Chapter 10: Traffic Stops
Generally
Requirements: There are essentially two requirements: (1) officers must have had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver had violated the Vehicle Code, and (2) the officers' actions during the stop must have been reasonably related to the purpose of investigating and resolving the violation. Also see Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Duration of Detentions).
Status of occupants
Drivers: Drivers who are stopped for traffic violations are "seized" under the Fourth Amendment.[1] Although they are technically "under arrest" if officers witnessed the violation,[2] they are merely detainees and are not subject to the rules pertaining to arrestees unless they were taken into physical custody.[3] See "Traffic Stop Procedure" below.
Passengers: All passengers are automatically detained during the course of a traffic stop.[4] This only means that officers can control their movements to prevent interference and as necessary for officer safety. See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions ("Officer Safety Precautions," Controlling the detainee's movements), below.
Grounds to Stop
: Grounds to make a traffic stop exist if there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe the driver committed a traffic violation.[5] The following are examples:
Speeding: Speed may be determined by radar, pacing, or visual estimation.[6]
Unsafe lane change: An unsafe lane change in violation of Vehicle Code§ 22107 occurs if (1) it was unsafe to change lanes, or (2) the driver failed to signal the turn and another vehicle might have been "affected" by the movement.[7]
Tailgating (Vehicle Code§ 21703): May be based on officer's observation or time-distance calculation.[8]
Using a cellphone while driving (Vehicle Code§ 23123)
Car temporarily stopped: A driver using an in-hand cellphone while operating a vehicle is in violation of Vehicle Code§ 23123 even if his car was temporarily stopped; e.g., at a traffic light.[9]
Looking at cellphone screen: Merely looking at the screen of a cellphone to view a map application does not violate Vehicle Code § 23123.[10]
Texting while driving: A violation of Vehicle Code§ 23123.5 may be based on circumstantial evidence; e.g., the driver "was leaning and looking down a few times as though he was still using his cellular telephone" and he made movements with his hands consistent with texting.[11]
Revoked or suspended license: If a license check on a moving vehicle shows that the license of the registered owner is currently under suspension or revocation, officers may infer that the driver of the vehicle is the person whose license was suspended or revoked license. Exception: This inference would not apply if there was reason to believe that someone other than the registered driver was driving (e.g., DMV listed the age of the licensee at 65 but the apparent age of the driver was 22).[12]
Tips from 911 callers: See Chapter 2 Probable Cause: Reliability of Information (911 Callers).
Unlicensed driver: Officers had reason to believe the driver was unlicensed.[13]
Missing plate: The front or rear plate was missing.[14]
Plate obscured: The plate was obscured; e.g., by trailer hitch ball.[15]
Upside-down license plate: An upside-down license plate is not "clearly legible" and may therefore justify a stop for a violation of Vehicle Code§ 5201.[16]
Expired tabs: An officer may stop a vehicle if, in addition to expired tabs, one of the following circumstances existed:
No temporary operation permit displayed: OK to stop.[17]
Temporary operating permit not visible: The officer could not see the permit, even if it turned out that a valid permit was displayed.[18]
Temporary operating permit appears to be invalid: OK to stop if there was reason to believe the permit had expired,[19] was forged,[20] or was otherwise invalid.[21]
Registration irregularities: Officers had reason to believe that the vehicle was not properly registered.[22]
Out of state registration violation: Officers may stop a vehicle with out-of-state plates for a registration violation of that state only if they were aware that the vehicle was, in fact, in violation of the out-of-state vehicle registration laws.[23]
Brake light out: A brake light was out in violation of Vehicle Code§ 24252(a).[24]
Window tint: Officers reasonably believed that windows were tinted in violation of Vehicle Code§ 26708(d)(2).[25]
Window obstruction: Officers reasonably believed that an object dangling from the rearview mirror obstructed the driver's vision in violation of Vehicle Code§ 26708(a)(2).[26]
Detention for traffic accident: It may be reasonable to detain a motorist if there was reason to believe he was driving a vehicle that had just been involved in a traffic accident.[27]
Detention for parking violations: If officers had grounds to cite a vehicle for a parking violation, they may detain the driver for the purpose of issuing a citation.[28]
Traffic Stop Procedure
Subjects covered elsewhere
Duration of traffic stops: See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Duration of Detentions, Traffic stops).
Miranda: See Chapter 42 Miranda: When Compulsory (Questioning Detainees).
Basic procedure
Summary: "An officer's mission includes certain ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop, even if they are not required to investigate a particular traffic violation. Those inquiries typically involve checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance. Such routine checks ensure that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. By contrast, unrelated inquiries such as dog sniffs or other non-routine checks, which are aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, lack the same close connection to roadway safety, and must be justified by independent reasonable suspicion."[29]
Officer-safety: Because traffic stops are inherently dangerous,[30] officers may take reasonable safety precautions. See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Officer Safety Precautions).
Inspect license: Officers may require that the driver present a driver's license for inspection.[31] Also see Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Seeking Identification)
Inspect registration, proof of insurance: Officers may examine the vehicle registration and the driver's proof of financial responsibility.
DMV checks: Officers may run the driver's name and vehicle registration information through DMV or other official database.[32]
Warrant and rap sheet checks: Officers may run a warrant check on the driver because (1) warrant checks further the public interest in apprehending wanted suspects, and (2) they further officer safety as officers will be better able to determine if the driver is apt to resist.[33]
Inspect VIN: Officers may inspect the VIN on the dash.[34]
Duration of traffic stops: See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Duration of Detentions, Responding to complications).
Expanded procedure: The following procedures are permissible depending on whether they were reasonably necessary:
High-risk stops: See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Officer-Safety Precautions, High-risk car stops.
Pat searches: See Chapter 24 Pat Searches.
Consent searches: See Chapter 16 Consent Searches.
Searches for evidence: See Chapter 31 Vehicle Searches.
Searches for ID: Chapter 31 Vehicle Searches (Searches for ID, Traffic stops)
Walk K9 around vehicle: See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Conducting the Investigation, Nonconsensual K9 sniff).
Identify passengers: See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Obtaining Identification, From companions).
Searching for marijuana: See Chapter 22 Marijuana Searches.
Investigating other crimes: See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Duration of Detentions, Investigating other crimes).
Pretext Stops (a.k.a. "Wall Stops")
Definition: A "wall stop" is a traffic stop based on an observed traffic violation, but whose real purpose was to investigate a crime for which grounds to detain did not exist.
When permitted: Wall stops are lawful if (1) there were grounds to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation, and (2) the officers followed the required procedure for traffic stops.[35] Thus, the officer's subjective motivation for stopping the car is irrelevant. Also see Chapter 8 Investigatory Detentions (Duration of detentions, Investigating other crimes).
Citation not issued: An officer's decision not to cite the driver does not prove that he did not observe the traffic violation.[36]
Stopping officer did not see violation: It is immaterial that the officer who stopped the car did not see the violation so long as he was notified of the violation by another officer who did. See Chapter 1 Principles of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion (The "Official Channels" Rule).
Lying about reason for stop: If officers have grounds to stop a vehicle for any reason, it is immaterial that they lied to the suspect about the reason for the stop.[37]
Potential legal problems: If evidence was obtained as the result of a wall stop, officers will sometimes omit from their reports all references to the true source of the information. This process is euphemistically known as "Reconstruction" or "Parallel construction" because officers construct a plausible (but false) account of how an investigation began. This can trigger the following legal issues that the courts have not yet resolved.
Discovery violation: If the suspect was charged with a crime as the result of the stop, and if prosecutors were aware of the true motivation for the stop, their failure to disclose it to the defense might constitute a violation of basic discovery rules.
False police report: A police report that was written so as to conceal relevant and discoverable information might be deemed a false police report.
Perjury: An officer might commit perjury if he failed to disclose the true purpose of the stop if he was asked in court why he stopped the defendant.
Wiretap disclosure requirement: If the stop was prompted by information obtained from a wiretap, California law provides that, at least ten days before a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, prosecutors must disclose to the defense that the defendant was identified as the result of a wiretap.[38]
Notes
[1] USSC: Whren v. US (1996) 517
US 806, 809 ["temporary detention of individuals during the stop
of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period
and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure'"].
[2] CAL: P v.
Hubbard (1970) 9 CA3 827, 833 ["Nevertheless the violator
is, during the period immediately preceding his execution of the
promise to appear, under arrest."]. OTHER: US
v. Garcia (7C 2004) 376 F3 648, 650 [the "traffic
stop was itself an arrest on probable cause"]; US
v. $404,905 (8C 1999) 182 F3 643, 648 [traffic stop
"is a form of arrest, based upon probable cause"].
[3] USSC: Rodriguez v. US (2015)
575 US 348, 354 ["A relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic
stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop than to a
formal arrest."]; Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)
468 US 420, 439, fn.29 ["most traffic stops resemble, in duration
and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in [Terry
v. Ohio]"]. CAL: P v.
Hernandez (2008) 45 C4 295, 299 ["Ordinary traffic stops
are treated as investigatory detentions"]. OTHER:
US v. Digiovanni (4C 2011) 650 F3 498, 506 ["a traffic stop
is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial
arrest"]; US v. Jones (8C 2001) 269 F3 919, 924 ["For
purposes of constitutional analysis, a traffic stop is
characterized as an investigative detention, rather than a
custodial arrest. As such, a traffic stop is governed by the
principles of [Terry]."].
[4] USSC:
Brendlin v. California (2007) 551, 249, 250 ["it would be
unreasonable to expect officers "to allow people to come and go
freely from the physical focal point of a [stop]"];
Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 US 323, 333 ["a passenger is
not free to "move about at will"]. CAL:
[5] USSC: Whren v.
US (1996) 517 US 806, 810 ["the decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Mariscal (9C 2002) 285 F3 1127, 1130
["Because most people are not such paragons of driving skill and
virtue that they consistently adhere to each one of the complex
laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles," grounds to stop
must be reasonable"]; US v. Hartz (9C 2006)
458 F3 1011, 1017 ["A police-initiated traffic stop is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment if the police stop the vehicle because
of reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants have broken
the law."]; US v. Choudhry (9C 2006) 461 F3
1097, 1100; US v. Lopez-Soto (9C 2000) 205 F3
1101, 1104-5 [probable cause is not required]. OTHER:
US v. Thompson (8C 2008) 533 F3 964, 969 ["It
is well established that a traffic violation—however minor—creates
probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle."].
[6] OTHER: US v. Lott (6C 2020)
954 F3 919, 923 [driving too slowly [statute similar to Veh. Code
§22400]]; US v. Green (3C 2018) 897 F3 173, 178
["Logically, the more excessive a driver's speed, the less precise
a measurement must be to establish reasonable suspicion that the
driver is speeding at least to some degree."];
US v. Gaffney (8C 2015) 789 F3 866, 869-70 [visual
estimation]; US v. Ludwig (10C 2011) 641 F3
1243, 1247 ["It's long been the case that an officer's visual
estimation can supply probable cause to support a traffic stop for
speeding in appropriate circumstances." Citations omitted.].
BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Sowards (4C 2012) 690 F3 583
[insufficient evidence that officer was qualified to make visual
estimation, especially because the estimated speed was not
significantly greater than the speed limit].
[7] CAL: P v. Suff (2014) 58 C4
1013, 1055-56 [if a vehicle is stopped at a red light behind the
suspect's vehicle, the suspect's failure to signal a right turn
"affects" the other vehicle and, therefore, the turn violates Veh.
Code§ 22107]; P v. Holiman (2022) 76 CA5 825, 832 ["It
has been the law for more than a decade that the requirement of
signaling continuously for 100 feet before a turn (§ 22108)
is not a distinct traffic offense; that section applies
only if another driver would be affected by the vehicle's
movement within the meaning of section 22107."]; P
v. Logsdon (2008) 164 CA4 741, 744 [the officer was
affected by the Logsdon's turn because he "was directly behind
Logsdon, in the same lane and within 100 feet of him"];
P v. Durant (2012) 205 CA4 57, 63 ["actual impact upon
another motorist is not required]. 9th CIR: US
v. Caseres (9C 2008) 533 F3 1064, 1069 [insufficient
evidence "that any other vehicles would have been affected by
Caseres's turn"].
[8] OTHER: US v. Lewis (7C 2019)
920 F3 483.
[9] CAL: P v.
Nelson (2011) 132 CA4 856.
[10] CAL: P v. Spriggs (2014)
224 CA4 150.
[11] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Corrales (2013) 213 CA4 696, 700.
[12] USSC:
Kansas v. Glover (2020) __ US __ [140 S.Ct. 1183] ["The
fact that the registered owner of a vehicle is not always the
driver of the vehicle does not negate the reasonableness of [the
officer's] inference. Such is the case with all reasonable
inferences."].
[13] CAL: P v.
Saunders (2006) 38 C4 1129, 1135; P v. Lopez (2016)
4 CA5 815, 825.
[14] CAL: P v.
Dotson (2010) 179 CA4 1045, 1049 ["Absence of license
plates provides reasonable suspicion that the driver is violating
the law unless there are other circumstances that dispel that
suspicion," edited.]; P v. Saunders (2006) 38 C4 1129, 1136
["the lack of a front license plate has long been recognized as a
legitimate basis for a traffic stop"]; P v.
Greenwood (2010) 189 CA4 742, 748-49. 9th CIR:
US v. Ngumezi (9C 2020) 980 F3 1285, 1286 [The car had no
license plates, in apparent violation of [Veh. Code§
5200(a)]."].
[15] CAL: P v.
White (2001) 93 CA4 1022, 1026.
[16] CAL: P v.
Duncan (2008) 160 CA4 1014, 1019.
[17] CAL: P v. Saunders (2006)
38 C4 1129, 1135 [expired tab "appeared to be a violation of [Veh.
Code§ 4601(a)"]; In re Raymond C. (2008) 45 C4 303,
307-8.
[18] CAL:
In re Raymond C. (2008) 45 C4 303;
P v. Dotson (2009) 179 CA4 1045, 1050-51;
P v. Greenwood (2010) 189 CA4 742, 748 ["If the officer
does not see the temporary permit and the vehicle has no license
plates, it is reasonable for the officer to make a traffic
stop."].
[19] CAL: P v. Saunders (2006)
38 C4 1129, 1135 [expired tab "appeared to be a violation of [Veh.
Code§ 4601(a)]."].
[20] CAL: P v. Hernandez (2008)
45 C4 295, 299-300.
[21] CAL: P v. Brendlin (2006)
38 C4 1107, 1114 (vacated on other grounds in
Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 US 249);
P v. Hernandez (2008) 45 C4 295, 300;
P v. Dotson (2009) 179 CA4 1045 [officers may stop a
vehicle without plates "unless there are other circumstances that
dispel that suspicion"]; P v. Greenwood (2010) 189 CA4 742,
748 ["a vehicle displaying a valid temporary permit may be stopped
where there is some objective indicia that something may be amiss
with the registration or permit"]; P v. Saunders (2006) 38
C4 1129, 1137.
[22] OTHER: US v. Hanel (8C
2021) 993 F3 540, 544 [the officer had "reasonable suspicion that
the Durango lacked proper registration"].
[23] CAL: P v.
Reyes (2011) 196 CA4 856, 864 ["If the law enforcement
officer does not know the answer [as to whether the vehicle is in
violation of the issuing state's law] he or she is not authorized
to make the stop anyway.].
[24] CAL: In re Justin K. (2002)
98 CA4 695, 698.
[25] CAL: P v.
Carter (2010) 182 CA4 522, 529 ["When a police officer sees
a vehicle with tinted front and side windows, the officer may stop
the car and cite the driver for a violation of [Veh. Code§
26708(a)]]; P v. Niebauer (1989) 214 CA3
1278, 1292 [window tint violation may be based on an officer's
"common-sense examination of a vehicle"]; P v.
Hanes (1997) 60 CA4S 6, 10 ["The tinting was so dark as to
appear black and prevent the officer from seeing the occupants on
the front seats"]. 9th CIR: US v.
Wallace (9C 2000) 213 F3 1216, 1220 ["the fact that [the
officer] observed a 'heavy tint' and that 'the occupant inside was
at a harder degree to look into the vehicle' establishes that the
tinting on Wallace's windows probably [violated Veh. Code§
26708]"]. OTHER: US v. Meadows (10C 2020) 970 F3
1338, 1341 [stop for excessive tint was warranted regardless of
whether the violation was civil—not criminal].
[26] CAL: P v.
Colbert (2007) 157 CA4 1068, 1072-73.
[27] OTHER: US v. Chang (7C
2021) 999 F3 1059, 1066 [when the officers "saw the car that had spun off
the road, he had reason to suspect that a traffic violation may have
occurred," and "in the ordinary course of events, cars do not slide off
the road"].
[28] CAL: P v.
Bennett (2011) 197 CA4 907; P v. Hart (1999)
73 CA4 852. 9th CIR: US v. Choudhry (9C 2006)
461 F3 1097, 1103 [California "has not removed parking regulation from the
division of the Vehicle Code that covers moving traffic violations."].
OTHER: US v. Prigmore (6C 2021) 15 F4 768, 778 [detention for
unlawful parking in handicap spot]; US v. Torres (10C 2021) 987 F3
893, 903 ["Officer Krause had probable cause to stop the vehicle to issue
a parking ticket. Given the existence of probable cause, rather than just
reasonable suspicion, no balancing was required."]; US v. Johnson
(7C 2017) 874 F3 571, 573 ["probable cause justifies stops and arrests,
even for fine-only offenses"]; US v. McGehee (10C
2012) 672 F3 860, 868 ["the Lexus in which Mr. McGehee was sitting
was illegally parked, and the officer was entitled to conduct a
traffic stop in order to issue a citation"].
[29] 9th Cir.: US v. Nault (9C
2022) 41 F4 1073, 1078.
[30] USSC: Pennsylvania v. Mimms
(1977) 434 US 106, 110 [officer-safety concerns during traffic stops are
"both legitimate and weighty"]; Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 US
323, 331 [the risk of a violent encounter "stems not from the ordinary
reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact
that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop"];
Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 356 ["Traffic stops are
especially fraught with danger to police officers."]; Michigan v.
Long (1983) 463 US 1032, 1052 [an officer who is conducting a traffic
stop is "particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest
has not been effected, and the officer must make a quick decision as to how
to protect himself and others from possible danger"]; Maryland v.
Wilson (1997) 519 US 408, 413 ["Regrettably, traffic stops may be
dangerous encounters."].
[31] USSC: Rodriguez v. US (2015)
575 US 348, 355 [duties typically include "checking the driver's license"];
Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 US 648, 659 [driver's licenses "are
subject to inspection"]; New York v. Class (1986) 475 US 106, 115
["a demand to see license and registration papers is within the scope of
police authority pursuant to a traffic violation stop"]. CAL: P
v. McKay (2002) 27 C4 601, 623 [driver had burden to provide
"satisfactory" ID"]; In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 C4 60, 78 ["When the
officer prepared to cite Arturo for a Vehicle Code violation, he had both a
right and an obligation to ascertain the driver's true identity"; reversed
on other grounds in P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353]; P v.
Webster (1991) 54 C3 411, 430 ["The law [requires] the driver of a
motor vehicle to produce his or her license and registration for
examination upon a peace officer's demand."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Gorman (9C 2017) 859 F3 706, 715 ["The stop should have taken only a
short time—enough time to warn Gorman about left lane rules, determine
whether to issue a traffic citation, and perform routine checks on his
driver's license and registration."]. OTHER: US v. Martin
(7C 2005) 422 F3 597, 602 ["failure to produce a valid driver's license
necessitated additional questioning"].
[32] OTHER: US v.
Rivera (8C 2009) 570 F3 1009, 1013 [license and registration check
"was a permissible incident of the traffic stop, and did not unreasonably
prolong it"]; US v. Anderson (10C 1997) 114 F3 1059,
1064 ["An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may perform a computer
check on the driver's license and the vehicle registration papers."];
US v. Shabazz (5C 1993) 993 F2 431, 437 ["the law
enforcement interest to be served by running a computer check on the
license of someone stopped for a traffic violation is unquestioned"];
US v. Brigham (5C 2004) 382 F3 500, 507-8 ["Like other
circuits, this court has found no constitutional impediment to a law
enforcement officer's request to examine a driver's license and vehicle
registration or rental papers during a traffic stop and to run a computer
check on both." Citations omitted].
[33] USSC:
Utah v. Strieff (2016) 136 US 2056, 2063 ["The officer's decision to
run the warrant check was a negligibly burdensome precaution for officer
safety."]; Rodriguez v. US (2015) 575 US 348, 349 [typical duties
include "determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the
driver"]. 9th CIR: US v. Hylton (9C 2022) 30 F4 842, 847
["Given the Supreme Court's reliance on this principle, it is unsurprising
that several other circuits have held that criminal history checks are
permissible post-Rodriguez," citations omitted.];
US v. Christian (9C 2004) 356 F3 1103, 1107 ["This [warrant check]
information could be as important to an officer's safety as knowing that
the suspect is carrying a weapon."];
US v. Evans (9C 2015) 786 F3 779, 786 ["vehicle records and warrant
checks" are "tasks that are ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic
stop"]; US v. Mayville (10C 2020) 955 F3 825, 830 ["This court has
routinely permitted officers to conduct criminal-history checks during
traffic stops in the interest of officer safety."]; US v. Young (6C
2012) 707 F3 598, 606 ["the officers here did not exceed the reasonable
scope of a Terry stop by running a warrant check"]; Klaucke v.
Daly (1C 2010) 595 F3 20, 26 ["most circuits have held that an officer
does not impermissibly expand the scope of a Terry stop by
performing a background and warrant check, even where that search is
unrelated to the circumstances that initially drew the officer's
attention."]; US v. Villagrana-Flores (10C 2006) 467 F3 1269, 1277
["permitting a warrants check during [detentions] promotes the strong
government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice"];
US v. Holt (10C 2001) 264 F3 1215, 1221-22 ["By determining whether
a detained motorist has a criminal record or outstanding warrants, an
officer will be better apprized of whether the detained motorist might
engage in violent activity during the stop."]; US v. Rice (10C 2007)
483 F3 1079, 1084 ["Obvious precautions [during traffic stops] include
running a background check on the driver"]. BUT ALSO SEE: US v.
Evans (9C 2015) 786 F3 779, 786 [traffic stop became unlawful because
the officers conducted "an ex-felon registration check and a dog sniff,
both of which were unrelated to the traffic violation"].
[34] USSC: New York v.
Class (1986) 475 US 106, 115 ["a demand to inspect the VIN, like a
demand to see license and registration papers, is within the scope of
police authority pursuant to a traffic violation stop"]. ALSO SEE:
P v. Davitt (1976) 56 CA3 845 [in older cars in which
the VIN is on the door jamb, officers may open the door for the limited
purpose of inspecting the VIN]. NOTE: What is a VIN number? "The VIN
consists of more than a dozen digits, unique to each vehicle and required
on all cars and trucks. The VIN is roughly analogous to a serial number,
but it can be deciphered to reveal not only the place of the automobile in
the manufacturer's production, run, but the make, model, engine type, and
place of manufacture of the vehicle." New York v.
Class (1986) 475 US 106, 111.
[35] USSC: Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd (2011) 563 US 731, 739 [pretext arrest did not violate
Fourth Amendment because probable cause existed]; Whren v.
US (1996) 517 US 806, 812 ["we have never held, outside the context
of inventory search or administrative inspection, that an officer's motive
invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment"];
Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 US 33, 38; Arkansas
v. Sullivan (2001) 532 US 769. CAL: P v. Tully
(2012) 54 C4 952, 980 ["If there is a legitimate reason for the stop, the
subjective motivation of the officer is irrelevant."]; P v.
Lomax (2010) 49 C4 530, 564 ["If there is a legitimate reason for
the stop, the subjective motivation of the officers is irrelevant."];
P v. Gallardo (2005) 130 CA4 234, 238 ["The defendant's
second claim, that a pretextual traffic stop is unlawful, is clearly in
error."]; P v. Gomez (2004) 117 CA4 531, 537 ["Stopping
defendant's vehicle for a seatbelt violation, even if done as a pretext for
the narcotics investigation, was entirely legal."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Diaz-Castaneda (9C 2007) 494 F3 1146, 1152
["Even if the police officer making the stop has an illicit motivation for
his action, subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."]; US v. Malik (9C 2020)
963 F3 1014, 1015 [it was error for the district court to "focus on [the
officer's] subjective motivations for performing the [probable cause]
search"]; US v. Willis (9C 2005) 431 F3 709, 715
["Whren stands for the proposition that if the officers have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, the officers
may conduct a traffic stop even if the stop serves some other purpose."].
[36] CAL: Brierton v.
DMV (2005) 130 CA4 499, 510 [not issuing a citation is "irrelevant"
in determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion]. 9th
CIR: US v. Willis (9C 2005) 431 F3 709, 717 ["We
think it was reasonable for the officers to view any traffic violations as
inconsequential in light of Willis's arrest"]. OTHER: US
v. Bell (6C 2009) 555 F3 535, 541 ["the fact that the
warning was never actually completed is not determinative"].
[37] 9th CIR:
US v. Magallon-Lopez (9C 2016) 817 F3 671, 675 ["That the officer
lied about seeing Magallon-Lopez make an illegal lane change does not call
into question the legality of the stop."].
[38] CAL: Pen. Code§ 629.70.
NOTE: If a motion to suppress is not filed, such information must
be given before a plea, or at least ten days before trial.