Chapter 3: Probable Cause to Arrest (Including Reasonable Suspicion)

[1] USSC: Florida v.
Royer (1983) 460 US 491, 507 ["the fact that the officers
did not believe there was probable cause would not foreclose the
State from justifying Royer's custody by proving probable cause,"
edited]. CAL: P v. Adams (1985) 175 CA3 855,
863 ["Courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's
determination he had probable cause to arrest. We see no reason
why a court cannot find probable cause, based on facts known to
the officer, despite the officer's judgment none existed."];
P v. Guajardo (1994) 23 CA4 1738, 1743 ["the fact
that there may be some room for doubt is immaterial"];
P v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 CA3 996, 1005 ["it makes
no difference that the detaining officer did not himself believe
he had probable cause to arrest"]; P v. Limon (1993)
17 CA4 524, 538 ["It is irrelevant whether [the officer] believed
he had probable cause."]; P v. Gonzales (1989) 216
CA3 1185, 1189-90 [the officer's "legal assessment" that he did
not have probable cause "was largely irrelevant if the search was
reasonable viewed objectively from a judicial perspective"].
OTHER: US v. Mulkern (1C 2022) 49 F4 623, 632 ["it
matters not that [the officer] did not subjectively believe that
he personally had sufficient information to support probable cause
to arrest Mulkern when the officers initiated the search…
our review of probable cause determinations is an objective
inquiry, unconcerned with the actual beliefs and motivations of
the officers on the scene"].

[2] CAL: P v. Moore (1970)
13 CA3 424, 435 ["If a known professional burglar walks down the
street furtively carrying a small safe with physical indications
that it has lately been ripped out of a wall, no one would deny a
peace officer's right to make an arrest although he has no
information concerning the particular burglary which produced the
safe."]; P v. Gorak (1987) 196 CA3 1032, 1040 [PC to
believe that an air compressor was stolen existed even though
officer was not aware of any thefts of such things]; P v.
Vasquez (1983) 138 CA3 995, 1001; P v.
Stokes (1990) 224 CA3 715, 721. OTHER: US
v. Pontoo (1C 2011) 666 F3 20, 29 ["The law does not
require officers to determine whether a reported crime actually
took place before stopping individuals who may be fleeing from the
scene."].

[3] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849, 883. USSC:
Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 US 266, 273-74
["We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a
bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report
of a person carrying a firearm before the police can
constitutionally conduct a frisk."]. CAL: P v.
Herrera (1975) 52 CA3 177, 182 ["The more serious the crime
under investigation, the greater the governmental interest in its
prevention and detection."]; P v. Brown (2015) 61 C4 968,
994 ["The reported crime was serious."].

[4] USSC: US v. Watson (1976) 423
US 411, 449 ["probable cause to arrest, once formed, will continue
to exist for the indefinite future, at least if no intervening
exculpatory facts come to light"].

[5] CAL: P v. Lomax (2010) 49 C4
530, 565 ["When the police have a description of a criminal
suspect, they may rely on that description, including race"];
P v. Marquez (1992) 1 C4 553, 578 [the suspect "resembled
the composite drawing" of the murderer]; P v. Morgan (1989)
207 CA3 1384, 1389 [composite sketch]. 9th CIR:
US v. Brooks (9C 2010) 610 F3 1186, 1193 ["substantial
correspondence"]. OTHER: US v. Ramos (1C 2010) 629
F3 60, 67 [the detainees' Middle-Eastern appearance was relevant
because they were stopped for investigation of terrorist
activities related to a subway bombing perpetrated by
Middle-Eastern terrorists].

[6] CAL: In re
Carlos M. (1990) 220 CA3 372, 381-82 ["A vague description
does not, standing alone, provide reasonable grounds to detain all
persons falling within that description."]; In re
Dung T. (1984) 160 CA3 697, 713 ["The police had no
detailed descriptions of the robbers other than their ages and
nationalities."]. 9th CIR: Grant v. Long Beach (9C
2002) 315 F3 1081, 1088 ["mere resemblance to a general
description"].

[7] USSC:
Hill v. California (1971) 401 US 797, 803, fn.6 ["the only
disparities in description established were that Miller was two
inches taller and 10 pounds heavier than Hill"].

[8] USSC: Chambers v.
Maroney (1970) 399 US 42, 46 [corresponding green sweater].
CAL: P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499, 1524-25 [red 49er
baseball cap worn backwards]; P v. Fields (1984) 159
CA3 555, 564 [corresponding jogging pants]; P v.
Hagen (1970) 6 CA3 35, 41 [corresponding three-quarter
length coat]; P v. Franklin (1985) 171 CA3 627, 634
[corresponding "white tennis bag"]; P v. Guillebeau (1980)
107 CA3 531, 553-54 [similar shoe soles];
P v. Carpenter (1997) 15 C4 312, 364 [similar shoe soles].
ALSO SEE: P v. Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 264
[corresponding bandage on the left hand].

[9] EXAMPLES: The following are examples
of unique or distinctive vehicle characteristics:

• Corresponding or similar license plate number. See
P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499, 1522 ["There was only
one car with (presumably) only one license plate number; the car
was a small foreign-made sedan (probably Japanese and possibly a
Toyota, although also possibly a Volvo); and the first five
characters of the license plate number were 1RCS5."]; P v.
Watson (1970) 12 CA3 130, 134-135.

• A "cream, vinyl top over a cream colored vehicle."
P v. Orozco (1981) 114 CA3 435, 440.

• The vehicle description "includes the vehicle's make,
model, color, and window condition; the gender of the vehicle's
occupant; and the direction and route in which the vehicle was
travelling".
US v. Centeno-Gonzalez (1C 2021) 989 F3 36, 46.

• A mag wheel on the right side. P v.
Brooks (1975) 51 CA3 602, 606-7.

• Both vehicles were light colored compact station wagons.
P v. Chandler (1968) 262 CA2 350 354.

• Both vehicles were quite old. See P v.
Flores (1974) 12 C3 85.

• Both vehicles were the same make and model, tinted windows,
dark-colored top with light-colored side. US v.
Abdus-Price (DCC 2008) 518 F3 926, 930-31.

• Both vehicles were both dark stake-bed trucks. P v.
Amick (1973) 36 CA3 140, 145.

[10] QUOTE: FROM:
U.S. v. Marxen (6th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3d 326, 331, fn.5.
OTHER: US v. Martin (8C 2021) 999 F3 636, 640
["Keeping in mind that the employee only saw the car briefly after
dark, it was reasonable for officers to believe the employee made
minor errors and that this was the car they were looking for."];
U.S. v. Abdus-Price (D.C. Cir 2008) 518 F.3d 926, 931
["Reasonable suspicion can survive in the face of discrepancies
between the vehicle described and the vehicle stopped"];
Williams v Superior Court (1985) 168 CA3 349, 361
["officers should not be held to absolute accuracy of detail in
remembering the numerous crime dispatches broadcast over police
radio"].

[11] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of discrepancies that did not undermine the existence of
probable cause to arrest:

• "The physical appearance of the Cadillac matched perfectly
the description of the getaway vehicle except that the license
plate read 107AOQ instead of 127AOQ." P v. Weston (1981)
114 CA3 764, 775, fn.5. Also see US v. Marxen (6C 2005) 410
F3 326, 331, fn.5 ["Trained police officers are aware that a
witness observing a getaway vehicle may see some, but not all,
letters and numbers correction," and errors "may be due to the
excitement of the moment, failing eyesight, insufficient lighting,
obscured license numbers, or some other factor"];
US v. Abdus-Price (DCC 2008) 518 F3 926, 931 ["Reasonable
suspicion can survive in the face of discrepancies between the
vehicle described and the vehicle stopped"].

• Yellow 1959 Cadillac, license number XQC33 was described as
a yellow 1958 or 1959 Cadillac with partial plate of OCX.
P v. Watson (1970) 12 CA3 130, 134-35 ["The license number,
although not the same as the given 'OCX,' was the somewhat similar
'XQC'; two of the letters were similar in appearance in the
license"].

• 2-door car was described as a 4-door.
P v. Brooks (1975) 51 CA3 602, 605.

• Green Lincoln Continental with Arizona plates described as
gray. P v. Adams (1985) 175 CA3 855, 861.

• Silver van was described as light blue.
P v. Bittaker (1989) 48 C3 1046, 1076.

• White 1961 Chevrolet with four occupants was described as a
white 1962 Chevrolet with three occupants.
P v. Smith (1970) 4 CA3 41, 48.

• A black-over-gold Cadillac was described as a light brown
vehicle, possibly a Chevrolet. P v. Rico (1979) 97 CA3 124,
132 ["both a Chevrolet and a Cadillac are large cars and General
Motors' products and one might be mistaken for the other."].

• Tan over brown 1970 Oldsmobile, license 276AFB, was
described as a 1965 Oldsmobile or Pontiac, license 276ABA.
P v. Jones (1981) 126 CA3 308, 313-14.

• Discrepancy between the actual number of perpetrators and
the number the victim reported. P v. Coffee (1980) 107 CA3
28, 33-34 ["it is a matter of common knowledge that holdup gangs
often operate in varying numbers and combinations and the victim
of a robbery does not always see all of the participants"].

• Because the plates were attached with "zip ties" and they
appeared to be new while the vehicle was old, it was reasonable to
believe the occupants had switched plates. US v. Hartz (9C
2006) 458 F3 1011. 1017-18.

[12] CAL: In re Brian A. (1985)
173 CA3 1168, 1174 ["Uniqueness of the points of comparison must
also be considered in testing whether the description would be
inapplicable to a great many others."]; P v. Hillery (1967)
65 C2 795, 80 ["Uniquely painted black and turquoise 1952
Plymouth."]; P v. Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 264 [suspect
and perpetrator both had a bandage on their left hands];
P v. Hill (2001) 89 CA4 48, 55 [medallion and scar];
P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499, 1522 ["There was only one car
with (presumably) only one license plate number; the car was a
small foreign-made sedan (probably Japanese and possibly a Toyota,
although also possibly a Volvo); and the first five characters of
the license plate number were 1RCS5."]; P v. Orozco (1981)
114 CA3 435, 440 [a "cream, vinyl top over a cream colored
vehicle"]; P v. Flores (1974) 12 C3 85, 92 [a "unique"
paint job and "distinctive" hat]; P v. Carpenter (1997) 15
C4 312, 364 [corresponding shoeprint]; P v. Brooks (1975)
51 CA3 602, 606-7 [mag wheel on the right side]. OTHER:
US v. Stubblefield (DCC 2016) 820 F3 445, 448 ["many
eyewitnesses readily noticed the robber's distinctive facial
disfigurement"]; US v. Carpenter (7C 2003) 342 F3 812, 814
["white designer jacket" with a "Karl Kani" logo on it and
"tiger-embellished jeans"]; US v. Thompson (DCC 2000) 234
F3 725 ["bright orange shirt"]. Also see US v. Jackson (2C
2004) 368 F3 59, 64 [when the points of similarity are less unique
or distinctive, more similarities are required before the
probability of identity between the two becomes convincing"].

[13] USSC: Chambers v.
Maroney (1970) 399 US 42, 46 [four perpetrators and
suspects]. CAL: P v. Soun (1995) 34 CA4 1499,
1518 ["there appeared to be six Oriental or Vietnamese males
inside the car, a number that exactly matched the reported number
of assailants"]; P v. Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 263
["The fact that there were two persons fitting descriptions given
for the two suspects narrowed the chance of coincidence."];
In re Brian A. (1985) 173 CA3 1168, 1174 ["Where, as
here, there were two perpetrators and an officer stops two
suspects who match the descriptions he has been given, there is
much greater basis to find sufficient probable cause for arrest.
The probability of there being other groups of persons with the
same combination of physical characteristics, clothing, and
trappings is very slight."]; In re Lynette G. (1976)
54 CA3 1087, 1092 ["Four girls had been at the scene of the
robbery; four girls ran away together; four girls were seen
together, shortly after the robbery and in its immediate vicinity;
three of the girls admittedly fitted the description of three of
the [perpetrators]."]; P v. Craig (1978) 86 CA3 906,
911 [grounds to detain three robbery suspects existed because,
even though they "did not perfectly match the general description
given," their descriptions "were substantially the same, and
coincided in the discernible factors (race, sex, build,
number)."].

[14] CAL: P v.
Coffee (1980) 107 CA3 28, 33-34 ["it is a matter of common
knowledge that holdup gangs often operate in varying numbers and
combinations, and the victim of a robbery does not always see all
of the participants"]; P v. Chandler (1968) 262 CA2
350, 354 ["It is common knowledge that frequently, perhaps more
often than not, where an automobile is used as a robbery getaway
car, one or more persons remain in the vehicle."];
P v. Smith (1970) 4 CA3 41, 48 ["Crime victims often have
limited opportunity for observation; their reports may be hurried,
perhaps garbled by fright or shock."];
Dawkins v. Los Angeles (1978) 22 C3 126, 133 [a witness to
an assault at night on a dark field said the perpetrator wore a
dark stocking cap, dark pullover, dark pants, light sneakers;
detention was warranted even though the suspect wore a yellow knit
cap, blue jogging suit, dark windbreaker, red track shoes];
P v. Arias (1996) 13 C4 92, 169 ["These estimates are not
so disparate as to cast particular suspicion on Lam's reliability
at trial."]; P v. Price (1991) 1 C4 324, 410-1 ["Although
the robber was described as being in his 20s, whereas defendant
was 35, [the witness] thought defendant looked about 25 when she
saw him in court"]. OTHER: US v. Thomas (5C 2021) 997 F3
603, 611 ["it was not unreasonable for [the officers] to be
uncertain how many people had responsibility for the earlier
robbery"]. NOTE:
Unreported getaway car is not a discrepancy: Even though
witnesses to a just-occurred crime did not see a getaway car,
officers may usually infer that one was used. Thus, if the suspect
was in a vehicle when he was detained or arrested, the fact that
witnesses did not see a vehicle is not necessarily a discrepancy.
See P v. Anthony (1970) 7 CA3 751, 761 ["It is a well-known
fact that automobiles are frequently a facility for the
perpetration of crime and an aid in the escape of criminals."];
P v. Overten (1994) 28 CA4 1497, 1505 ["Law enforcement can
reasonably anticipate that a car will be employed to facilitate
escape from a crime scene regardless whether one was reported."];
P v. Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 263 ["That there was an
automobile with an apparent 'get-away' driver was to be expected
even though it had been reported that the [robbery] suspects had
fled the crime scene on foot."]. OTHER:
US v. Pontoo (1C 2011) 666 F3 20, 27 ["The variation in the
two descriptions is not particularly surprising. Guessing at a
stranger's height and weight is a notoriously uncertain
enterprise."]; US v. Abdus-Price (DCC 2008) 518 F3 926, 930
["it is easy to imagine confusing a dark blue-and-white car for a
black-and-white car after night has fallen. This much will be
obvious to anyone who has dressed before daybreak and arrived at
the office wearing mismatched socks."]. NOTE:
Discrepancy based on officer's mistake: The courts are not
so forgiving when the error was made by an officer, not others.
See Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168 CA3 349, 361
["While officers should not be held to absolute accuracy of detail
in remembering the numerous crime dispatches broadcast over police
radio ... an investigative detention premised upon an officer's
materially distorted recollection of the true suspect description
is [unlawful]."].

[15] USSC: Maryland v.
Buie (1990) 494 US 325, 334, fn.2 ["Even in high crime
areas, where the possibility that any given individual is armed is
significant, Terry requires reasonable, individualized
suspicion"]; Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 US 47, 52 ["that
appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing
alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was
engaged in criminal conduct"]; Ybarra v. Illinois (1979)
444 US 85, 91. CAL: P v. Holloway (1985) 176
CA3 150, 155 ["It is true, unfortunately, that today it may be
fairly said that our entire nation is a high crime area where
narcotic activity is prevalent. Therefore, such factors, standing
alone, are not sufficient to justify interference with an
otherwise innocent-appearing citizen."].

[16] CAL: P v. Casares (2016) 62
C4 808, 1117-18 ["No evidence was presented at the suppression
hearing, for example, of the overall frequency of thefts at the
Circle K or that robbers did not commonly park [in a
better-illuminated side of the store]". OTHER:
US v. Dapolito (1C 2013) 713 F3 141, 151 ["But there was no
evidence that Monument Square was a particular hot spot, or that
it had even had any recent burglaries. There was no evidence of
ATM burglaries in the area, and there was no evidence as to what
was meant by 'recent.'"].

[17] USSC:
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 US 119, 124 ["officers are
not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location
in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently
suspicious to warrant further investigation"]; US
v. Cortez (1981) 449 US 411, 419 ["Of critical
importance, the officers knew that the area was a crossing point
for illegal aliens."]; US v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) 422 US
873, 884 ["officers may consider the characteristics of the area
in which they encounter a vehicle"]; Carroll v. US (1924)
267 US 132, 159-60 ["the court is bound to take notice of public
facts and geographical positions; and that this remote part of the
country has been infested, at different periods, by smugglers, is
a matter of general notoriety, and may be gathered from the public
documents of the government"]. CAL:
P v. Manis (1969) 268 CA2 653, 660 ["A commonplace of law
enforcement tells us that a great amount of stolen property
funnels into pawnshop areas."]; P v. Nonnette (1990) 221
CA3 659, 668 ["Here the fact that Caselli Circle was known as an
area of high drug activity was directly tied to Officer Flores's
belief defendants were involved in illegal drug sales."];
P v. Souza (1994) 9 C4 224, 240 ["An area's reputation for
criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing
whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."]; P v. Limon (1993) 17 CA4 524, 532 ["While a
person cannot be detained for mere presence in a high crime area
without more, this setting is a factor that can lend meaning to
the person's behavior."]; P v. King (1989) 216 CA3 1237,
1241 ["that an area involved increased gang activity may be
considered if it is relevant to an officer's belief the detainee
is armed and dangerous. While this factor alone may not justify a
weapon search, combined with additional factors it may"].
9th CIR: US v. Diaz-Juarez (9C 2002) 299 F3 1138,
1142 ["While Diaz's presence in a high-crime area cannot alone
provide reasonable suspicion, [the officer] could consider this
fact in forming reasonable suspicion."]. OTHER:
US v. Brown (7C 1999) 188 F3 860, 865 ["the exchange took
place in a high crime area where there had been drug activity,
shootings, and gang violence"]; US v. McCoy (4C 2008) 513
F3 405 [suspects' conduct was consistent with typical drug
transactions that occur in grocery store parking lots];
US v. Cook (1C 2002) 277 F3 82, 86-87 [suspected
hand-to-hand drug transaction in high drug area].
US v. Dapolito (1C 2013) 713 F3 141, 149 ["We have looked
at (1) the nexus between the type of crime most prevalent or
common in the area and the type of crime suspected in this case"];
US v. Guardado (10C 2012) 699 F3 1220, 1223 ["an area's
disposition toward criminal activity [is] a factor that
contributes to an officer's reasonable suspicion"]; US
v. Johnson (4C 2010) 599 F3 339, 345 ["Johnson
appeared to have been caught in the very act of drug-dealing for
which the area was renowned."]; US v.
Andrade (1C 2008) 551 F3 103, 111 ["there is a nexus
between the type of crime most prevalent or common in the area and
the type of crime suspected in the instant case"]; US
v. Lane (6C 1990) 909 F2 895, 898 ["The officers
were aware that the specific apartment building they were entering
had been a problem location for unauthorized persons and drug
trafficking."]; US v. McCoy (4C 2008) 513 F3
405, 412-13 [suspects' conduct was consistent with typical drug
transactions that occur in grocery store parking lots]; US
v. Bustos-Torres (8C 2005) 396 F3 935, 943 ["these
events occurred within a matter of minutes in a location notorious
for drug traffic"].

[18] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of situations in which the area where the suspect was
detained was relevant in establishing reasonable suspicion or
probable cause:

• Smuggling suspect was spotted "along a little-traveled
route used by smugglers to avoid [a Border Patrol] checkpoint."
US v. Arvizu (2002) 534 US 266, 277.

• Late at night in an area with a high incidence of
burglaries in which TV sets were stolen, officers saw three people
parked in front of a darkened house, and there was an "electrical
cord hanging from the trunk." P v.
Schoennauer (1980) 103 CA3 398, 407. Also see P v.
Remiro (1979) 89 CA3 809, 828 ["the lateness of the hour,
the frequency of burglaries and thefts from vehicles in the area,
and the circuitous route of the van through the neighborhood"
reasonably indicated the occupants were "casing"]. Compare
P v. Walker (2012) 210 CA4 165, [the officer "testified
that the area was an 'open area market for narcotic sales.' But
the crime being investigated was a sexual battery, not a drug
crime."].

• "Many complaints" of vehicle tampering; officers saw the
suspect "secreted or standing between two parked cars, looking
first into one and then into the other as if examining them."
In re Michael S. (1983) 141 CA3 814, 816.

• "Probable cause to believe that the zip-lock bag contained
cocaine existed because the officer reasonably suspected that
apartment number three, the residence defendant entered and
exited, was being used to sell drugs and thereafter defendant made
a furtive movement in an effort to dispose of the plastic baggie."
P v. Banks (1990) 217 CA3 1358, 1363.

• Suspect left the curb of "a known gang house."
In re Frank V. (1991) 233 CA3 1232, 1241.

• The location "was not just a neighborhood generally
associated with violence and high crime rates. It was a specific
building known to be the subject of an active territorial dispute
between two gangs." US v. Dortch (8C 2017) 868 F3 674, 680.

• In a high narcotics area, the defendant exited a parked car
then, after he glanced at the officer, the officer saw him "hunch
over, place his right hand in the small of his back, and start
backing away." US v. Pearce (6C 2008) 531 F3
374, 382-83.

• Convenience stores: Although convenience stores are
not considered high crime areas, the courts are aware they are
attractive to robbers because they are open late at night, the
clerks often work solitary shifts, and there is cash on the
premises. US v. Glover (4C 2011) 662 F3 694, 700.

• Riots: "Olson decided to come armed with a gun, to a
scene of active and dangerous civil revolt [a George Floyd riot]
replete with criminality where officers and civilians were under
direct threat of physical violence. True, proximity to criminal
activity does not, by itself, support a particularized suspicion
of Olson's criminality, but it is among the relevant contextual
considerations in a reasonable suspicion analysis."
US v. Olson (7C 2022) 41 F4 792, 801.

[19] OTHER: US v. Segoviano (7C
2022) 30 F4 613, 621 ["We have repeatedly and consistently held
that a mere suspicion of illegal activity at a particular place is
not enough to transfer that suspicion to anyone who leaves that
property," citations omitted.].

[20] CAL: P v. Juarez (1973) 35
CA3 631, 635 ["the suspect was "the only pedestrian in the
vicinity of the burglary that occurred ten minutes earlier"];
P v. Conway (1994) 25 CA4 385, 390 ["there was no other
traffic"]; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 CA3 1232, 1238 ["the
motorcycle was the only vehicle in sight"];
P v. Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 262-54 ["No other cars were
in the area"]; P v. Anthony (1970) 7 CA3 751, 761 ["it was
the only car seen traveling away from the scene of the crime"].
OTHER: US v. Martin (8C 2021) 7 F4 628, 643 [suspect
in "general area" of the crime scene]; US v. Foster (4C
2016) 824 F3 84, 91 ["Because Foster was the only person in the
area [at 12:20 a.m.] where the gunshot was reported, the police
justifiably had some suspicion that he might have been the
individual who fired the shot."]; US v. Brewer (7C 2009)
561 F3 676, 678 [no other vehicles in the area].

[21] EXAMPLES: In the following cases,
the suspect's location near the crime scene was an important or
pivotal factor when considered in combination with other
circumstances:

• Robbers told victims they were members of the 48th Street
gang; a few minutes later, in the nearby 48th Street gang's area,
officers detained a man who matched a general description of the
robber. P v. Leath (2013) 217 CA4 344. Also see
P v. Souza (1994) 9 C4 224, 240 ["An area's
reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration
in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable"];
P v. Walker (2012) 210 CA4 165, 180 ["Were defendant to
have been seen at the station moments after the commission of the
crime, his presence there, coupled with his sharing of some
physical characteristics with Suspect One, might have had some
relevance."].

• "They were located, only about a half an hour after the
first dispatch went out, about three miles away from the scene of
the crime." P v. Little (2012) 206 CA4 1364, 1373. Also see
US v. Foster (3C 2018) 891 F3 93, 105 [vague description
but suspect was observed shortly after the crime occurred, within
two-tenths of a mile from the scene, and officers were aware that
none of the officers who were searching had found anyone matching
the description].

• Quickly-departing vehicle from crime scene. US
v. Sanchez (10C 2008) 519 F3 1208, 1214-15 ["quickly
departing vehicles" from crime scene]; US v.
Bolden (5C 2007) 508 F3 204, 206 [officers who had just
heard gunshots spotted a car leaving the area from which the shots
had come and, although the driver was not speeding, he was driving
at a "relatively fast pace"].

• While filling out paperwork outside a housing complex at
1:30 a.m., an officer heard a gunshot; within a few seconds, a car
quickly pulled out of one of the project's two exits; the officer
detained the occupants. US v. Williams (11C
2010) 619 F3 1269, 1271 ["middle of the night within seconds of a
gunshot, it was eminently reasonable of him to suspect that the
car's occupants might have committed a crime"].

• At 4:40 a.m. in a high-crime area, officers saw a man at an
open but deserted gas station make a sudden approach to the lone
gas station attendant. US v. Glover (4C 2011)
662 F3 694, 698-99.

• Responding to a report that a man had attempted to shoot a
woman in a residence, officers stopped "the only car parked in the
driveway of the residence, which had its brake lights
illuminated." US v. Fisher (10C 2010) 597 F3
1156, 1157. Also see US v. Brown (DCC 2003)
334 F3 1161, 1166.

• A restaurant employee was seen near the premises shortly
after the manager was robbed and killed in what appeared to be an
"inside job"; and it was the employee's day off and he had no
apparent reason for being there. P v. Spears (1991)
228 CA3 1, 18.

• At 4:30 a.m., an officer saw a man walking "from the
immediate area" of a residential burglary that had just occurred,
and the man offered "a suspicious and ridiculous excuse for being
in the area." P v. Fry (1969) 271 CA2 350, 354-55.

• At 12:45 a.m., police radio reported that a man had just
been shot and killed on a street corner. The killer was described
by age, race, height, build, and wearing a dark jacket. About two
blocks from the intersection, an officer detained a man who
matched that description. P v. Atmore (1970) 13 CA3
244, 246. Also see P v. Lindsey (2007) 148 CA4 1390.

• The suspect was the only pedestrian in the vicinity of the
burglary that occurred ten minutes earlier, and his explanation of
why he was in the area was not plausible]. P v.
Juarez (1973) 35 CA3 631, 635 ["Presence in the general
area of a recent burglary accompanied by an explanation of
doubtful veracity constitutes cause to [detain]."].

• At 3 a.m., an officer was dispatched to a "burglary in
progress." No suspect or vehicle description was given. Less than
two minutes later, the officer saw a car leaving the area of the
burglary. "There was no other traffic, and he did not see anyone
on foot in the area." P v. Conway (1994) 25 CA4 385,
390.

• Officers were dispatched to a report of "reckless
motorcycle driving" at 9:45 p.m. When they arrived in the area a
few minutes later they saw a man on a motorcycle leaving a "house
known for gang activity," and "the motorcycle was the only vehicle
in sight." In re Frank V. (1991) 233 CA3 1232, 1238.

• An officer was dispatched to a report of an armed robbery
committed by two male blacks in an older model blue pickup truck;
the officer spotted such a truck occupied by two male blacks about
13 blocks from the crime scene. P v. Huff (1978) 83
CA3 549, 557. Also see US v. Daniel (8C 2018) 887 F3 350,
354 ["When a traffic stop is based on a radio dispatch, factors
such as the temporal and geographic proximity of the car to the
scene of the crime, a matching description of the vehicle, and the
time of the stop are highly relevant to a finding of reasonable
suspicion."].

• At 12:45 a.m., officers responded to a report that a man
had just been shot and killed on a street corner; the killer was
described by age, race, height, build, and that he was wearing a
dark jacket. About two blocks from the scene, an officer detained
a man who matched that description. US v.
Bolden (5C 2007) 508 F3 204, 206.

• At 4:45 a.m., within four or five minutes after a report
that a "cat burglary" had just occurred, officers were at an
intersection a few blocks away when they saw a yellow van driving
in a direction away from the scene. The officers knew that a
yellow van had reportedly been used in other cat burglaries in the
vicinity; the race of the driver of the van was the same as the
race of the perpetrator of the other burglaries. P v.
Taylor (1975) 46 CA3 513, 520.

• A man who matched the description of a person who had just
burglarized a home was spotted a block and a half away from the
residence, and he ran when the officer called to him.
In re Rafael V. (1982) 132 CA3 977, 982

• "Defendant had been seen near the victim's residence
shortly before her death." P v. Wright (1990) 52 C3
367, 392.

• Officer knew that the suspect was with the victim at about
the time she was murdered and, contrary to the suspect's
statement, witnesses reported he had been arguing with the victim
just before she was killed. P v. Davis (1981)
29 C3 814, 823.

• Suspect ran from officers. P v.
Williams (1967) 67 C2 226, 229; P v.
Messervy (1985) 175 CA3 243, 247.

• Shortly after a robbery occurred, a suspect was "stopped in
the vicinity of the location," plus he was in the company of a
person whom the victim ID'd as one of the robbers, plus his
physical and clothing descriptions were consistent with that of
the second perpetrator. P v. Bowen (1987) 195 CA3
269, 275.

• At 3 a.m., within a few minutes after a gas station was
robbed, an officer spotted in a car "in the immediate vicinity."
P v. Anthony (1970) 7 CA3 751, 761

• At 2 a.m. officers responding to a "shots fired" call at an
apartment complex stopped a car that was just leaving the
apartment]. US v. Brewer (7C 2009) 561 F3 676. Compare:
P v. Bates (2013) 222 CA4 60, 68 [two-hour time lapse was
too long without additional circumstances].

[22] CAL: P v. Rivera
(1992) 8 CA4 1000, 1009-10 [the arresting officer "knew that 10
surveillance units and at least 10 other patrol cars, with their
lights flashing, had formed a perimeter to contain the suspects"].
OTHER: US v. Quinn (8C 2016) 812 F3 694, 698
[defendant crossed "from inside of the police perimeter to outside
its boundaries"].

[23] OTHER: US v. Jones (DCC
2021) 1 F4 50, 54 ["the gunshots reported here were pinpointed to
a single block, and the officers saw that Jones was the only
person on that block"]; US v Rickmon (7C 2020) 952 F3 876,
882-83. NOTE: For information about the proper foundation
for expert testimony re ShotSpotter, see US v. Godinez (7C
2021) 7 F4 628.

[24] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of circumstances in which reasonable suspicion or
probable cause was based in part on the suspect's location on a
logical escape route:

• Responding to a "shot-spotter" alert that shots had been
fired from the roof of an apartment building, the arriving
officers "observed the defendants exiting the building at around
the time it would have taken to descend the six flights of stairs
from the rooftop of the building." US v. Hawkins (2C 2022)
37 F4 854, 859.

• Shortly after a gang-related drive-by murder, LAPD officers
located the shooters' vehicle abandoned; they had reason to
believe that the occupants had taken off on foot. An officer
assigned to a gang unit figured that the shooters would be
returning to their own neighborhood "by a route which avoided the
territories of rival and hostile gangs," and he knew their "most
logical route." Along that route, he detained several young men
who were wearing the colors of the perpetrators' gang.
P v. Superior Court (Price) (1982) 137 CA3 90, 96.

• At about 8 p.m., two men robbed a motel in Coronado, which
is an island with only two bridges. Police radio transmitted a
very general description of the suspects but no vehicle
description. Within minutes, an officer at one of the bridges saw
a car occupied by two men who matched the general description. Two
other men in the car ducked down when the officer started
following them. P v. Overten (1994) 28 CA4 1497, 1505.

• At about 2:20 a.m. an officer who was responding to a
"shots fired" call at an apartment complex "renowned for
criminality," saw an SUV exiting on the only road out of the area.
No other vehicles in the area. US v.
Brewer (7C 2009) 561 F3 676, 678 ["It was a natural surmise
that whoever fired the shots had left the complex, and the street
that the defendant's vehicle was driving on was the only street
leading from it, and he was driving away from rather than towards
it. The house reinforced the suspicion, since few people are on
the road at 2:30 a.m. and, sure enough, there was no other
traffic."].

• At about 4 a.m. two men robbed a gas station in Long Beach.
Two officers "proceeded to a nearby intersection, a vantage point
which permitted them to survey the street leading from the crime
scene to a freeway entrance, a logical escape route." A few
minutes later, they saw two men in a car; the men fit the
description of the robbers. No other cars were in the area; the
suspects were "excessively attentive to the officers."
P v. Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 262-65.

• At about 3 a.m., within a few minutes after a gas station
was robbed in Santa Ana, an officer spotted in a car "in the
immediate vicinity"; it was the only car he saw and it was
"traveling away from the scene of the crime on a likely escape
route."
P v. Anthony (1970) 7 CA3 751, 761.

• Suspect was "traveling in a direction consistent with
escape from the scene." P v. Jones (1981) 126 CA3
308, 314.

• Suspect's car "was traveling in a direction consistent with
the suspect's involvement in the robbery." P v.
McCluskey (1981) 125 CA3 220, 226-27.

• Suspect was walking two blocks away from the scene of a
murder that just occurred, walking "in a direction away from" the
scene.
P v. Atmore (1970) 13 CA3 244, 246.

• Suspect's car "was traveling away from the robbery on one
of the nearest available exits from [the crime scene]."
P v. Chandler (1968) 262 CA3 350, 354.

• The officers "reasonably deduced that vehicles picking up
aliens were likely to arrive at the site during that time frame."
US v. Berber-Tinoco (9C 2007) 510 F3 1083,
1088.

• "The affidavits suggest a short time lapse between the
robbery and [the officer's] sighting, which generally coincides
with the amount of time needed to drive between the two towns."
US v. Swope (8C 2008) 542 F3 609, 617.

• Suspect "emerged from a private yard, consistent with the
route of a fugitive escaping from the abandoned car." US
v. Burhoe (1C 2005) 409 F3 5, 10.

• When a "seismic intrusion device" was activated, Border
Patrol officers "deduced"—based on their training and
experience—that the illegal aliens would likely be picked up at a
certain location.
US v. Berber-Tinoco (9C 2007) 510 F3 1083,
1088.

[25] CAL: P v. Steele (2016) 246
CA4 1110, 1119 [defendant was parked on an isolated driveway in
front of a vehicle whose driver was wanted on a felony arrest
warrant]; P v. Adams (1985) 175 CA3 855, 861;
P v. Rodriguez (1987) 196 CA3 1041, 1048.
OTHER: US v. Thomas (5C 2021) 997 F3 603, 613
["Thomas's close physical proximity to a vehicle that was known to
be stolen and his conversation with the person in the driver's
seat provide support for suspicions particular to him."];
US v. Burhoe (1C 2005) 409 F3 5 [suspect near
car that had been abandoned following a pursuit].

[26] USSC:
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 US 295, 304 ["a car
passenger… will often be engaged in a common enterprise
with the driver"]; Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 US 366,
373 ["Here we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a
common enterprise among the three men."]. CAL: P v.
Hunter (2005) 133 CA4 371, 379 ["presence of a known drug
dealer in the front seat" was relevant]. OTHER:
US v. Freeman (7C 2012) 691 F3 893, 900.

[27] OTHER US v. Myers (4C 2021)
986 F3 452, 458 [discussing Maryland v.
Pringle (above), the court said, "Because the three
occupants in Pringle denied ownership of drugs that were
found in the automobile, the officer was justified in inferring
that all three were involved in the illegal conduct, justifying
their arrest"].

[28] CAL: P v. Huntsman (1984)
152 CA3 1073, 1091 ["Absent a showing the citizen should
reasonably know that those who are approaching are law enforcement
officers, no reasonable inference of criminal conduct may be
drawn."]; P v. Conley (1971) 21 CA3 894, 899 ["the
rationale of the furtive gesture doctrine applies only where the
gesture is made in response to seeing an approaching police
officer"]. OTHER: US v. Briggs (10C 2013) 720 F3
1281, 1287 ["Mr. Briggs's movements and change of pace might not
have been suspicious if the officers had not been readily
identifiable as police."]; US v. Edmonds (DCC 2001) 240 F3
55, 51 ["furtive gestures are significant only if they were
undertaken in response to police presence"]. ALSO SEE:
P v. Flores (2021) 60 CA5 978, 981 ["But some reactions to
police can be telltale. These reactions may suggest consciousness
of guilt and may entitle police to investigate further."].

[29] OTHER: US v.
Dykes (DCC 2005) 406 F3 717, 718 [the officers wore
"multiple items of identification—either MPD raid jackets and
medallions, or badges and orange MPD emblems"].

[30] QUOTE FROM:
Flores v. Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 219, 224.
USSC: Florida v. Rodriguez (1984) 469 US 1 ["Before
the officers even spoke to the three confederates, one by one they
had sighted the plainclothes officers and had spoken furtively to
one another. One was twice overheard urging the others to 'get out
of here.'"]. OTHER: US v. Price (6C 2016) 841 F3
703, 706 ["True, the vehicles were unmarked; but unmarked does not
mean unrecognizable, particularly since, as the district court
correctly observed, a Crown Victoria is 'easily associated with
police even when unmarked.'"]; US v. Nash (7C
1989) 876 F2 1359, 1360 [dark blue Dodge with several antennae and
police lights on the rear shelf was "clearly was identifiable as a
police car"]; US v. Miller (1C 1978) 589 F2
1117, 1123, fn.1 [suspect "accelerated rapidly" when he saw the
unmarked vehicle which had a "flashing light" and the deputy was
"in uniform"].

[31] USSC: Illinois v.
Wardlow (2000) 528 US 119, 124 ["Headlong flight—wherever
it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion; it is not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of
such."]; California v. Hodari (1991) 499 US 621,
623, fn.1 ["The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Quoting
Proverbs 28:1]. CAL: P v. Souza (1994) 9 C4
224, 235 ["flight from police is a proper consideration-and indeed
can be a key factor-in determining whether in a particular case
the police have sufficient cause to detain"]; P v.
Mims (1992) 9 CA4 1244, 1249 ["An inference that an
individual is engaging or has just engaged in criminal conduct may
be drawn where that individual, knowing that police are
approaching, flees or engages in other activity indicative of an
effort to avoid apprehension or police contact."]. OTHER:
US v. Babilonia (2C 2917) 854 F3 163, 179 ["We have long
recognized flight as an appropriate factor supporting a finding of
probable cause to search a vehicle after it is stopped."].

[32] USSC: Illinois v.
Wardlow (2000) 528 US 119, 124 [flight plus "presence in an
area of heavy narcotics trafficking"]. CAL: P v.
Souza (1994) 9 C4 224, 235-36 ["An inference of guilt from
flight" may be found "only in those instances in which there is
other indication of criminality, such as evidence that the
defendant fled from a crime scene or after being accused of a
crime. To put it succinctly, these authorities rely on 'flight
plus.'"]; P v. Britton (2001) 91 CA4 1112, 1118
["More than simple unprovoked flight occurred here. Rather, Lipton
testified to what might be dubbed 'flight plus.'"].
9th CIR: US v. Smith (9C 2011) 633 F3
889, 894 [flight in "high-crime neighborhood"].

[33] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of additional circumstances that, when combined with
flight at the approach of officers, were found to constitute
reasonable suspicion:

• After making a hand-to-hand transaction in a Jeep, the
suspects saw the officers approaching, at which point they had
"expressions of shock on their faces and they tossed something
into the backseat," then they "exited the Jeep and quickly walked
away." US v. Davis (3C 2013) 726 F3 434, 440.

• Suspect ran after being "spotted in a high-crime area, late
at night, wearing the color of a local gang" and grabbed his
waistband as if to "conceal some type of evidence or retrieve a
weapon." US v. Guardado (10C 2012) 699 F3 1220, 1225.
Compare P v. Flores (2019) 38 CA5 617, 634-35 [flight plus
high gang area did not constitute reasonable suspicion where there
was nothing else; "The detectives embarked upon this expedition in
the hope that something might turn up"].

• A passenger in a car that was being pursued by police
bailed out. About a minute later an officer saw a man "half a
block away, walking alone." He matched the passenger's
description. The man fled when the officer shined a spotlight at
him.
P v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 CA4 1540, 1544.

• "Here, Officer Strickland knew the following facts: (1) he
was in a high-crime area, particularly known for drug activity;
(2) Officer Strickland observed Defendant and another man engaged
in an apparent hand-to-hand transaction; (3) Defendant ran when
Strickland exited his car; (4) as Defendant was fleeing he threw
several items to the ground." US v. Jones (6C
2012) 673 F3 497, 502.

• A suspected drug dealer in a high-crime area ran when
officers stopped their van; he then ran into a house and locked
himself in a bathroom. P v. Magee (2011) 194 CA4 178, 191,
fn.12. Compare US v. Brown (9C 2019) 925 F3 1150 [suspect
ran when he saw officers, but the only evidence against him came
from an anonymous tip].

• As officers in unmarked cars entered a parking lot in an
area "known for heavy narcotics trafficking," the defendant "began
to walk away from the police cars"; then, when he saw the officers
get out of their cars, he "began to run away at a fast pace."
US v. Dykes (DCC 2005) 406 F3 717.

• Flight by several occupants of an apartment house known for
drug trafficking, plus an anonymous tip of drug dealing.
US v. Lane (6C 1990) 909 F2 895.

• Flight by two men sitting at a table in the backyard of a
house; on the table was narcotics paraphernalia. P v.
Britton (2001) 91 CA4 1112, 1118-19 ["The evasive conduct
by two people instead of just one person, we believe, bolsters the
reasonableness of the suspicion that there is criminal activity
brewing."].

• Flight by two men walking down a street at 3:30 a.m.; the
men were carrying backpacks "stuffed with objects."
Crofoot v. Superior Court (1981) 121 CA3 717,
724.

• At 4 a.m., an officer investigating a report of a prowler
in the neighborhood saw a man emerge from a dark area between a
home and a plastics company. When the man saw the officer, he ran.
P v. Superior Court (Johnson) (1971) 15 CA3 146.
Also see Sibron v. New York (1968) 392 US 40,
67 [flight by prowler]; P v. Williams (1967) 67 C2
226, 229 [silent burglar alarm].

• At 3 a.m., an officer on patrol in a "high crime" area saw
a man standing near a car, talking to the occupants. The car was
parked in an area of "almost complete darkness." When the officer
shined his spotlight at the car, the two occupants "bent down
toward the floorboard" and the man "took off running."
P v. Souza (1994) 9 C4 224, 240.

• A man who matched a general description of a burglar who
had just broken into a house about a block away ran when he saw an
officer. In re Rafael V. (1982) 132 CA3 977, 982-83.

• Two men arriving on a flight from Miami and exhibiting
characteristics of the "drug courier profile" ran when approached
by police and DEA agents. US v. Haye (4C
1987) 825 F2 32.

• A man who approached a stolen Porsche as if to open the
door spotted a uniformed deputy and "turned tail and ran."
P v. Superior Court (Quinn) (1978) 83 CA3 609, 615.

• Narcotics officers in an area known for "heavy narcotics
trafficking" saw a man holding an opaque bag. The man looked in
the direction of the officers and immediately ran.
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 US 119.

• Suspected hand-to-hand drug transaction in high drug area,
plus a suspect shouted "police." P v. Mims (1992) 9
CA4 1244, 1250.

• Suspect was "showing some object" to some other people
outside a dance hall when someone yelled "rollers" and the
defendant "quickly went back into the dance hall. P v.
Brown (1990) 216 CA3 1442, 1446.

• Officers dispatched to an anonymous report of drug dealing
inside an apartment building saw the suspect in the hallway acting
suspiciously; then he ran. P v. Johnson (1991) 231
CA3 1, 10.

• Suspected drug dealer, upon seeing the officers "spun
around" and ran, yelling "Jesus Christ, the cops." P v.
Bigham (1975) 49 CA3 73, 78.

• Two men arriving on a flight from Miami and exhibiting
characteristics of the "drug courier profile" ran when approached
by police and DEA agents. US v. Haye (4C
1987) 825 F2 32.

• Flight in response to a ruse: It is highly suspicious that
a suspect fled from his home or other place shortly after
receiving a phone call from an officer posing as an associate who
warned him that the police were coming with a search or arrest
warrant.
P v. Rand (1972) 23 CA3 579, 583; P v.
Porras (1979) 99 CA3 874.

• Suspect's companion flees: Although the suspect did not
flee from officers, it is relevant that his companion did.
US v. Briggs (10C 2013) 720 F3 1281, 1289;
US v. Cotton (8C 2015) 782 F3 392, 395.

[34] USSC: Sibron v.
New York (1968) 392 US 40, 66. CAL: P v.
Mendoza (1986) 176 CA3 1127, 1131 ["An individual who
chooses to run from an officer under suspicious circumstances may
by that act provide probable cause to detain or arrest."];
P v. Messervy (1985) 175 CA3 243, 247 ["The
People make a cogent point when they state that the deputy's
"reasonable suspicion deepened into probable cause" when Messervy
evaded the deputies and failed to stop."]. OTHER:
US v. Smith (8C 2011) 648 F3 654, 659
[reasonable suspicion became probable cause when a suspected bank
robber ran from officers].

[35] CAL: P v.
Allen (1980) 109 CA3 981, 987 ["Since appellant knew he was
going to be detained, and since the detention would clearly have
been lawful, it was the officers' duty to cause the detention to
be made. The actions of appellant (running and hiding) caused a
delay in the performance of Officer Barron's duty."]; P v.
Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 13, fn.2 ["Given their right to
forcibly detain, California precedent arguably would have allowed
the officers to arrest for flight which unlawfully delayed
the performance of their duties."].

[36] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Woodrum (1C 2000) 202 F3 1, 7. USSC:
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 US 119, 124
["evasive behavior" is a "pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion"].

[37] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of attempts to hide from officers:

• A traffic stop. As the officer approached the car, the
passenger was "slouching in his seat" which suggested that he was
trying to "minimize his visibility as the officer approached."
US v. Weaver (2C 2021) 9 F4 129, 148.

• At 10 p.m., two officers saw the defendant standing behind
a car; "when he sees them, [he] goes around and ducks behind a
car. The man looks up, ducks behind the car again, and then ducks
down again"; he claimed he was tying a shoe but the court ruled
that his actions were demonstrated an attempt to hide from
officers].
P v. Flores (2021) 60 CA5 978, 986.

• At 4:40 a.m., officers saw a man in an open gas station;
the man was "glancing around the corner" and pulled "his head back
as if he were trying to hide." US v. Glover (4C 2011) 662
F3 694, 695.

• Upon seeing the officers, a young man standing between two
parked cars in an alley "stepped behind a large dumpster and then
continued to move around it in such a fashion that he blocked
himself from the officers' view." In re
Michael S. (1983) 141 CA3 814, 816.

• The officers observed Thompson concealing himself behind
the fence and peering out toward the street." US v.
Thompson (DCC 2000) 234 F3 725, 729.

• When their parked car was spotlighted by an officer, "two
people in the front seat immediately bent down toward the
floorboard." P v. Souza (1994) 9 C4 224, 240.

• Four men in a parked car were "ducking up and down."
P v. Nonnette (1990) 221 CA3 659, 668.

• On a logical escape route from a robbery that had just
occurred, officers saw a car containing four men. As the car
passed the patrol car, two of the men ducked down, then "popped
their heads up two or three times and then ducked down out of
sight." P v. Overten (1994) 28 CA4 1497,
1504.

• When officers spotlighted a car full of teenagers at 3:30
a.m., one of them "ducked down in the front seat and put his arm
up over his head bringing his jacket with it trying to shield
himself from the view of the officers." In re
Jonathan M. (1981) 117 CA3 530, 535.

[38] CAL: P v. Valdez (1987) 196
CA3 799, 807 ["Torres's act of turning away from the police is at
best mildly suspicious."].

[39] OTHER: US v. Mays (7C 2016)
819 F3 951, 957 ["Walking away from the police hardly amounts to
the headlong flight considered in Wardlow and of course
would not give rise to reasonable suspicion by itself, even in a
high-crime area, but it is a factor that can be considered in the
totality of the circumstances."]; US v.
Valentine (3C 2000) 232 F3 350, 357.

[40] EXAMPLES: The following reactions
were considered suspicious.

• Suspects "suddenly changed course" and "increased their
pace" as "the officers' vehicle came into view."
US v. Briggs (10C 2013) 720 F3 1281, 1286.

• Two suspected drug dealers "looked at the black and white
sheriff's unit the deputies were driving and started walking away
in different directions." P v. Boissard (1992) 5 CA4
972, 975. Also see Florida v.
Rodriguez (1984) 469 US 1, 6; US v.
Brignoni-Ponce (1975) 422 US 873, 885.

• When a suspected robber saw the officer, he "abruptly began
jaywalking across the street." US v.
Jones (8C 2008) 535 F3 886.

• "Defendant leaving the Jeep when the officer approached
only added to [the officer's] level of suspicion."
P v. Moore (2021) 64 CA5 291, 299.

• As a murder suspect drove up to his girlfriend's house and
started to pull into the driveway, he apparently saw that
sheriff's deputies were there, at which point he backed up into
the street and took off. P v. Turnage (1975) 45 CA3
201, 205.

• A man standing alone at 4 a.m. next to a business in which
a silent alarm had just been triggered began walking away as
officers arrived. P v. Lloyd (1992) 4 CA4 724, 734.
Also see P v. Smith (1981) 120 CA3 282, 286.

• Suspected drug smuggler near Mexico border drove along a
rough, little-traveled route commonly used to avoid a Border
Patrol checkpoint. US v. Arvizu (2002)
534 US 266.

• Officers on patrol at 3 a.m. spotted a car in an alley. As
they turned around to follow the car, the driver "accelerated his
vehicle and made two quick turns and an abrupt stop, hurriedly
dousing his auto lights." In re Eduardo G. (1980)
108 CA3 745, 754.

• After engaging in an apparent hand-to-hand drug
transaction, the suspect looked at the approaching police car and
changed his course of travel and walked away. When the car again
neared him, he again altered his course and proceeded in a
different direction. Flores v.
Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 219, 224.

• "When first observed, appellant appeared headed for a
pawnshop area, but on the visible interest of the police in his
movements he reversed direction and went into a park."
P v. Manis (1969) 268 CA2 653, 660.

• When an officer approached three suspects, one of them
attempted to disassociate himself from the group; i.e., he
"dropped back behind [the others] and changed his direction of
movement." P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849, 882.

• "Defendants' starting to walk away from the window as the
police car's lights were turned on would have impelled such
questioning as a matter of a policeman's duty." P v.
Koelzer (1963) 222 CA2 20, 26.

• Suspect tried to hide himself from surveillance camera in a
post office. US v. Gill (9C 2002) 280 F3 923.

• Suspect opened the door to his house, saw the officers
outside, and quickly shut the door. US v.
Hauk (10C 2005) 412 F3 1179, 1192.

• "As soon as the officers entered the courtyard and moved
toward the group [of gang members standing near new gang
graffiti], the group split into two segments and apparently
attempted to leave the area in two different directions."
In re Stephen L. (1984) 162 CA3 257, 260.

• Upon seeing officers, a suspected drug dealer "turned and
walked rapidly away." P v. Divito (1984) 152
CA3 11, 13.

[41] EXAMPLE FROM:
P v. Ochoa (1970) 9 CA3 500, 502. Also see
P v. Lee (1987) 194 CA3 975, 983; P v. McLean (1970)
6 CA3 300, 306; P v. Atmore (1970) 13 CA3 244, 246;
P v. Lopez (2004) 119 CA4 132, 134.

[42] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Patterson (2022) 25 F4 123, [2022 WL 333248].

[43] USSC:
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 US 119, 124 ["Our cases have
recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion."];
Sibron v. New York (1968) 392 US 40, 66-67. OTHER:
US v. Weaver (2C 2021) 9 F4 129, 147-48 ["We use the term
'furtive' advisedly here to describe specific testimony that
Weaver engaged in conduct suggesting he was hiding something from
the police."]. NOTE: In the past, some courts in California
downplayed the importance of furtive gestures because of the
possibility there might have been an innocent explanation for
them. See, for example, P v. Superior Court (Kiefer) (1970)
3 C3 807, 823. This view has been rejected. See
US v. Sokolow (1989) 490 US 1, 10;
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213;
P v. Green (1994) 25 CA4 1107, 1111.

[44] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of suspicious attempts to hide an object:

• Officers saw a group of men looking at a TV set inside the
trunk of a car. When the men saw the officers, one of them slammed
the trunk shut, then they all started walking away. P v.
Gravatt (1971) 22 CA3 133, 137.

• As the officers approached the car, they saw the driver
"pushing a white box under the front seat and [the passenger]
putting a metallic tin under the front seat by the box.
P v. Superior Court (Vega) (1969) 272 CA2 383, 387.

• "The officers saw appellant reach into the back of his
waistband and secrete in his hands an object which he had
retrieved." In re John C. (1978) 80 CA3 814, 819.

• Upon seeing officers, the suspect "threw a small plastic
bag onto the ground." US v. Stigler (8C 2009) 574 F3 1008,
1009.

• As an officer entered a basement to conduct a consensual
search of a residence, the defendant "had his back to [the
officer], but [the officer] could see him place something on the
headboard of a bed and cover it with a stocking cap." US
v. Hernandez-Leon (8C 2004) 379 F3 1024, 1028.

• Officers on patrol saw three men, and one of them was
showing something to the others; when the man saw the officers, he
put the object in his pants pocket and started walking away.
P v. Divito (1984) 152 CA3 11, 13. Also see
P v. Holloway (1985) 176 CA3 150, 156 ["The appearance of a
police officer, even when unexpected, would not lead an innocent
citizen ... to attempt to hurl his personal property into the
night."].

• While officers were executing a warrant to search the
suspect's house for evidence in a burglary, the suspect grabbed a
diary, yelled "that's mine" and started to leave the room.
P v. Miller (1976) 60 CA3 849, 854 [it was
reasonable for the officer to conclude "that defendant feared
discovery of the book or notebook because it contained or would
lead to incriminating evidence"].

• While an officer was questioning a suspect who was sitting
in a car, a plastic box containing a brown substance fell from the
visor and landed on the floorboard. When the officer picked it up,
the suspect grabbed it and tried to shove it under the front seat,
yelling, "This is an illegal search. You can't have it."
P v. Torralva (1971) 17 CA3 686, 689. Also
see US v. Ramdihall (1C 2017) 859 F3 80, 92 [the officer
"observed Ramdihall surreptitiously closing the console to conceal
a plastic baggie"].

[45] EXAMPLES: The following furtive
gestures were deemed relevant even though officers saw nothing in
the suspect's hands:

• A traffic stop. As the officer approached the vehicle, the
defendant, a passenger, "slouched down and shifted his hips in his
seat." Before stopping the car, the officer had noticed that the
passenger "gave a noticeable upward tug to his waistband."
US v. Weaver (2C 2021) 9 F4 129, 147 ["It is a reasonable
inference that an 'upward tug' [of the person's pants] may be
needed to counteract the downward pull of something else, and it
takes no specialized expertise to understand that a firearm would
be weighty enough to do just that."].

• "Williams's nervousness, combined with his repeated
reaching towards his front pocket despite [the officer's] commands
not to, gave rise to reasonable suspicion that he might be armed
and presently dangerous." US v. Williams (8C 2022) 39 F4
1034, 1042.

• Two men involved in a hand-to-hand exchange suddenly put
their hands in their pocket. P v. Mims (1992) 9 CA4 1244,
1246.

• "Shocked expressions, and tossing motions."
US v. Davis (3C 2013) 726 F3 434, 440.

• Upon seeing officers, the suspect quickly made a
"hand-to-mouth movement, as though secreting drugs." P v.
Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 12.

• "When the officers approached the vehicle to speak with
Griffith he was observed reaching under the front seat as if
attempting to hide something." US v.
Griffith (8C 2008) 533 F3 979, 984.

• As the suspect was looking for vehicle registration he
"probed the [glove] compartment with his right hand, he shielded
the interior with his left hand. When he moved his right hand over
to the left potion of the compartment, he slid his other hand
across to the other side of the compartment." P v.
Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 264.

• According to an informant, the detainee might be armed;
when officers saw him sitting in a car and approached, he made a
furtive gesture as if he was hiding something under the seat.
US v. Graham (6C 2007) 483 F3 431.

• When officers ordered a detainee to put his hands outside
the car window he "reached back inside the car toward his
waistband."
US v. Price (DCC 2005) 409 F3 436, 442.

• "In addition to [the driver's] movement, we have the
contemporaneous sound of metal on metal and the officer's fear
created by the increased level of gang activity in the area."
P v. King (1989) 216 CA3 1237.

• The officer saw "defendant's left hand above his shoulder
but his right hand remained near the right hand pocket of his
jacket."
P v. Wigginton (1973) 35 CA3 732, 737.

• A passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation
"lifted himself up from the seat with both arms in his rear
portion of his body behind his back, both arms went up and down
rapidly."
P v. Clayton (1970) 13 CA3 335.

• An officer making a traffic stop "saw Davis [a passenger]
rise off the seat and place his hand behind his back as if he were
placing something underneath or behind him."
US v. Davis (8C 2006) 457 F3 817, 822. Also see US
v. Hunnicutt (10C 1998) 135 F3 1345, 1349 ["after
the stop, the passengers repeatedly moved back and forth and
leaned over."].

• Hand of "shots fired" suspect was concealed in a jacket
pocket. P v. Woods (1970) 6 CA3 832, 838.

• Suspect appeared to be concealing something in his hand.
P v. Brown (1989) 213 CA3 187, 190.

• Suspected drug dealer who was sitting inside his car kept
his left hand hidden from the officer who detained him.
P v. Butler (2003) 111 CA4 150.

• Suspect "continued to make 'shoving down' motions, gestures
that were the very opposite of complying with Fulton's order, and
which a reasonable officer could have thought were actually
suggestive of hiding (or retrieving) a gun." US v.
Johnson (DCC 2000) 212 F3 1313, 1316-17.

• Bicycle rider tried to stuff something into the handlebar
of his bicycle after running a stop sign and refusing an officer's
order to stop. P v. Allen (2000) 78 CA4 445, 450.

• After officers knocked on the door and an occupant
apparently saw them, they heard the "sounds of people moving
things around the room." US v. Crapser (9C
2007) 472 F3 1141, 1147.

• As the suspect was looking in her purse for ID, she
"attempted to obstruct [the officer's] view." US v.
Burnette (9C 1983) 698 F2 1038, 1048.

• "Defendant was holding his hands clasped together in front
of a bulge in the waistband in the middle of his waist. [The
officer] thought defendant was trying to hide a weapon."
P v. Superior Court (Brown) (1980) 111 CA3 948, 956.

• Defendant "was keeping his right side turned from the
officer's view and appeared to have his right hand in his jacket
pocket." In re Glenn R. (1970) 7 CA3 558.

• "Before and after the exchange, defendant walked over and
reached into an apparent hiding place. This conduct suggested drug
sales." P v. Limon (1993) 17 CA4 524, 533.

• The suspect "appeared to be actively attempting to conceal
something from the officers' view. US v.
Taylor (1C 2007) 511 F3 87, 92.

• The driver "appeared to raise himself up from the car seat
and began reaching towards the floor." US v.
Nash (7C 1989) 876 F2 1359.

[46] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Orozco (4C 2022) 41 F4 403, 419.

[47] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of situations in which the suspects' sudden movements
toward pockets that were deemed relevant:

• Hand of "shots fired" suspect was concealed in jacket
pocket.
P v. Woods (1970) 6 CA3 832, 838.

• Suspected drug dealer kept his hand hidden from the
officer.
P v. Butler (2003) 111 CA4 150.

• Hand of "shots fired" suspect was concealed in jacket
pocket.
P v. Woods (1970) 6 CA3 832, 838.

• Assault suspect had his hands in pocket.
US v. Simmons (2C 2009) 560 F3 98, 108.

• When asked if he was carrying a weapon, the suspect
suddenly reached into his pocket. US v. Foster (4C 2016)
824 F3 84, 90.

• Suspect was "grabbing at his waistline" which indicated to
the officer that he was carrying a concealed weapon.
US v. Briggs (10C 2013) 720 F3 1281, 1291.

• When a drug trafficking suspect apparently recognized the
men approaching him were plainclothes officers, he "put his hands
in his pockets and started 'digging' in them. He also began to
turn away from the officers and appeared to be deciding whether to
run away. US v. Mays (6C 2011) 643 F3 537,
543 ["a sudden and alarming change in defendant's demeanor"].

• When a man suspected of selling drugs to a passing motorist
saw an officer, he "abruptly withdrew from the (buyer's) car
window" and the driver took off. US v. Lopez-Garcia (11C
2009) 565 F3 1306, 1314.

• When a suspected drug dealer turned toward the patrol car,
he suddenly put his hand inside his jacket. P v.
Lee (1987) 194 CA3 975, 983.

• After the suspect produced an I.D. card from his rear
pocket, he made "a sudden gesture with his right hand to his left
T-shirt pocket." P v. McLean (1970) 6 CA3 300, 306.

• The officer testified: "Like I said, all three suspects
alighted from the vehicle almost simultaneously. They all got out
on us." P v. Hubbard (1970) 9 CA3 827, 830.

• "When defendant [a suspected heroin dealer] suddenly put
his hand into the bulging pocket, [the officer] reasonably
believed he was, or could be, reaching for a weapon." P v.
Rosales (1989) 211 CA3 325, 330. Compare P v.
Valdez (1987) 196 CA3 799, 807 ["Torres's act of turning
away from the police is at best mildly suspicious."];
Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) 444 US 85, 93
["[Ybarra] made no gestures or other actions indicative of an
intent to commit an assault"].

• "Just after [the officer] started the search around
defendant's waistband, defendant abruptly grabbed for his outside
upper jacket pocket." P v. Atmore (1970) 13 CA3 244,
246.

• "Upon the officers' approach, defendant lunged forward
thrusting his right hand into one of the bag's open pockets."
P v. Flores (1979) 100 CA3 221, 226.

• "When the officer approached the defendant he reached into
his right rear pocket and appeared to be trying to get something
out, and it was a jerking motion as though he were trying
desperately to get something out of his pocket." P v.
Superior Court (Holmes) (1971) 15 CA3 806, 808-809.

• "Appellant was combative and reached towards the front of
his pants several times." P v. Lopez (2004) 119 CA4
132, 134.

• "Defendant got out of his car swiftly and walked quickly
toward the squad car before the officer had the chance to get out
of his car." US v. Mattarolo (9C 1999) 191 F3
1082, 1087. ALSO SEE: US v.
Flatter (9C 2006) 456 F3 1154, 1158 ["We have also
considered sudden movements by defendants, or repeated attempts to
reach for an object that was not immediately visible, as actions
that can give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a defendant is
armed."].

• When the suspects saw the patrol car, "their conversation
ceased and their hands went into their pockets very rapidly."
P v. Handy (1971) 16 CA3 858, 860.

• As the officer approached him, the suspect "shoved his hand
into his right trouser pocket quite rapidly." P v.
Ochoa (1970) 9 CA3 500, 502.

• When a known drug user spotted an officer, he "moved his
hand down to his right front pants pocket," like a 'kid with his
hand caught in the cookie jar.'" P v.
Gonzales (1989) 216 CA3 1185, 1189.

• As officers pulled up to a car in which a suspected drug
dealer was sitting, the suspect "looked shocked, fumbled with the
[vehicle's] door, and attempted to dart out of the car"
US v. Johnson (DCC 2008) 519 F3 478.

[48] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of nervousness that reasonably appeared suspicious:

• "Visibly elevated heart rate, shallow breathing, and
repetitive gesticulations, such as wiping his face and scratching
his head." US v. Riley (8C 2012) 684 F3 758, 763.

• "Shaking hands, labored breathing, a visible pulse in his
neck [and] red blotches on his face." US v.
Mayo (8C 2010) 627 F3 709, 713-14.

• Suspect was "shaking uncontrollably." US v.
Simpson (10C 2010) 609 F3 1140, 1148.

• When an officer told a murder suspect that he knew he had
threatened the victim, the suspect's "neck started to visibly
throb." P v. Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136, 1159.

• When the search began, the suspect's demeanor "changed from
calm to nervous." P v. Allen (2000) 78 CA4
445, 451.

• "His hands were shaking, his voice was cracking, he could
not sit still, and his heart was beating so fast that [the
officer] was able to see his chest jerk." US v.
Williams (10C 2005) 403 F3 1203, 1205.

• "Very nervous" and "his hands were shaking." US
v. Crapser (9C 2007) 472 F3 1141, 1144.

• "Shocked look." P v. Garcia (1981) 121 CA3
239, 245.

• "Perspiring and shaking." P v. Methey (1991)
227 CA3 349, 358.

• "Visibly trembling." US v. Holzman (9C
1989) 871 F2 1496, 1504.

• "Extreme nervousness, profuse shaking." US
v. Hanlon (8C 2005) 401 F3 926, 929.

• "Perspiring, swallowing and breathing heavily, and
constantly moving his feet or fingers." US v.
Bloomfield (8C 1994) 40 F3 910, 913.

• "His face started to turn pale, his hands began to shake,
and he did not take his eyes off of [the officer]" P v.
Brown (1985) 169 CA3 159, 162.

• "He kept looking around as he approached the patrol car,
appearing nervous and anxious to leave the area." P v.
Guajardo (1994) 23 CA4 1738, 1743.

• He "was more nervous than one would expect in a routine
traffic stop, and his failure to meet [the officer's] gaze…
The totality of circumstances included Brown's repeatedly glancing
back towards the car in question"]. US v.
Brown (7C 1999) 188 F3 860, 865.

• "Burks's nervousness and hesitancy in answering questions
gave further basis for suspicion." P v.
Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96, 103.

[49] USSC: Florida v.
Rodriguez (1984) 469 US 1, 3 ["Let's get out of here"].
CAL: P v. Bigham (1975) 49 CA3 73, 78 ["Jesus
Christ, the cops"]; Pierson v.
Superior Court (1970) 8 CA3 510, 516 ["Bobby, Bobby, run,
it's the narcs"]; P v. Vasquez (1983) 138 CA3 995,
999 ["Oh shit. Don't say anything"]; P v.
Mims (1992) 9 CA4 1244, 1250 ["Cops!"] P v.
Lee (1987) 194 CA3 975, 980 ["Rollers!"]; P v.
Wigginton (1973) 35 CA3 732, 736 ["The man is across the
street."].

[50] CAL: P v. Brown (1990) 216
CA3 1442, 1450; P v. Vasquez (1983) 138 CA3 995, 999.
OTHER: US v. Cook (1C 2002) 277 F3 82, 87 [suspects
broke off their hand-to-hand exchange and separated when they saw
approaching officers]; US v. Briggs (10C 2013) 720 F3 1281,
1289.

[51] EXAMPLES: The following reactions
to seeing officers were deemed suspicious.

•Defendant "appeared to be staring at [the vehicle] longer
than typically one would look at a vehicle, and he continued to
stare"]. US v. Weaver (2C 2021) 9 F4 129, 135.

• Defendant was "constantly checking the mirrors and talking
on his mobile phone as he looked back at the unmarked car behind
them." US v. Sloan (7C 2011) 636 F3 845, 850.

• "The defendant upon seeing the [police] car did not give it
the passing glance of the upright, law abiding citizen. His eyes
were glued on that car." Flores v.
Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 219, 224.

• The officer "noticed that [the suspect] appeared to be
startled by him, had a 'look of fear in his eyes' and then quickly
looked away." P v. Fields (1984) 159 CA3 555, 564.

• The suspects "stared intently at the officers. [One of the
officers] characterized it as just about 'eyeball contact' and
explained that in his experience people who had shown that much
attention to him as a police officer turned out to have been up to
something." P v. Joines (1970) 11 CA3 259, 263.

• Six suspects inside a moving vehicle all turned to look at
the officer as they drove past him. P v. Soun (1995)
34 CA4 1499, 1513.

• "Scrutinizing the movements of the officers." P v.
Harris (1980) 105 CA3 204, 212.

• The suspect "twice looked back at the marked police car."
P v. Juarez (1973) 35 CA3 631, 635.

• The officer "observed both men continually scanning the
area, and monitoring [the officer's] movements once they were
aware of his presence." US v. Holzman (9C
1989) 871 F2 1496, 1502.

• After officers lit up the car, the backseat passenger
started moving around and looked back several times at the police
car.
P v. Hunter (2005) 133 CA4 371, 379, fn.5. Compare
P v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 CA4 817, 828 [suspect's
"kneading of the steering wheel, even if indicative of
nervousness" was not sufficient]; P v. Dickey (1994)
21 CA4 952, 956 [run-of-the-mill nervousness]; US
v. Chavez-Valenzuela (9C 2001) 268 F3 719,
726 ["No circuit has held that nervousness alone suffices to
create reasonable suspicion"]; US v.
Brown (7C 1999) 188 F3 860, 865 ["Nervousness or refusal to
make eye contact alone will not justify a [detention]."].

[52] OTHER: US v. Martin (8C
2021) 999 F3 636, 640 [the car's occupants "did not acknowledge an
overwhelming police presence"].

[53] CAL: P v.
Valenzuela (1994) 28 CA4 817, 828 ["Failure to meet the
border agent's gaze, and kneading of the steering wheel, even if
indicative of nervousness, does not provide a sufficient reason to
suspect defendant was in the country illegally or doing anything
else illegal."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Montero-Camargo (9C 2000) 208 F3 1122, 1136 ["Although eye
contact, or the lack thereof, may be considered as a factor
establishing reasonable suspicion, we have noted that whether the
contact is suspicious or not is highly subjective and must be
evaluated in light of the circumstances of each case. The
skepticism with which this factor is treated is in large part due
to the fact that reliance upon 'suspicious' looks can so easily
devolve into a case of damned if you do, equally damned if you
don't."]; US v. Mallides (9C 1973) 473 F2
859, 861, fn.4 ["Here, the officers concluded that not looking was
suspicious. But in another case (P v.
Williams (1971) 20 CA3 590), the officer testified that
defendant's looking at an approaching police car was
suspicious."]. OTHER: US v. Bowman (4C 2018) 884 F3
200, 215 ["There is nothing intrinsically suspicious or nefarious
about the occupant of a vehicle not making eye contact with an
officer during a traffic stop."]; US v. Broomfield (7C
2005) 417 F3 654, 655 [noting that the importance of eye contact
is purely subjective and easily skewed by police officers to
support their view of a situation]. BUT ALSO SEE:
Nicacio v. INS (9C 1986) 797 F2 700, 704 ["Although routine
reliance on lack of eye contact is inappropriate, we also
recognize that special circumstances may make innocent avoidance
of eye contact improbable and thus a factor"]; US
v. Hanlon (8C 2005) 401 F3 926, 930 [suspect's
failure to make eye contact "at any time" during a traffic stop
was a relevant factor].

[54] USSC:
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 243, fn.13 ["seemingly
innocent activity became suspicious in the light of the initial
tip"]; US v. Sokolow (1989) 490 US 1, 9 ["Any one of these
factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite
consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they
amount to reasonable suspicion."];
Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009) 557 US
364, 371 [the distinction between criminal and noncriminal conduct
"cannot rigidly control" because probable cause and reasonable
suspicion "are fluid concepts that take their substantive content
from the particular contexts in which they are being assessed."];
Massachusetts v. Upton (1984) 466 US 727, 731-32 [the
Supreme Court rejected the state court's reasoning that, because
"each item of corroborative evidence either related to innocent,
nonsuspicious conduct or related to an event that took place in
public," probable cause did not exist]. CAL:
P v. Glenos (1992) 7 CA4 1201, 1207 ["Despite Freon not
being a controlled substance, it is unlikely an individual would
have a legitimate use for the quantity of Freon Smith transported
to defendant's property."]. OTHER: US v. Ruidiaz (1C
2008) 529 F3 25, 30 ["a fact that is innocuous in itself may in
combination with other innocuous facts take on added
significance"].

[55] USSC: Brown
v. Texas (1979) 443 US 47, 52 [officer testified "that the
situation in the alley 'looked suspicious,' but he was unable to
point to any facts supporting that conclusion"]. OTHER:
US v. Foster (4C 2011) 634 F3 243, 248 ["an officer and the
Government must do more than simply label a behavior as
'suspicious' to make it so"].

[56] EXAMPLES: Examples of situations
in which the time of night was deemed relevant:

• 8:30 a.m.; Officers saw two men in a car apparently asleep
or passed out. US v. Harrington (1C 2022) 56 F4 195, 201
[the officer "was alerted via a phone call that two men were
passed out at 8:30 a.m. on a weekday morning in a parked vehicle;
observed two men passed out or sleeping in the vehicle identified
in the phone call at an unusual time"].

• 2:35 a.m.: Officer saw a man "exiting from darkened private
property where valuable merchandise was located." P v.
Allen (1975) 50 CA3 896, 901.

• 3:30 a.m.: Two men who were walking in a business area
started running when they saw a patrol car approaching.
Crofoot v. Superior Court (1981) 121 CA3 717,
724 ["the fact that the hour of the stop was 3:30 a.m. adds
something to the equation"].

• Midnight: Officer saw two occupied cars parked behind the
sheriff's warehouse; there were no homes or places of business in
the area. P v. Lovejoy (1970) 12 CA3 883,
886.

• 11:40 p.m.: Officer saw three people inside a car parked
"in front of a darkened home" in a neighborhood in which two to
three burglaries had been occurring each week. P v.
Schoennauer (1980) 103 CA3 398, 407.

• Midnight: On a "dark" and "secluded" road, an officer saw
an occupied pickup truck "nosed into the driveway of a fenced
construction storage area," there was a big box in the back of the
truck. US v. Mattarolo (9C 1999) 191 F3 1982.

• 12:15 a.m.: Officers saw two men "peering" into the front
window of a closed radio shop"; when the men saw the officers,
they started to walk away. P v. Koelzer (1963) 222
CA2 20.

• 3:10 a.m.: "The stop occurred late at night, when few
pedestrians were around." US v. Quinn (8C 2016) 812 F3 694,
698.

• 2:30 a.m.: Officers saw "three people in a car driving
around a high crime area" and "the car proceeded along two
residential blocks, slowing intermittently in a manner that an
observing officer thought consistent with preparing for a burglary
or drive-by shooting." US v. Rice (10C 2007) 483 F3 1079.

[57] USSC: Terry v.
Ohio (1968) 392 US 1, 23. CAL: P v.
Remiro (1979) 89 CA3 809, 828. 9th CIR: US
v. Johnson (9C 2009) 581 F3 994. OTHER:
US v. Howard (7C 2018) 883 F3 703, 708 [the Mercedes "sat
in the parking lot in front of the store for an unnatural period
of time prior to the robbery," "it [then] drove to the back of the
store just before the robber entered the store's rear door"; after
the robbery, as the robber ran past the Mercedes, it "zoomed
[away] at a high rate of speed'"]; Green v. Newport (7C
2017) 868 F3 629, 634 [car drove around O'Reilly Auto Parts store
about five times shortly before closing; recent robbery at store];
US v. Glover (4C 2011) 662 F3 694, 698.

[58] OTHER: US v.
Thompson (DCC 2000) 234 F3 725, 729 ["the officers observed
Thompson concealing himself behind the fence and peering out
toward the street [and] he was doing so in the parking lot of a
closed restaurant at 3 a.m."].

[59] OTHER: US v. Matchett (11C
2015) 802 F3 1185, 1192.

[60] EXAMPLES: The following conduct
was considered suspicious:

• As a suspected drug purchaser was leaving a drug house, he
kept "looking side to side in a hurried manner." P v.
Green (1994) 25 CA4 1107, 1109, 1111

• A suspected drug dealer "looked about furtively, and
quickly transferred into the garage tubular bags which contained
smaller bundles." US v. Tobin (11C 1991) 923
F2 1506, 1510. Also see Flores v.
Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 219, 223 ["Those involved in
the narcotics trade are a skittish group—literally hunted animals
to whom everyone is an enemy until proven to the contrary."].

• A suspected drug dealer "scouted the area before entering
the apartment." P v. Avalos (1996) 47 CA4
1569, 1577.

• A suspected drug dealer "loitered about and looked
furtively in all directions." P v. Carrillo (1995)
37 CA4 1662, 1668.

• A suspected burglar "alighted from the vehicle and looked
around apprehensively for quite some period of time" P v.
Moore (1970) 13 CA3 424, 431.

• Two men leaving a jewelry store (after robbing it) kept
looking back at the store. P v. Dolliver
(1986) 181 CA3 49.

[61] CAL: P v. $497,590 (1997)
58 CA4 145, 148 [Countersurveillance driving "is a common practice
used by drug traffickers to expose and elude following police
officers. Such driving tactics typically include driving slowly at
less than the flow of traffic, making sudden and unsignaled
changes in velocity and direction, as well as running red traffic
lights. Each of these tactics is designed to make unobserved
surveillance very difficult."]; P v. McNabb (1991) 228 CA3
462, 466 ["the conduct of suspect 3 was consistent with
countersurveillance to make sure the police were not watching"];
P v. Carvajal (1988) 202 CA3 487, 496 [defendant "drove his
truck in a highly unusual, apparently evasive manner immediately
following the retrieval of several large, heavy boxes from a
storage facility"]. 9th CIR: US v. Alaimalo (9C
2002) 313 F3 1188, 1193 [defendant drove "by a circuitous route"
which is "typical behavior of drug dealers who wish not to be
followed"]; US v. Ocampo (9C 1991) 927 F2 485, 490 ["We
have previously recognized that counter-surveillance driving [is]
indicative of narcotics distribution."];
US v. Chavez-Miranda (9C 2002) 306 F3 973, 978
["counter-surveillance driving techniques [are] recognized as
being indicative of narcotics distribution"]. OTHER:
US v. Nolen (8C 2008) 536 F3 834 [the suspect drove in "an
erratic fashion, which made surveillance difficult"].
COMPARE: US v. Cervantes (9C 2012) 678 F3 798,
803-804 [that the suspect did not take the most direct route to
his destination did not constitute countersurveillance driving].

[62] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of countersurveillance measures by suspected drug
traffickers:

• "The Lexus went to two addresses which the officers
associated with drugs, and drove in and out of the parking lots of
those buildings several times." US v.
Johnson (8C 1995) 64 F3 1120, 1125.

• Suspect would "drive slowly, then rapidly increase his
speed, make U-turns in the middle of streets, slow down at green
lights, and then accelerate through intersections when the lights
turned yellow." US v. Hoyos (9C 1989) 892 F2
1387, 1390. Also see US v. Del Vizo (9C 1990)
918 F2 821, 826.

• Suspect "pulled to the curb, allowing a surveillance unit
to pass her vehicle. She drove to a residence after first going
past it and making a U-turn." P v.
Rodriguez-Fernandez (1991) 235 CA3 543, 546.

• Suspect "drove about the town, up and down side streets,
making numerous U-turns, stopping, backing up, and finally
arriving at the Ganesha Street property." P v.
Campbell (1981) 118 CA3 588, 592.

• Suspect began "weaving in and out of traffic at a high rate
of speed in an apparent attempt to evade surveillance." US
v. Fiasche (7C 2008) 520 F3 694, 695.

• DEA agents who were monitoring the flight of a small plane
(they suspected it contained large quantities of marijuana)
noticed that the pilot took an "indirect flight path" to his
destination and this "nearly doubled his transit time, required
additional refueling stops, and increased the costs of the trip."
US v. Bodnar (2C 2022) 37 F4 833, 840.

[63] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Del Vizo (9C 1990) 918 F2 821, 826. USSC: US
v. Sharpe (1985) 470 US 675, 682, fn.3.
OTHER: US v. Berg (10C 2020) 947 F3 1313, 1318
[three vehicles appeared to be traveling together, all with
out-of-state plates, and all "traveling at approximately the same
speed: ten miles under the posted speed limit"];
US v. Jenkins (DCC 2021) 984 F3 1038, 1043 ["the vehicles'
in-tandem driving to and from the scene of the shooting is
suggestive of a conspiracy to perpetrate the shooting"];
US v. Belakhdhar (6C 2019) 924 F3 925, 927-28 [district
court erred when it ruled that "tandem driving with a vehicle
suspected of drug activity cannot, alone, support reasonable
suspicion"]; US v. Escamilla (5C 2017) 852 F3 474, 481
["Escamilla was also driving 'in tandem'—a manner of travel common
among smugglers"]; US v. Allen (8C 2013) 705 F3 367, 370
["Officer Pinner observed two apparent rental vehicles with
license plates from the same state traveling in tandem, and he
then discovered a large quantity of marijuana in one of them."];
US v. Sloan (7C 2011) 636 F3 845, 849
[suspect's vehicle followed marijuana-laden truck for 20 minutes];
US v. Zamudio-Carrillo (10C 2007) 499 F3
1206, 1210.

[64] CASE REFERENCED:
P v. Stanfill (1985) 170 CA3 420, 423. CAL:
P v. Mims (1992) 9 CA4 1244, 1248 [the officer
"observed an exchange, or attempted exchange, of what appeared to
be currency for a plastic baggie"]; P v. Garrett (1972) 29
CA3 535, 538. OTHER: US v.
Bustos-Torres (8C 2005) 396 F3 935, 945.

[65] CAL: Flores v.
Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 19, 223 ["to the trained
officer seeing someone pass a transparent bag containing a leafy
substance to another and receive money in exchange is to be judged
in the environment in which the transaction took place. Seeing
that transaction take place in an area of known narcotics activity
is a suspicious circumstance. Seeing the same transaction take
place on the floor of a Chicago Grain Exchange would probably (and
hopefully) be meaningless."]; P v. Butler (2003) 111 CA4
150, 161-62 ["upon arriving, Deputy Hayes saw conduct he believed,
based on his training and experience, was a drug transaction—the
criminal conduct explicitly alleged in the telephone call."];
P v. Limon (1993) 17 CA4 524, 532 ["Though an exchange of
an unrecognizable object for money on a street in a high crime
area does not justify arrest, it may justify detention if the area
is known for drug sales."]; In re Frederick B. (1987) 192
CA3 79, 86 ["The crucial circumstances were the passing of money
and the area in which it occurred"]; P v. Stanfill (1985)
170 CA3 420, 423 ["a park area where the police were aware sales
of marijuana took place"]; P v. McGriff (1990) 217
CA3 1140, 1144 [hand-to-hand drug transaction in high drug area].

[66] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of clandestine activity pertaining to hand-to-hand
transactions:

• The seller "looked about furtively." US v.
Tobin (11C 1991) 923 F2 1506, 1510.

• "The hasty, even furtive, nature of this series of
encounters was much in keeping with an illicit handoff."
US v. Johnson (4C 2010) 599 F3 339, 345.

• "The officer observed three people, on three separate
occasions, enter the rear yard through a gate, approach the rear
door of the house, knock on the door, have a conversation, make a
hand-to-hand exchange, and then depart. This corroborating
information tended to establish that the resident in this house
was engaged in narcotic sales." P v. Childress (1979) 99
CA3 36, 41

• The seller "walked over to an apparent hiding place before
and after the exchange." P v. Limon (1993) 17 CA4 524, 532.
Also see P v. Maltz (1971) 14 CA3 81, 392 ["The suspicious
quality of this observed conduct was materially enhanced by
Sergeant Babcock's knowledge and experience that drug dealers
frequently have a 'stash' to which they return for an additional
supply of drugs after having made a sale"].

• The seller handed the buyer "a small object which the
companion, in turn, secreted in a cigarette case which he then
placed in his pocket." P v. Guajardo (1994) 23 CA4 1738,
1743 ["he kept looking around as he approached the patrol car,
appearing nervous and anxious to leave the area"].

• While the exchange was underway and the suspects saw the
approaching police car, "their conversation ceased and their hands
went into their pockets very rapidly." P v. Handy (1971) 16
CA3 58, 860.

• After the buyer handed money to the seller, the buyer's
friend drove off with another suspect; when the car returned, the
buyer's friend removed a bag from the trunk.
US v. Rabbia (1C 2012) 699 F3 85, 90.

• A suspected drug dealer "looked about furtively, and
quickly transferred into the garage tubular bags which contained
smaller bundles." US v. Tobin (11C 1991) 923
F2 1506, 1510.

• In a "high narcotics area," the officer "saw a woman lean
into the car and hand Johnson an object," Johnson then made a
"shoving down" motion. US v. Johnson (DCC
2000) 212 F3 1313, 1316.

• "Some sort of exchange at 1:30 a.m. in an area known for
narcotics trafficking," the men "separated when they saw the
approaching police officers," and one of the men "secreted some
object." US v. Cook (1C 2002) 277 F3 82,
876-77.

• When a participant in a hand-to-hand sale of drugs saw
officers, he "abruptly withdrew from the car window" and the
driver of the car immediately drove off. US v.
Lopez-Garcia (11C 2009) 565 F3 1306, 1314. Also see
US v. Perez (1C 2020) 977 F3 163, 168 ["pacing back and
forth and looking up and down various streets while on a
cellphone, before finally rushing towards an arriving
vehicle… together with the nature of the man's brief
interaction with the occupants of the Mercedes" reasonably
indicated that "a street-level drug transaction had just
occurred"].

[67] CAL: P v. Maltz (1971) 14
CA3 381, 393 ["two apparent exchanges in the same area within 40
minutes"].

[68] OTHER: US v. Miller (4C
2022) 54 F4 219, 225 ["the district court noted that Phillips 'was
slow to pull over and passed at least one or two well-lit streets
and parking lots in favor of a dimly-lit section of Route 7.' In
considering whether Phillips was slow to stop, the district court
found it significant that Phillips would have travelled roughly
100 yards if traveling at 35 miles per hour for six seconds."];
US v. Ludwig (10C 2011) 641 F3 1243, 1248 ["a
driver's failure to stop his vehicle promptly is a factor that can
contribute to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity"];
US v. Mason (4C 2010) 628 F3 123, 128-29;
US v. Hunnicutt (10C 1998) 135 F3 1345, 1349
["He failed to stop promptly, which led the officer to wonder
whether the occupants were stuffing things under the seats; and
after the stop, the passengers repeatedly moved back and forth and
leaned over."]. COMPARE: US v.
Jenson (5C 2006) 462 F3 399, 405 ["modest" delay not
particularly suspicious].

[69] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Westerfield (2019) 6 C5 632, 659.

[70] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Foranyic (1998) 64 CA4 186, 190.

[71] QUOTE FROM:
Chestnut v. Wallace (8C 2020) 947 F3 1085, 1090.

[72] CAL: P v. Williams (2000)
79 CA4 1157, 1167 ["Deliberately false statements to the police
about matters that are within a suspect's knowledge and materially
relate to his or her guilt or innocence have long been considered
cogent evidence of consciousness of guilt, for they suggest there
is no honest explanation for incriminating circumstances."];
P v. Carrillo (1995) 37 CA4 1662, 1670 ["Consciousness of
guilt is shown by fabrications which, like devious alibis, are
apparently motivated by fear of detection, or which, like devious
explanations of the possession of stolen goods, suggest that there
is no honest explanation for the incriminating circumstances."];
P v. Westerfield (2019) 6 C5 632, 660 [officers "had
information suggesting defendant may have lied about retrieving
his motorhome from storage on the morning after [the victim's]
abduction."]. OTHER: US v. Wise (5C 2017) 877 F3
209, 223 ["He denied ownership of a backpack that was sitting next
to his own duffle bag. Yet, no other passengers sat near the
backpack."].

[73] 9th CIR: US v.
Wong (9C 2003) 334 F3 831, 836 [murder suspect withheld
information about his relationship with the victim].

[74] 9th CIR: US v. Malik (9C
2020) 963 F3 1014, 1016 [from "Malik's changing story about when
he smoked the marijuana cigarette," the officer "can reasonably
infer that [Malik] is lying"]. OTHER:
US v. Mercado-Gracia (10C 2021) 989 F3 829, 838 [the
suspect "did not know the last name of the car's owner, and
changed his answer as to who the owner was, first a cousin and
then his lady's husband"].

[75] EXAMPLES: The lies about the
following lies were deemed relevant:

Date of birth: P v.
Superior Court (Price) (1982) 137 CA3 90, 97 ["The fact
that at least two of the four suspects gave false names to the
officer connoted consciousness of guilt."]; P v.
Burnett (1980) 107 CA3 795, 798 ["The fact that the
purported owner was using a name different from the name on the
registration was another circumstances, not necessarily evidence
of crime, but a proper subject of further inquiry or
investigation."]; US v. Brown (1C 2007) 500
F3 48, 57. ["the police caught the suspect in several lies and
inconsistencies related to his name, age, and ownership of the
duffel bags"].

Use of alias: US v. Sokolow (1989) 490
US 1, 9; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 US 491,
502; P v. Profit (1996) 183 CA3 849, 882;
P v. Daugherty (1996) 50 CA4 275, 286; US
v. Gill (9C 2002) 280 F3 923.

Address of home: P v. Huerta (1990) 218 CA3
744, 750.

No ID in possession: P v. Daugherty (1996) 50 CA4
275, 286; P v. Loudermilk (1987) 195 CA3 996, 1005;
P v. Adams (1985) 175 CA3 855, 861. Also see
US v. Amaral-Estrada (7C 2007) 509 F3 820 [a suspected drug
trafficker denied having driven a car containing $250,000 that
officers had seen him driving].

Did not possess car key: P v. Hunter (2005) 133 CA4
371, 379, fn.5; In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 CA4 1232, 1238
[suspect who was detained for car theft lied about having the
car's keys in his possession].

Ownership of car: P v. Carrillo (1995) 37 CA4 1662,
1668-71.

Marital status: US v. Raymond Wong (9C 2003) 334 F3
831

Travel plans: P v. Shandloff (1985) 170 CA3 372, 382
[a suspected drug courier who had just deplaned on a flight from
Miami denied being aboard; US v. Gonzalez-Carmona (8C 2022)
35 F4 636, 641 ["When [the officer] asked Gonzalez-Carmona and
Jiminez about their ravel plans, they gave different answers."];
US v. Guerrero (10C 2007) 472 F3 784, 788 [inconsistent
statements as to travel plans "adds strongly" to reasonable
suspicion]; US v. Winters (6C 2015) 782 F3 289, 200
["conflicting or implausible explanations of travel plans have
been accorded some weight by this court in certain cases"];
US v. $109,179 (9C 2000) 228 F3 1080, 1085
["inconsistent answers to Jones's simple question of how he had
arrived at the hotel"]; US v. Mayo (8C 2010)
627 F3 709, 713 ["contradictory statements about their travel
history"]; US v. Simpson (10C 2010) 609 F3
1140, 1148-49 ["["implausible" or "inconsistent" travel plans are
relevant]; US v. Braddy (11C 2021) 11 F4 1298, 1311 [there
was an incongruity between the defendant's travel plans and the
length of time he had rented the vehicle in which he was stopped];
P v. Suennen (1980) 114 CA3 192, 199;
P v. Hart (1999) 74 CA4 479, 491; P v. Harris (1980)
105 CA3 204, 212-13; P v. Campbell (1981) 118 CA3 588, 597;
US v. Torres-Ramos (6C 2008) 536 F3 542, 553
[suspects gave "starkly different accounts of the origin of their
journey"]; US v. Gill (8C 2008) 513 F3 836,
845 [conflicting statements as to destination and purpose of their
trip]; US v. Anderson (10C 1997) 114 F3 1059,
1066 ["slightly conflicting versions of their travel itinerary;
the passenger seemed particularly vague about their travel
destination"]; US v. Williams (10C 2005) 403
F3 1203 [driver and passengers had conflicting versions of travel
itinerary]; US v. Booker (8C 1999) 186 F3
1004, 1005 [vehicle occupants "gave differing stories as to the
nature and purpose of their trip"]; US v.
Mendez (10C 1997) 118 F3 1426, 1431 ["contradictory or
implausible travel plans can contribute to a reasonable suspicion
of illegal activity"]; US v. Riley (8C 2012) 684 F3 758,
763 [suspect "gave vague or conflicting answers to simple
questions about his itinerary"].

[76] CAL:
P v. Westerfield (2019) 6 C5 632, 658 [defendant made
"inconsistent statements regarding his whereabouts on the night of
the [abduction]"]; P v. Memro (1995) 11 C4 786, 843
["when the police asked him whether he had seen anything unusual
the day Carter vanished, he first said no. He later suddenly
recalled that he had invited Carter out for a soft drink at around
the time that he disappeared"]; P v. Gravatt
(1971) 22 CA3 133, 137 [suspect claimed at first that an item
belonged to his brother-in-law, then he changed his story and said
he won it in a crap game]; P v. Shandloff (1985) 170
CA3 372, 382; P v. Spears (1991) 228 CA3 1, 20
[various conflicting statements reflected "consciousness of
guilt"]. 9th CIR: US v. Molina-Gomez (9C 2015) 781
F3 13, 20 ["Molina gave odd and suspicious answers to routine
Customs questions."]. OTHER: US v. Williams (5C
2018) 880 F3 713, 721 ["Williams gave conflicting reasons to the
source of the cash"].

[77] CAL: P v.
Garcia (1981) 121 CA3 239, 246 [defendant said the TV
belonged to a man who wanted him to sell it for him, while the
other suspect said it belonged to the defendant].

[78] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Gastelum (8C 2021) 11 Ff4 898, 903.

[79] CAL: P v. Davis
(1981) 29 C3 814, 823 [several witnesses told officers that the
defendant and a woman had argued just before the woman had been
raped and killed; the defendant gave a different story, saying
they had gone on a friendly walk.]; P v.
Spears (1991) 228 CA3 1 [murder suspect told officers that
he left his home at 8 a.m. (which was after his employer had been
murdered), but his mother said he had left well before then].

[80] EXAMPLES: The following stories
are examples of stories that were not believable or at least
dubious:

• The suspect claimed that two individuals were "chasing"
him, but he "didn't appear to be out of breath like he had been
running, nor did he "appear to be sweating or anything like" as if
"he was running from someone." US v. Roper (5C 2023) __ F5
__ [2023 WL 2662181].

• A suspected car thief said the car belonged to someone
else, but he did not know the person's last name.
P v. Cartwright (1999) 72 CA4 1362, 1364 ["Any experienced
officer hearing this frequently used but almost literally
incredible tale—provided by a driver who had no identification, no
proof of registration, and a car with tabs which Department of
Motor Vehicles records showed did not belong to it—would have
entertained a robust suspicion the car was stolen."].

• When questioned by DEA agents at the San Diego
International Airport, a woman who was carrying $42,500 in cash
inside a bag told them she had obtained the bag from a man named
"Samuel," that she did not know his last name, and that she had
just met him at the airport. US v. $42,500 (9C 2002) 283 F3
977, 981.

• During a car stop, the driver and front-seat passenger both
said they picked up the two men in the back seat at a gas station,
and let them ride in the back with the driver's and passenger's
small children. US v. Cortez (10C 2020) 965 F3 827, 836
["it is peculiar to some that two women entrusted with their
sister's small children would pick up two strange men they met at
a gas station and then permit them to travel alone in the back
seat in close proximity to one of the children"].

• During a traffic stop, the suspect said he was traveling
from Philadelphia to Georgia. When asked why there was no luggage
in the vehicle, he said he "would just buy what he needed" in
Georgia. US v. Wilson (3C 2020) 960 F3 136, 145].

• A suspected burglar, who had suddenly parked in the
driveway of a home, claimed the home belonged to a friend who he
was picking up for work. But the suspect did not know the name of
his friend or the address of the home. US v. Goebel (10C
2020) 959 F3 1259, 1267.

• A suspected drug trafficker who was stopped for a traffic
violation said he was driving from New Jersey to San Jose to fix
a. computer server for a company. "Yet if this were true," said
the court, "it was surely curious that the San Jose company would
be willing to wait for Mr. Ludwig to drive cross-country."
US v. Ludwig (10C 2011) 641 F3 1243, 1249. Also see
US v. Pettit (10C 2015) 785 F3 1374, 1381 ["We have
consistently held that "implausible travel plans can contribute to
reasonable suspicion."]; In re Richard T. (1978) 79
CA3 382, 388 ["possession of stolen property, accompanied by no
explanation or unsatisfactory explanation, or by suspicious
circumstances, will justify an inference that the goods were
received with knowledge that they had been stolen"]. Compare
P v. Lujano (2014) 229 CA4 175, 185 ["but the explanation
was not patently inconsistent, false, or inherently implausible"].

• A man who was suspected of having murdered a woman told
officers that the woman had only been missing a week or so but the
woman's mother said the woman had been missing 3-4 weeks.
P v. Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136, 1159.

• A man who was inside the apartment of a robbery suspect
claimed he was not the suspect, but he couldn't explain how he was
able to get into the locked apartment. Hill v.
California (1971) 401 US 797, 803, fn.8.

• When an officer asked a suspected car thief how he had
obtained the truck he was driving, he said he bought it two weeks
earlier "from a guy in Coon Rapids." US v.
Hanlon (8C 2005) 401 F3 926, 929.

• At 5:30 a.m., suspect claimed he was on a two-hour
motorcycle ride before work. P v. Williams (2007)
156 CA4 949.

• A rape suspect claimed he had been jogging, but he wasn't
perspiring or breathing hard, nor did he have a rapid pulse.
P v. Fields (1984) 159 CA3 555, 564.

• Suspect, who was carrying a bundle of clothing, claimed he
was looking for his stolen bicycle. P v.
Gonzales (1989) 216 CA3 1185, 1189 [a "dubious" story].

• A burglary suspect told El Cerrito police that she was
waiting for a friend, but she did not know her friend's name, and
she said her friend would be arriving on BART from San Jose, but
there are no BART stations in San Jose. P v.
Harris (1980) 105 CA3 204, 212-13.

• Burglary suspect said he was walking home, but he was
walking in the wrong direction. P v. Juarez (1973)
35 CA3 631, 635.

• A man suspected of being under the influence of drugs said
the odor coming from his car was from a cough drop, but the odor
was "overwhelming." P v. Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96,
102-3.

• An officer suspected that the fishing equipment a man was
carrying was stolen. The officer had asked if his equipment was
"any good." The man responded, "No, they're just cheap old things
I bought on sale. I think I paid $25 or $30 for them." The
officer, an avid fisherman, knew the equipment was high-quality
and very expensive. P v. Warren (1984) 152 CA3 991,
997.

• When asked what he was doing near a closed Goodwill
collection station, the suspect said he was "exchanging things."
US v. Summers (9C 2002) 268 F3 683, 687.

• A woman who had been detained spontaneously told the
officer that she had "just found" the purse she was carrying."
US v. Burnette (9C 1983) 698 F2 1038, 1048.

• Suspect said he was unemployed, that he lived in New York,
and was returning from California where he bought the car he was
driving, yet the vehicle registration showed a California address.
US v. Alcaraz-Arellano (10C 2006) 441 F3
1252, 1259.

• Suspect said a man let him borrow the stolen car he was
driving to go to a liquor store, but it was well after 2 a.m. and
all the liquor stores were closed. P v. Brown (1969)
1 CA3 161, 165.

• "Thompson's story about taking a newly-repaired boat on a
'test run' appeared contrived because his clothes were unsoiled,
the nearest boat launch was 12 miles away, and the tools lying on
the deck appeared unused." US v. Thompson (9C
2002) 282 F3 673, 678.

• Four men who had been sitting in a car in Sacramento said
they had driven from Los Angeles to visit a friend; the friend's
home was not in the vicinity. P v. Nonnette (1990)
221 CA3 659, 665.

• Assortment of jewelry, including women's jewelry, in
possession of man. In re Donald L. (1978) 81 CA3
770, 775.

• Male occupants of car claimed they did not know anything
about a woman's wallet in plain view. P v.
Superior Court (Torres) (1977) 67 CA3 620, 623-24.

• When an officer asked him what he was doing in Chula Vista
at 4:30 a.m., the suspect said "he had gone to Tijuana with a
friend in the latter's car and his friend had left him. He was
unable to identify the friend." P v. Fry (1969) 271
CA2 350, 355 ["defendant had offered a suspicious and ridiculous
excuse for being in the area"]. Also see P v.
Brown (1985) 169 CA3 159, 162: US v.
Rodriguez (9C 2006) 464 F3 1072, 1078 ["he provided an
implausible explanation for how he arrived at the apartment"].

[81] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of vague and evasive answers:

• "Vague or conflicting answers to simple questions about his
itinerary." US v. Riley (8C 2012) 684 F3 758, 763.

• "Hesitant, evasive, and incomplete answers." US
v. Suitt (8C 2009) 569 F3 867, 872.

• "Vague and evasive answers regarding his identity."
P v. Adams (1985) 175 CA3 855, 861.

• "Evasive responses to simple questions." US
v. Holzman (9C 1989) 871 F2 1496, 1504.

• "Unsatisfactory explanation" for being where he was
detained.
P v. Lewis (1980) 109 CA3 599, 608.

• Suspects could not explain what they were doing in a
residential area at 1:30 a.m. P v. Hart (1999) 74
CA4 479, 493.

• "Vague" description of her travel plans, she "could not
remember the flight details." US v.
Torres-Ramos (6C 2008) 536 F3 542, 552.

[82] EXAMPLES: The following are
situations in which possession of fruits or instrumentalities were
significant in establishing probable cause:

• Murder suspect possessed bailing wire; bailing wire had
been used to bind the victims. P v. Easley (1983) 34 C3
858, 872.

• Murder suspect possessed lidocaine; the victims were killed
with lidocaine. P v. Diaz (1992) 3 C4 495, 563.

• Murder suspect possessed "cut-off panty hose"; officer knew
that the murderers had worn masks and that cut-off panty hose are
used as masks. P v. Hill (1974) 12 C3 731, 763.

• Murder suspect possessed shells of the same caliber as
those used by the perpetrator. P v. Orozco (1981) 121 CA3
395, 404.

• A robbery suspect possessed clothing matching that worn by
the perpetrator. Warden v. Hayden (1967) 387 US 294.

• A robbery suspect possessed a handcuff key; the victim had
been handcuffed. Horton v. California (1990) 496 US 128,
130-1, 142.

• A robbery suspect possessed a bag similar to one used by
the perpetrator. P v. Franklin (1985) 171 CA3 627 635.

• A newspaper in the suspect's house contained an article
about the crime under investigation, and the officer knew that
"suspects commonly harbor newspaper accounts of their offenses."
P v. Guillebeau (1980) 107 CA3 531, 554.

• An officer seized poetry from a rape suspect's home because
the rapist read poetry to the victim. P v. Duncan (1981)
115 CA3 418, 426.

• A man who had solicited the murder of his estranged wife
possessed a hand-drawn diagram of his wife's home and lighting
system. P v. Miley (1984) 158 CA3 25, 35-36.

• Suspected burglars possessed pillowcases filled with
"large, bulky" items. P v. Vasquez (1983) 138 CA3
995, 999-1000. Also see P v. Suennen (1980) 114 CA3
192, 199 [half-filled pillowcases inside car of suspected
pillowcase burglar].

• Suspected burglar possessed burglar tools. P v.
Koelzer (1963) 222 CA2 20, 25.

• A man suspected of having just committed a burglary was
carrying a screwdriver and a VCR wrapped in a blanket.
P v. Stokes (1990) 224 CA3 715, 721.

• Inside the van of a man suspected of having just committed
a cat burglary, officers found a furniture dolly, a stereo, a
knife, screwdriver, flashlight, and gloves. P v.
Taylor (1975) 46 CA3 513, 518.

• A burglary suspect possessed bolt clippers; bolt cutters
had been used to gain entry into a burglarized home. P v.
Mack (1977) 66 CA3 839, 859.

• Suspected marijuana grower possessed "insect net,
drip-line, fittings." P v. Williams (2007) 156 CA4
949, 953.

• Suspected drug dealer possessed a "bundle of small, plastic
baggies." P v. Nonnette (1990) 221 CA3 659, 666.

• A man suspected of possessing drugs was carrying a "big
stack or wad of bills." P v. Brueckner (1990) 223
CA3 1500, 1505. Also see P v. Evans (1973) 34
CA3 175, 180 ["Once the unusual amount of cash, genuine or
contraband [$21,125] was found, the focus of the search shifted.
The officers reasonably suspected that the money was the fruit of
a robbery or counterfeit"]; P v. Huerta (1990) 218
CA3 744, 751; US v. Bustos-Torres (8C 2005)
396 F3 935, 943 [suspect possessed $10,000 in currency after
leaving the scene of a suspected drug transaction].

• A suspected drug dealer possessed guns and brass knuckles.
P v. Gallegos (2002) 96 CA4 612, 623-30.

• Inside a car occupied by two suspects in a shooting were a
.22 automatic rifle, a box of ammunition, and expended shell
casings.
P v. Rico (1979) 97 CA3 124, 133. Also see
P v. Superior Court (Orozco) (1981) 121 CA3 395,
404; 51, 763.

• A man suspected of sexually assaulting and murdering a boy
possessed materials "showing a morbid sexual interest in young
boys." P v. Memro (1995) 11 C4 786, 843.

[83] 9th CIR: US v.
Harrell (9C 2008) 530 F3 1051, 1057 ["An object is
contraband per se if its possession, without more, constitutes a
crime"].

[84] CAL: In re
Daniel G. (2004) 120 CA4 824, 831; P v.
Martino (1985) 166 CA3 777, 790 ["Plain view observation of
a defendant attempting to dispose of or conceal contraband
constitutes adequate probable cause to arrest."];
Frazzini v. Superior Court (1970) 7 CA3 1005, 1016
]"Unlawful possession may be inferred when the contraband is found
in a pocket of a shirt belonging to the accused or among his
personal effects, notwithstanding that someone else may have had
the opportunity to deposit the contraband there."].

[85] USSC: Maryland v.
Pringle (2003) 540 US 366, 372. CAL: In re
Daniel G. (2004) 120 CA4 824, 831 ["Constructive possession
means the object is not in the defendant's physical possession,
but the defendant knowingly exercises control or the right to
control the object."]; Armstrong v.
Superior Court (1990) 217 CA3 535, 539 ["Constructive
possession exists when a defendant maintains control or a right to
control the contraband."]; P v. Montero (2007) 155 CA4
1170, 1176 ["Many courts have long stated [the possession]
requirement as a showing that defendant exercised dominion and
control over the controlled substance."]; P v.
Newman (1971) 5 C3 48, 52 ["possession may be imputed when
the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and
exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion
and control"]. OTHER: US v. Dorman (DCC 2017) 860 F3
675, 679 ["Constructive possession is a potentially expansive
concept, and this court has limited its reach. The government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of, and
was in a position to exercise dominion and control over, the
contraband. This avoids ensnaring 'incidental bystanders' who
happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time."].

[86] USSC: Ker v.
California (1963) 374 US 23, 36-37. CAL:
P v. Gabriel (1986) 188 CA3 1261, 1265-66 [drugs in
plain view in the bedroom; Frazzini v.
Superior Court (1979) 7 CA3 1005 [drugs in kitchen];
P v. Magana (1979) 95 CA3 453, 464 [drugs in a light
fixture].

[87] USSC:
Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 US 366, 372-73 [cocaine was
found behind the rear seat armrest]; P v. Newman (1971) 5
C3 48, 53 [in plain view on tape deck: Drugs were in plain view on
the tape deck below the dashboard of his car]; In re James M.
(1977) 72 CA3 133, 137-38 [nunchakus in plain view on the floor on
the driver's side; P v. Vermouth (1971) 20 CA3 746, 756;
P v. Schoennauer (1980) 103 CA3 398, 410.

[88] EXAMPLES: Probable cause to arrest
for possession of contraband based on possession by a companion:

• Probable cause existed to arrest a man for car theft when,
about five hours after the car was stolen, officers saw it parked
near a phone booth, the car's engine was running and its lights
were on, a person was sitting in the passenger's seat, the
driver's seat was unoccupied, the arrestee was in a telephone
booth about 15-20 feet away, and no one else was in the area.
P v. Windham (1987) 194 CA3 1580, 1589.

• Probable cause existed to arrest the front seat passenger
in a car for possession of a billy club that was on the floor next
to the driver's door because officers found a five-inch knife
within the passenger's reach, thus indicating "there was an
alliance between them, either defensive or offensive."
P v. Vermouth (1971) 20 CA3 746, 756. Also see
Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 US 366, 373
[drug dealing is "an enterprise to which a dealer would be
unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish
evidence against him."].

• Probable cause existed to arrest a woman who accompanied a
drug seller to a home where the sale was to occur when a reliable
informant told officers that the seller sometimes had a companion
carry the drugs for him when he was going to make a sale.
P v. Fourshey (1974) 38 CA3 426, 430.

• Probable cause existed to arrest the wife of a suspected
drug dealer after officers received reliable information that her
husband was dealing large quantities of drugs out of the
residence; she was present in the house when a sale to an
informant occurred; when officers arrived the only other person in
the house attempted to flee; and during a search of the person
officers found five heroin-filled balloons in his pocket. (Note
that probable cause existed even though the informant said the
suspect's wife was not involved in the drug sales, and she had no
arrest record.) Pierson v.
Superior Court (1970) 8 CA3 510, 524. Also see P v.
Boyd (1959) 173 CA2 537, 539; P v.
Coleman (1972) 28 CA3 36, 43.

• Probable cause did not exist to arrest a man for
possession of a stolen check when he merely walked into a
check-cashing store with a companion who attempted to cash the
check. P v. Richards (1977) 72 CA3 510.

• Probable cause did not exist to arrest the front
seat passenger based on the discovery of counterfeit rationing
coupons in the hand of a passenger in the back seat. US
v. Di Re (1948) 332 US 581, 592.

[89] CAL: P v.
Nicolaus (1991) 54 C3 551, 575; P v.
Goodall (1982) 131 CA3 129, 143; P v.
Rushing (1989) 209 CA3 618, 622; P v.
Williams (1992) 3 CA4 1535.

[90] CAL: P v.
James (1969) 1 CA3 645, 648-49 [driver had no license or
registration, no current registration tag, driver said his cousin
owned the car but he did not know her name]; P v.
Webster (1991) 54 C3 411, 430-1 ["Defendant had disclaimed
ownership of the car, stating that it belonged to a passenger, but
also said the passengers were hitchhikers"]; In re
Jonathan M. (1981) 117 CA3 530, 534 [breaking a windwing is
"a common means of entry to a locked vehicle"]; P v.
Cartwright (1999) 72 CA4 1362, 1364 [driver said it wasn't
his car and he did not know the owner's name: "Any experienced
officer hearing this frequently used but almost literally
incredible tale—provided by a driver who had no identification, no
proof of registration, and a car with tags which Department of
Motor Vehicles records showed did not belong to it—would have
entertained a robust suspicion the car was stolen."]; P v.
Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96, 103; P v.
Burnett (1980) 107 CA3 795, 799 [VIN plate had been
temporarily reattached to the Camaro "by nonstandard rivets"];
P v. Lindsey (1986) 182 CA3 772, 779 ["the
VIN plate and the rivets attaching it were damaged. This fact
alone would lead a reasonable person to believe that the plate
might have been tampered with in an effort to disguise a stolen
vehicle."]; P v. Dasilva (1989) 207 CA3 43,
50 ["When a motorist who is stopped driving a vehicle licensed
out-of-state can produce neither driver's license nor vehicle
registration and tells the officer a friend loaned him the car
which the officer subsequently learns is registered to a business,
a reasonable officer will not be satisfied and terminate his
inquiry merely because the car has not yet been reported
stolen."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Torres-Sanchez (9C 1996) 83 F3 1123, 1128. OTHER:
US v. Wallace (2C 2019) 937 F3 130, 139 ["First, they saw
scratch marks on the upper-right portion of the driver's side
door, which indicated to both officers that someone had forcibly
entered the vehicle. Second, Wallace was unable to produce the
registration for his vehicle. Third, the vehicle's registration
and inspection stickers were damaged (affecting the visibility of
the VIN on the registration sticker) and appeared to have been
tampered with and re-taped onto the windshield."]; US
v. Ludwig (10C 2011) 641 F3 1243, 1249 ["defendant
was driving a car that was not registered to him or to his
passenger"]; US v. Torres-Ramos (6C 2008) 536
F3 542, 552 [driver did not know the last name of the registered
owner who lived over 1000 miles from the location of the stop];
US v. Soto (10C 1993) 988 F2 1548, 1556
[defendant "was unable to provide even a general address for his
alleged uncle, from whom he claimed to have borrowed the car"];
US v. Fernandez (10C 1994) 18 F3 874, 879 ["a
defining characteristic of our traffic stop jurisprudence is the
defendant's lack of a valid registration, license, bill of sale,
or some other indicia of proof to lawfully operate and possess the
vehicle"]; US v. Brigham (5C 2004) 382 F3 500
[the driver was not the lessee of the car; the lessee was not
present in the vehicle; driver and passenger gave inconsistent
itinerary]; US v. Jenkins (2C 1974) 496 F2
57, 72 [cardboard license plates; driver could not produce vehicle
registration and did not know the identity the owner]; US
v. Hanlon (8C 2005) 401 F3 926, 929] [highly nervous
driver said he bought the vehicle—which was registered to a
woman—two weeks earlier "from a guy in Coon Rapids"].

[91] CAL: P v. Sims (2021) 59
CA5 943, 955 [at 3 a.m., suspect in vehicle in parking lot in
which after-hours drinkers were congregating, and he reasonably
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol];
P v. Goldberg (1969) 2 CA3 30, 34 ["Manifestations of
recent drug use such as dilated pupils, slurred speech and
difficulty balancing, when observed by an experienced officer,
present grounds for a valid arrest."]; P v.
Sanchez (1987) 195 CA3 42; P v.
Cardenas (1982) 31 C3 897, 911; Johanson v.
DMV (1995) 36 CA4 1209, 1217; Green v.
DMV (1977) 68 CA3 536, 539; P v.
Gonzales (1989) 216 CA3 1185, 1189; P v.
Sanchez (1987) 195 CA3 42; 9th CIR: Ramirez
v. City of Buena Park (9C 2009) 560 F3 1012, 1022
["apparent uncontrollable sleepiness, irritability, rapid
breathing, elevated pulse rate and distorted time perception,"
edited]; Tatum v. City of San Francisco (9C
2006) 441 F3 1090, 1095. OTHER: US v. Blakeney (4C
2020) 949 F3 851, 858-59 [combative]; US v. Gilmore (10C
2015) 776 F3 765, 770 ["that Mr. Gilmore was gazing into space,
staggering, unsteady, and unable to respond to simple questions
were enough to establish a reasonable belief Mr. Gilmore was
sufficiently intoxicated for protective custody"].

[92] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Krohn (2007) 149 CA4 1294, 1298.

[93] QUOTE FROM:
In re Zorn (1963) 59 C2 650, 652.

[94] CAL: P v.
Krohn (2007) 149 CA4 1294, 1298.

[95] CAL: P v.
Strider (2009) 177 CA4 1393, 1405 ["the porch and area
inside the fenced yard was not a public place within the meaning
of [PC§ 12031"].

[96] CAL: In re R.K. (2008) 160
CA4 1615, 1624.

[97] CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Saari) (1969) 2 CA3 197, 202, fn.7.
OTHER: US v. Lewis (11C 2012) 674 F3
1298, 1305.

[98] CAL: P v.
Osborne (2009) 175 CA4 1052, 1059 [burglar tools, exposed
wires, trim around stereo removed, door panel ripped off].
9th CIR: US v. Valles-Velencia (9C
1987) 811 F2 1232, 1235-36 [window pried open]. OTHER:
In re Sealed Case (DCC 1998) 153 F3 759, 764-65; US
v. Johnson (6C 1993) 9 F3 506, 507 [broken window];
US v. Dart (4C 1984) 747 F2 263, 265 [lock
was sawed off, door forced open]; US v.
Estese (6C 1973) 479 F2 1273 [door pried open].

[99] CAL: P v.
Green (1983) 146 CA3 369, 377. ALSO SEE:
P v. Khan (2019) 41 CA5 460, 480 [arson of workplace by
disgruntled employee]; P v. Beagle (1972) 6 C3 441, 449
["the very nature of the crime of arson ordinarily dictates that
the evidence will be circumstantial"]. P v.
Beagle (1972) 6 C3 441, 449 ["the very nature of the crime
of arson ordinarily dictates that the evidence will be
circumstantial"].

[100] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Martin (1955) 45 C2 755, 761-62.

[101] USSC: New Jersey
v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 US 325, 347 ["The discovery of
the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana as well"]. CAL:
P v. LeBlanc (1997) 60 CA4 157, 166; P v.
Ross (1968) 265 CA2 195, 201, fn.2 ["Judicial notice may be
taken that certain articles innocuous in themselves are part of
the paraphernalia of narcotic users."]; P v.
Topp (1974) 40 CA3 372, 378 ["The box with its scales and
Ziploc baggies [were] clearly recognizable as paraphernalia"].

[102] CAL: P v.
Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96, 103 ["overwhelmingly strong odor"
of air freshener in vehicle]. OTHER:
US v. Anguiano (8C 2019) 934 F3 871, 873 [officer "saw
'dryer sheets all over the floor in the back and the front' of the
car"]; US v. Ludwig (10C 2011) 641 F3 1243,
1248 ["overpowering smell of cologne"]; US v.
Mason (4C 2010) 628 F3 123, 129 ["extreme odor of air
fresheners"]; US v. Leos-Quijada (10C 1997)
107 F3 786, 795 ["strong air freshener scent]; US
v. Alvarez (10C 1995) 68 F3 1242, 1246 ["air
freshener coupled with other indicia of criminal activity supports
a reasonable brief inquiry."]. BUT ALSO SEE:
US v. Rodriguez-Escalera (7C 2018) 884 F3 661, 670 ["A
non-excessive presence of air fresheners, however, may show
nothing more than a car owner's preference for the smell of air
fresheners or desire to cover up other, lawful odors."].

[103] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Vaughan (4C 2012) 700 F3 705, 711. COMPARE:
US v. Stepp (6C 2012) 680 F3 651, 666 [only one pre-paid
cellphone ].

[104] CAL: P v.
Gonzales (1989) 216 CA3 1185, 1189, 1191; In re
Ruth H. (1972) 26 CA3 77, 82.

[105] CAL: P v.
Tenney (1972) 25 CA3 16, 25; P v. Levy
(1971) 16 CA3 327, 334; P v. Banks (1990) 217 CA3
1358, 1363; P v. Boyd (1959) 173 CA3 537, 539.

[106] CAL:
Bailey v. Superior Court (1992) 11 CA4 1107, 1112 ["'Heavy
foot traffic' might raise suspicions, or be one indicator of
possible narcotics transactions," edited.];
P v. Medina (1985) 165 CA3 11, 19-20, fn.4 ["the foot
traffic to Medina's residence was indeed suggestive of criminal
conduct when examined as part of the total picture."].
OTHER: US v. Palega (8C 2009) 556 F3 709, 715
["unusual frequency of short term visitors late at night"];
US v. Johnson (8C 2008) 528 F3 575, 579 ["great deal of
short-term traffic to the apartment, consistent with narcotics
trafficking"]; US v. Artez (10C 2004) 389 F3 1106, 1114
[heavy foot traffic can corroborate information from an untested
informant].

[107] QUOTES FROM:
US v. Soderman (8C 2020) 983 F3 369, 375.

[108] CAL: P v.
Hunter (2005) 133 CA4 371, 378 ["street packaging" (drugs
in two separate locations); P v.
Campbell (1981) 118 CA3 588, 598 ["Appellant owned several
residences in the area which Officer Davenport categorized as
'drops.' All of the automobiles being used by the various suspects
were owned by appellant"]; P v. Parra (1999) 70 CA4
222, 227. 9th CIR: US v. Ewing (9C
2011) 638 F3 1226, 1233, fn.7 ["although drug users are not
necessarily drug couriers, a drug user who travels around with a
hidden stash of money looks very much like a drug courier, even if
only a small-time one"]. OTHER: US v.
Brooks (6C 2010) 594 F3 488, 495 ["Courts have readily
acknowledged that large sums of cash are indicative of the drug
trade"].

[109] CAL: P v.
Rios (1988) 205 CA3 833, 840 ["In determining whether there
is probable cause to believe property has been stolen, a police
officer may consider all circumstances reasonably bearing on the
question"]; P v. Richard T. (1978) 79 CA3 382, 388
["Knowledge that property was stolen can be proved by direct
evidence, and resort often must be made to circumstantial
evidence."]; P v. Stokes (1990) 224 CA3 715, 720-21
["The nature of the property, the manner and circumstances of its
possession, efforts by the defendant to conceal the property from
police view, flight upon approach of the police, or other facts
may combine to establish probable cause to arrest"].

[110] CAL: P v.
Gorak (1987) 196 CA3 1032, 1039; In re
Curtis T. (1989) 214 CA3 1391, 1398; P v.
Sedillo (1982) 135 CA3 616, 623; P v.
Williams (1988) 198 CA3 873, 890; P v.
McGraw (1981) 119 CA3 582, 603; P v.
Baker (1968) 267 CA2 916, 919-20; P v.
Atkins (1982) 128 CA3 564, 570; P v.
Garcia (1981) 121 CA3 239, 246; P v.
Superior Court (Thomas) (1970) 9 CA3 203, 210; P v.
Jennings (1965) 231 CA2 744.

[111] CAL: P v.
Martin (1973) 9 C3 687, 696; P v.
Wolder (1970) 4 CA3 984, 994; In re
Donald L. (1978) 81 CA3 770, 775; P v.
Williams (1988) 198 CA3 873, 890 [officers "knew from
experience that firearms and electronic equipment are among the
'hottest' items encountered by the burglary detail"];
In re Curtis T. (1989) 214 CA3 1391 [large quantity
of car stereo equipment on floor]. OTHER: US
v. Vitali (1C 1967) 383 F2 121, 122 ["substantial
quantity" of watch bands].

[112] CAL: P v.
Deutschman (1972) 23 CA3 559, 562.

[113] 9th CIR: US v.
Holzman (9C 1989) 871 F2 1496, 1504.

[114] CAL: P v.
Williams (1988) 198 CA3 873, 890.

[115] CAL: P v.
Anderson (1983) 149 CA3 1161, 1165 ["Fingerprint evidence
is the strongest evidence of identity and is sufficient by itself
to constitute probable cause for arrest."]; P v.
Wright (1990) 52 C3 367, 392; P v.
Superior Court (Brown) (1975) 49 CA3 160, 166.

[116] CAL: P v.
Nelson (2008) 43 C4 1242, 1257-60; P v.
Wilson (2006) 38 C4 1237; P v. Travis
(2006) 139 CA4 1271; P v. Johnson (2006) 139 CA4
1135. NOTE: For a general discussion of DNA science, see
P v. Xiong (2013) 215 CA4 1259.

[117] USSC: Strickler
v. Green (1999) 527 US 263, 293 ["the police
recovered hairs on a bra and shirt found with Whitlock's body that
were microscopically alike in all identifiable characteristics to
petitioner's hair"].

[118] CAL: P v. Berkoff (1985)
174 CA3 305, 311 ["The officer kept the informant under close
surveillance until she reached defendant's apartment."].
OTHER: US v. Artez (10C 2004) 389 F3
1106, 1111-12 ["The common formalities observed by police officers
when conducting such controlled purchases are as follows: the
police search the informant (and his vehicle, if appropriate) for
money and contraband prior to the buy; give the informant money
with which to purchase the narcotics; transport the informant to
the suspect residence (or follow the informant to the residence);
watch the informant enter the suspect residence, disappear while
inside the suspect residence, and emerge from the suspect
residence; search the informant upon exiting the suspect
residence; and receive the narcotics from the informant."].
ALSO SEE: US v. Gibson (7C 2021) 996 F3 451, 461 ["a
properly executed controlled buy is generally a reliable indicator
as to the presence of illegal drug activity"];
P v. Mason (1982) 132 CA3 594, 599 [failure to show that
the informant was operating under police surveillance]; US
v. Artez (10C 2004) 389 F3 1106, 1112 ["the absence
of constant visual contact with the informant conducting the
transaction does not render a controlled purchase insufficient"];
US v. Jennen (9C 2009) 596 F3 594, 599-600 ["The second
controlled purchase, though it did not result in the CI obtaining
methamphetamine, showed only that Jennen had no methamphetamine
that he was willing to sell at that time once his suspicion was
aroused, and did not exculpate Jennen from his apparent
involvement in a continuing drug scheme. Given the totality of the
circumstances, the second, failed controlled purchase did not
undermine probable cause that Jennen had the items sought in the
warrant in his residence."]

[119] CAL: Ramey v.
Murphy (1985) 165 CA3 502, 510 ["police officers are
justified in taking into account past conduct, character and
reputation of the person suspected"]; P v.
Price (1991) 1 C4 324, 410 [a career criminal];
P v. Lim (2000) 85 CA4 1289, 1298 [even "stale"
arrest information is somewhat relevant]; P v.
Guajardo (1994) 23 CA4 1738, 1742 [prior drug sale];
P v. Bush (2001) 88 CA4 1048, 1052-53 ["Our
experience has led us to the conclusion that, unfortunately,
felons convicted of illegal weapons offenses often later carry
concealed weapons, and they do so more than six years after an
initial conviction."]. OTHER: US v. Bass (5C 2021)
996 F3 729, 739 [suspect admitted that he "was previously
convicted for similar conduct"]; US v.
Simpson (10C 2010) 609 F3 1140, 1147 ["criminal history
contributes powerfully to the reasonable suspicion calculus"];
US v. Cantu (10C 2005) 405 F3 1173, 1177
["Mr. Cantu's prior narcotics-related arrests, while certainly not
determinative, tended to establish his participation in
drug-related conduct over a period of time."]; US
v. Taylor (1C 1993) 985 F2 3,6 ["affiant's knowledge
of the target's prior criminal activity or record clearly is
material to the probable cause determination"]; US
v. Conley (3C 1993) 4 F3 1200, 1207 ["The use of
prior arrests and convictions to aid in establishing probable
cause is not only permissible, it is often helpful."].
ALSO SEE: US v. Harris (1971)
403 US 573, 582-83 [officers may also consider the suspect's
reputation]; US v. Langer (9C 2010) 618 F3
1044, 1048 [rap sheet is sufficiently reliable to be considered in
sentencing].

[120] USSC:
Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 US 366, 373 [drug dealing is
"an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an
innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against
him"]. CAL; P v. Campbell (1981) 118 CA3 588, 597;
P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849, 882;
P v. Banks (1990) 217 CA3 1358, 1364. OTHER:
US v. Ingrao (7C 1990) 897 F2 860, 864 ["in order to find
probable cause based on association with persons engaging in
criminal activity, some additional circumstances from which it is
reasonable to infer participation in criminal enterprise must be
shown"]; US v. Artez (10C 2004) 389 F3 1106, 1114-15 ["four
other individuals who either lived at or frequented the suspect
residence had prior convictions for narcotics-related offenses;
this information further corroborated the confidential informant's
tip," edited].

[121] CAL: P v. Sedillo (2015)
235 CA4 1037, 1055. OTHER: US v. Guardado (10C 2012)
699 F3 1220, 1223 ["gang connection further supports the
reasonableness of an officer's suspicion"].

[122] CAL: P v.
Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 162 [burglary suspect had
committed another burglary with same MO]; P v.
Maier (1991) 226 CA3 1670, 1675 ["This was his modus
operandi."].

[123] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of admissions:

• When asked if there was "anything illegal" in the vehicle,
he replied "not that I know of." P v. Moore (2021) 64 CA5
291, 3 [suspect's response was "equivocal," and therefore
relevant].

• When an officer arrived at the home of a suspected graffiti
vandal to discuss the matter, the suspect said, "Take me to jail."
In re Trinidad V. (1989) 212 CA3 1077, 1080 ["The
minor's statement 'take me to jail' could reasonably be
interpreted as an admission of guilt."].

• As an officer approached two burglary suspects, one said to
the other, "I told you not to do it." P v.
Stokes (1990) 224 CA3 715, 721.

• Suspect told an informant that he could "do a small thing"
of heroin)." P v. Veasey (1979) 98 CA3 779, 784-85.

• An undercover officer who had phoned a suspected bookmaker
heard two men in the background talking about point spreads on pro
football games. P v. Rooney (1985) 175 CA3 634, 648.

• When an officer detained a suspected prowler the suspect
said, "I'm not prowling. I'm just lost," "I've been in trouble in
Arizona for burglary," and "I just got out of jail in Long Beach
for prowling." P v. Superior Court (Johnson) (1971)
15 CA3 146, 150-52.

• Officers overheard a suspected drug dealer talking about
"nine-millimeters, money counters, kilos, thousands of dollars,
something arriving tomorrow, and the need to 'break it down.'"
US v. Garcia (6C 2007) 496 F3 495.

[124] OTHER: US v.
Steppello (2C 2011) 664 F3 359, 364 ["the cryptic nature of
the call was consistent with other transactions in which drug
dealers 'often engage in a so-called narcotics code'"].

[125] CASE REFERENCED:
US v. Jones (10C 2012) 701 F3 1300, 1316.

[126] CAL: P v.
Spears (1991) 228 CA3 1 [murder suspect said "He's been
shot!"; when he "discovered" the victim's body; the victim had, in
fact, been shot—three times in the head—but the damage to his
skull was so extensive that only the killer would have known he
had been shot, not bludgeoned]; P v. Westerfield (2019) 6
C5 632, 660 [defendant possessed information that he could have
obtained only from the murder victim].

[127] CAL: P v.
Loudermilk (1987) 195 CA3 996, 1002 ["If he refuses to
identify himself to the officer, this fact may by itself be
considered suspect and together with surrounding events may create
probable cause to arrest."].

[128] CAL: P v.
Miller (1972) 7 C3 219, 225. 9th CIR: Graves
v. City of Coeur d'Alene (9C 2003) 339 F3 828, 842.
OTHER: US v. Suitt (8C 2009) 569 F3
867, 872-73 ["exercising one's right not to consent to a search is
not a suspicious action that would justify an otherwise
unconstitutional seizure"]; US v. Wilson (4C
1991) 953 F2 116, 126 ["The ominous implication in this argument
is that only guilty persons have anything to keep from the eyes of
the police."]; US v. Hunnicutt (10C 1998) 135
F3 1345, 1350 ["refusal to consent should not have been considered
in determining reasonable suspicion"]; US v.
Boyce (11C 2003) 351 F3 1102, 1110 ["The police cannot base
their decision to prolong a traffic stop on the detainee's refusal
to consent to a search."].

[129] CAL: P v.
Daugherty (1996) 50 CA4 275, 287 ["Daugherty's refusal to
consent to a search of the checked bags after allowing a search of
her carry-on was enough to cause a reasonable police officer with
Gillespie's 10 years of experience in the narcotics unit to
suspect Daugherty of transporting drugs in the checked luggage."];
P v. Baldwin (1976) 62 CA3 727, 743 ["Baldwin did
not object to [the officer's] proceeding upstairs but did object
to the search of the back of the house."].

[130] CASE REFERNCED:
US v. Gist-Davis (4C 2022) 41 F4 259, 264.

[131] CAL: P v.
Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136, 1159 [defendant "exhibited no
concern over [the victim's] unexplained disappearance"].

[132] CAL: P v.
Manis (1969) 268 CA2 653, 661 [officers may "gain a certain
amount of information from the person's dress, appearance,
physical condition, and demeanor"]; P v. York (1980)
108 CA3 779, 785; P v. Superior Court (Wells) (1980)
27 C3 670; P v. Kaurish (1990) 52 C3 648, 676;
P v. Beal (1974) 44 CA3 216, 220 [DUI car stop based
on seeing driver "staggering" before getting into his car and
driving off].

[133] 9th CIR:
US v. $42,500 (9C 2002) 283 F3 977, 982 ["Here, Hysell was
carrying a substantial sum of money, $42,500 in cash, obtained
from an unknown man, to be delivered to another man, identified
only as Jose. Hysell denied knowing who owned the funds she
carried across the country and disclaimed ownership both verbally
and in writing. We find significant that the money was wrapped in
cellophane. Unlike a purse or money pouch, cellophane is not a
normal repository for carrying large amounts of money. Rather
cellophane, which is largely impermeable to gas, is commonly used
to conceal the smell of drugs and avoid detection by drug dogs."].
OTHER: US v. Orozco (4C 2022) 41 F4 403, 408 ["being
paid to transport money could occur for innocent reasons [but]
given the large amount of money and the way it was stored—wrapped
in grocery bags and stashed in a hidden compartment—those innocent
explanations seem unlikely."]; US v. Williams (5C 2018) 880
F3 713, 716 [$10,000 in pockets but suspect's income was only
$2,500 per month]; Conrod v. Davis (8C 1997)
120 F3 92, 97 ["Conrad carried over $6,000 in small denominations
in his front pants pocket and $4,000 in a wicker briefcase in the
automobile. [The officer knew] that drug couriers often carry
large amounts of cash in small denominations."]. Compare
US v. Chhien (1C 2001) 266 F3 1, 8 [ "the
mere possession of a large, unexplained amount of cash, without
more, cannot be the basis for heightened suspicion"].

[134] CAL: In re
William J. (1985) 171 CA3 72, 77 [court refuses to adopt a
rule permitting a car stop only if the suspect was the driver,
saying, "If we were to adopt such an untenable rule, then legions
of criminals throughout the land could hire drivers, who are
upstanding citizens with no past criminal involvement, to
chauffeur them around our streets and highways in open, notorious
view. As smug passengers they could wave to the police who could
only watch in frustration as they passed by."];
P v. Saldana (2002) 101 CA4 170;
P v. Dominguez (1987) 194 CA3 1315. OTHER:
US v. Pyles (6C 2018) 904 F3 422, 424-25 [if the registered
owner has an outstanding arrest warrant, it is reasonable to
believe he is inside the vehicle, despite the presence of other
people; i.e., "It is fair to infer that the registered owner of a
car is in the car absent information that defeats the inference"].
COMPARE: US v. Hudson (6C 2005) 405 F3
425, 434 [insufficient link between car and fugitive].

[135] OTHER: US v. Winters (6C
2015) 782 F3 289, 300 ["we have described an oddity in a
rental-car contract as a legitimate consideration in the
reasonable-suspicion analysis"].

[136] 9th CIR: US v.
Del Vizo (9C 1990) 918 F2 821, 826 ["The use of public,
rather than private telephones, is typical of narcotics
traffickers and may be taken into account in evaluating probable
cause."].

[137] USSC: US v.
Johns (1985) 469 US 478, 482.

[138] CAL: P v. Khan (2019) 41
CA5 460, 480 [disgruntled employee had motive for arson at
workplace]; P v. Varghese (2008) 162 CA4 1084, 1105
[jealousy may have been motive for murder]; P v.
Kaurish (1990) 52 C3 648, 676; P v. Davis
(1981) 29 C3 814, 823; P v. Spears (1991) 228 CA3 1,
20. 9th CIR: US v. Raymond Wong (9C
2003) 334 F3 831 [murder suspect killed his girlfriend because she
was pregnant].

[139] CAL: P v.
Barnum (1980) 113 CA3 340, 346; In re
Trinidad V. (1989) 212 CA3 1077, 1080.

[140] CAL:
P v. Westerfield (2019) 6 C5 632, 660 ["defendant matched
other characteristics identified by the [FBI] profilers as typical
of abductors"].

[141] USSC: US v.
Sokolow (1989) 490 US 1, 10; Reid v.
Georgia (1980) 448 US 438. CAL: P v.
Russell (2000) 81 CA4 96; P v.
Shandloff (1985) 170 CA3 372, 381-82. 9th CIR:
US v. Diaz-Juarez (9C 2002) 299 F3 1138, 1141
["Reasonable suspicion may not be based on broad profiles which
cast suspicion on entire categories of people without any
individualized suspicion of the particular person to be
stopped."]. OTHER: US v. O'Neal (8C
1994) 17 F3 239, 242, fn.5 ["drug courier profile has little
meaning independent of the objective facts"]; US v.
Urrieta (6C 2008) 520 F3 569, 576 ["An officer's reasonable
suspicion may be based on characteristics that include factors
from a profile, so long as the suspicion is accompanied by other
evidence."].

[142] CAL: P v.
Gorrostieta (1993) 19 CA4 71, 84 ["There is no discernible
distinction between probable cause to believe a person is carrying
narcotics and probable cause to arrest for carrying narcotics"].