Chapter 61: Inevitable Discovery Independent Source

[1] USSC: Murray v.
US (1988) 487 US 533, 539 ["The inevitable discovery
doctrine is in reality an extrapolation from the independent
source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if
in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be
admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered."];
Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 US 431, 444, 447
["if the government can prove that the evidence would have been
obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted
regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational
basis to keep that evidence from the jury"]. CAL:
P v. Cervantes (2017) 11 CA5 860, 872;
In re Javier A. (1984) 159 CA3 913, 926 ["The inevitable
discovery rule is a variation upon the independent source theory,
but it differs in that the question is not whether the police did
in fact acquire certain evidence by reliance upon an untainted
source but instead whether evidence found because of a Fourth
Amendment violation would inevitably have been discovered
lawfully."]; P v. Carpenter (1999) 21 C4 1016, 1040;
P v. Robles (2000) 23 C4 789, 800; P v.
Rosales (1987) 192 CA3 759, 769 ["The inevitability of the
lawful discovery removes the taint of illegality that otherwise
would attach to the evidence, and leaves no exclusionary rule
barrier to its admission."]; P v. Tye (1984) 160 CA3
796, 800 ["The inevitable discovery exception allows admission of
evidence where the court finds that challenged evidence would have
been eventually secured through legal means regardless of improper
official conduct."]. 9th CIR: US v. Smith (9C 1998)
155 F3 1051, 1060, fn.16 ["The inevitable discovery exception
serves to permit evidence that, in spite of the unlawful search,
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means."].
OTHER: US v. Christy (10C 2014) 739 F3 534, 541
["inevitable discovery requires only that the lawful means of
discovery be independent of the constitutional violation"];
US v. Stabile (3C 2011) 633 F3 219, 237;
US v. Marrocco (7C 2009) 578 F3 627, 637-38
["the Government must demonstrate that two criteria are met:
First, it must show that it had, or would have obtained, an
independent, legal justification for conducting a search that
would have led to the discovery of the evidence; second, the
Government must demonstrate that it would have conducted a lawful
search absent the challenged conduct"]; US v.
Brown (7C 1995) 64 F3 1083, 1085 ["what makes a discovery
'inevitable' is not probable cause alone but probable cause plus a
chain of events that would have lend to a warrant independent of
the search," edited]; US v. Holmes (DCC 2007)
505 F3 1288, 1292 ["the government must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that, even without the unlawful seizure, the
evidence it seeks to admit would have been discovered anyway"];
US v. Johnson (7C 2004) 380 F3 1013, 1014
["The 'inevitable discovery' doctrine allows the government to use
evidence that it obtained illegally but would have obtained
legally in any event."]. NOTE: The inevitable discovery
exception applies to violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 US
431, 442, 446; Murray v. US (1988) 487 US
533, 537.

[2] CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 CA3 665, 680-81.

[3] CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 CA4 1183, 1215 ["the
People must show a reasonable probability that the challenged
evidence would have been procured in any event by lawful means"];
In re Rudy F. (2004) 117 CA4 1124, 1136]; Hernandez
v. Superior Court (1980) 110 CA3 355, 364;
P v. Tye (1984) 160 CA3 796, 800; P v.
Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 CA3 665, 680-81;
In re Javier A. (1984) 159 CA3 913, 927; P v.
Gordon (1978) 84 CA3 913, 926. OTHER:
US v. Stokes (2C 2013) 733 F3 438, 446 ["focusing on
demonstrated historical facts," the trial court "must determine,
with a high level of confidence, that each of the contingencies
necessary to the legal discovery of the contested evidence would
be resolved in the government's favor"].

[4] QUOTE FROM: Lockridge
v. Superior Court (1970) 3 C3 166, 170. CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 CA3 665,
680-81 ["the rule's requirement is that it would have been
discovered in the normal course of a lawfully conducted
investigation. The test is not one of certainty, but rather of a
reasonably strong probability."].

[5] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Ramsey (1969) 272 CA2 302, 313. CAL: P v.
Boyer (1989) 48 C3 247, 279, fn.21. ALSO SEE:
US v. Lazar (6C 2010) 604 F3 230, 240 ["A
court assesses the likelihood that routine procedures would have
led inevitably to acquisition of the evidence"]. COMPARE: US v. Kennedy (8C 2005) 427 F3
1136, 1145 [inevitable discovery exception did not apply because
there was no testimony as to whether the place in which the
evidence was found would inevitably have been searched].

[6] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Superior Court (Corbett) (2017) 8 CA5 670, 683-84.
OTHER: US v. Maxi (11C 2018) 886 F3 1318, 1330
[evidence in plain view as the defendant opened the door would
have been inevitably discovered because, assuming some illegality
as to the manner in which the officers approached the house, the
defendant did not see the officers before he opened the door and
did not even know they were officers; thus, the evidence would
have been observed regardless of any misconduct].

[7] CAL: P v. Boyer (1989)
48 C3 247, 278 ["Lacking a ready suspect for two brutal homicides,
the police were pursuing a broad-based investigation of every
person who might possibly be involved."]; P v.
Carpenter (1999) 21 C4 1016, 1040; P v.
Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 CA4 1183, 1216
["the safety officers' investigation had disclosed a potentially
significant marijuana sales enterprise on the University campus"].
OTHER: US v. Swift (7C 2000) 220 F3
502, 510 ["Given the alert law enforcement work evidenced in this
case, the police in all likelihood would ..."].

[8] USSC: Nix v.
Williams (1984) 467 US 431, 444. CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Corbett) (2017) 8 CA5 670, 682 ["The
prosecution must establish inevitable discovery without resort to
speculation, for inevitable discovery involves no speculative
elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of
ready verification or impeachment."]; P v.
Carpenter (1999) 21 C4 1016, 1040; P v.
Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 CA4 1183, 1217.

[9] CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Corbett) (2017) 8 CA5 670, 684;
P v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 CA4 1004,
1022 ["Courts have indicated a reluctance to apply the inevitable
discovery doctrine when a search warrant was otherwise necessary
and could have been obtained"]; P v. Robles (2000) 23 C4
789, 801 [court rejects the argument that "evidence obtained
during the warrantless search and seizure [of the defendant's
garage] was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine
because a warrant could have been obtained for the garage based
upon the initial plain view sighting of the [stolen] car therein,
had the police officers thought to have done so."];
P v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 CA4 1183, 1208,
fn.18 ["we reject any assertion that the inevitable discovery
doctrine applies here simply because the police had sufficient
probable cause to obtain a warrant to enter the dorm room"].
9th CIR: US v. Lundin (9C 2016) 817 F3 1151;
US v. Reilly (9C 2000) 224 F3 986, 996;
US v. Echegoyen (9C 1986) 799 F2 1271, 1280, fn.7 ["to
excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers
had probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant
would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment"]. OTHER: US v. Huskisson (7C 2019) 926 F3
369, 376 [although officers clearly had probable cause before the
entry, and although there was no apparent exigency, the court
applied the independent source rule, mainly because of the
overwhelming evidence of trafficking].

[10] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of inevitable discovery:

Discovery of hit-and-run vehicle inevitable: Because
witnesses saw the license number of a fatal hit-and-run vehicle,
it was inevitable that officers would have lawfully observed the
damage to the car even though the car was discovered unlawfully.
It was not, however, inevitable that officers would have tracked
down the car so quickly they would have seen raindrops on the car
indicating it had been recently driven. Consequently, testimony
about the damage was admissible, but testimony about the raindrops
was not. P v. Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 CA3
665.

Discovery of body inevitable: Because members of a search
party in a rural area were only a short distance from the body of
a murder victim they were seeking, the body was admissible even
though it was actually discovered by officers as a result of their
questioning of the defendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 US 431. Also see
P v. Coffman (2004) 34 C4 1, 62 ["Novis's body lay,
partially exposed, in a shallow grave in a working vineyard near a
residential area. Investigators found evidence that bicycles and
horses had been ridden nearby. On these facts, the trial court
reasonably could find that Novis's body ultimately would have been
found regardless of defendants' statements."]; P v.
Foster (1980) 102 CA3 882, 888-89 [although exigent
circumstances did not justify officers' entry into a garage, it
was inevitable that a dead body located in the garage would have
been found and the victim's wife questioned "given the offensive
smell which permeated" the area and the likelihood that the
coroner would have been notified and "would have been obliged by
law to investigate the death."]; P v. Macioce (1987)
197 CA3 262, 275 ["we have no doubt that the body of [the murder
victim] inevitably would have been discovered. The corpse was
beginning to smell, and eventually would have attracted the
attention of the neighbors. Ultimately the coroner would have been
called by someone, and he would have been obliged by law to
investigate the death."]; P v. Boyer (1989) 48 C3
247, 277, fn.18; P v. Molnar (N.Y. App. 2002)
774 NE2 738, 742-43 ["no person—let alone a murderer—can, in the
name of constitutional privacy, expect to harbor a dead body
without generating official cognizance and action"].

Discovery of shells under body: The inevitable discovery
exception applied because the coroner would undoubtedly have seen
shells under a murder victim's body when the body was removed from
the suspect's home. P v.
Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 CA4 1004, 1023.

Discovery of drugs inevitable: Even if officers exceeded
the permissible scope of the terms of a vehicle passenger's
probation by searching containers in the back seat, it was
inevitable that, regardless of whether the officers searched the
containers, they would have searched the center console which
contained drugs and, therefore, would have inevitably searched the
containers in the back seat as a probable-cause vehicle search.
P v. Cervantes (2017) 11 CA5 860, 872.

Discovery of body, drugs, weapon inevitable: CHP officers
would have inevitably discovered drugs and a weapon inside a car
driven by a man they had just arrested. This is because they would
have inevitably attempted to awaken the passenger who was
reclining on the passenger seat, and they would have discovered
that he was dead; from that location, they would have seen the
other evidence. P v. Kraft (2000) 23 C4 978, 1040.

Discovery of drugs inevitable: Although the defendant was
arrested without probable cause, officers had grounds to detain
him; and it was inevitable that, regardless of whether he was
arrested or detained, they would have had a K9 check the outside
of his car; and because the K9 inspection occurred within the time
frame of a detention (ten minutes), officers would inevitably have
been alerted that the vehicle contained drugs. US
v. Howard (6C 2010) 621 F3 433.

Discovery of drugs inevitable: When suspect was detained,
officers had a warrant to search a house that was connected to the
detainee and in which drugs were, in fact, found; thus, the
discovery of the drugs was inevitable. US v.
Bullock (7C 2011) 632 F3 1004, 1018 ["If Bullock had been
detained at the scene without restraints, instead of placed in the
squad car and taken to the residence, officers would still have
found the marijuana"].

Discovery of drug paraphernalia inevitable: An officer who
had obtained consent to search a vehicle for drugs would have
inevitably searched the console, even if he had not previously
illegally searched a backpack which contained a handgun and drugs.
US v. Munoz (8C 2010) 590 F3 916, 923.

Discovery of murderer's clothing inevitable: A murder
suspect consented to a search of his workplace in which officers
found coveralls with traces of the victim's blood. Although the
suspect consented during an illegal detention, the coveralls were
admissible because police technicians were already at the
workplace and would inevitably have discovered them. Green
v. Superior Court (1985) 40 C3 126.

Discovery of prosecution witness inevitable: Although a
multiple-murder suspect told officers during questioning in
violation of Miranda that he had ordered glasses from a
certain optometrist, the officers would inevitably have questioned
the optometrist and his employees because the suspect's parents
had already given them the name of the optometrist, they had
previously questioned an employee of the optometrist but were
"dissatisfied" with the information they had received and had
already "decided to return [to the optometrist's office] to
investigate further" even before they questioned the suspect in
violation of Miranda. P v. Carpenter (1999)
21 C4 1016, 1040. Also see P v. Boyer (1989) 48 C3
247, 278 [Boyer I: officers would have inevitably learned
of a prosecution witness because a woman who was cooperating with
police knew of the witness and the witness's involvement in the
case]; P v. Boyer (2006) 38 C4 412, 454 [Boyer
II; affirms Boyer I]; Rippberger (1991) 231 CA3
1667, 1690 ["It seems certain that the police would have
identified and located Miller as a potential witness without the
use of the information gained from the challenged interviews with
appellants."]; P v. Williams (1988) 45 C3 1268,
1303; In re Javier A. (1984) 159 CA3 913, 927.

Discovery of blood inevitable: Even if bloodstains inside a
car were discovered in an area that officers were not authorized
to search pursuant to their warrant, they would have been
discovered inevitably because the officers, having lawfully seen
blood elsewhere in the car, would have inevitably (and lawfully)
have expanded the scope of their search to the area where the
bloodstain was found. P v. Kraft (2000) 23 C4 978,
1044.

Discovery of drugs inevitable: Assuming the use of a
drug-sniffing dog to conduct a warranted search of home for drugs
was unlawful, the discovery of the drugs was inevitable because
"the dozen officers involved in the search at the residence would
have inevitably located the evidence even without the help of
Dandy. Dandy only hastened what the officers would have discovered
anyway." P v. Russell (1987) 195 CA3 186,
190.

Discovery of drugs inevitable: Because an officer had
arrested the driver (who was the only occupant of the vehicle) and
because the officer was unable to contact the registered owner, it
was inevitable that the drugs in the car would have been
discovered in the course of a pre-towing inventory search.
US v. Ruckes (9C 2009) 586 F3 713.

Blood match inevitable: Although a blood sample was drawn
unlawfully from a murder suspect, a blood sample would have
inevitably been taken because blood stains were found at the
murder scene and there was probable cause to believe the suspect
was the murderer." P v. Siripongs (1988) 45 C3 548,
569 ["At the time the blood was drawn, defendant was the prime
suspect in a double murder. A blood sample would inevitably have
been drawn and would have disclosed the identical information"].
Also see P v. Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 993.

Search of duty bag inevitable: Because an officer had been
indefinitely suspended, his duty bag which he had left at the
station would have inevitably been searched and the contents
inventoried if he had tried to leave with it. US v.
Chandler (8C 1999) 197 F3 1198.

Discovery of defendant's fingerprints inevitable:
Because officers lifted fingerprints from a pickup truck used in a
drive-by shooting, and because officers had information that the
defendant was involved in the shooting, it was "inconceivable that
a match-up would not have been made." It was, therefore,
immaterial that the prints of the defendant that were used to make
the match-up were obtained unlawfully. P v.
Rosales (1987) 192 CA3 759.

Discovery of evidence in house inevitable: Officers who
were executing a warrant to search the defendant's house for gun
asked him where the guns were located. Even if the answer should
have been suppressed under Miranda, the discovery of the
guns was inevitable. P v. Emanuel (1978) 87 CA3 205,
214; P v. Berry (1990) 224 CA3 162, 170.

Discovery of evidence in house inevitable: Although
officers inadvertently neglected to include in the warrant a list
of the evidence to be seized. Said the court, "had the police
complied with the Fourth Amendment the consequences for the
defendant would have been exactly the same as they were. The
search would have been authorized, would have taken place, and
would have been identical in scope, both as to places searched and
things seized, to the search that the police did conduct. The
defendant would have been no better off had the warrant complied
with the Fourth Amendment." US v. Sims (7C
2009) 553 F3 580, 584.

Discovery of gun inevitable: Gun would have been discovered
inevitably because it was in a gun case and the officer knew the
person who possessed the gun case was a felon (see US
v. Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 649-50) or because
officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect and would have
discovered the gun in his possession (see US v.
Johnson (8C 2008) 528 F3 575).

Discovery of sawed-off shotgun inevitable: Although the
officer's search of a vehicle was unlawful, he would have
inevitably discovered the shotgun because, before the search
occurred, the officer knew that the defendant's driver's license
had been suspended and that the vehicle was registered to a dead
person. Thus, it was inevitable that the officer would have towed
the car and would have found the shotgun in the court of an
inventory search. US v. Johnson (11C 2015) 777 F3 1270,
1277.

Inventory search inevitable: "When asked whether there was
'any way [the police] would have just left the items as they were
out on the street,' an officer answered that they would not 'have
just taken the two subjects from the vehicle and left all the
property in the parking lot.'" US v. Allen (8C 2013) 713 F3
382, 388.

[11] USSC: Murray v.
US (1988) 487 US 533, 542 ["The ultimate question is
whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely
independent source of the information and tangible evidence at
issue here."]. CAL: P v. Neely (1999) 70 CA4
767, 785 ["A 'fruit' may be admitted if there was an independent
source for it; it would have been found anyway"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Smith (9C 1998) 155 F3 1051, 1060, fn.16 ["The
independent source exception operates to admit evidence that is
actually found by legal means through sources unrelated to the
illegal search."]. OTHER: US v. Gonzalez (7C 2009)
555 F3 579, 581 ["The key to determining whether the independent
source doctrine applies is to ask whether the evidence at issue
was obtained by independent legal means."]; US v.
Johnson (7C 2004) 380 F3 1013, 1014 ["The 'independent
source' doctrine allows the government to use evidence that it
obtained both illegally and legally, as when evidence first found
in an illegal search is later rediscovered in a legal one."];
US v. Williams (7C 2005) 400 F3 1023, 1025
["The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of
evidence that was initially discovered during an unlawful search
if the evidence was seized later during a search that was not
tainted by the initial illegality."]. NOTE: Because the
legal basis for both doctrines are essentially the same, it
appears that the independent source exception, like the inevitable
discovery exception, applies to violation of the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments. Nix v. Williams (1984)
467 US 431, 442, 446; Murray v. US (1988) 487
US 533, 537.

[12] USSC: Segura v.
US (1984) 468 US 796, 814 ["None of the information on
which the warrant was secured was derived from or related in any
way to the initial entry into petitioners' apartment"].
CAL: P v. Superior Court (Corbett) (2017) 8 CA5 670,
693; P v. Maestas (1988) 204 CA3 1208, 1215 ["the
question that must be addressed "is whether a reasonably
well-trained officer in petitioner's position would have known
that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he
should not have applied for the warrant"];
P v. Robinson (2012) 208 CA4 232, 241. 9th CIR:
US v. Vasey (9C 1987) 834 F2 782, 788 ["The
mere inclusion of tainted evidence in an affidavit does not, by
itself, taint the warrant or the evidence seized pursuant to the
warrant. A reviewing court should excise the tainted evidence and
determine whether the remaining, untainted evidence would provide
a neutral magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant."].
OTHER: US v. Alexander (3C 2022) 54 F4 162, 172
["Here, the search warrant was issued based on information
obtained before the officers entered the building, and thus, under
Murray, the independent source doctrine is applicable."];
US v. DiTomasso (2C 2019) 932 F3 58, 66 ["If a search
warrant application contains erroneous or inappropriate
information, our question becomes, after putting aside the
improvidently included information, whether there remains a
residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to
support probable cause."]; US v. Castro (6C 2018) 881 F3
961 ["The remedy is to sever the offending phrase from the
warrant, suppress any evidence collected under it, and admit the
evidence collected under the valid portions that remain."];
US v. Thompson (7C 2016) 811 F3 944, 948 ["But a search
warrant based partly on tainted evidence will still support a
search if the untainted information, considered by itself,
establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue."];
US v. Glover (DCC 2012) 681 F3 411, 418 [officer had
smelled odor consistent with PCP emanating from house before the
entry was made]; US v. Stabile (3C 2011) 633
F3 219, 243 [we ask "whether a neutral justice would have issued
the search warrant even if not presented with information that had
been obtained during an unlawful search"]; US v.
Silva (1C 2009) 554 F3 13, 19 [we ask "whether the warrant
contains sufficient information to establish probable cause after
setting aside the tainted information"]; US v.
Budd (7C 2008) 549 F3 1140, 1147 ["The heart of this
question is whether, taking away any illegally obtained
information, the affidavit still demonstrated probable cause."].

[13] USSC: Murray v.
US (1988) 487 US 533, 543 [the issue was whether "the
agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered
the warehouse"]. CAL: P v. Weiss (1999) 20 C4
1073; P v. Lamas (1991) 229 CA3 560, 571 ["Here, the
evidence is undisputed that the officers had determined to obtain
a search warrant prior to any entry into the apartment."].
OTHER: US v. Alexander (3C 2022) 54 F.4th 162, 172
["The Supreme Court made clear that a subsequent search warrant is
not independently obtained if law enforcement decided to seek the
warrant due to information gathered from the initial, unlawful
entry, or if information obtained from the initial unlawful entry
influenced the magistrate judge's decision to issue the
warrant."]; US v. Christy (10C 2014) 739 F3 534, 541
["where the theory of inevitable discovery is that a warrant would
have been obtained but for the illegal search, the district court
must determine how likely it is that a warrant would have been
issued and that the evidence would have been found pursuant to the
warrant"]; US v. Stabile (3C 2011) 633 F3
219, 243 [we ask "whether the first search [the search of the
contents of the eleven video files] prompted the officers to
obtain the [subsequent] search warrant"]; US v.
Silva (1C 2009) 554 F3 13, 19 [ we ask "whether the police
officer would have sought the warrant even without the evidence
obtained from the illegal search"]; US v.
Budd (7C 2008) 549 F3 1140, 1147 ["The second part of this
test asks whether the decision to seek the warrant was prompted by
information gained from the initial illegal activity."];
US v. Swope (8C 2008) 542 F3 609, 615 ["the
proper test under Murray's first prong is whether the
police would have applied for the warrant had they not made the
prior illegal observations"]; US v.
Mowatt (4C 2008) 513 F3 395, 404 ["the government has never
maintained that the officers would have sought a warrant absent
their prior illegal discovery"]; US v.
Leveringston (8C 2005) 397 F3 1112, 1115 ["When the
government seeks to rely on the independent source doctrine in a
case involving a later-obtained warrant, it should present
specific evidence that the officers were not prompted by allegedly
unlawful activity to obtain the warrant"]. NOTE: It is not
necessary for the prosecution to prove the judge would have issued
the warrant if the illegally-obtained evidence had not been
included in the affidavit. In other words, if probable cause
remained after the information was removed, it is presumed the
judge would have issued the warrant. P v.
Weiss (1999) 20 C4 1073.

[14] 9th CIR: US v. Saelee (9C
2022) 51 F4 327, 336 ["Before any of the challenged actions
occurred, Agent Anderson had already prepared a near-complete
warrant application in consultation with the U.S. Attorney's
Office, save for the addition of a single paragraph to be inserted
after the controlled delivery was completed."]. OTHER:
US v. Alexander (3C 2022) 54 F4 162, 174 ["We conclude
that, because there was probable cause to search the Stash House,
and because an affidavit was fully drafted and ready to submit at
the time of the [illegal search], a search warrant was surely
forthcoming and discovery of the evidence inside the home was
inevitable."]; US v. Etchin (7C 2010) 614 F3
726, 737 [before other officers entered, a detective "set to work
on an affidavit"]; US v. Alexander (7C 2009)
573 F3 465, 477 ["Sgt. Kosovac directed Officer Schroedl to return
to the police station to draft a search warrant application and
Schroedl already had left to do that very thing."].

[15] OTHER: US v. Christy (10C
2014) 739 F3 534, 543 ["evidence of steps to obtain a warrant is
one way the government might meet its burden of showing that a
warrant would have ultimately been obtained, but not the only
way"].

[16] OTHER: US v. Brooks (8C
2013) 715 F3 1069, 1075-76 [FBI agent testified that the decision
to seek a warrant was based on new information that the defendant
had an accomplice]; US v. Budd (7C 2008) 549
F3 1140, 1148 ["While it is true that officers' assurances that
they would have sought a warrant are not to be credited where the
facts render those assurances implausible, in this case the
assurances were not implausible."]; US v. Gonzalez (7C
2009) 555 F3 579, 582.

[17] OTHER: US v. Alston (4C
2019) 941 F3 132, 139 (inevitable that officer would have searched
car because he had probable cause to search);
US v. Maxi (11C 2018) 886 F3 1318, 1330 [inevitable that
officers would have sought a warrant because they saw a stash of
drugs in plain view when the defendant opened the door];
US v. Soto (1C 2015) 799 F3 68, 83 ["there is little doubt
that any reasonable officer would have believed the laptop was
involved in the fraud and would have wanted to search it"];
US v. Bullard (4C 2011) 645 F3 237, 244
[strong evidence of drug sales in motel room];
US v. Gonzalez (7C 2009) 555 F3 579, 582 ["The affidavit
already reflected sufficient, legally acquired, evidence of
probable cause."].

[18] OTHER: US v. Bah (6C 2015)
794 F3 617, 634 ["We are, however, troubled by the officer's
failure to inform the magistrate judge that, prior to the warrant
application, separate officers had conducted a warrantless search
of the Blackberry."].