premises and secure a
safe environment in which learning can flourish."].
ALSO SEE: New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
469 US 325, 339 ["Maintaining order in the classroom has never
been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken
particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools
have become major social problems."].

[25] CAL:
In re William V. (2003) 111 CA4 1464, 1471 ["We see no
reason to distinguish for this purpose between a non law
enforcement security officer and a police officer on assignment to
a school as a resource officer."]; P v. Turner (2013) 219
CA4 151 [detention by probation officers hired to provide security
for football game]. NOTE: A person who resists, delays, or
obstructs a "school security officer" may be charged with a
violation of Pen. Code§ 148. In re M.M. (2012) 54 C4
530.

[26] CAL: In re Randy G. (2001)
26 C4 556, 559 ["school officials [must] have the power to stop a
minor student in order to ask questions or conduct an
investigation even in the absence of reasonable suspicion, so long
as such authority is not exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing manner"]; In re K.J. (2018) 18 CA5 1123, 1129 ["a
school official may detain a student for questioning on campus,
without reasonable suspicion, so long as the detention is not
arbitrary, capricious, or for the purpose of harassment"].

[27] USSC: New Jersey v.
T.L.O. (1985) 469 US 325 [detention for smoking in a
lavatory]. CAL: In re William V. (2003) 111
CA4 1464, 1472 [detention for displaying gang paraphernalia].
OTHER: Wofford v. Evans (4C
2004) 390 F3 318, 326 [detention OK "if there is a reasonable
basis for believing that the pupil has violated the law or a
school rule"].

[28] CAL: Pen. Code§ 627.2.

[29] CAL: In re
Joseph F. (2000) 85 CA4 975, 989 ["school officials,
including police who assist in maintaining general order on school
campuses, need not articulate a specific crime which appears to be
violated in order to detain an outsider for the limited purpose of
determining the fundamental factors justifying an outsider's
presence on a school campus"].