Chapter 18: Entry to Arrest

[1] CAL: P v.
Ramey (1976) 16 C3 263, 275.

[2] USSC: Payton v.
New York (1980) 445 US 573. ALSO SEE:
Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 US 103, 113,
fn.13 [“The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the
most controversy is whether and under what circumstances an
officer may enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest,”
edited.].

[3] USSC: Steagald v.
US (1981) 451 US 204.

[4] CAL: P v.
Willis (1980) 104 CA3 433, 443 [“for Ramey purposes,
‘home’ should be defined in terms as broad as necessary to protect
the privacy interests at stake and, therefore, would include any
premises in which the occupant had acquired a legitimate
expectation of privacy”; P v. Tillery (1979)
99 CA3 975, 979 [“The expectation of privacy against warrantless
searches and seizures applies to tenancy of any kind, regardless
of duration of the stay or nature of any consideration paid.”];
P v. Trudell (1985) 173 CA3 1221, 1229 [“The
sanctity of the premises is the subject of the
Payton court’s protection.”]; P v.
Lee (1986) 186 CA3 743, 746 [Ramey covers any
structure of “private retreat”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Driver (9C 1985) 776 F2 807, 809 [“The relevant
question in the context of an entry into the home or business is
the individual’s expectation of privacy.”].

[5] USSC: Payton v.
New York (1980) 445 US 573, 590 [“the Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant”]; Minnesota v.
Olson (1990) 495 US 91 [duplex]. CAL: P v.
Boyd (1990) 224 CA3 736, 744 [mobile home]; P v.
Franco (1986) 183 CA3 1089, 1093 [hut in which the arrestee
slept]; P v. Bigham (1975) 49 CA3 73, 81 [converted
garage]; P v. Superior Court (Arketa) (1970) 10 CA3
122 [wooden shed in which a light was burning, the shed was about
25 yards from a house].

[6] OTHER: US v. Mastin (11C
2020) 972 F3 1230, 1236 [“A hotel room—though not what ordinarily
comes to mind when one pictures a ‘house’—qualifies as a place in
which the people remain secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures”].

[7] CAL: P v. Lee (1986)
186 CA3 743, 750 [“Lee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his locked interior office, which was not accessible to the public
without permission.”]. 9th CIR: US v.
Driver (9C 1985) 776 F2 807, 810 [“Mrs. Driver was
not in an area exposed or visible to the public, but in an area of
the warehouse with a reasonable expectation of privacy.”].
OTHER: O’Rourke v. Hayes (11C 2004)
378 F3 1201, 1206 [area “off-limits to the general public”].

[8] USSC: US v.
Watson (1976) 423 US 411, 418, fn.6 [restaurant].
CAL: P v. Lovett (1978) 82 CA3 527,
532 [Ramey not applicable “before crossing the threshold of
a store into which the general public has been invited to
enter.”]; P v. James (1971) 17 CA3 463, 467
[“Business premises the door to which is kept open during daylight
hours and in and out of which people freely pass”]; P
v. Pompa (1989) 212 CA3 1308, 1311 [upholstery store
with “Open for Business” sign out front].

[9] USSC: New York v.
Harris (1990) 495 US 14, 17 [“the rule in Payton was
designed to protect the physical integrity of the home”];
Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 US 91, 95 [“The
purpose of [Payton] was not to protect the person of the
suspect but to protect his home from entry in the absence of a
magistrate’s finding of probable cause.”]. CAL:
P v. McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 908 [“It is the
intrusion into, rather than the arrest in, the dwelling which
offends constitutional standards under Ramey.”];
P v. Ford (1979) 97 CA3 744, 748 [“it is the
unlawful intrusion into the dwelling which offends
constitutional safeguards and which is therefore at the heart of
the matter, rather than the arrest itself.”]; P v.
Lewis (1999) 74 CA4 662, 672 [“the interest behind the
Payton-Ramey rule [is] preserving the sanctity of the
home”]. NOTE: In US v. Quaempts (9C
2005) 411 F3 1046 the Ninth Circuit ruled that that an officer
violated Payton even though he did not even enter the
premises. But because the court did not explain how its conclusion
did not run afoul of the Court’s often-quoted observation in
Payton that “the physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed,” Quaempts may not have much persuasive value.

[10] USSC: Steagald v.
US (1981) 451 US 204, 221 [the arrestee “can be readily
seized before entering or after leaving”]. CAL: P
v. Green (1983) 146 CA3 369, 377 [“Appellant’s
reliance on Ramey is misplaced, since the arrest took place
outside his home.”]. BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Banks (7C
2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 1956605] [suspect was arrested while
barbequing on his front porch; the entry was unlawful because an
immediate arrest was unnecessary and (we think) the entry was
particularly intrusive because, at the time, the porch was serving
as ancillary to the kitchen].

[11] CAL: P v. Trudell (1985)
173 CA3 1221, 1229 [“Appellant next contends that his decision to
exit his residence was nonconsensual and therefore his arrest was
invalid. Consent, however, is not a prerequisite to a valid arrest
if the arrest is based on probable cause and does not require an
invasion of a residence.”]; P v. Tillery (1979) 99 CA3 975,
979-80 [“privacy interests protected by Ramey were
satisfied when appellant voluntarily stepped outside”];
P v. Green (1983) 146 CA3 369, 374 [“When appellant
answered the door, [the officer] asked him to step outside so that
they could talk. After a brief conversation, he placed appellant
under arrest.”]; P v. Jackson (1986) 187 CA3 499, 505
[“Jackson was arrested outside his home after being asked out by
the police. Under such circumstances an arrest is lawful.”].
NOTE: We are aware of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the
contrary in US v. Nora (9C 2014) 765 F3 1049. But because
Nora cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent, we
do not think it is good law.

[12] CAL: P v.
Trudell (1985) 173 CA3 1221, 1229 [“post-Ramey
decisions have upheld the use of subterfuge to trick a defendant
into leaving a residence”]; P v.
Porras (1979) 99 CA3 874 [suspect was arrested as he fled
his house after a narcotics officer phoned him, identified himself
as one of his customers and said he had just been forced by some
narcs to snitch him off, and that he had better “get rid of the
dope” because the cops “were coming with a search warrant” in 20
minutes]; P v. Martino (1985) 166 CA3 777 [officer
made an anonymous call to the suspect and said, “The cops are
getting a search warrant. If you have any dope, you had better get
it out of there.”]; In re Danny E. (1981) 121 CA3
44, 51 [“the use of a ruse to persuade a potential arrestee
to leave a house, thereby subjecting himself to
arrest on the street where the concerns attendant to
Ramey are not present is not necessarily precluded.”];
P v. McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 906 [“Employment
of a ruse to obtain consent to enter is immaterial where officers
have a right to enter”]. 9th CIR: US v.
Michaud (9C 2001) 268 F3 728, 733 [“We have held that there
is no constitutional mandate forbidding the use of deception in
executing a valid arrest warrant. Citing Leahy v.
US (9C 1960) 272 F2 487, 490].

[13] USSC: US v.
Santana (1976) 427 US 38, 42 [an arrestee at her doorway
“was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy”];
Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 335
[“This Court has held that a person standing in the doorway of a
house is ‘in a public place,’ and hence subject to arrest without
a warrant permitting entry of the home.”]. CAL:
P v. Hampton (1985) 164 CA3 27, 36 [“respondent was
standing on the threshold when the officer placed her under
arrest”]. 9th CIR: US v. Whitten (9C
1983) 706 F2 1000, 1015 [“A doorway, unlike the interior of a
hotel room, is a public place.”]. OTHER:
US v. Malagerio (5C 2022) 49 F4 911, 915 [“But a person
standing in the doorway of a house is in a public place, and hence
subject to arrest without a warrant permitting entry of the
home.”]; US v. Council (8C 2017) 860 F3 604, 619 [“Council
was ‘in the doorway’ and had not yet pulled back”].

[14] CASE REFERENCED: P
v. Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 480-81 [court indicated
that a warrantless entry might not violate Ramey-Payton if
it did not “undermine the statutory purposes of safeguarding the
privacy of citizens in their homes and preventing unnecessary
violent confrontations between startled householders and arresting
officers”].

[15] CASE REFERENCED: US
v. Vaneaton (9C 1995) 49 F3 1423. COMPARE:
US v. Johnson (9C 1980) 626 F2 753, 757 [“it
cannot be said that Johnson voluntarily exposed himself to
warrantless arrest by opening his door to agents who
misrepresented their identities”]; US v.
McCraw (4C 1990) 920 F2 224, 229 [“by opening the door only
halfway, Mathis did not voluntarily expose himself to the public
to the same extent as the arrestee in Santana“]; US
v. Edmondson (11C 1986) 791 F2 1512 [entry unlawful
because the suspect opened the door after an agent yelled, “FBI.
Open the door.”].

[16] OTHER: US v. Bennett (8C
2020) 972 F3 966, 973 [“Because [the officer] recognized Bennett
before entering the property, any incursion onto the curtilage was
a limited intrusion for a legitimate law enforcement objective.”].

[17] OTHER: US v. Mastin (11C
2020) 972 F3 1230, 1236 [“So entering a home to carry out an
arrest warrant is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the
officer has a reasonable belief both that the location to be
searched is the suspect’s dwelling and that the suspect is within
the residence at the time of entry.”]; US v. Ford (8C 2018)
888 F3 922, 926 [“For the entry to be valid, officers must have
both (1) a reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the place
to be entered and (2) reason to believe that the suspect is
present at the time the warrant is executed.”].

[18] UCCS: Steagald v.
US (1981) 451 US 204, 213 [“An arrest warrant is issued
upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the
subject of the warrant has committed an offense.”].

[19] CAL: Pen. Code§ 813 [felony
warrants], Pen. Code§ 1427 [misdemeanor warrants];
In re Walters (1975) 15 C3 738, 747 [“a person charged with
the commission of a misdemeanor may also be arrested pursuant to a
warrant”]. OTHER: US v. Clayton (8C
2000) 210 F3 841, 843.

[20] CAL: Nunes v.
Superior Court (1980) 100 CA3 915, 935-36. OTHER:
Washington v. Simpson (8C 1986) 806 F2 192,
196, fn.4 [“federal constitutional law does not require the actual
possession of a warrant if the arresting officer has knowledge of
its existence”].

[21] CAL: P v.
McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 908 [“no
Ramey violation as to [the arrestee] could have occurred
under the present facts since the police had judicial
authorization to enter her home via a validly issued and executed
search warrant.”].

[22] CAL: Pen. Code§ 3060(a) [“The
written order of the parole authority shall be a sufficient
warrant for any peace or prison officer to return to actual
custody any conditionally released or paroled prisoner.”];
P v. Hunter (2006) 140 CA4 1147, 1153-54 [parolee
may be arrested on a “parole hold”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Harper (9C 1991) 928 F2 894, 896 [parole
violation warrant authorizes entry; overruled on other grounds in
US v. King (9C 2012) 687 F3 1189]. OTHER: US
v. Pelletier (1C 2006) 469 F3 194, 200 [a valid
parole violation warrant “is adequate to support an entry into the
parolee’s domicile for the purpose of executing the warrant”].

[23] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1203.2(a).

[24] CAL: Pen. Code§ 945.

[25] CAL: Pen. Code§§ 978.5 [“A
bench warrant of arrest may be issued whenever a defendant fails
to appear in court as required by law”]; 813(c) [bench warrant for
failure to appear]; 853.8 [bench warrant for failure to appear];
983 [“The bench warrant may be served in any county in the same
manner as a warrant of arrest.”]; Allison v.
County of Ventura (1977) 68 CA3 689, 701-2 [“The term
‘bench warrant’ is not defined in our codes but as applied to
civil actions is generally understood to mean a process issued by
the court itself, or from the ‘bench,’ for attachment or arrest of
a person to compel his attendance before the court to answer to a
charge of contempt.”]. 9th CIR: US v.
Gooch (9C 2007) 506 F3 1156, 1159 [misdemeanor bench
warrant is sufficient]. OTHER: US v.
Spencer (2C 1982) 684 F2 220, 222 [misdemeanor bench
warrant is sufficient].

[26] CAL: Code Civ. Proc.§
1993. OTHER: US v. Clayton (8C 2000) 210 F3 841 [FTA
on a speeding violation].

[27] QUOTE FROM: Payton
v. New York (1980) 445 US 573, 602-3. OTHER:
US v. Brinkley (4C 2020) 980 F3 377, 388-89 [“The police
officers did not even talk to [the person who answered the door]
if Brinkley resided there, but only if he was present—a critical
difference under Steagald.”].

[28] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Risse (8C 1996) 83 F3 212, 217. USSC: US
v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 171, fn.7. CAL:
P v. Marshall (1968) 69 C2 51, 55-56; P v.
Tidalgo (1981) 123 CA3 301, 307; P v.
Fuller (1983) 148 CA3 257, 264; P v.
LeBlanc (1997) 60 CA4 157, 164. 9th CIR: US
v. Franklin (9C 2010) 603 F3 652, 656 [“Residential
arrangements take many forms. A ‘residence’ does not have to be an
old ancestral home, but it requires more than a sleepover at
someone else’s place.”]; US v. Litteral (9C
1990) 910 F2 547, 553 [“But if the suspect is a co-resident of the
third party, then … Payton allows both arrest of the
subject of the arrest warrant and use of the evidence found
against the third party.”]; Case v.
Kitsap County Sheriff’s Department (9C 2001) 249 F3 921,
931. OTHER: US v. Junkman (8C 1998)
160 F3 1191, 1194 [“As long as the officers reasonably believed
Kent Junkman was a co-resident of the room, the entry into the
room to arrest Kent Junkman was a reasonable one.”]; US
v. Risse (8C 1996) 83 F3 212, 216 [“the officers’
assessment need not in fact be correct; rather, they need only
reasonably believe that the suspect resides at the dwelling to be
searched and is currently present at the dwelling”]; US
v. Gay (10C 2001) 240 F3 1222, 1226; Valdez
v. McPheters (10C 1999) 172 F3 1120, 1225.

[29] 9th CIR: US v.
Franklin (9C 2010) 603 F3 652, 656 [“It is insufficient to
show that the parolee may have spent the night there
occasionally.”]; Perez v. Simpson (9C 1989)
884 F2 1136, 1141 [arrestee did not reside in the house merely
because “he spent the night there on occasion”]; Cuevas
v. De Roco (9C 2008) 531 F3 726, 733 [unreasonable
to believe that the arrestee stayed there regularly because the
information “was several years old, uncorroborated by available
sources, and contradicted by two more recent pieces of
information”]. OTHER: Washington v.
Simpson (8C 1986) 806 F2 192, 196 [court ruled that an
arrestee “resided” in a house when she stayed there two to four
nights per week, kept some personal belonging there, and
previously gave that address as her residence when she was
booked”] ALSO SEE: Steagald v.
US (1981) 451 US 204, 230 (dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.) [“If
a suspect has been living in a particular dwelling for any
significant period, say a few days, it can certainly be considered
his ‘home’ for Fourth Amendment purposes”].

[30] OTHER: US v. Brinkley (4C
2020) 980 F3 377, 387 [“If Brinkley was merely staying as a guest
in someone else’s home, Steagald would require the officers
to obtain a search warrant”].

[31] 9th CIR: Case v.
Kitsap County Sheriff’s Department (9C 2001) 249 F3 921,
931 [officers reasonably believed the arrestee lived at the house
“at least part of the time.”]; US v.
Litteral (9C 1990) 910 F2 547, 553 [entry permitted if “the
suspect is a co-resident of the third party”]. OTHER:
US v. Risse (8C 1996) 83 F3 212, 217
[arrestee may “live” in a house “even if [the arrestee]
concurrently maintains a residence elsewhere as well”]; US
v. Bennett (11C 2009) 555 F3 962, 965 [“The fact
that a suspect may live somewhere else from time to time does not
categorically prevent a dwelling from being the suspect’s
residence.”]; Washington v. Simpson (8C 1986)
806 F2 192, 196 [arrestee stayed in the residence two to four
nights a week, she kept clothing and other personal belongings
there, and she listed [the] address as her address on a booking
form]; US v. Junkman (8C 1998) 160 F3 1191,
1194 [“As long as the officers reasonably believed Kent Junkman
was a co-resident of the room, the entry into the room to arrest
Kent Junkman was a reasonable one.”]; US v.
Bervaldi (11C 2000) 226 F3 1256, 1263 [“even if the 132nd
Place address was his ‘permanent residence’ in some sense, that is
not inconsistent with Deridder’s residence at the 129th Avenue
address”].

[32] USSC:
Payton v. New York (1980) 445 US 573, 603 [“an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the
limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives
when there is reason to believe the suspect is within”].
CAL: P v. Downey (2011) 198 CA4 652. 662 [“Applying
the standard adopted by our Supreme Court and the majority of the
circuit courts, we expressly hold that an officer executing an
arrest warrant or conducting a probation or parole search may
enter a dwelling if he or she has only a ‘reasonable belief,’
falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect lives
there and is present at the time. Employing this standard, the
entry into defendant’s apartment was lawful.”]. NOTE: Some
circuit courts are split on the issue and think probable cause is
required. See: US v. Grandberry (9C 2013) 730 F3 968, 970;
US v. Bohannon (2C 2016) 824 F3 242, 253;
US v. Vasquez-Algarin (3C 2016) 821 F3 467, 474. But
because the Supreme Court is quite familiar with the term
“probable cause,” and because it decided not to use that term in
its seminal case on the issue (Payton v. New York), it is
unlikely that its decision to employ the term “reason to believe”
meant probable cause. See US v. Thomas (DCC 2005) 429 F3
282, 286 [“We think it more likely that the Supreme Court in
Payton used a phrase other than ‘probable cause’ because it
meant something other than ‘probable cause.'”];
US v. Magluta (11C 1995) 44 F3 1530, 1534 [“The strongest
support for a lesser burden than probable cause remains the text
of Payton, and what we must assume was a conscious effort
on the part of the Supreme Court in choosing the verbal
formulation of ‘reason to believe’ over that of ‘probable
cause.'”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Barrera (5C 2006) 464 F3
496, 501, fn.5 [“The disagreement among the circuits has been more
about semantics than substance”].

[33] OTHER: US v.
Graham (1C 2009) 553 F3 6, 14 [“we examine the information
known to the officers in the totality and not in isolation”];
US v. Lovelock (2C 1999) 170 F3 339,
344 [“Though Lovelock attempts to segment, isolate, and minimize
each item of evidence that contributed to the existence and
reasonableness of the officers’ belief on November 9 that Williams
resided at that address, the totality of the information possessed
by the officers gave them no reason to doubt that Williams was
then a resident of the attic apartment.”]; US v.
Gay (10C 2001) 240 F3 1222, 1227 [“We recognize we must be
sensitive to common sense factors indicating a resident’s
presence. The officers are not required to actually view the
suspect on the premises.”].

[34] OTHER: US v.
Gay (10C 2001) 240 F3 1222, 1227 [“Indeed the officers may
take into account the fact that a person involved in criminal
activity may be attempting to conceal his whereabouts.”].

[35] 9th CIR: Motley v.
Parks (9C en banc 2005) 432 F3 1072, 1082 [“Motley’s
statement that [the parolee] did not live at that address, coming
from a less-than-disinterested source, did not undermine the
information that officers previously had received from their
advance briefing. It is not an unheard-of phenomenon that one
resident will tell police that another resident is not at home,
when the other resident actually is hiding under a bed when the
police came to call.”].

[36] CAL: P v.
Bennetto (1974) 10 C3 695, 699-700 [“The landlady at the El
Camino apartment informed the police only that defendant had
rented the apartment two weeks before the night of the entry. She
had not seen defendant or anyone else enter or leave the apartment
since then.”]. 9th CIR: Cuevas v.
De Roco (9C 2008) 531 F3 726, 733 [the officers’
information “was several years old, uncorroborated by available
sources, and contradicted by two more recent pieces of
information”]. OTHER: US v. Bervaldi
(11C 2000) 226 F3 1256, 1264. NOTE: The court in
Bervaldi (at p. 1265) indicated that information as
to the suspect’s residency in a certain house does not suffer from
the same staleness problems as, for instance, drugs: “Residency in
a house … generally is not transitory or ephemeral, but instead
endures for some length of time.”

[37] 9th CIR: US v. Ped (8C
2019) 943 F3 427, 431 [“But because the officers had a reasonable
basis for believing that Wilson lived there, they were not
required to take further steps to verify his last reported
address”].

[38] 9th CIR: US v. Ped (8C
2019) 943 F3 427, 431. OTHER: Valdez v.
McPheters (10C 1999) 172 F3 1220, 1225 [“The officers’
belief need not prove true in fact, it is sufficient if the belief
was objectively reasonable at the time of entry.”]; US
v. Route (5C 1997) 104 F3 59, 62-63 [whether the
suspect actually lived at the house “is irrelevant”]; US
v. Junkman (8C 1998) 160 F3 1191, 1193 [“officers’
belief that [the suspect] was residing in the room and was
currently present in the room, although not in fact correct, was
reasonable”]; US v. Lovelock (2C 1999)
170 F3 339, 343 [“Nor need the officers’ belief, if reasonable, be
correct.”].

[39] USSC:
Payton v. New York (1980) 445 US 573, 603 [“an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the
limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives
when there is reason to believe the suspect is within”].
CAL: P v. Downey (2011) 198 CA4 652. 662 [“an
officer executing an arrest warrant may enter a dwelling if he or
she has only a ‘reasonable belief,'” edited].

[40] NOTE: Some circuit courts are
split on the issue and think probable cause is required. See
US v. Maley (10C 2021) 1 F4 816, 820 [“there is a circuit
split over the meaning of ‘reason to believe’ under Payton.
At issue here, the Ninth Circuit, where the search at issue
occurred, interprets ‘reason to believe’ to ’embody the same
standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause”];
US v. Grandberry (9C 2013) 730 F3 968, 970;
US v. Bohannon (2C 2016) 824 F3 242, 253;
US v. Vasquez-Algarin (3C 2016) 821 F3 467, 474. But
because the Supreme Court is quite familiar with the term
“probable cause,” and because it decided not to use it in its
seminal case on the issue (Payton v. New York), it is hard
to imagine that its use of “reason to believe” was an error. See
US v. Thomas (DCC 2005) 429 F3 282, 286 [“We think it more
likely that the Supreme Court in Payton used a phrase other
than ‘probable cause’ because it meant something other than
‘probable cause.'”]; US v. Magluta (11C 1995) 44 F3 1530,
1534 [“The strongest support for a lesser burden than probable
cause remains the text of Payton, and what we must assume was a
conscious effort on the part of the Supreme Court in choosing the
verbal formulation of ‘reason to believe’ over that of ‘probable
cause.'”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Barrera (5C 2006) 464 F3
496, 501, fn.5 [“The disagreement among the circuits has been more
about semantics than substance”].

[41] OTHER: US v.
Edmonds (3C 1995) 52 F3 1236, 1247-48 [arrestee “signed the
lease and paid the rent” at the apartment]; US v.
Bennett (11C 2009) 555 F3 962, 965 [“Bennett had recently
delivered the rent for the apartment to the building’s landlord”].

[42] CAL: P v.
Fuller (1983) 148 CA3 257, 263 [hotel room was registered
to the suspect]. 9th CIR: US v.
Franklin (9C 2010) 603 F3 652, 657 [“When the location in
question is a motel room, however, especially one identified as
having been rented by the person in question, establishing that
location as the person’s residence is much less difficult. There
is no need to draw an inference based solely on physical presence
in someone else’s home, and no concern about the rights of an
established resident.”]. OTHER: US v. Mastin (11C
2020) 972 F3 1230, 1236 [“Neither man was likely to rent a hotel
room in his own name—they were wanted for armed robbery”];
US v. Junkman (8C 1998) 160 F3 1191, 1192.

[43] CAL: P v. Downey (2011) 198
CA4 652, 659 [officer testified that “utility bills were a very
good source in finding out where someone lives because in his
experience many probationers and parolees did not know that police
had access to utility bills, edited”].

OTHER: US v. Johnson (7C 2017) 867 F3 737, 742 [“The
Accurint search showed that Johnson was ‘associated’ with the
Jackson residence. [the ATF agent “explained that ‘associated’
means that the person listed the address on a utility bill or
library card”]; US v. Denson (10C 2014) 775 F3 1214,
1217-18; US v. Route (5C 1997) 104 F3 59, 61,
fn.1; US v. Edmonds (3C 1995) 52 F3 1236,
1248; US v. Romo-Corrales (8C 2010) 592 F3
915.

[44] CAL: P v.
Icenogle (1977) 71 CA3 576, 581. OTHER: US
v. Terry (2C 1983) 702 F2 299, 319.

[45] OTHER: US v.
Route (5C 1997) 104 F3 59, 62, fn.1.

[46] CAL: P v.
Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 478.

[47] OTHER: US v.
Route (5C 1997) 104 F3 59, 61, fn.1; US v.
Stinson (D. Conn. 1994) 857 FS 1026, 1031.

[48] CAL: P v.
Boyd (1990) 224 CA3 736, 740. 9th CIR: US
v. Ayers (9C 1991) 924 F2 1468, 1480. OTHER:
US v. Route (5C 1997) 104 F3 59, 62, fn.1.

[49] OTHER: US v.
Manley (2C 1980) 632 F2 978, 983.

[50] OTHER: Washington
v. Simpson (8C 1986) 806 F2 192, 196; US
v. Clayton (8C 2000) 210 F3 841, 842-43.

[51] OTHER: US v.
Barrera (5C 2006) 464 F3 496, 504.

[52] CAL: P v. Ott (1978)
84 CA3 118, 126 [“last known address”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Ayers (9C 1991) 924 F2 1468, 1479. OTHER:
US v. Graham (1C 2009) 553 F3 6, 13.

[53] CAL: P v.
Kanos (1971) 14 CA3 642, 645, 648. 9th CIR:
US v. Ped (8C 2019) 943 F3 427, 431; US v.
Mayer (9C 2008) 530 F3 1099, 1104. OTHER: US
v. Lovelock (2C 1999) 170 F3 339, 344; US
v. Thomas (DCC 2005) 429 F3 282, 286; US
v. Graham (1C 2009) 553 F3 6, 13.

[54] OTHER: US v. Lauter (2C
1995) 57 F3 212, 215 [“Any discrepancy between the address in the
supporting affidavit and the address where Lauter was ultimately
arrested is irrelevant because all an arrest warrant must do is
identify the person sought.”]; US v. Bervaldi (11C 2000)
226 F3 1256, 1263 [“Nor is it significant that the arrest warrant
listed the 132nd Place address.”];

Wanger v. Bonner (5C 1980) 621 F2 675, 682
[court rejects the argument that “the inclusion of an address for
the person to be arrested in the warrant provided the deputies
with a reasonable basis for the belief that the [arrestee] could
be found within the premises”]. ALSO SEE: Cuerva
v. Fulmer (E.D. Pa. 1984) 596 FS 86, 90 [“In an
arrest warrant, unlike a search warrant, the listed address is
irrelevant to its validity and to that of the arrest itself.”].

[55] CAL: P v.
Alcorn (1993) 15 CA4 652, 655 [“Klein told the officers
appellant was either at the apartment or in Lancaster.”];
P v. Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 659 [motel desk clerk
had reason to believe that the arrestee was staying with a guest].
9th CIR: US v. Franklin (9C 2010) 603
F3 652, 656 [an officer “previously received a tip that Franklin
was living in the room from a credible informant”]; US
v. Mayer (9C 2008) 530 F3 1099, 1104 [“one of
Mayer’s Hansen Lane neighbors called Rauch to report that Mayer
was residing at 103 Hansen Lane”]. OTHER: US
v. Risse (8C 1996) 83 F3 212, 216-17 [“Rhoads
herself told officers that she was ‘staying with’ Risse and that
officers could contact her at Risse’s home.”]; US
v. Junkman (8C 1998) 160 F3 1191, 1192 [motel desk
clerk ID’d the arrestee as a guest]; US v.
De Parias (11C 1986) 805 F2 1447, 1457 [info from apartment
manager]; US v. Edmonds (3C 1995) 52 F3 1236,
1248 [info from apartment manager]; US v.
Lauter (2C 1995) 57 F3 212, 215 [“a reliable C

US v. Magluta (11C 1995) 44 F3 1530, 1537
[info from security guard.

[56] CAL: P v.
Kanos (1971) 14 CA3 642, 648 [officers saw the suspect
leaving the house at 7:30 a.m. with his wife and child]; P
v. Gibson (2001) 90 CA4 371, 381 [surveillance].
9th CIR: US v. Harper (9C 1991) 928 F2 894, 896.
OTHER: US v. Bervaldi (11C 2000) 226 F3 1256, 1263
[surveillance]; US v. Risse (8C 1996) 83 F3 212, 217
[“After CCO Hernandez knocked on the door of the room, a voice
from inside called ‘Who is it?’ and Hernandez recognized the voice
as Franklin’s.”].

[57] CAL: P v.
Icenogle (1977) 71 CA3 576, 581. 9th CIR: US
v. Harper (9C 1991) 928 F2 894, 896. OTHER:
US v. Magluta (11C 1995) 44 F3 1530, 1537-38;
US v. Edmonds (3C 1995) 52 F3 1236;
US v. Barrera (5C 2006) 464 F3 496, 504;
US v. Bervaldi (11C 2000) 226 F3 1256,
1264.

[58] USSC: Payton v.
New York (1980) 445 US 573, 603 [there must be “reason to
believe the suspect is within”]. CAL: P v.
Alcorn (1993) 15 CA4 652, 655 [“An officer may enter a
residence in order to execute a valid arrest warrant if the
officer reasonably believes the suspect is inside.”].

[59] CAL: P v.
Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 479; P v.
Alcorn (1993) 15 CA4 652, 655; P v.
Superior Court (Dai-Re) (1980) 104 CA3 86, 89; P v.
Bacigalupo (1991) 1 C4 103, 121; P v.
Manderscheid (2002) 99 CA4 355, 361-62. OTHER:
US v. Glover (8C 2014) 746 F3 369, 373 [“The 911 caller,
while choosing to remain anonymous, provided consistently accurate
and detailed information about Glover.”]; US v.
Jackson (7C 2009) 576 F3 465, 469; US v.
Hardin (6C 2009) 539 F3 404, 414; US v.
Spencer (2C 1982) 684 F2 220, 223 [officers entered 35
minutes after being told by the arrestee’s girlfriend that he was
at home]; US v. Gay (10C 2001) 240 F3 1222,
1227.

[60] OTHER: US v.
Clayton (8C 2000) 210 F3 841, 844; US v.
Taylor (DCC 2007) 497 F3 673, 679.

[61] OTHER: US v.
Richards (7C 1991) 937 F2 1287, 1291 [“in our opinion, the
officers would have been entitled to sweep the house even if
Richards said that no one else was home”].

[62] USSC: Maryland v.
Buie (1990) 494 US 325, 328. 9th CIR: Case
v. Kitsap County Sheriff’s Department (9C 2001) 249
F3 921, 931. OTHER: US v. Risse (8C
1996) 83 F3 212, 217.

[63] CAL: P v.
Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 659 [officers saw someone open the
curtains then immediately close them]. OTHER:
US v. Contreras (7C 2016) 820 F3 255, 268 [officers saw
suspect flee into house]; US v. Roberts (5C
2010) 612 F3 306, 312 [the officers “observed additional
occupants”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Denson (10C 2014) 775
F3 1214, 1219 [officers knew that the arrestee had a roommate who
was also wanted on an outstanding warrant”]. COMPARE:
US v. Delgado-Perez (1C 2017) 867 F3 244, 255 [“We decline
to conclude that, under Buie, it is rational, on this
record, to infer that Delgado’s voluntary surrender outside his
home supports a belief that confederates were lying inside in
wait.”].

[64] OTHER: US v. Waters (8C
2018) 883 F3 1022, 1026 [“officers observed window blinds move in
both an upstairs and downstairs window within a short period”];
US v. Burrows (7C 1995) 48 F3 1011, 1013
[officer “observed a curtain moving in an upstairs window”];
US v. Alatorre (8C 2017) 863 F3 810, 815.

[65] CAL: P v.
Mack (1980) 27 C3 145, 149 [heard “multiple voices” inside
garage]; P v. Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 659 [someone
inside said. “It’s the fucking pigs”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Hoyos (9C 1989) 892 F2 1387, 1396, fn.7 [“It was
also reasonable for the officers to infer that Hoyos was trying to
warn others inside”]. OTHER: US v.
Taylor (6C 2001) 248 F3 506, 514 [“[The officers] had heard
noises suggesting that more than one person was present in the
apartment.”]; US v. Junkman (8C 1998) 160 F3
1191, 1193 [after officers knocked and announced, someone yelled
“cops,” then there was a “commotion in the room.”].

[66] CAL: Guidi v.
Superior Court (1973) 10 C3 1, 9 [“upon entering the
apartment the officer had heard sounds coming from elsewhere than
the open areas”]. OTHER: US v. Gay (10C 2001)
240 F3 1222, 1227 [a “thud”]; US v.
Taylor (6C 2001) 248 F3 506, 514 [the officers “heard
noises suggesting that more than one person was present in the
apartment.”]; US v. Lopez (1C 1993) 989 F2
24, 26, fn.1 [Officer testified he heard “fast moving footsteps. I
couldn’t determine how many people … But there was footsteps
running about the house, inside the door.”]. COMPARE: US v. Akrawi (6C 1990) 920 F2 418,
420 [“The agents heard no noises or voices that indicated anyone
might have been in hiding on the second floor.”]; US
v. Moran–Vargas (2C 2004) 376 F3 112, 116
[“none of the agents testified to hearing any noises coming from
the bathroom”].

[67] OTHER: US v. Morehead (10C
1992) 959 F2 1489, 1496-97 [the illuminated lights “could have
reasonably led the officers to believe that Senior was inside”].

[68] CAL: P v.
Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 659 [officers saw someone open the
curtains then immediately close them, then they heard someone
inside say “It’s the fucking pigs”]. OTHER: US
v. Junkman (8C 1998) 160 F3 1191, 1193 [there was a
“commotion in the room”].

[69] CAL: P v.
Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 659 [the person who opened the
door “appeared nervous and uncooperative.”]. OTHER:
US v. Thompson (8C 2021) 6 F4 789, 791 [among other things,
when asked if there were any other people in the house, the
suspect (a suspected terrorist) said, “nobody else that he knew
of”]; US v. Richards (7C 1991) 937 F2 1287, 1291 [“Richards
twice failed to answer [the officer’s] question about whether
anyone else was in the house”]. COMPARE: P v.
Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 479 [“When they asked Gretchen if
defendant was home, she told them he would be back in an hour. The
evidence does not suggest that Gretchen’s response or behavior
further aroused the officers’ suspicions.”];
US v. Brinkley (4C 2020) 980 F3 377, 391 [significance of
nervousness undermined by officers’ aggressiveness at the door].

[70] CAL: P v.
Maier (1991) 226 CA3 1670, 1675 [trial court noted that
“Maier habitually pursued his criminal activities with
accomplices”]. 9th CIR: US v.
Paopao (9C 2006) 469 F3 760, 767 [“officers had yet to
encounter Paopao’s suspected confederate”]; US v.
Hoyos (9C 1989) 892 F2 1387, 1396 [“officers reasonably
believed that at least six men were involved in the distribution
of cocaine”]; US v. Whitten (9C 1983) 706 F2
1000, 1014 [“a number of codefendants were unaccounted for”].
OTHER: US v. Davis (7C 2022) 44 F4 685, 690 [“When
the officers went into the home, they were aware from the warrant
that Davis had allegedly recently used a firearm and that other
individuals of unknown ages were in the house.”].

[71] CAL: P v.
Block (1971) 6 C3 239, 245; P v.
Baldwin (1976) 62 CA3 727, 743 [“After (the officers)
entered, they knew only of the presence of Martinez and Baldwin;
then they discovered Cano in the living room. They were told that
Baldwin’s sister was asleep upstairs and also that there were two
other owners of the home who were not present.”]; P v.
Mack (1980) 27 C3 145, 150-51 [“[The officers] knew Bowden
had been arrested for an armed robbery in which shots were fired
and that his accomplices had escaped. He believed these dangerous
fugitives might be in the garage. He knew the stolen property
alleged to be in the garage included firearms. Therefore, anyone
remaining in the garage would have access to deadly weapons.
Moreover, he did not know whether the five men who had come out of
the garage included all five of the accused burglars.”];
P v. Schmel (1975) 54 CA3 46, 52. 9th CIR:
US v. Hoyos (9C 1989) 892 F2 1387, 1396
[“there were at least five men including Hoyos who were not in
custody”]. OTHER: US v. Mata (5C 2008)
517 F3 279, 289 [“numerous cars and individuals entered and exited
the lot, which meant that at any given time the officers might
have lacked an accurate count of suspects present”]; US
v. Barker (7C 1994) 27 F3 1287 [“when serving the
arrest warrant, the officers knew not only that a weapon had been
seen inside the home, but also that people other than Barker and
Abrams might very well have been within the house”]; US
v. James (7C 1994) 40 F3 850, 863 [“[The arresting
officer] knew that the lower floor of the duplex contained illegal
narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and two loaded firearms… He
also knew that there were at least four suspects in the flat, and
that one of the suspects had attempted to flee by way of the upper
floor of the duplex. He could thus deduce that there was an easy
means of access between the two floors, and he could not be
certain that all of the occupants of the duplex had been accounted
for and secured.”].

[72] CAL: P v. Ledesma (2003)
106 CA4 857, 866 [officer “observed two cars [and a trailer]
parked sufficiently close to the residence to create a reasonable
possibility that former occupants of the vehicles might be
inside”]; P v. Williams (1989) 48 C3 1112, 1139
[“The proximity of the [murder] victim’s car clearly suggested
defendant’s presence in the apartment”]. 9th CIR:
US v. Litteral (9C 1990) 910 F2 547, 554 [“The informant
told the agents that if Litteral’s car was there, he would be
there.”]; US v. Ayers (9C 1991) 924 F2 1468,
1480 [suspect’s car was parked in front of the house at 7:15
a.m.]; US v. Hoyos (9C 1989) 892 F2 1387, 1396 [officers
“observed Hoyos’ white Mazda in the driveway”];
US v. Whitten (9C 1983) 706 F2 1000, 1014 [“Three vehicles,
not one, were parked in the driveway.”]. OTHER:
US v. Glover (8C 2014) 746 F3 369, 374 [“they observed a
vehicle in the driveway that matched the description of one of the
vehicles associated with Glover in his fugitive profile”];
US v. Morehead (10C 1992) 959 F2 1489, 1496
[“the presence of a car in the carport and a truck in front of the
house gave the officers reason to believe [the arrestee] was on
the premises”]; US v. Magluta (11C 1995) 44
F3 1530, 1538 [“The presence of a vehicle connected to a suspect
is sufficient to create the inference that the suspect is at
home.”]; US v. Jones (4C 2012) 667 F3 477, 485
[“there were seven vehicles parked on the property at 1:00 in the
morning, yet only the two Joneses were known to reside there.”];
US v. Tapia (7C 2010) 610 F3 505, 511 [car belonging
to possible gang associate parked outside]; US v.
Barrera (5C 2006) 464 F3 496, 504 [“cars known to be driven
by Jose were at the residence”]; Valdez v.
McPheters (10C 1999) 172 F3 1120, 1225 [“The suspect’s
presence may be suggested by the presence of an automobile.”];
US v. Hauk (10C 2005) 412 F3 1179, 1192 [“an unidentified
individual had recently parked in the driveway and might have
entered the house”]; US v. De Parias (11C
1986) 805 F2 1447, 1457 [“The apartment manager had informed the
FBI agents that the De Pariases lived there and that they were
home if a certain car was parked in front of the apartment.”];
US v. Edmonds (3C 1995) 52 F3 1236, 1248;
US v. Beck (11C 1984) 729 F2 1329, 1332;
US v. Bohannon (2C 2016) 824 F3 242, 256 [officers saw the
arrestee’s car parked in front of 34 Morgan Avenue on the morning
[of the arrest]. COMPARE: P v. White (1986)
183 CA3 1199, 1209 [when officers arrived, “they did not see any
car fitting the victim’s description anywhere in the vicinity”];
P v. Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 479 [“Defendant’s
vehicles were nowhere in sight.”].

[73] OTHER: US v.
Boyd (8C 1999) 180 F3 967, 978 [“the hood of Troup’s black
Volvo was still warm which confirmed the CI’s statement that
Troupe had just arrived.”].

[74] CAL: Guevara
v. Superior Court (1970) 7 CA3 531, 535 [“informant
had told the officers that defendant was living with a woman, that
other persons frequented the apartment”]; Guidi v.
Superior Court (1973) 10 C3 1, 5 [informant “told the
officers that two other suspects were in the apartment”].
OTHER: US v. Yeary (11C 2014) 740 F3 569, 580 [after
being arrested, an armed fugitive told officers there were two
other men inside]; US v. Pruneda (8C 2008)
518 F3 597, 603 [“there were reports that other individuals were
in the residence”]; US v. Henry (DCC 1995) 48
F3 1282, 1284 [“The informant had advised officers that [the
arrestee’s] ‘boys’ or ‘counterparts’ might be with him.”].

[75] 9th CIR: US v.
Diaz (9C 2007) 491 F3 1074, 1078 [the arrestee previously
told officers that he was usually home during the day, and that he
worked at home as a mechanic]. OTHER:
US v. Denson (10C 2014) 775 F3 1214, 1217 [“After all, it
isn’t unnatural to think someone might be at his place of abode at
8:30 in the morning when he is not working”]; US v.
Magluta (11C 1995) 44 F3 1530, 1535 [“officers may presume
that a person is at home at certain times of the day—a presumption
which can be rebutted by contrary evidence regarding the suspect’s
known schedule”]; US v. Beck (11C 1984) 729
F2 1329, 1331-32 [“it was reasonable to believe that one would be
at home at 7:30 a.m. and be sound asleep, in which case his
apartment would not exhibit any outward ‘signs of life.'”];
US v. Terry (2C 1983) 702 F2 299, 319 [“the
agents arrived at the apartment at 8:45 a.m. on a Sunday morning,
a time when they could reasonably believe that [the arrestee]
would be home.”]; US v. Edmonds (3C 1995) 52
F3 1236, 1248 [“Normally a person who is currently living at an
apartment returns there at some point to spend the night and does
not leave prior to 6:45 a.m.”]; US v.
Lauter (2C 1995) 57 F3 212, 215 [reliable informant said
the arrestee was unemployed and usually slept late]; US
v. Thomas (DCC 2005) 429 F3 282, 286 [“As for
whether the officers had reason to believe Thomas would be at home
when they executed the warrant, the early morning hour [6-6:30
a.m.] was reason enough.”]; US v. Woods (5C
1977) 560 F2 660, 665 [the arrestee did not have a job and
officers entered at 8:30 a.m.]. BUT ALSO SEE: P v.
Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 478-79 [“Although [the officer’s]
testimony supports an inference that [the unemployed] defendant
could be home at 3:20 p.m. when the officers attempted to
serve the warrant, it does not, without more, support a finding
that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was
in fact home.”].

[76] OTHER: US v. Bohannon (2C
2016) 824 F3 242, 256 [“Verizon data showed that the cell sector
where Bohannon had last used his phone included Dickson’s 34
Morgan Avenue apartment.”].

[77] 9th CIR: Case v.
Kitsap County Sheriff’s Department (9C 2001) 249 F3 921,
931. OTHER: US v. Beck (11C 1984) 729
F2 1329, 1332 [“The fact that no one responded to Leary’s knock
and announcement did not mean that no one was home since it was
reasonable to expect a fugitive to hide or flee is possible.”];
US v. Edmonds (3C 1995) 52 F3 1326, 1248.

[78] CAL: In re Johnny V. (1978)
85 CA3 120, 130 [“A right to enter for the purpose of talking with
a suspect is not consent to enter and effect an arrest.”].
9th CIR: US v. Johnson (9C 1980) 626 F2 753
[agents immediately arrested the suspect after obtaining consent
to “talk” with him]. OTHER: US v. Harrison (10C
2011) 639 F3 1273, 1280 [consent to enter was invalid because
officers lied that they sought to enter to investigate a report of
bombs on the premises].

[79] CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Kenner) (1977) 73 CA3 65, 69 [“A
person may willingly consent to admit police officers for the
purpose of discussion, with the opportunity, thus suggested, of
explaining away any suspicions, but not be willing to permit a
warrantless and nonemergent entry that affords him no right to
explanation or justification.”]; P v. Villa (1981) 125 CA3
872, 878 [“the evidence disclosed the entry was for the purpose of
investigating the earlier incident. There was no evidence of
subterfuge at the time consent to enter was given.”];
P v. Patterson (1979) 94 CA3 456, 463 [“There is nothing in
the record to indicate that the police intended to arrest
Patterson immediately following the entry or that they were not
prepared to discuss the matter with Patterson first in order to
permit her to explain away the basis of the officers’
suspicions.”].

[80] CAL:
Toubus v. Superior Court (1981) 114 CA3 378, 383 [“Payton
and Ramey are inapplicable where an agent is invited by a
suspect to enter.”]; P v. Evans (1980) 108 CA3 193, 196
[the officers “were inside with consent, with probable cause to
arrest but with the intent to continue the investigation by
effecting a purchase of Quaalude or Dilaudid. We find no violation
of the Ramey principles”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Bramble (9C 1997) 103 F3 1475. 1478 [“It is
well-settled that undercover agents may misrepresent their
identity to obtain consent to entry.”].

[81] USSC: Georgia v.
Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 108 [“No question has been
raised, or reasonably could be, about the authority of the police
to enter a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic
violence”]. ALSO SEE: P v. Wilkins (1993) 14
CA4 761, 775 [“We conclude the victim had the authority to consent
to police entry into the premises to arrest defendant.”].

[82] USSC: Pearson v.
Callahan (2009) 555 US 223, 244 [“consent once removed”
doctrine “had been considered by three Federal Courts of Appeals
and two State Supreme Courts,” and it “had been accepted by every
one of those courts”].

[83] OTHER: US v. Rivera (7C
2016) 817 F3 339, 341 [“At first glance the doctrine of ‘consent
once removed’ is absurd. If one thing is certain, it’s that [the
defendants] would never have consented to the entry of federal
drug agents into [the] garage”].

[84] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Paul (7C 1986) 808 F2 645, 648. CAL: Toubus
v. Superior Court (1981) 114 CA3 378, 384.
9th CIR: US v. Bramble (9C 1997) 103
F3 1475, 1478 [“We seriously doubt that the entry of additional
officers would further diminish the consenter’s expectation of
privacy, and, in the instant case, any remaining expectation of
privacy was outweighed by the legitimate concern for the safety of
the officers inside.”]; US v. Rubio (9C 1983)
727 F2 786, 797 [“Once consent has been obtained from one with
authority to give it, any expectation of privacy has been lost.”].
OTHER: US v. Rivera (7C 2016) 817 F3 339, 342;
US v. Yoon (6C 2005) 398 F3 802, 809-10
(conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [consent once removed “is based upon
the theory that, because an undercover agent or informant who
establishes probable cause to arrest the suspect may in fact
arrest him then and there, he should be entitled to call in the
agents with whom he is working to assist in the arrest because,
once the suspect invites the agent or informant into his house and
displays his illegal activity to him, the suspect’s Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy has been fatally compromised”].

[85] CAL: P v.
Cespedes (1987) 191 CA3 768, 774 [arresting officers
entered within seconds after the undercover officer left].
9th CIR: US v. Bramble (9C 1996) 103
F3 1475,1478 [“where an undercover agent is invited into a home,
establishes the existence of probable cause to arrest or search,
and immediately summons help from other officers, the warrantless
entry of the other officers does not violate the Fourth
Amendment”]. OTHER: US v.
Akinsanya (7C 1995) 53 F3 852, 856 [“consent was not
withdrawn simply because [the informant] stepped out of the
apartment moments before, or at the same time, the agents
entered”]; US v. Diaz (7C 1987) 814 F2 454,
459 [“Agent Mueller was in the hotel room with Diaz’s consent, and
the fact that Mueller momentarily stepped out to obtain help from
other officers in making the arrest did not violate this
consent.”]; US v. Jachimko (7C 1994) 19 F3
296, 299 [“It does not matter that Hendrickson was a confidential
informant and not a police officer”]; US v.
Yoon (6C 2005) 398 F3 802, 807. COMPARE:
O’Neil v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government
(6C 2011) 662 F3 723, 732 [consent once removed doctrine did not
apply because the “officers in fact never intended to effectuate
an arrest in this case”]; US v. Pollard (6C 2000) 215 F3
643, 649; US v. Obguh (6C 1993) 982 F2 1000 [“consent once
removed” did not apply because the informant “did not summon the
agents; they entered forcibly of their own volition less than a
minute after sending [the courier] into the room.”].
ALSO SEE: Smith v. State (Md. App. 2004) 857 A2
1224, 1231 [“in nearly all the cases discussing the doctrine of
‘consent once removed,’ the confidential informant or undercover
agent either remained on the premises while the officers entered
or, if not, they maintained an express or implied right of
reentry”].

[86] OTHER: US v.
Jachimko (7C 1994) 19 F3 296, 299 [“where a suspect does
not withdraw his valid consent to search for illegal substances
before they are discovered, the consent remains valid”].

[87] CAL: P v.
Williams (1979) 93 CA3 40, 57-58 [consent to enter to
discuss the arrestee’s whereabouts “cannot be reasonably construed
as consent for the police to go into any room of the residence in
order to find the [arrestee]”].

[88] USSC: US v.
Banks (2003) 540 US 31, 37 [“if circumstances support a
reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the
door, they may go straight in”]. OTHER: US
v. Pollard (6C 2000) 215 F3 643, 646 [“They entered
without a prior announcement to avoid the risk that the undercover
officer (the ‘new’ face in the transaction) would be taken hostage
or injured by gunfire.”].

[89] CAL: P v.
Toubus (1981) 114 CA3 378, 384 [“Here, there was no
occasion to protect the privacy of petitioner in his home since a
peace officer who already possessed probable cause to arrest was
already in that home; there were no innocent persons on the
premises who needed protecting; it was unlikely the entry without
notice would provoke a violent confrontation”].

[90] USSC: Maryland v.
Buie (1990) 494 US 325, 330 [“until the point of Buie’s
arrest the police had the right, based on the authority of the
arrest warrant, to search anywhere in the house that Buie might
have been found”]. 9th CIR: US v.
Harper (9C 1991) 928 F2 894, 897 [“Once the police
possessed an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe David
was in his home, the officers were entitled to search anywhere in
the house in which he might be found.” Overruled on other grounds
in US v. King (9C 2012) 687 F3 1189].

[91] OTHER: US v. Mastin (11C
2020) 972 F3 1230, 1238 [the rule permitting detentions of
occupants pending execution of search warrant also applies to
entries to arrest].

[92] USSC: Washington v.
Chrisman (1982) 455 US 1, 7. OTHER: US
v. Roberts (5C 2010) 612 F3 306, 310-11.

[93] CAL: Pen. Code§ 817(h).

[94] USSC: New York v.
Harris (1990) 495 US 14, 20 [“The warrant requirement for
an arrest in the home is imposed to protect the home, and anything
incriminating the police gathered from arresting Harris in his
home, rather than elsewhere, has been excluded, as it should have
been; the purpose of the rule has thereby been vindicated.”].
CAL: P v. Marquez (1992) 1 C4 553, 569 [“a
Ramey-Payton violation would require suppression solely of
evidence obtained from searching the home at the time of the
arrest”].

[95] USSC: New York v.
Harris (1990) 495 US 14, 21 [“where the police have
probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not
bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside
of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest
made in the home in violation of Payton“]. CAL:
P v. Marquez (1992) 1 C4 553, 569 [“the lack of an
arrest warrant does not invalidate defendant’s arrest or require
suppression of statements he made at the police station”];
P v. Watkins (1994) 26 CA4 19, 29 [“Where there is
probable cause to arrest, the fact that police illegally enter a
home to make a warrantless arrest neither invalidates the arrest
itself nor requires suppression of any postarrest statements the
defendant makes at the police station.”]; P v.
Ford (1979) 97 CA3 744, 748 [“it is the unlawful
intrusion into the dwelling which offends constitutional
safeguards and which is therefore at the heart of the matter,
rather than the arrest itself.”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Crawford (9C 2004) 372 F3 1048, 1056 [“the
presence of probable cause to arrest has proved dispositive when
deciding whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence or
statements obtained after the defendant is placed in custody”].

[96] USSC: New York v.
Harris (1990) 495 US 14, 19 [“Harris’ statement taken at
the police station was not the product of being in unlawful
custody. Neither was it the fruit of having been arrested in the
home rather than someplace else.”].

[97] 9th CIR: US v. Nora (9C
2014) 765 F3 1049, 1057 [court ruled the seizure of evidence was
unlawful because, by ordering the arrestee out of his home, his
“opportunity to collect himself before venturing out in public is
certainly diminished, if not eliminated altogether.”].
NOTE: This new constitutional right to “collect himself” is
absurd.

[98] USSC: Steagald v.
US (1981) 451 US 204. CAL: P v.
Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 658 [“a homeowner’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violated when officers enter his home to
arrest a guest pursuant to an arrest warrant”].

[99] USSC: Steagald v.
US (1981) 451 US 204, 219 [“The issue here is not whether
the subject of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of a
search warrant when he is apprehended in another person’s home,
but rather whether the residents of that home can complain of the
search.”]. 9th CIR: US v.
Underwood (9C 1983) 717 F2 482, 484 [“A person has no
greater right of privacy in another’s home than in his home.”].
OTHER: US v. Bohannon (2C 2016) 824 F3 242, 251
[“Thus, if at the time of entry, law enforcement officers
possessed a valid warrant for the subject’s arrest and reason to
believe that he was then on the premises entered, the subject of
the arrest warrant will not be heard to complain that entry was
not authorized by a search warrant.”]; US v.
Jackson (7C 2009) 576 F3 465, 468 [“it would be anomalous
if the subject of an arrest warrant had a greater expectation of
privacy in another person’s home than he had in his own”];
US v. McCarson (DCC 2008) 527 F3 170, 172
[“Nor does McCarson have standing to invoke [the rights of the
apartment owner].”]; US v. Agnew (3C 2005)
407 F3 193, 196 [“If Agnew resided at 2740 Ludwig Street, his
arrest was lawful under Payton because the police acted
pursuant to an arrest warrant. If Agnew did not reside at 2740
Ludwig Street, he may have lacked a privacy interest in the
residence and would have no standing to challenge the police
officers’ entry.”].