Chapter 58: The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Generally
The rule: A court may not suppress evidence on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment unless it also finds that the benefits of suppression outweighed its costs in that particular case.[1] Thus, "suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation."[2]
Costs and Benefits
Benefits of suppression: The main benefits of suppression are (1) deterring illegal searches and seizures, and (2) providing officers with a strong incentive to learn and apply the law.[3]
Costs of suppression: The main cost of suppression is that it lets "guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free—something that offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system."[4]
The "good faith rule" has become redundant: The so-called good faith rule is not covered as a separate subject in this treatise because it has been subsumed into the cost-benefit rule. See this endnote.[5]
Proposition 8: In addition to conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the courts may not suppress evidence unless it was obtained in violation of the U.S. Constitution. See Appendix B (Citation Guide) (Proposition 8).
Relevant Circumstances
: As a practical matter, the most important costs and benefits are as follows:
Seriousness of crime: The seriousness of the crime with which the defendant has been charged is critical because the people who commit such crimes pose a greater threat to the public. Note that the seriousness of a crime does not depend solely on whether the crime was a felony or misdemeanor.[6]
Criminal history: It is arguable that the defendant's criminal history is also relevant because career criminals and violent felons generally present a more significant threat to the public.
Magnitude of officer's misconduct: Probably the most important circumstance in determining whether the costs of suppression outweigh its benefits is the magnitude of the officer's misconduct.[7] This is because the more egregious the officer's misconduct, the greater the need to deter it, and the more the public will realize that suppression was warranted.
Reasonably well-trained officer test: In determining the magnitude of police misconduct, the courts apply an objective test: To what extent did the officer's conduct deviate from that which would be expected of a reasonably well-trained officer under the same circumstances?[8]
Intentional and grossly negligent violations: It is virtually certain that evidence will be suppressed if it was obtained as the result of an officer's intentional violation of the Fourth Amendment,[9] or gross negligence or reckless disregard of the law.[10]
Ordinary negligence: In most cases, an isolated incident of inadvertence or ordinary negligence is not sufficiently blameworthy to warrant suppression.[11]
Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied
Search warrant irregularities
Serious misconduct: Suppression of evidence obtained by means of a search warrant is likely under any of the following circumstances:
Warrant based on false or illegally-obtained information: Probable cause was based on information that was illegally obtained or knowingly false.[12] But also see Chapter 61 Inevitable Discovery and Independent Source (Illegally obtained information was superfluous).
Obviously no probable cause: A reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the information contained in the affidavit did not establish probable cause.[13] Note, however, that suppression would likely be unwarranted if the affiant notified the judge of the potential problem with the affidavit and the judge concluded that it was nevertheless valid.[14]
Warrant obviously not particularized: A reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the descriptions of the evidence to be seized or the place to be searched were not sufficiently specific.[15]
Judge not impartial: The officer knew or should have known that the issuing judge was not neutral and detached.[16]
Indications of ordinarily negligence: The following circumstances indicate only ordinary negligence: Probable cause was a "close or debatable question,"[17] a knowledgeable prosecutor reviewed and approved the warrant and affidavit.[18]
Mistakes of fact or law: See Chapter 1 Principles of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion (Effect of Mistakes of Fact and Law).
Database errors: Searches and seizures are often based on information that officers received from governmental databases, such as registries of people who are wanted on outstanding warrants and probationers who are subject to warrantless searches. If this information was incorrect, the evidence obtained as the result will probably not be suppressed unless the officer knew or should have known that the database was unreliable or if "the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system."[19]
Unreasonable delays: If evidence was seized lawfully, it is unlikely that an officer's delay in taking certain post-search actions (waiting 20 days to search a laptop) would constitute the type of circumstance that would warrant suppression.[20]
Not a law enforcement mistake: See Chapter 27 Searches by Civilians and Police Agents.
Search invalidated after the fact: Officers will sometimes conduct a search that was lawful when it was conducted but, before the suspect's case was finalized, a court would rule in a published opinion that such searches were unlawful. Still, the evidence discovered in the course of the search will not be suppressed as follows:
Binding precedent: If the search was legal under then-existing binding precedent.[21]
Non-binding precedent: The Third Circuit has ruled that non-binding precedent may be considered in balancing if the officer's search "conformed to practices authorized by a 'uniform treating' of 'continuous judicial approval."[22]
Reasonable interpretation: The Third Circuit has ruled that evidence may be admissible if existing precedent could be reasonably interpreted as permitting the search; i.e., the search "falls well within the rationale espoused in binding appellate precedent, which authorizes nearly identical conduct."[23]
Notes
[1] USSC: Utah v. Strieff (2016)
579 US 232, 235 ["even when there is a Fourth Amendment violation,
this exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion
outweigh its deterrent benefits"];
Riley v. California (2014) 573 US 373, 385 ["we generally
determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the
warrant requirement by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests"]; Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 US
586, 595 ["the exclusionary rule has never been applied except
where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social
costs"]; Davis v. US (2011) 564 US 229, 231 ["suppression
would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances
and it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public
safety"]; Herring v. US (2009) 555 US 135, 147 ["the
deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh
any harm to the justice system"]; Illinois v. Krull (1987)
480 US 340, 352-53 ["to the extent that application of the
exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that
possible benefit must be weighed against the substantial social
costs exacted by the exclusionary rule"]. CAL:
P v. Kasrawi (2021) 65 CA5 751, 761 ["But exceptions to the
exclusionary rule apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its
deterrent benefits."]. OTHER: US v. Baker (6C 2020)
976 F3 636, 646 ["To decide whether the [exclusionary] rule
applies, the [Supreme] Court asks if its deterrence benefits
outweigh its substantial social costs."]; US v. Davis (11C
2015) 785 F3 498, 518 ["a traditional balancing of interests amply
supports the reasonableness " of the search];
US v. Katzin (3C 2014) 769 F3 163, 171 ["deterrence must
outweigh the substantial social costs of exclusion"];
US v. Gordon (10C 2014) 741 F3 64, 72-74 [de minimis
violation of possessory interest in weapon];
US v. Clariot (6C 2011) 655 F3 550, 555 [citing
Hudson and Herring, the court rejects the argument
that "all Fourth Amendment violations must be punished by
prohibiting the introduction of any evidence discovered
after a violation, no matter how attenuated the connection to the
underlying violation"]; US v. Julius (2C 2010) 610 F3 60,
66 ["a court should order exclusion only after it has satisfied
itself that the benefits of deterrence outweigh the costs"];
US v. Farias-Gonzalez (11C 2009) 556 F3 1181, 1187 [Per
Herring, "We now apply the cost-benefit balancing test to
the case before us."]. ALSO SEE: US v. Knox (10C
2018) 883 F3 1262, 1273 ["The exclusionary rule, however, is not
itself a constitutional guarantee. The constitutional violation
occurs when an unreasonable search occurs, not when evidence
seized in the course of that search is later introduced in a
subsequent criminal proceeding .... Put succinctly, the
exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right of the defendant,
but rather is a disincentive for law enforcement to engage in
unconstitutional activity."].
[2] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Moorehead (6C 2019) 912 F3 963, 968.
[3] USSC: Davis v. US (2011) 564
US 229, 241 ["Responsible law-enforcement officers will take care
to learn what is required of them under Fourth Amendment
precedent"]; US v. Leon (1984) 468 US 897, 916 ["the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct"].
CAL: P v. Willis (2002) 28 C4 22, 30 ["application
of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted where it would not result
in appreciable deterrence," quoting from
Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 US 1, 11].
BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Leon (1984) 468 US 897, 918 ["No
empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the [exclusionary]
rule has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the
rule has a deterrent effect."].
[4] QUOTE FROM:
Herring v. US (2009) 555 US 135, 141. USSC:
US v. Leon (1984) 468 US 897, 908 [suppression is likely to
generate disrespect for the courts]. OTHER:
US v. Katzin (3C 2014) 769 F3 163, 171 ["These costs often
include omitting reliable, trustworthy evidence of a defendant's
guilt, thereby suppressing the truth and setting a criminal loose
in the community without punishment."].
[5] NOTE: Over the years, the good faith
rule was commonly interpreted as applying only if two
circumstances existed: (1) the evidence was obtained during the
execution of a search warrant, and (2) at the suppression hearing
the judge ruled that the magistrate who issued the warrant was
mistaken when he concluded that the affiant had established
probable cause. But the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
good faith rule was never intended to be restricted to these
specific circumstances. Instead, it was only one fact-specific
application of the cost-benefit analysis. See
Davis v. US (2011) 564 US 229, 238 ["The basic insight of
the Leon [good faith] line of cases is that the deterrence
benefits of exclusion vary with the culpability of the law
enforcement conduct at issue."]. Furthermore, the good faith rule
has generated a lot of confusion for two reasons. First, unless
the affiant knew or should have known that his affidavit was
deficient (which almost never happens), his reliance on the
warrant would always have been objectively reasonable—which means
it would be unnecessary to invoke any suppression exception
because the search would not have violated the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the term "good faith" is not only ambiguous, it was
misinterpreted from the start because the Court's definition of
"good faith" did not mean honesty, forthrightness, or any other
esteemed moral attribute. In fact, it did not even mean good
faith. See Herring v. US (2009) 555 US 135, 142 ["We
(perhaps confusingly) called this objective reasonableness 'good
faith.'"]; US v. Leon (1984) 468 US 897, 908, 919, fn. 20
["Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the
exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual
officers"]; P v. Willis (2002) 28 C4 22, 29, fn.3 ["the
term 'good faith exception' may be somewhat of a misnomer because
the exception focuses on the objective reasonableness of an
officer's conduct"]; P v. Machupa (1994) 7 C4 614, 618,
fn.1 ["Although many courts and commentators routinely describe
the Leon decision as establishing a 'good faith' rule, the
Leon exception itself focuses expressly and exclusively on the
objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct, not on his or
her subjective 'good faith' (or 'bad faith')."];
US v. Lopez-Soto (9C 2000) 205 F3 1101, 1106 [if the good
faith rule covered all "honest" mistakes of law enforcement
personnel "it would remove the incentive for police to make
certain that they properly understand the law that they are
entrusted to enforce and obey"]. Although prosecutors might still
invoke the good faith rule in cases where the facts are identical
to those in Leon, in most cases it will make more sense to
apply the cost-benefit requirement because it is more expansive
and it applies even if a court finds that the officer was somewhat
negligent.
[6] USSC:
Lange v. California (2021) __ US __ [141 S.Ct. 2011].
[7] USSC: Davis v. US (2011) 564
US 229, 251 ["the deterrence benefits of exclusion vary with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue"];
Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 US 154, 171 ["the Court has
not questioned, in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the
continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the
State's case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been
substantial and deliberate"]; US v. Leon (1984) 468 US 897,
911 ["an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct
constitutes an important step in the calculus"]. CAL:
P v. Maxwell (2020) 58 CA5 546, 596 ["Police practices
trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are
deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable
enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system."].
OTHER: US v. Walker (5C 2022) 49 F4 903, 908
["Without deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct on
the part of the police, excluding evidence has little, if any,
deterrent value and is therefore unjustified."];
US v. Davis (7C 2022) 44 F4 685, 689 ["we do not employ the
exclusionary rule when suppression would do nothing to deter
police misconduct. We have previously cautioned courts that losing
sight of this fundamental notion allows guilty people to go free
due to an irrelevant bungle on the part of law enforcement."];
US v. Baker (6C 2020) 976 F3 636, 646 ["the exclusionary
rule should apply only to police conduct only if that misconduct
is sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the
price paid by the justice system"]; US v. Szczerba (8C
2018) 897 F3 929, 938 ["Over time, the Supreme Court has
recalibrated its cost-benefit analysis in exclusion cases to focus
on the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue"].
[8] USSC:
Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 US 340, 348 [suppression is
warranted if the officer "had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledge that the search was unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment]; Herring v. US (2009) 555 US 135, 145
["The pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is
objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of the
arresting officers."]; Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 474
US 54, 66 ["The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable
mistakes"]. OTHER: US v. Workman (10C 2017) 863 F3
1313, 1321 ["We expect agents executing warrants to be 'reasonably
well-trained,' but we do not expect them to understand legal
nuances the way that an attorney would."].
[9] USSC: Herring v. US (2009)
555 US 135, 145 ["To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct
must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that deterrence is worth the
price paid by the justice system."]; Davis v. US (2011) 564
US 229, 238 ["When the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the
deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the
resulting costs."]; Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 US 154
[intentional misstatements in search warrant affidavit];
Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 US 643 [officers broke into a
home]. 9th CIR: US v. Cha (9C 2010) 597 F3 995, 1004
["the police conduct was deliberate, culpable, and systemic"].
OTHER: US v. Shaw (6C 2013) 707 F3 666, 670
[officers gained entry by lying that they had a search warrant].
[10] USSC: Davis v. US (2011)
564 US 229, 238 ["When the police exhibit 'deliberate,'
'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment
rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to
outweigh the resulting costs."]. Herring v. US (2009) 555
US 135, 145 ["In a case where systemic errors were demonstrated,
it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable warrant
system."].
[11] USSC: Herring v. US (2009)
555 US 135, 147-48 ["we conclude that when police mistakes are the
result of negligence such as that described here, rather than
systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional
requirements, any marginal deterrence does not pay its way"];
Davis v. US (2011) 564 US 229, 238 ["the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force" when an officer's conduct
"involved only simple, isolated negligence"]. CAL:
P v. Robinson (2010) 47 C4 1104, 1129 ["the law enforcement
personnel errors in this case were the result of negligence,
rather than systematic error or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements"]. NOTE: Some critics of the
claim contend that it may give officers a strong incentive to stay
uninformed about the Fourth Amendment and its rules. See, for
example, Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 US 54, 66-67.
Their reasoning is as follows: An officer who has intentionally
kept himself ignorant of the laws of search and seizure can
truthfully testify at a suppression hearing that he did not
intentionally or recklessly violate any of these laws. Assuming
that any officer would actually believe that this strategy would
be successful, it would be rejected outright because the Supreme
Court has ruled that, in determining the magnitude of an officer's
misconduct, the test is not what the officer knew or did not know,
but what a reasonably well-trained officer would have known. See
Herring v. US (2009) 555 US 135, 145 ["The pertinent
analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an
inquiry into the subjective awareness of the arresting
officers."].
[12] USSC: US v.
Leon (1984) 468 US 897, 923 ["Suppression therefore remains
an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false except for his
reckless disregard of the truth. CAL: P v.
Ingham (1992) 5 CA4 326, 334-35 ["the good faith exception
is inapplicable where, as here, the search warrant is based on
illegally seized evidence"]. 9th CIR: US v.
Vasey (1987) (9C 1987) 834 F2 782, 789 [good faith rule not
applicable when the officer "conducted an illegal warrantless
search and presented tainted evidence obtained in this search to a
magistrate in an effort to obtain a search warrant"].
[13] USSC: Malley v.
Briggs (1986) 475 US 335, 346, fn.9 [an incompetent affiant
cannot avoid suppression by "pointing to the greater incompetence
of the magistrate"]; US v. Leon (1984) 468 US
897, 922 ["the officer's reliance on the magistrate's
probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of
the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable"].
CAL: Bailey v. Superior Court (1992)
11 CA4 1107, 1113-14 ["Harried magistrates may not always take the
care necessary to ensure that the application for the warrant
contains sufficient allegations of probable cause. An officer may
not shift all of the responsibility for the protection of the
accused's Fourth Amendment rights to a magistrate. Therefore, an
officer applying for the warrant is required to exercise
reasonable and professional judgment."]; P v.
Camarella (1991) 54 C3 592, 604 ["It is true that in an
ideal system an unreasonable request for a warrant would be
harmless, because no judge would approve it. But ours is not an
ideal system, and it is possible that a magistrate, working under
docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should."];
P v. Pressey (2002) 102 CA4 1178, 1190-91 ["The
question is whether a well-trained officer should reasonably have
known that that the affidavit failed to establish probable
cause (and hence that the officer should not have sought a
warrant.")]; Higgason v.
Superior Court (1985) 170 CA3 929, 952 ["Any rookie officer
knows uncorroborated, unknown tipsters cannot provide probable
cause for an arrest or search warrant."]; P v.
Spears (1991) 228 CA3 1, 19 ["Where the affidavit is
sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent
judges, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's determination
of probable cause should be deemed objectively reasonable."].
ALSO SEE: In re Christopher R. (1989) 216 CA3
901, 906 ["In truth, the risk today is that even after an officer
has presented his evidence fairly and fully to a neutral and
detached magistrate, inquiring as to its adequacy, and been
assured of its legal sufficiency, he may later discover that the
fruits of his potentially perilous labors are to be suppressed
because another neutral and detached jurist has subsequently
disagreed with his colleague's earlier conclusion. When this
occurs, of course, several officers' lives may have been
needlessly placed in jeopardy during their performance of the
fool's errand the warrant commended them to perform."].
[14] USSC: Massachusetts
v. Sheppard (1984) 468 US 981, 990 ["there is little
reason why [the affiant] should be expected to disregard
assurances that everything is all right, especially when he has
alerted the judge to the potential problems"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Freitas (9C 1988) 856 F2 1425, 1432
["the agents in this case not only noticed the potential defect in
the warrant, they brought it to the attention of an Assistant U.S.
Attorney and the magistrate, who both approved it"]; Marks
v. Clarke (9C 1996) 102 F3 1012, 1028 ["The officers
applying for the warrant in this case did not ask for, nor did
they receive any such specific assurances from the magistrate
issuing the warrant."].
[15] USSC: Groh v.
Ramirez (2004) 540 US 551, 558 ["the warrant did not
describe the items to be seized at all. In this respect the
warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search
as 'warrantless'"]; US v. Leon (1984) 468 US
897, 923; Massachusetts v. Sheppard (1984)
468 US 981. CAL: P v. MacAvoy (1984)
162 CA3 746, 764-65; P v. Alvarez (1989) 209
CA3 660, 665-68; P v. Rodrigues-Fernandez (1991) 235
CA3 543, 551-53. OTHER: US v. Bershchansky (2C 2015)
788 F3 102, 113-14; US v. Reilly (2C 1996) 76
F3 1271, 1280 ["The officers presented only a bare-bones
description of Reilly's land to [the judge]. It was a description
that was almost calculated to mislead."]. COMPARE:
P v. MacAvoy (1984) 162 CA3 746, 764 [it was
not apparent that the description was inadequate plus the
officers searched only those places they reasonably believed they
were authorized to search]; P v. Alvarez
(1989) 209 CA3 660 [description in affidavit was inadvertently not
included in the warrant]; Bay v.
Superior Court (1992) 7 CA4 1022, 1031 ["we cannot conclude
that a reasonably well-trained police officer would have or should
have recognized that the description of property on the face of
the warrant was so general in nature that he/she could only
speculate whether an item of property was among the items to be
seized"].
[16] USSC: US v.
Leon (1984) 468 US 897, 923; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.
v. New York (1979) 442 US 319, 326-28.
[17] CAL: P v.
Camarella (1991) 54 C3 592, 606.
[18] USSC: Massachusetts
v. Sheppard (1984) 468 US 981, 989 ["The officers in
this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of
them. Detective O'Malley prepared an affidavit which was reviewed
and approved by the District Attorney."]. CAL: P v.
Nicolaus (1991) 54 C3 551, 575; P v.
Camarella (1991) 54 C3 592, 605, fn.5 ["It is, of course,
proper to consider ... whether the affidavit was previously
reviewed by a deputy district attorney."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Underwood (9C 2013) 725 F3 1076, 1087-88 [the officer
"did not have a supervisor or anyone else review, let alone
approve, his affidavit"]; Dixon v.
Wallowa County (9C. 2003) 336 F3 1013, 1019 ["Though not
conclusive, reliance on [the District Attorney's] advice is some
evidence of good faith."]. OTHER: US v. Matthews (7C
2021) 12 F4 647, 656 ["Consulting with the State's Attorney or
similar prosecutorial officer certainly is one step a responsible
and diligent officer can take, and such consultation is, in many
respects, exactly what Leon's good-faith exception expects of law
enforcement."]; US v. Tracey (3C 2010) 597 F3
140, 153 [DA's approval is relevant]; US v.
Otero (10C 2009) 563 F3 1127, 1135 ["[One of the more
important facts… is the officers' attempts to satisfy all
legal requirements by consulting a lawyer."]; US v.
Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 649 ["[The officer's] telephone
call to the ADA further demonstrates the officers' good faith."].
[19] QUOTE FROM:
Herring v. US (2009) 555 US 135, 146-47. USSC:
Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 US 1, 15-16 ["There is no
indication that the arresting officer was not acting objectively
reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record"].
OTHER: US v. Esquivel-Rios (10C 2015) 786 F3 1299,
1309 ["there is no evidence that CBI negligently failed to update
its database or routinely made record-keeping errors"].
[20] 9th CIR: US v. Jobe (9C
2019) 933 F3 1074, 1079 [20-day delay in searching seized laptop
did not justify suppression because there was insufficient
deterrent value].
[21] CASE REFERENCED:
Davis v. US (2011) 564 US 229, 241 ["Evidence obtained
during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding
precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule."]. UCCS:
Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 US 340, 349 ["The application
of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an
officer acting in objective reasonable reliance on a statute would
have [little deterrent effect]."]. CAL:
P v. Rossetti (2014) 230 CA4 1070, 1076 [the officer "acted
in accordance with existing legal precedent"]. OTHER:
US v. Rodriguez (8C 2015) 799 F3 1222, 1224;
US v. Katzin (3C 2014) 769 F3 164, 176 [the search "falls
well within the rationale espoused in binding appellate precedent,
which authorizes nearly identical conduct"];
US v. Stephens (4C 2014) 764 F3 327, 337 [exclusionary rule
not applicable because the officer's use of GPS "was objectively
reasonable because of the binding appellate precedent of
Knotts"]; US v. Sparks (1C.2013) 711 F3 58, 67 [the
existence of "settled" and "binding" precedent "precludes
suppression of the resulting evidence"];
US v. Lebowitz (11C 2012) 676 F3 1000, 1010 [In searching
the car, [the officer] relied on our precedent, which until
recently allowed [such searches]"];
US v. Barraza-Maldonado (8C 2013) 732 F3 865, 868 [court
rejects the argument "that officers may reasonably rely on
'settled' appellate precedent only when that precedent is both
uniform in the governing circuit and generally accepted
nationwide"]. COMPARE: US v. Camou (9C 2014) 773 F3
932, 944-45 [suppression was required because the search was
illegal under then-governing law].
[22] CASE REFERENCED:
US v. Katzin (3C 2014) 769 F3 164, 176 [Citing US
v. Peltier (1975) 422 US 531, 541 ["It was in reliance upon
a validly enacted statute, supported by longstanding
administrative regulations and continuous judicial approval."].
[23] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Katzin (3C 2014) 769 F3 164, 176.