Chapter 47: Interrogation

[1] OTHER: US v. Haak (2C 2018)
884 F3 400, 409 ["When a defendant seeks to suppress non-custodial
statements made to law enforcement authorities, the single issue
before the court is whether the statements were voluntary."].

[2] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Saldana (2018) 19 CA5 432, 436.

[3] USSC: Watts v.
Indiana (1949) 338 US 49, 53 ["A statement to be voluntary
of course need not be volunteered."]; Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 224 ["very few
people give incriminating statements in the absence of official
action of some kind"].

[4] USSC: Colorado v.
Connelly (1986) 479 US 157 166 ["Only if we were to
establish a brand new constitutional right—the right of a criminal
defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and
properly motivated—could respondent's present claim be
sustained."]. CAL: P v. Cox (1990) 221 CA3
980, 986 ["The thrust of Cox's argument is not that the police
were coercive, but that his mental condition was such as to
preclude a knowledgeable and voluntary decision to make
incriminating statements. Exclusion of evidence on this grounds
was conclusively rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Colorado v. Connelly."].

[5] USSC: Stein v.
New York (1953) 346 US 156, 183 ["When [physical violence]
is present, there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on
the will of the individual."].

[6] CAL: Pen. Code§ 859.5.
NOTE: The amendments to Pen. Code§ 859.5. are not
retroactive. P v. Cervantes (2020) 55 CA5 927, 940-41.

[7] CAL: P v. Thomas (2012) 54 C4
908, 929 ["we reject defendant's contention that the absence of a
recording of the Miranda advisements and his waiver of his
rights precludes the conclusion that his waiver was knowing and
voluntary"]; P v. Pearson (2012) 53 C4 306,
318 ["While we have no wish to discourage law enforcement
officials from recording such interrogations, we have already
found that such a blanket rule is not required"]; P v.
Gurule (2002) 28 C4 557, 603; P v.
Lucas (1995) 12 C4 415, 443 ["The police had no obligation
to make a tape recording of the Miranda advisements or the
rest of the interrogation."]; P v. Holt (1997) 15 C4
619, 665 [due process does not require that statements be
recorded]. OTHER: US v. Wright (1C 2019) 937 F3 8,
19 ["Wright cites no authority to support his alleged entitlement
under the federal Constitution to a recorded interview. In fact,
we have previously held to the contrary."].

[8] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 CA3 520, 526. CAL:
P v. Gray (1982) 135 CA3 859, 864 ["Thanks to the
professionalism of [the interrogating officers] in their taping of
the statement, there was little room to argue at trial that the
waiver was not complete and unequivocal"]; P v.
Silva (1988) 45 C3 604, 630 [Trial judge: "And if
you listen to the portion of the tape to which I listened, it is
clear from the inflection that he was not even intimating that he
wished to terminate the interrogation when he said, 'I don't know,
I really don't want to talk about that.'"]; P v.
Jennings (1988) 46 C3 963, 979 ["Having viewed the
videotaped interrogation of defendant, and observed his
interaction with the officers, we, too, conclude that his further
statements were voluntary."]; P v.
Musselwhite (1998) 17 C4 1216, 1239 ["no invocation based
in part on videotape of the interview which showed how the suspect
"was acting" and "responding"]. 9th CIR:
Balbuena v. Sullivan (9C 2020) 970 F3 1176, 1189 ["the
video recording reveals that the tone of the interview was
non-threatening"]. OTHER: US v. Shabazz (11C 2018)
887 F3 1204, 1215 ["it would have been better practice for the
agents to have recorded Shabazz's waiver"];
US v. Romain (1C 2004) 393 F3 63, 74 ["words are like
chameleons; they frequently have different shades of meaning
depending upon the circumstances"].

[9] USSC: Lopez v.
US (1963) 373 US 427, 439 ["Stripped to its essentials,
petitioner's argument amounts to saying that he has a
constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent's
memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being
beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of
impeachment. For no other argument can justify excluding an
accurate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to
from memory."]; US v. White (1971) 401 US
745, 751 ["If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating
without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant's
constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does
a simultaneous recording of the same conversations"]. CAL:
P v. Loyd (2002) 27 C4 997, 1013, fn.2 (conc. opn.
Moreno, J.) ["Where authorities have the right to monitor, they
also have the right to record."]; P v.
Jackson (1971) 19 CA3 95, 101 ["Admissions and confessions
secretly recorded are admissible."]; Pen. Code§ 859.5(b)(2)
[if the suspect "states that he or she will speak to a law
enforcement officer only if the interrogation is not
electronically recorded, that statement shall be electronically
recorded," edited].

[10] USSC: Michigan v.
Tucker (1974) 417 US 433, 448 [the voluntariness
requirement protects "the courts from reliance on untrustworthy
evidence"]; Spano v. New York (1959) 360 US
315, 320 ["inherent untrustworthiness"]; Dickerson
v. US (2000) 530 US 428, 433 ["coerced confessions
are inherently untrustworthy"]. CAL: P v.
Boyer (2006) 38 C4 412, 444 [coerced testimony is excluded
"in particular, to ensure the reliability of testimony offered
against him."].

[11] QUOTE FROM: Miranda
v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 448. USSC:
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218,
225 [coercion "poses a real and serious threat to civilized
notions of justice"]; Brown v.
Mississippi (1936) 297 US 278, 286 [coercion is "revolting
to the sense of justice"]. CAL: P v.
Montano (1991) 226 CA3 914, 940 [coerced confessions
"degrades our system of justice"].

[12] USSC:
Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 US 157, 167, 169 ["coercive
police activity"]; Culombe v. Connecticut (1961) 367 US
568, 576 [the pressure "drained [his] capacity for freedom of
choice"]; Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 US 279, 287
["coercion can be mental as well as physical, and the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition"]; Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 US 298, 304
[statement is involuntary if obtained "by techniques and methods
offensive to due process, or under circumstances in which the
suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise a free and
unconstrained will"]. CAL: P v. Winbush (2017) 2 C5
402, 452] ["the question is whether defendant's choice was not
essentially free because his or her will was overborne"];
P v. Depriest (2007) 42 C4 1, 34 ["Involuntariness means
the defendant's free will was overborne."];
P v. Guerra (2006) 37 C4 1067, 1093 [a statement is
involuntary if the "defendant's will was overborne by the
circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession."];
P v. Hall (2000) 78 CA4 232, 240 ["Involuntariness cases
invariably involve misconduct directed, in one way or another, at
compelling a defendant to confess…. Thus, cases talk, for
example, of 'extracting' or 'wringing' confessions from a
suspect."].

[13] USSC: Oregon v.
Elstad (1985) 470 US 298, 305 [officers may apply "moral
and psychological pressures to confess"]. CAL:
P v. Henderson (2020) 9 C5 1013, 1024 ["To be clear, after
being admonished and waiving their rights, suspects may give
halting or reluctant answers. They may give responses that the
questioners suspect are false. Officers are permitted to encourage
a subject to talk and to challenge statements as untrue."];
P v. Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563, 575 ["When a
person under questioning would prefer not to answer, almost all
interrogation involves some degree of pressure."]. OTHER:
US v. Dehghani (8C 2008) 550 F3 716, 720 ["an
interrogation of a suspect will always involve some pressure
because its purpose is to elicit a confession"].

[14] CAL: P v.
Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 986, fn.10 ["slightest pressure"
standard is contrary to Arizona v.
Fulminante (1991) 499 US 279, 285]. NOTE: Strangely,
even after the California Supreme Court decided Clark, it
inadvertently inserted "slightest pressure" language into two of
its opinions. See P v. Leonard (2007) 40 C4
1370, 1402; P v. Jablonski (2006) 37 C4 774,
814, 1091.

[15] USSC: Berkemer v.
McCarty (1984) 468 US 420, 433, fn.20 ["cases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating
statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare"]; Missouri v.
Seibert (2004) 542 US 600, 608-09 ["[giving the
[Miranda] warnings and getting a waiver has generally
produced a virtual ticket of admissibility"]; US v.
Washington (1977) 431 US 181, 188 ["Indeed, it seems
self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer
questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his
answers were compelled."]; Beckwith v. US (1976) 425
US 341, 348 [Miranda warnings would be relevant "on the
issue of whether the questioning was in fact coercive"].
CAL: P v. James (1984) 157 CA3 381,
385 [Miranda warnings "may be circumstantial evidence of
voluntariness"].

[16] USSC: Dickerson v.
US (2000) 530 US 428, 444 ["The requirement that
Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense
with the voluntariness inquiry."]. CAL:
P v. Clark (1968) 263 CA2 87, 91 ["It cannot be seriously
argued that [Miranda compliance] immunizes law enforcement
officers from the legal effect of later coercive practices."].

[17] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Jablonski (2006) 37 C4 774, 814. USSC:
Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 401 [the determination
of voluntariness "requires careful evaluation of all the
circumstances of the interrogation"];
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 226 ["In
determining whether a defendant's will was overcome in a
particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances"]; Culombe v. Connecticut (1961)
367 US 568, 601 ["No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally
impermissible interrogation has been evolved."]. CAL:
P v. Kendrick (1961) 56 C2 71, 84 ["it is difficult, if not
impossible, to formulate a rule that will comprehend all cases"];
P v. Williams (2010) 49 C4 405, 436 ["no
single factor is dispositive"]; P v. Andersen (1980)
101 CA3 563, 582 ["Although isolated sentences and phrases in the
interview can be viewed as implied threat or implied promise, we
do not believe the interrogation as a whole, put in its context,
carries sufficient implication of threat or promise"].
ALSO SEE: Haley v. Ohio (1947) 332 US
596, 666 ["Unhappily, we have neither physical nor intellectual
weights and measures by which judicial judgment can determine when
pressures in securing a confession reach the coercive intensity"].

[18] USSC: Procunier v.
Atchley (1971) 400 US 446, 453 [consider the "setting in
which actual coercion might have been exerted"]. CAL:
P v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 C5 1, 20 ["If coercive
police conduct is present, we evaluate the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether a defendant's statements were
freely given. Factors that we consider include the coercion
discussed above, as well as "the length of the interrogation and
its location and continuity, and the defendant's maturity,
education, and physical and mental health."]. 9th CIR:
Henry v. Kernan (9C 1999) 197 F3 1021, 1026
["Voluntariness depends on such factors as the surrounding
circumstances and the combined effect of the entire course of the
officers' conduct upon the defendant."].

[19] USSC: Blackburn v.
Alabama (1960) 361 US 199, 204 ["most of the interrogation
took place in closely confined quarters—a room about four by six
or six by eight feet"]; Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US
436, 445 [suspects who are questioned in police stations are "cut
off from the outside world"]. CAL: Green v.
Superior Court (1985) 40 C3 126, 131 ["The [interview]
rooms 7 by 12 feet, have no windows and require a key to enter or
exit."]; P v. Bennett (1976) 58 CA3 230, 239 [court
describes police station as a "cold and normally hostile
atmosphere"]; P v. Lopez (1985) 163 CA3 602, 605
["Miranda presented the clearest example of custody, namely
the official isolation of a criminal suspect in a police
station"].

[20] QUOTE FROM:
Culombe v. Connecticut (1961) 367 US 568, 579. Edited.
OTHER: US v. Haak (2C 2018) 884 F3 400, 415 ["Haak
met with police in a standard interview room"].

[21] OTHER: US v.
Braxton (4C 1997) 112 F3 777, 785 [suspect was interviewed
"around the kitchen table in his mother's home"]; US
v. Lamy (10C 2008) 521 F3 1257, 1262 [interview "was
conducted in the kitchen of his home"]; US v.
Ross (7C 2007) 510 F3 702, 710 ["when Ross gave his
confession, he was sitting in his own apartment"].

[22] USSC:
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 US 420, 440 ["comparatively
nonthreatening"]. CAL: P v. Manis (1969) 268 CA2
653, 668 ["transitory"]; P v. Tully (2012) 54 C4 952, 983
["While defendant was not free to leave until the citation process
was completed, he was under no obligation to answer [the
officer's] questions."].

[23] USSC: Blackburn v.
Alabama (1960) 361 US 199, 207 ["tiny" interview room was
"literally filled with police officers"]; Spano v.
New York (1959) 360 US 315, 322 [suspect was subjected to
questioning not by 12 officers and two deputy DAs]; Haley
v. Ohio 1947) 332 US 596, 598 ["Five or six of the
police questioned him in relays of one or two each."].

[24] USSC: Bobby v. Dixon (2011)
565 US 23, 29] [defendant "was given water and offered food"].
CAL: P v. Winbush (2017) 2 C5 402, 454 ["The
officers provided defendant with meals and access to the restroom.
The questioning was interspersed with numerous breaks."];
P v. Coffman (2004) 34 C4 1, 54 ["[Officers] provided her
with food and coffee, allowed her a cigarette, and brought her
socks and other clothing after she complained of feeling cold."];
officers "provided her with food and coffee, allowed her a
cigarette, and brought her socks and other clothing after she
complained of feeling cold"]; P v. Cunningham (2015) 61 C4
609, 644 ["the initial interview was spread over a four-hour
period with the detectives offering defendant both food and
drink"]; P v. Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 175.
ALSO SEE: P v. Peoples (2016) 62 C4 718, 741
[ten-hour interview but defendant "was given numerous breaks,
drinks, and food"]; P v. Linton (2013) 56 C4 1146, 1178
[two-hour and 15-minute interview, "multiple breaks were taken"].
COMPARE: Payne v. Arkansas (1958) 356 US 560, 567
[suspect "was denied food for long periods"];
Watts v. Indiana (1949) 338 US 49, 53 ["Disregard of
rudimentary needs of life—opportunities for sleep and a decent
allowance of food—are also relevant"].

[25] USSC: Fare v.
Michael C. (1979) 442 US 707, 727 ["Their questioning was
restrained and free from the abuses that so concerned the Court in
Miranda."]. CAL: In re I.F. (2018) 20 CA5
735, 768 ["low-key and conversational"]; P v.
Perdomo (2007) 147 CA4 605, 618 ["[The officers] posed
their questions in a calm, deliberate manner," their voices were
"very quiet and subdued."]; P v. Benson (1990) 52 C3
754, 780 ["Everything totally aboveboard with the officers. No
coercion, no harassment. No heavy-handedness. To the contrary, it
was strangely cordial and somewhat light, and not at all
heavy-handed in the approach that was taken. We don't have any
tough guy cop approach. We had to the contrary, officers who were
patient and even-handed and fair in the way they approached their
discussion." Quote from trial judge];
P v. Cunningham (2015) 61 C4 609, 644 [the questioning was
not "particularly harsh or accusatory"]; P v.
Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563, 578 ["Neither the tone nor
tempo nor decibel does coercive pressure appear. The conduct of
the interview was so far removed from the third degree as it is
possible to imagine."]; P v. Farnam (2002) 28
C4 107, 182 [initial questioning was "quiet and nonjudgmental"];
P v. Jones (1998) 17 C4 279, 297-98 ["low-key,"
"nonthreatening"]; P v. Cox (1990) 221 C3 980,
985-86 ["short and simple"]; P v. Boyde (1988) 46 C3
212, 239 ["[The officer's] role in eliciting the story was
responsive rather than aggressive"]; P v.
Thompson (1990) 50 C3 134, 170 ["restrained and
noncoercive"]; P v. Mickey (1991) 54 C3 612,
650 ["it was generally defendant who was active and [the officers]
who were passive"]. 9th CIR: Ortiz v.
Uribe (9C 2011) 671 F3 863, 870 ["a polygrapher's empathic
and parental questioning does not render a confession
involuntary"]; Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart (9C
1997) 121 F3 486, 494 ["the officers' voices were calm and non
threatening"]; Pollard v. Galaza (9C 2002)
290 F3 1030, 1035 [the interview "became less of an interrogation
and more of a conversation"]; US v.
Heller (9C 2009) 551 F3 1108, 1112 [the interview was
"friendly and cordial on all sides"]. OTHER:
US v. Jacobs (6C 2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 2661363] ["He
spoke throughout in a conversational tone, offered Jacobs food and
drink, never brandished a weapon or handcuffs, and did not
threaten or use violence"]; US v. Lamy (10C
2008) 521 F3 1257, 1262 ["The officers never raised their
voices."]; Hardaway v. Young (7C 2002) 302 F3
757, 766 ["no particularly coercive or heavy-handed interview
techniques"].

[26] USSC: Haynes v.
Washington (1963) 373 US 503, 515 [persistent]. CAL:
P v. Linton (2013) 56 C4 1146, 1178 ["the overall approach
of the officers remained low key"]; P v. Carrington (2009)
47 C4 145, 175 ["the police properly may confront, and even debate
with, a suspect"]; P v. Ditson (1962) 57 C2
415, 433 ["intellectual persuasion" and "searching questions"];
P v. Boyde (1988) 46 C3 212, 242 ["harsh
questioning"]; P v. Anderson (1980) 101 CA3 563, 576
["confrontation with contradictory facts"];
In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 CA4 200, 213 ["tough talk"];
In re Joe R. (1980) 27 C3 496, 515 ["loud, aggressive
accusations of lying"]. OTHER: US v.
Holmes (4C 2012) 670 F3 586, 592-93 ["Numerous cases
reiterate that statements by law enforcement officers that are
merely 'uncomfortable' or create a 'predicament' for a defendant
are not ipso facto coercive."].

[27] CAL: P v. Jones (1998) 17
C4 279, 297 ["Although adversarial balance, or rough equality, may
be the norm that dictates trial procedures, it has never been the
norm that dictates the rules of investigation and the gathering of
proof."]. BUT ALSO SEE: In re Elias J. (2015) 237
CA4 568 [affect of tactics on minors].

[28] OTHER: Martin v.
Wainwright (11C 1995) 770 F2 918, 925 ["bad" cop "discussed
the death penalty"].

[29] CAL: P v.
Jablonski (2006) 37 C4 774, 815 [court rejects "excessive
friendliness" prohibition]; P v.
Bradford (1997) 14 C4 1005, 1043 ["Nor would we conclude
that [the officer's] efforts to establish a rapport with defendant
constitute coercion."]. OTHER: Jenner v.
Smith (8C 1993) 982 F2 329, 334 ["Numerous cases have held
that questioning tactics such as… a sympathetic attitude on
the part of the interrogator will not render a confession
involuntary"]; Miller v. Fenton (3C 1986) 796
F2 598, 607 ["the Supreme Court has indicated that a sympathetic
attitude on the part of the interrogator is not in itself enough
to render a confession involuntary"]; Hawkins v.
Lynaugh (5C 1988) 844 F2 1132, 1140 ["there is nothing
inherently wrong with efforts to create a favorable climate for
confession"].

[30] CAL: P v.
Enraca (2012) 53 C4 735, 755 ["officers may legitimately
accuse a suspect of lying"]; P v. Jones (2017) 7 CA5 787,
812 [the officers "engaged in a back-and-forth conversation during
which the detectives expressed their belief that Jones was the
shooter and Jones consistently denied that allegation."];
P v. Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563, 578, 576;
P v. Johns (1983) 145 CA3 281, 292;
In re Joe R. (1980) 27 C3 496, 515 ["loud,
accusations of lying do not, in and of themselves, constitute
coercive threats"].

[31] USSC: Illinois v.
Perkins (1990) 496 US 292, 297 ["mere strategic deception"
is not coercive]. CAL: P v. Thompson (1990)
50 C3 134, 167 ["Numerous California decisions confirm that
deception does not necessarily invalidate a confession."];
P v. Maury (2003) 30 C4 342, 411 ["Deception does
not necessarily invalidate an incriminating statement."];
P v. Jones (2017) 7 CA5 787, 814 ["the deceptive statements
made by the detectives about the evidence did not have the effect
of coercing Jones into an involuntary and unreliable confession"];
P v. Lee (2002) 95 CA4 772, 785 ["it is sometimes
necessary to use deception to get at the truth."]; P v.
Musselwhite (1998) 17 C4 1216, 1240 ["Lies told by the
police to a suspect under questioning can affect the voluntariness
of an ensuing confession, but they are not per se sufficient to
make it involuntary."]; P v. Chutan (1999) 72 CA4
1276, 1280 ["Police officers are at liberty to utilize deceptive
stratagems to trick a guilty person into confessing. The cases
from California and federal courts validating such tactics are
legion."].

[32] EXAMPLES: The following lies were
deemed insufficient to render a subsequent statement involuntary:

• Officers lied to a murder suspect that they had an ID by
witnesses and fingerprint evidence. P v.
Williams (2010) 49 C4 405, 442-43

• An officer lied to a murder suspect that her car was
captured on surveillance video from cameras near the murder scene.
P v. Johnson (2010) 183 CA4 253, 295.

• An officer implied that defendant's confession to a second
murder "wouldn't make any difference"; this was not impermissible
because the "gist" of the officer's comments was that "in view of
the overwhelming evidence against defendant, her denial of
participation in the Esparza homicide was unlikely to alter the
outcome of the case against her." P v.
Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 172.

• An officer lied to the suspect that investigators had found
semen on the body of his kidnap-murder victim. P v.
Davis (2009) 46 C4 539, 601, fn.5 ["Even if Sergeant Meese
was intentionally deceiving defendant about the presence of semen
on Polly's panties, it was not the kind of deception that would be
reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement."].

• We have a witness who saw you at the crime scene. P
v. Richardson (2008) 43 C4 959, 993 ["Here, the
police deceived defendant only about having been seen by two
witnesses leaving the Holley residence—which ultimately led him to
admit he was in the residence"]; P v.
Castello (1924) 194 C 595, 602 [officers told the suspect
"that they could introduce them to the persons who saw them steal
the property"]; Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart (9C
1997) 121 F3 486, 495.

• Your fingerprints were found on the victim's neck, on the
victim's wallet, on the victim's cash register, in the victim's
home, in the getaway car, at the crime scene. P v.
Musselwhite (1998) 17 C4 1216, 1241 ["it does not follow
that telling a murder suspect that his prints had been lifted from
the neck of the homicide victim 'caused' him to confess"];
P v. Farnam (2002) 28 C4 107, 182 ["Here, the
deception concerning defendant's fingerprints was unlikely to
produce a false confession."]; P v.
Connelly (1925) 195 C 584, 597; Lucero v.
Kerby (10C 1998) 133 F3 1299, 1311; P v.
Watkins (1970) 6 CA3 119, 124-25; Oregon v.
Mathiason (1977) 429 US 492, 495.

• There were eyewitnesses to the crime. P v.
Castello (1924) 194 C 595, 602.

• You've been positively identified by the victim. P
v. Pendarvis (1961) 189 CA2 180, 186;
Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart (9C 1997) 121 F3 486,
495.

• Your accomplice was captured and he confessed.
Frazier v. Cupp (1969) 394 US 731, 739 ["The
fact that the police misrepresented the statements that [the
accomplice] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view
to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible."];
P v. Felix (1977) 72 CA3 879,885 ["it is even
permissible to pretend an accomplice has confessed in order to
persuade the suspect to confess," citations omitted];
In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 CA4 200, 213; Martin
v. Wainwright (11C 1985) 770 F2 918, 925; US
v. Montgomery (7C 2009) 555 F3 623, 632.

• We know a lot more than we're telling you." P
v. Jones (1998) 17 C4 279, 299 ["Such deception
regarding the evidence was permissible, for it was not of a type
reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement."].

• We've got probable cause to arrest you. P v.
Guerra (2006) 37 C4 1067, 1097 ["Here, the detective's
statement that there was sufficient probable cause to arrest
defendant was not likely to produce a false statement."].

• Tire tracks from your car were found at the murder scene.
P v. Thompson (1990) 50 C3 134, 167.

• You flunked the lie detector test. P v.
Mays (2009) 174 CA4 156, 166 ["The use of the mock
polygraph was not likely to produce a false confession."];
US v. Haswood (9C 2003) 350 F3 1025, 1029
["The use of polygraph results is a reasonable means of police
questioning. Even misrepresentations"]; Jenner v.
Smith (8C 1993) 982 F2 329, 334.

• You flunked the gunshot residue test. P v.
Parrison (1982) 137 CA3 529, 537.

• You flunked the DNA test. Pierce v.
State (Ind. 2002) 761 NE2 821, 824.

• Officers told a wounded suspect that he should give a
statement because he might die before reaching the hospital.
In re Walker (1974) 10 C3 764, 775, 777.

• Officers did not tell the suspect the real reason they were
questioning him. Colorado v. Spring (1987)
479 US 564, 576-77; US v. Boskic (1C 2008)
545 F3 69, 77-80; P v. Chutan (1999) 72 CA4
1276, 1282.

• Officers did not tell the suspect that his interview was
being tape recorded. P v. Jackson (1971) 19
CA3 95, 101.

• Richmond detectives gave a murder suspect a "Neutron Proton
Negligence Intelligence Test" (actually, they just dabbed his hand
with a drug test solution which naturally changed color), and said
it proved he had recently fired a gun. P v.
Smith (2007) 40 C4 483, 506 ["It does not appear that the
tactic was so coercive that it tended to produce a statement that
was involuntary or unreliable."].

[33] CAL: P v.
Cahill (1994) 22 CA4 296, 315; P v. Hensley (2014)
59 C4 788, 813 ["Deception does not undermine the voluntariness of
a defendant's statements to the authorities unless the deception
is of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement."];
P v. McCurdy (2014) 59 C4 1063, 1088 ["The use of deceptive
statements during an investigation does not invalidate a
confession as involuntary unless the deception is the type likely
to procure an untrue statement."]; P v. Scott (2011) 52 C4
452, 481 ["The use of deceptive statements during an interrogation
does not invalidate a confession as involuntary unless the
deception is of a type reasonably likely to produce an untrue
statement."]; P v. Farnam (2002) 28 C4 107, 182
["Where the deception is not of a type reasonably likely to
procure an untrue statement, a finding of involuntariness is
unwarranted."]. ALSO SEE: P v. Jones (2017) 7 CA5
787, 807 ["The totality of the interview further demonstrates that
the deceptive statements made by the detectives about the evidence
did not have the effect of coercing Jones into an involuntary and
unreliable confession."]; P v. Mays (2009) 174 CA4 156, 164
["A psychological ploy is prohibited only when, in light of all of
the circumstances, it is so coercive that it tends to result in a
statement that is both involuntary and unreliable."];
P v. Felix (1977) 72 CA3 879, 886 ["The limits on the use
of subterfuge in interrogation are defined by the potentiality of
the subterfuge to produce an untrue statement."].

[34] CAL: P v. Kelly (1990) 51
C3 931, 953-54 ["[The detective's] single, oblique reference to
defendant's state of mind falls well short, however, of the
egregious misconduct in Hogan [P v. Hogan (1982) 31
C3 815] where the defendant repeatedly expressed anxiety that he
might be 'crazy' and the police exploited that weakness by
promising psychiatric treatment."]. Also see
P v. Esqueda (1993) 17 CA4 1450, 1485-87.

[35] USSC:
Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 US 387, 403. CAL:
P v. Montano (1991) 226 CA3 914, 935 [the officer
"aggravated the situation by using their common religion to
conjure up in defendant's mind the picture of confessing to avoid
going to hell"]; P v. Kelly (1990) 51 C3 931, 953 ["the
tactic of exploiting a suspect's religious anxieties has been
justly condemned"]. COMPARE:
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 US 370, 372 ["The fact
that [the officer's] question referred to Thompkins's religious
beliefs also did not render Thompkins's statement involuntary."];
P v. Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 176 [although officers
made a religious appeal, "defendant exhibited no sign of being in
a particular fragile mental state that would render her vulnerable
to manipulation by reference to religion."];
P v. Kelly (1990) 51 C3 931, 953 ["no acute religious
anxiety or sense of guilt was apparent from prior questioning"];
P v. Maestas (1987) 194 CA3 1499, 1506 ["Such references
[to religion and appellant's Catholic beliefs] were brief and
suggestive that appellant tell the truth."].

[36] CAL: P v. Andersen (1980)
101 CA3 563, 576 ["good faith confrontation is an interrogation
technique possessing no apparent constitutional vices"];
P v. Thomas (2011) CA4 987, 1011-12 [officer told the
suspect that video cameras would show he was driving];
P v. Hill (1967) 66 C2 536, 548 [the officer "told the
defendant what the authorities had learned concerning the crime at
that point"]. OTHER: US v. McNeal (10C 2017) 862 F3
1057, 1064 ["It is not per se coercion to present a suspect with
correct information from which the suspect can make a reasoned
decision."].

[37] USSC: Colorado v.
Spring (1987) 479 US 564, 577 ["the additional information
[about the nature of the crime under investigation] could affect
only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially
voluntary and knowing nature"]. CAL: P v.
Boyette (2002) 29 C4 381, 411 ["Defendant does not explain
how the voluntariness of his confession required police to
disclose they were focusing on him as a suspect."]; P
v. Chutan (1999) 72 CA4 1276, 1280 [officer did not
reveal that he was conducting a criminal investigation].

[38] CAL: P v.
Hernandez (2009) 178 CA4 1510, 1539 ["The bare fact that
the interviewer advised Gonzalez that if he withheld information
he could be considered an accessory after the fact did not in
itself make his later statement involuntary."]. OTHER:
US v. Braxton (4C 1997) 112 F3 777, 782
["informing him of the statutory penalty for making false
statements does not constitute coercive police conduct rendering a
statement involuntary"].

[39] CAL: P v.
Thompson (1990) 50 C3 134, 170.

[40] CAL: P v. Garcia (1984) 36
C3 539 [the officer "advised defendant that an accomplice is
generally better off than a triggerman. That was sound advice."];
P v. Long (1970) 6 CA3 741, 748 ["Good faith
confrontation with the confessions of other accomplices is an
interrogation technique possessing no apparent constitutional
vice."]; P v. Ditson (1962) 57 C2 415, 433
[officer's "trying to get [the accomplice] to help himself by
clearing up the details as to Ditson's dominant control, appears
to have been a straightforward, honest procedure"]; P v.
Robinson (1969) 274 CA2 514, 520-1 ["It was not an improper
inducement for the officers to inform defendant that his
confederate had confessed."].

[41] CAL: P v. Cox (1990)
221 CA3 980, 986 ["The fact that the questions were somewhat
leading does not equate to a conclusion that they were
coercive."].

[42] CAL: P v.
Cahill (1994) 22 CA4 296, 311 ["threats of harsh penalty
often contain an implicit promise of more lenient treatment"].

[43] CAL: P v.
Hill (1967) 66 C2 536, 549 ["The offer or promise of such
benefit need not be expressed, but may be implied from equivocal
language not otherwise made clear."]; P v.
Vasila (1995) 38 CA4 865, 873 ["express or clearly implied
promise" may suffice]; P v. Andersen (1980) 101 CA3
563, 579 ["promises can be implicit as well as explicit"];
P v. Trout (1960) 54 C2 576, 585 ["a threat
or promise to the defendant was implied"]; P v.
Jimenez (1978) 21 C3 595, 611 [a confession is involuntary
"if it was elicited by any promise of benefit or leniency whether
express of implied"]. ALSO SEE: P v.
Thompson (1990) 50 C3 134, 169 ["The line between a threat
(or a promise) and a statement of fact or intention can be a fine
one."].

[44] QUOTE FROM: US v. Haak (2C
2018) 884 F3 400, 410.

[45] CAL: P v.
Dominick (1986) 182 CA3 1174, 1192 ["Whether or not the
detective's statement was false does not in any way change the
actuality of the defendant's state of mind with respect to
voluntariness."]; P v. Vasila (1995) 38 CA4 865, 875
["The Attorney General urges us to conclude that officers are
permitted to induce a confession by making promises, so long as
they keep them. This is not the law." Edited].

[46] CAL: P v. Groody (1983) 140
CA3 355, 359; P v. Boyde (1988) 46 C3 212, 239.

[47] CAL: In re Roger C. (1975)
53 CA3 198, 203 ["While the interrogating officers used bare
language informing Roger that they could not promise probation or
parole, they made it crystal clear to him that he had no hope of
anything other than incarceration if he did not confess."];
P v. Anderson (1980) 101 CA3 563, 579.

[48] CAL: P v. Winbush (2017) 2
C5 402, 453 ["A constitutional violation arises only where the
confession results directly from the threat (capital) punishment
will be imposed if the suspect is uncooperative, coupled with a
promise of leniency in exchange for the suspect's cooperation."];
P v. Perez (2016) 243 CA4 863, 878-79 [confession
suppressed because officer told the suspect that "if he told the
truth and was honest, then we are not gonna charge you with
anything"]; P v. Linton (2013) 56 C4 1146, 1177 [officer's
comment that defendant would not face any criminal consequences as
the result of any prior sexual encounter with the murder victim
constituted an implied promise of leniency]; P v.
Daniels (1991) 52 C3 815, 863 ["There is nothing improper
in confronting a suspect with the predicament he or she is in"];
P v. Flores (1983) 144 CA3 459, 469
["truthful and commonplace statements of possible legal
consequences, if unaccompanied by threat or promise, are
permissible"]; P v. Cahill (1994) 22 CA4 296,
311 ["The critical question is: when does a representation in the
course of an interrogation about the penal consequences of silence
or untruthfulness amount to a threat or promise?"];
P v. Hill (1967) 66 C2 536, 549 ["[If the suspect] is given
to understand that he might reasonably expect benefits in the
nature of more lenient treatment at the hands of the police,
prosecution or court in consideration of making a statement, even
a truthful one, such motivation is deemed to render the statement
involuntary"]; P v. Maestas (1987) 194 CA3 1499, 1507
["Although the officer erred when he stated that Youth Authority
time would be a maximum of four years, the police made no promise
that he would be sent to the Youth Authority or what kind of
sentence he would receive, stating at one point, 'I don't know I'm
not the judge.'"]; P v. Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563,
583 ["Homicide does possess degrees of culpability, and when
evidence of guilt is strong, confession and avoidance is a better
defense tactic than denial."]. 9th CIR: Clark
v. Murphy (9C 2003) 331 F3 1062, 1072-73 [not a
promise when officer gave his opinion that remorse might be a
factor in sentencing]. OTHER: US v
Ballard (5C 1978) 586 F2 1060, 1063 ["A truthful and
noncoercive statement of the possible penalties which an accused
faces may be given to the accused without overbearing one's free
will."]; US v. Braxton (4C 1997) 112 F3 777,
783 ["A law enforcement officer's admonishment to a suspect during
an investigatory interview to tell the truth or face consequences
is simply not an implied promise of non-prosecution."];
US v. Young (10C 2020) 964 F3 938, 946 [FBI agent's
"conduct was coercive in nature, particularly in light of his
misrepresentation of the sentence Young faces, his false statement
that he would speak to a federal judge about Young's cooperation,
and his promises of leniency."]; US v. Montgomery (7C 2009)
555 F3 623, 629-30 ["[The officer] did not promise Montgomery that
he would not receive a ten-year sentence if he confessed; he said
that Montgomery would not receive ten years from the federal
system."]. ALSO SEE: US v. Haak (2C 2018) 884 F3
400, 413-14 ["countless defendants who enter into cooperation
agreements without immunity expect to save themselves 'a world of
hurt' in any number of respects, most related to reduced jail
time"] ["countless defendants who enter into cooperation
agreements without immunity expect to save themselves 'a world of
hurt' in any number of respects, most related to reduced jail
time"].

[49] EXAMPLES:

Not coercive: The following are examples of statements by
officers that were not deemed coercive; i.e., the officers did
nothing more than point out the realities of the suspect's
position:

• Officer: "Well, it can go anywhere from, and this is just
my opinion, I'm not telling you what's going to happen, it can go
anywhere from 2nd degree murder to 1st degree murder… If
there's a trail of girls laying [sic] from here to Colorado, then
it doesn't look too good for you." Court: "We believe defendant
would reasonably understand these statements to mean that no
promises or guarantees were being made." P v.
Bradford (1997) 14 C4 1005, 1044. Also see P
v. Davis (2009) 46 C4 539, 600 ["Sergeant Meese said
nothing beyond the obvious in that defendant's crimes, involving
the kidnap and murder of a child, made him eligible for the death
penalty. Meese correctly implied that any evidence of a sexual
assault (or lack thereof) would not have altered that
circumstance."].

• "[The officer's] statement merely offered his opinion that
the person who committed a crime like the one for which defendant
was under arrest would serve substantial time in prison, but
probably less than 30 years. There was no mention of the effect of
cooperation upon the time to be served." P v.
Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 989.

• After noting that the officers "suggested various mitigated
and non-mitigated scenarios again and again," the court said,
"this by itself could be considered merely pointing out the
consequences which would naturally flow from a truthful and honest
course of conduct."]. P v. Esqueda (1993) 17
CA4 1450, 1485.

Coercive: The courts noted the following in ruling that an
officer's words were coercive:

• Suspect's parole officer told him that, unless he gave a
statement, the officer "would be forced to write a parole report
recommending Christopher for the maximum in-custody time."
P v. Gonzalez (2012) 210 CA4 875, 884.

• "The officers repeatedly suggested to appellant that if he
told them the truth, his penalty might be less." P v.
Hinds (1984) 154 CA3 222, 238.

• "The officers implied that appellant was more likely to be
sent to San Quentin if he failed to provide the police with a
confession." In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 CA4 200, 213.

• The officer "made it crystal clear to him that he had no
hope of anything other than incarceration if he did not confess."
In re Roger G. 1975) 53 CA3 198, 203.

• "The clear implication of the officer's remarks was that
unless defendant changed her story and confessed her true
involvement in the crime, she would be tried for murder."
P v. McClary (1977) 20 C3 218, 223.

• "They told him his only way out was to say [the shooting]
was an accident. They implied by so saying he would not have to go
to prison and would be out with his children." P v.
Esqueda (1993) 17 CA4 1450, 1486.

• "The clear implication of [the officers'] remarks is that
defendant would be tried for first degree murder unless he
admitted that he was inside the house and denied that he had
premeditated the killing." P v. Cahill (1994)
22 CA4 296, 314.

• "Defendant was given bald promises that, if he provided the
necessary information, he would not be prosecuted federally and
would be released from custody." P v.
Vasila (1995) 38 CA4 865, 875.

• "[The officer] in essence told Saxon: We will prosecute you
for first degree murder unless you name [Lee] as the killer."
P v. Lee (2002) 95 CA4 772, 785.

• The officer promised the suspect "that he would spend 54
fewer years in prison if he would confess." US v.
Lopez (10C 2006) 437 F3 1059, 1065.

• "If you don't confess, we'll tell the DA." US
v. Tingle (9C 1981) 658 F2 1332, 1336, fn.5.

[50] CAL: P v.
Boyde (1988) 46 C3 212, 239 [officer "repeatedly and
clearly stated that he had no authority to make any promise of
leniency… but could only pass information on to the
district attorney"]; P v. Andersen (1980) 101 CA3
563, 582 ["Defendant posed a legal question—would she spend the
rest of her life in jail? Undoubtedly, it would have been better
police practice to parry this question or merely answer it with
the statement that sentence and punishment are matters for the
courts."]; P v. Groody (1983) 140 CA3 355, 359
["[The detective] expressly informed appellant that he could make
no guarantees of leniency."]. OTHER:
US v. Hufstetler (1C 2015) 782 F3 19, 25 ["the officers
also emphasized that they could not, and would not, promise
Hufstetler anything in exchange for his confession"].

[51] CAL: In re Roger G. (1975)
53 CA3 198, 203 ["While the interrogating officers used bare
language informing Roger that they could not promise probation or
parole, they made it crystal clear to him that he had no hope of
anything other than incarceration if he did not confess."].

[52] CAL: P v.
Holloway (2004) 33 C4 96, 115 ["In telling defendant that
'we're talking about a death penalty case here, Detective Hash
said nothing beyond the obvious, for the crime—the murder of two
young women, in their home, with signs of sexual assault—was a
clear candidate for capital prosecution."]; P v.
Ray (1996) 13 C4 313, 340 ["a confession will not be
invalidated simply because the possibility of a death sentence was
discussed beforehand"]; P v. Johnson (1969)
70 C2 469, 478 [officer merely informed the suspect that "there
was a first degree murder charge under investigation for which he
could get the gas chamber"].

[53] CAL: P v. Case (2018) 5 C5
1, 25 ["Reference to the death penalty does not necessarily render
a statement involuntary"]; P v. Ray (1996) 13
C4 313, 340 ["We have found a constitutional violation in this
context only where officers threaten a vulnerable or frightened
suspect with the death penalty"]; P v.
McClary (1977) 20 C3 218, 229 [coercive: officers "advised
her that unless she changed her statement and admitted the true
extent of her complicity, she would be charged as a principal to
murder and would face the death penalty"]; P v.
Williams (1997) 16 C4 635, 659 [Officer: "We can talk to
the DA and you assist us in this investigation, you won't get the
death penalty"; a blatant promise]; P v.
Nicholas (1980) 112 CA3 249, 265 [a threat: Officer: "Death
penalty went back in today. Did you know that?"]; P
v. Flores (1983) 144 CA3 459, 466 [Officer: "Right
now the way it looks, it looks like robbery and murder. You know
what robbery and murder is? Robbery and murder is a capital
offense in California. An offense that you could go to the gas
chamber." Court: "Only by confessing his involvement in the
decedent's death could the appellant avoid the possible death
penalty."]; P v. Hinds (1984) 154 CA3 222,
238 [threat: officers repeatedly "suggested that if appellant did
not explain to them mitigating factors, he might get the death
penalty"].

[54] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Williams (2010) 49 C4 405, 443.

[55] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of statements by officers that were deemed to be nothing
more than pointing out mitigating circumstances:

• Although the officer told the defendant that his "version
of the events could make a difference in how he was prosecuted,
this was not false." P v. Krebs (2019) 8 C5 265, 305.

• "The officers' conduct in emphasizing the severity of the
crime at issue and telling defendant that he was 'looking at going
to jail' for that crime did not transgress these limits."
P v. Orozco (2019) 32 CA5 802, 820.

• "At most, the detective was saying that he would
investigate any explanation [Murdock] might offer about what
happened inside the house when Prince Wright was murdered."
US v. Murdock (DCC 2012) 667 F3 1302, 1307.

• "[The detective's] suggestions that the Gleason homicide
might have been an accident, a self-defensive reaction, or the
product of fear, were not coercive; they merely suggested possible
explanations of the events and offered defendant an opportunity to
provide the details of the crime. This tactic is permissible."].
P v. Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 170.

• "The comments explain the possible consequences, depending
upon his motivation and involvement in the shooting, and as such
do not constitute threats or false promises of leniency."
P v. Maestas (1987) 194 CA3 1499, 1507.

• "To the extent [the detective's] remarks implied that
giving an account involving a blackout or accident might help
defendant avoid the death penalty, he did no more than tell
defendant the benefit that might flow naturally from a truthful
and honest course of conduct." P v. Holloway (2004)
33 C4 96, 116

• Officer: "If you guys were doing a robbery, he shot the
guy, he panicked or whatever, that's the price he's going to have
to pay. We're going to focus our thing on him—Orlando. But there's
no sense you going down the way he is, that far down with him as a
trigger man." Court: "This statement does not constitute an offer
of leniency on the part of the police or the prosecution in return
for a confession; it advised defendant that an accomplice is
generally better off than a triggerman. That was sound advice."
P v. Garcia (1984) 36 C3 539, 546

• "The officers only pointed out those benefits which would
naturally accrue to him if his true role in the crime was made
known, but such benefits did not include leniency or favorable
treatment by the state." P v. Hill (1967) 66
C2 536, 550

• The officer's statement that "a showing of remorse is a
factor which mitigates punishment" was "no more than a truthful
legal commonplace with which all persons familiar with criminal
law would agree." P v. Andersen (1980) 101
CA3 563, 579.

• The officer suggested that "the killings might have been
accidental or resulted from an uncontrollable fit of rage during a
drunken blackout, and that such circumstances could make a lot of
difference." Such statements, said the court, "fall far short of
being promises of lenient treatment in exchange for cooperation."
P v. Holloway (2004) 33 C4 96, 116.

• "The circumstances of the crime here suggested alternative
theories of accidental or intentional killing and, absent evidence
refuting one theory, both would likely be asserted. The police did
not promise to abandon the theory of intentional killing if
defendant confessed." P v. Thompson (1990) 50
C3 134, 170.

• Officer: "Unless your story changes to where you can say
something else happened and we can prove you true, then you're
going to be tried [as a direct participant]." Court: The officer
"advised her that unless she changed her statement and admitted
the true extent of her complicity, she would be charged as a
principal to murder and would face the death penalty." P
v. McClary (1977) 20 C3 218, 224

• "[The officers told Maestas] that his concealment of the
identity of the person who shot the victim tended to reflect
negatively on the extent of his own involvement. The comments
explain the possible consequences, depending upon his motivations
and involvement in the shooting, and as such do not constitute
threats or false promises of leniency." P v.
Maestas (1987) 194 CA3 1499, 1507.

• "Encouraging a suspect to tell the truth and suggesting
that is cohorts might leave him 'holding the bag' does not, as a
matter of law, overcome a confessor's will." US v.
Ballard (5C 1978) 586 F2 1060, 1063.

[56] CAL: P v.
Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 174 ["The interviewing
officers did not suggest they could influence the decisions of the
district attorney, but simply informed defendant that full
cooperation might be beneficial in an unspecified way."];
P v. Ramos (2004) 121 CA4 1194 [officer told the
suspect his cooperation would be brought to the DA's attention
"for consideration"]; P v. Groody (1983) 140 CA3
355, 359 ["[The detective's] promise to talk to the district
attorney about 'special consideration' for appellant, and his
statement that one such consideration might be for the district
attorney to charge only one burglary, was no more than the
pointing out of benefits which might result naturally from a
truthful and honest course of conduct. [The detective] expressly
informed appellant that he could make no guarantees of
leniency."]; P v. Boyde (1988) 46 C3 212, 239 ["[The
detective] repeatedly and clearly stated that he had no authority
to make any promise of leniency regarding the pending
robbery-kidnap charges, but could only pass information on to the
district attorney."]; P v. Seaton (1983) 146 CA3 67,
74 ["[The detective] testified he told defendant the district
attorney would make no deals unless all of the information
defendant claimed to have was first on the table. We conclude no
implied promise of a 'deal' or leniency resulted from these
conversations."]; P v. Anthony J. (1980) 107 CA3
962, 969 ["[The detective's] response that the juvenile court
would be told that defendant had been cooperative was a truthful
response to the defendant's question [which was 'what would he
get?' if he cooperated]."]; P v. Jones (1998) 17 C4
279, 298 ["the detective's offers of intercession with the
district attorney ['telling the district attorney that defendant
had been honest'] amounted to truthful implications that his
cooperation might be useful in later plea bargain negotiations"];
P v. Higareda (1994) 24 CA4 1399, 1409 [statement
not involuntary merely because the officer told the suspect "if he
spoke the truth I would talk to the District Attorney"].
9th CIR: Juan H. v. Allen (9C 2005) 408 F3 1262,
1273 ["It is not enough, even in the case of a juvenile, that the
police indicate that a cooperative attitude would be to the
benefit of an accused unless such remarks rise to the level of
being threatening or coercive."]. ALSO SEE: P v.
Coffman (2004) 34 C4 1, 58 [not coercive to tell suspect
that his cooperation "could be made known to jail authorities, and
that the latter might look favorably on such cooperation" because
it "simply amounted to [the officer's] acknowledgment that the
nature of the crimes of which Marlow stood accused tends to evoke
negative feelings."].

[57] 9th CIR: US v.
Tingle (9C 1981) 658 F2 1332, 1336, fn.5 [court disapproves
of "a representation that a defendant's failure to cooperate will
be communicated to a prosecutor"].

[58] USSC: Fare v.
Michael C. (1979) 442 US 707, 727. CAL:
P v. Ramirez (2022) 13 C5 997, 1108 [the officers "observed
that defendant and Garza were equally guilty of murder, but that
being truthful about who pulled the trigger might assist defendant
at sentencing"]; P v. Zabelle (2022) 80 CA5 1098, 1107 ["At
most, the officer simply informed defendant that full cooperation
'could possibly' be beneficial in some unspecified way. But that
is not enough to show improper coercion under case precedent."];
P v. Case (2018) 5 C5 1, 26 ["there is nothing improper in
pointing out that a jury probably will be more favorably impressed
by a confession and a show of remorse"]; P v.
Vance (2010) 188 CA4 1182, 1212 [Officer said "we are here
to listen and then to help you out"]; P v.
Hill (1967) 66 C2 536, 549; P v. Maury (2003)
30 C4 342, 363, 406-7; P v. Flores (1983) 144 CA3
459, 469; P v. Adams (1983) 143 CA3 970, 987;
P v. Jackson (1980) 28 C3 264, 298-99; P v.
Nicholas (1980) 112 CA3 249, 265 [officers said they would
have "some consideration for him if he admitted his crime"].
9th CIR: Petrocelli v. Baker (9C 2017) 869 F3 710,
724 [the officer "testified that Petrocelli was told that they
would do what they could, but no promises were made"; and officer
told him that "talking to the detectives could do nothing but
help"]. OTHER: US v. Villalpando (7C
2009) 588 F3 1124, 1130 ["The interrogating detective offered to
help him, but her offer of help did not amount to a false promise
of leniency."].

[59] CAL: P v.
Azure (1986) 178 CA3 591, 602 ["The very real impression
conveyed throughout the four-hour interrogation was that defendant
was not free to leave until he admitted molesting his
step-daughters."]; P v. Esqueda (1993) 17 CA4
1450, 1485 [officers "implied questioning would only stop if
Esqueda gave them the story they wanted"]. COMPARE:
P v. Linton (2013) 56 C4 1146, 1178 ["There was nothing
coercive in informing defendant… that the sooner he told
the truth, the sooner the interview would finish."].

[60] CAL: In re
J. Clyde K. (1987) 192 CA3 710 ["The potential benefits
that the boys could expect (lesser punishment and immediate
release with only a citation) were clearly and expressly spelled
out by [the officer] himself."]; P v. Orozco (2019) 32 CA5
802, 820 ["The officers' promise not to arrest defendant
immediately if he confessed presents a closer question"];
P v. Vasila (1995) 38 CA4 865, 874 [officer
"went beyond" what is permissible when he "promised he would
release defendant on his own recognizance"]; P v.
Flores (1983) 144 CA3 459, 471-72 [officer implied that
suspect would be ORd if he made a statement]; P v.
Azure (1986) 178 CA3 591, 602 ["The very real impression
conveyed throughout the four-hour interrogation was that defendant
was not free to leave until he admitted molesting his
step-daughters."]; P v. Linton (2013) 56 C4 1146, 1178
["There was nothing coercive in the officers urging defendant to
tell the truth"]; P v. Vance (2010) 188 CA4 1182, 1212
["the only benefits promised by the officers was the peace of mind
defendant and others would have after he did the right thing and
gave his side of the story"]; P v. Andersen (1980) 101 CA3
563, 578 ["It is settled that admonitions to tell the truth do not
amount to coercion."]; P v. Hill (1967) 66 C2 536, 549;
P v. Jiminez (1978) 21 C3 595, 611 ["mere advice or
exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused
to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or promise
does not render a subsequent confession involuntary"];
P v. Boyde (1988) 46 C3 212, 238;
P v. Jackson (1980) 28 C3 264, 298-99. 9th CIR:
Ortiz v. Uribe (9C 2011) 671 F3 863, 872 ["Detective
Cardwell simply reminded Ortiz of his obligation to his family to
tell the truth and that his children were counting on him to do
the right thing."].

[61] USSC: Arizona v.
Fulminante (1991) 499 US 279, 286-87. CAL:
P v. Wall (2017) 3 C5 1048, 1067 ["The attempts to assuage
Wall's fear [of his co-defendant] did not rely on deception, nor
were they attempts to leverage that fear to extract
information."].

[62] USSC: Haynes v.
Washington (1963) 373 US 503, 512.

[63] USSC: Lynumn v.
Illinois (1963) 372 US 528, 534 [officers told suspect that
her infant children would be "taken from her, if she did not
'cooperate'"]. CAL: P v. Steger (1976) 16 C3
539, 550 ["A threat by police to arrest or punish a close
relative, or a promise to free the relative in exchange for a
confession, may render an admission invalid."];
P v. Dowdell (2014) 227 CA4 1388, 1403 [officer implicitly
suggested leniency for his girlfriend/accomplice in return for a
statement that the gun he and she used in a robbery/kidnapping was
a toy]; P v. Matlock (1959) 51 C2 682, 697 ["A
serious question is presented by the threat of an officer to
'bring the rest of the family in' which was expressly made in
order to, and did, induce defendant to 'tell us where the jewelry
was.'"]; P v. Trout (1960) 54 C2 576, 584 ["the
police held [the suspect's wife] in custody for the purpose of
securing a confession from defendant"]; P v.
Rand (1962) 202 CA2 668, 673 ["Where a confession is
coerced by a threat to arrest a near relative, it is not
admissible."]; P v. Berve (1958) 51 C2 286,
291 ["It has been held that the threat of mere arrest of one's
mother is sufficient to taint a confession extracted thereby"].
9th CIR: Brown v. Horell (9C 2011) 544
F3 969, 980 [implied promise that suspect would be able to see the
birth of his child if he gave a statement]. COMPARE: P v. Howard (1988) 44 C3 375, 398 ["The
interrogating officers did not imply that the fate of defendant's
son and of [defendant's girlfriend] depended upon defendant
stating what they wanted to hear. They repeated that they did not
want to involve Gary, Jr., and that their primary focus was on
defendant"]; P v. Chutan (1999) 72 CA4 1276, 1282
["Nor do we find anything coercive in [the officer's] statement
that 'what happens here affects your whole family.'"].
NOTE: If the officers did not make such a threat, it is
immaterial that the suspect believed or hoped that his cooperation
would benefit the friend or relative. See P v.
Wimberly (1992) 5 CA4 773, 787-88 ["a suspect's belief that
his cooperation will benefit a relative will not invalidate an
admission"]; P v. Thompson (1980) 27 C3 303,
328 ["While appellant undoubtedly hoped [his girlfriend] would be
released if he confessed, his decision to talk to achieve that
goal was self-motivated."]; P v.
Steger (1976) 16 C3 539, 550 ["a suspect's belief that his
cooperation will benefit a relative will not invalidate an
admission"].

[64] CAL: P v.
McWhorter (2009) 47 C4 318, 350 [defendant's comments about
his wife, mother, and brother made them legitimate subjects of
conversation]; P v. Abbott (1958) 156 CA2
601, 605 ["The officers believed that Nichols, and he alone, could
implicate [the cashier] or exonerate her. In justice to her it was
their duty to learn, if they could, whether her further detention
was warranted and this required the interrogation of Nichols."];
P v. Thompson (1990) 50 C3 134, 169 [Officer:
"Information hasn't come forward at this time which would cause me
to release her. See what I'm saying?" Court: These comments "seem
clearly proper" because the officer had reason to believe that
Lisa was implicated."]; P v. Jackson (1971) 19 CA3
95 [Officer: "After I get through talking to her and comparing
what you told me with what she says, if I have reason to feel
she's not involved in it, I'm sure as hell not going to book her."
Court: "At most there was a simple statement of fact by the
officer that defendant's wife would be released if further
investigation convinced him and his superior that she had no
connection with the crime."]; P v.
Kendrick (1961) 56 C2 71, 86 [officer's remark that "the
defendant's mother and wife might be subject to prosecution if it
appeared that they had concealed defendant's presence" was "far
short of a threat"]; P v. Daniels (1991) 52
C3 815, 863 ["Both had apparently helped defendant escape and hide
from the police, and could in fact have been charged as
accessories"]; P v. Howard (1988) 44 C3 375, 398
[officers "did not imply that the fate of defendant's son and of
Stevens depended upon defendant stating what they wanted to
hear."]. OTHER: US v. Hufstetler (1C 2015) 782 F3
19, 24 ["an officer's truthful description of the family member's
predicament is permissible since it merely constitutes an attempt
to both accurately depict the situation to the suspect and to
elicit more information about the family member's culpability"].

[65] CAL: P v. Tully (2012) 54
C4 952, 994 [officer told the suspect and his wife that "if they
were being truthful, they might qualify for witness protection,
but the final decision would be made by the district attorney"].

[66] CAL: P v.
Belmontes (1988) 45 C3 744, 772 [defendant indicated "that
he had not been threatened or promised anything to make a second
statement"]; P v. Jackson (1980) 28 C3 264, 299
["defendant himself expressly acknowledged at the conclusion of
his statement that no tangible or official benefits were promised
him"]; P v. Bradford (1997) 14 C4 1005, 1044
["defendant acknowledged that no promises or threats had been made
to him"].

[67] USSC: Haley v.
Ohio (1947) 332 US 596, 601 ["Formulas of respect for
constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life
which contradict them."]; Haynes v.
Washington (1963) 373 US 503, 513 ["if the authorities were
successful in compelling the totally incriminating confession of
guilt ... they would have little, if any, trouble securing the
self-contained concession of voluntariness"]. CAL:
P v. Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563, 579 ["an assertion
that no promises are being made may be contradicted by subsequent
conversation"].

[68] CAL: P v.
Sapp (2003) 31 CA4 240, 456 ["defendant summoned a jail
guard and asked for the homicide investigators to come back so he
could admit to three murders"]; P v.
Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563, 581 ["the suspect sought out
the police to talk to them, rather than vice versa, as is usually
the case"].

[69] 9th CIR: US v.
Haswood (9C 2003) 350 F3 1024, 1028.

[70] CAL: P v.
Boyer (2006) 38 C4 412, 445 [not improper to offer
"immunity from prosecution for the witness's criminal role in
return for the witness's promise to testify fully and fairly"];
P v. Riel (2000) 22 C4 1153, 1179 ["He was obligated
to tell the truth, not to conform his testimony to any prior
statement"]. ALSO SEE: P v. Avila (2006) 38 C4 491,
595 ["Here, the condition requiring Rojas to pass a polygraph
examination did not dictate his testimony. He remained free to
testify as he desired"].

[71] CAL: P v. Grimes (2015) 60
C4 729, 771 ["It is proper for the prosecution to present the
testimony of a witness pursuant to a plea bargain if the witness
believes that the agreement merely requires him to testify
truthfully."]; P v. Boyer (2006) 38 C4 412, 455
["But if the immunity agreement places the witness under a strong
compulsion to testify in a particular fashion, the testimony is
tainted by the witness's self-interest, and is inadmissible."];
P v. Badgett (1995) 10 C4 330, 358 ["An immunity
agreement that requires the witness to testify consistently with a
previous statement to the police is deemed coercive, and testimony
produced by such an agreement is subject to exclusion from
evidence."]; P v. Daniels (1991) 52 C3 815, 862 ["We
have insisted that the arrangement require the witness to tell the
truth, not to present a previously agreed-upon story."];
P v. Allen (1986) 42 C3 1222, 1252, fn.5 ["it seems
clear these principles are equally applicable when the accomplice
testimony is obtained pursuant to a plea agreement rather than a
grant of immunity"]; P v. Maury (2003) 30 C4 342,
417 ["the district attorney's promise was not conditioned on [the
witness] testifying in a particular fashion or on the testimony's
achieving a particular result"]; P v. Avila
(2006) 38 C4 491, 594 ["when an "accomplice is granted immunity
subject to the condition that his testimony substantially conform
to an earlier statement given to police, or that his testimony
result in the defendant's conviction, the accomplice's testimony
is tainted beyond redemption and its admission denies the
defendant a fair trial. But an agreement requiring only that the
witness testify fully and truthfully is valid"].

[72] USSC:
Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 US 157, 164 ["As
interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological
persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of the
defendant a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness'
calculus."]; Stein v. New York (1953) 346 US 156, 185 ["The
limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of
pressure against the power of resistance of the person
confessing."]; Yarbrough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 US 652,
667-688 ["voluntariness of a statement is often said to depend on
whether the defendant's will was overborne, a question that
logically can depend on the characteristics of the accused"];
Dickerson v. US (2000) 530 US 428, 434 ["The determination
[of voluntariness] depends upon a weighing of the circumstances of
pressure against the power of resistance of the person
confessing."]; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218,
226 [suspect's mental state relevant to assess the "psychological
impact on the accused"]; Fenton v. Miller (1985) 474 US
104, 109 [interrogation techniques "either in isolation or as
applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect" may
violate due process]. CAL: P v. Rundle (2008) 43 C4
76, 114 ["circumstances relating to the particular defendant" must
be considered]; P v. Smith (2007) 40 C4 483, 502 ["mental
condition is relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police
coercion"]; P v. Hill (1992) 3 C4 959, 981 [consider "both
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation"]. 9th CIR: Balbuena v. Sullivan (9C
2020) 970 F3 1176, 1186 [weigh "the circumstances of pressure
against the power of resistance of the person confessing"].

[73] USSC: Colorado v.
Connelly (1986) 479 US 157 160-62 ["his answers were
intelligible"]. CAL: P v. Perdomo (2007) 147
CA4 605, 618 ["Each of appellant's answers is appropriate to the
question asked."]; P v. Boyette (2002) 29 C4
381, 412 [although 19-years old with a "lack of educational
achievement" and "modest level of literacy," "the record does not
even hint that these factors came into play"]; P v.
Richardson (2008) 43 C4 959, 993 [his responses did not
indicate "mental defect"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Gutierrez-Mederos (9C 1992) 965 F2 800, 803 ["[The
officer] testified that he never had to repeat any questions"].
OTHER: US v. Zubia-Melendez (10C 2001) 263 F3 1155,
1163 ["Appellant and [the officer] could converse sufficiently to
understand one another"]; US v. Zapata (11C 1999) 180 F3
1237, 1242 ["There is no evidence that [defendant] was confused
by, or did not understand, any of [the officer's] questions."];
US v. Garcia (7C 1990) 897 F2 1413, 1419 ["his ability to
speak and understand English was clearly proven as he conversed
with different troopers"]; US v. Mattox (8C 2022) 27 F4
668, 675 ["Being on pain medication does not show that a
defendant's will has been overborne if there is evidence that the
patient answered reasonably and understood what was occurring.];
US v. Montgomery (7C 2009) 555 F3 623, 633 ["[The officers]
all testified that Montgomery was coherent and did not appear to
be intoxicated or sleep deprived."]; US v.
Dehghani (8C 2008) 550 F3 716, 721 ["clear, responsive
answers to the detectives' questions"]; US v.
Gaddy (8C 2008) 532 F3 783, 788 [despite sleeplessness,
suspect "appeared awake and coherent"]; US v.
Howard (8C 2008) 532 F3 755, 763 [despite drug use, he was
"coherent and spoke in a manner which indicated he understood what
was happening"]. COMPARE: Mincey v.
Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 399 ["Mincey gave unresponsive
or uninformative answers to several more questions"].

[74] CAL: In re Jessie L. (1982)
131 CA3 202, 216 [suspect "appeared very calm and showed no
emotion regarding the murder"]; P v. Higareda (1994) 24 CA4
1399, 1409 ["appellant appeared calm, not frightened or scared"];
In re Aven S. (1991) 1 CA4 69, 77 [minor "remained calm and
in control of himself throughout the interview process"];
P v. Bradford (1997) 14 C4 1005, 1041 [court noted that the
trial judge said, "There isn't any excitement in the voice. There
isn't any nervousness particularly. There isn't any outward sign
of stress. It is just a straight account of what happened"];
P v. Johns (1983) 145 CA3 281, 293 ["Defendant did not
become confused, break down of lose his general composure"].
9th CIR: Juan H. v. Allen (9C 2005) 408 F3 1262,
1273 ["Juan H. stood his ground. The minor remained in control of
his responses during the interrogation"].

[75] CAL: P v.
Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 175. ALSO SEE:
P v. McWhorter (2009) 47 C4 318, 360 defendant's "maturity
and ability to again handle himself in a fashion that reflects
maturity and sophistication and articulation served to cleanse any
taint"]; P v. Higareda (1994) 24 CA4 1399, 1409
["appellant appeared calm, not frightened or scared"];
In re Aven S. (1991) 1 CA4 69, 77 [minor "remained calm and
in control of himself throughout the interview process"];
P v. Bradford (1997) 14 C4 1005, 1041 [court noted
that the trial judge said, "There isn't any excitement in the
voice. There isn't any nervousness particularly. There isn't any
outward sign of stress. It is just a straight account of what
happened"]; In re Jessie L. (1982) 131 CA3 202, 216
[suspect "appeared very calm and showed no emotion regarding the
murder"].

[76] CAL: P v.
Storm (2002) 28 C4 1007, 1036.

[77] CAL: P v.
Johns (1983) 145 CA3 281, 293.

[78] 9th CIR:
Balbuena v. Sullivan (9C 2020) 970 F3 1176, 1189.

[79] CAL: P v. Case (2018) 5 C5
1, 26 [maintaining innocence "tends to undercut the notion that
his free will was overcome"].

[80] EXAMPLES: In rejecting arguments
that defendants were coerced during interrogation, the courts
noted the following:

• "Defendant's attempt to deceive the officers in his initial
interview indicates attentiveness and an awareness of his
circumstances. He was not so inattentive or distracted during the
questioning that he could not formulate a false account of what
happened." P v. Leon (2020) 8 C5 831, 844.

• "Satterwhite effectively parried the [detectives']
accusations and questions." P v. Thomas (2012) 211 CA4 987,
1013.

• "Defendant was deceptive throughout the five-hour session
and admitted to wrongdoing only when confronted with evidence or
caught in a lie." P v. Nelson (2012) 53 C4 367, 380.

• "He was 16 years old, arrested in bed with his pregnant
girlfriend, and well versed in the gang activities in his
neighborhood."]. Balbuena v. Sullivan (9C 2020) 970 F3
1176, 1181, 1186.

• "Hufstetler actively tried to extend the interrogation,
attempted to avoid questions, and even appeared to be having some
fun with the officers." US v. Hufstetler (1C 2015) 782 F3
19, 25-26.

• "Collins was able and willing to deceive or even lie"
Collins v. Gaetz (7C 2010) 612 F3 574, 590.

• "He effectively parried the officers' accusations and
questions." P v. Williams (2010) 49 C4 405,
442.

• "Even after the police showed defendant the fake test
results, defendant continued to deny involvement in the crime."
P v. Mays (2009) 174 CA4 156, 166. Also see
P v. Jackson (1971) 19 CA3 95, 191 ["He showed
substantial mental agility in interacting with the officers and in
responding to various thrusts and efforts of the officers to, to
in effect, catch him in what they perceived as untruths or lies."

• "Defendant admittedly lied to the detectives throughout the
interview. This is not the behavior of one whose free will have
been overborne." P v. Johns (1983) 145 CA3
281, 293. Edited

• "Belmontes acknowledged he lied in all three of his
statements to police. Defendant's own behavior and testimony
virtually precludes a conclusion that his free will was overborne
by the substance or manner of the interrogation." P
v. Belmontes (1988) 45 C3 744, 774. Edited

• Defendant "was keen enough to change his story" to fit the
facts. P v. Lewis (2001) 26 C4 334, 383-84.

• Defendant's invocation of his Miranda right to
counsel is "contrary to his characterization of himself as a
helpless, easily confused naïf." P v.
Richardson (2008) 43 C4 959, 993.

• Defendant's subsequent refusal to give a written statement
reflect "an understanding of his right not to cooperate or talk."
US v. Boskic (1C 2008) 545 F3 69, 81.

• "His resistance, far from reflecting a will overborne by
official coercion, suggests instead a still operative ability to
calculate his self-interest in choosing whether to disclose or
withhold information." P v. Coffman (2004) 34 C4 1,
59.

• The suspects' confessions "obviously came when they were
convinced that their dance was over and the time had come to pay
the fiddler. Even then, Cooper was so far in control of himself
and the situation as to dictate the quid pro quo for which he
would confess." Stein v. New York (1953) 346 US 156,
186-86.

• Defendant "made a very sophisticated approach by trying to
make a deal" P v. Lara (1967) 67 C2 365, 392

• Defendant "initiated and instigated the negotiations" with
officers. P v. Maury (2003) 30 C4 342, 388.

• Defendant "was behaving strategically; he was probing to
find out how much the officers knew." US v.
Bassignani (9C 2009) 575 F3 879, 884.

• Defendant "appreciated subtle nuances in the questions and
intelligently answered some poorly phrased compound questions."
P v. Guerra (2006) 37 C4 1067, 1096.

• "It appears appellant was even alert enough to attempt to
deceive the officers." P v. Perdomo (2007) 147 CA4
605, 618.

• "Even when he later admitted his presence at the scene of
the murders, he insisted that he had played no role in the
killings."
P v. Williams (1997) 16 C4 635, 660.

• Defendant "continued to deny involvement with child
pornography until the detectives confronted him with evidence from
his computer."]; US v. Dehghani (8C 2008) 550
F3 716, 720.

• "Cameron clung resolutely and emphatically during this
hour-long interrogation to his total lack of memory of the events
in question." In re Cameron (1968) 68 C2 487, 500.

• "Given the opportunity to end the discussion, he chose to
continue." P v. Thompson (1990) 50 C3134,
170.

[81] USSC: US v.
Watson (1976) 423 US 411, 424 ["There is no indication in
this record that [the suspect] was a newcomer to the law"];
Stein v. New York (1953) 346 US 156, 185
["What would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be
utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal."];
Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 US 707, 726
["He was a 16½-year-old juvenile with considerable experience with
the police."]. CAL: P v. Krebs (2019) 8 C5 265, 305
["We should not forget that defendant was a grown man, experienced
with the criminal justice system, physically healthy"];
P v. Parker (2017) 2 C5 1184, 1216 ["Defendant, moreover,
had extensive prior experience with the criminal justice system,
having been arrested and pleaded guilty to felonies in three
previous cases before being interrogated in this case."];
P v. Winbush (2017) 2 C5 402, 453 ["Despite his youth,
defendant had extensive experience with the criminal justice
system, beginning in his early teens."];
P v. Cunningham (2015) 61 C4 609, 644[defendant had "served
two prior prisoner terms and one prior county jail term"];
P v. Vance (2010) 188 CA4 1182, 1211
["defendant was hardly a terrified novice"]; P v.
Williams (2010) 49 C4 405, 443 ["He had experience in the
criminal justice system"]; P v. Coffman (2004) 34 C4
1, 58-59 ["given Marlow's maturity and criminal experience (he was
over 30 years old and a convicted felon at the time of the
interrogation) it was unlikely Marlow's will was thereby
overborne"]; P v. Boyette (2002) 29 C4 381, 412
["given defendant's prior felony convictions, we cannot conclude
he was unfamiliar with the legal system"]; P v.
Sapp (2003) 31 C4 240, 456 [defendant was "well-acquainted
with the criminal justice system"]; P v.
Farnam (2002) 28 C4 107, 182 [defendant "had been arrested
a number of times as a juvenile"]; P v.
Jablonski (2006) 37 C4 774, 815 ["extensive criminal
history"]; P v. Coffman (2004) 34 C4 1, 58-59 [a
convicted felon); In re Aven S. (1991) 1 CA4 69, 77 ["The
minor, while young, was experienced in the ways of the juvenile
justice system."]; P v. Sapp (2003) 31 C4
240, 456 ["well-acquainted with the criminal justice system"];
P v. Jablonski (2006) 37 C4 774, 815
["extensive criminal history"]; In re Norman H. (1976) 64
CA3 997, 1002 [15-years old, IQ of 47, but he knew "he did not
have to speak to police unless he wanted to"]. OTHER:
US v. Jacobs 6C 2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 2661363] ["Jacobs
is sophisticated enough that Detective Agee's conduct wouldn't
have overborne his will. Unsurprisingly, the more intelligent,
mature, experienced, or educated the suspect is, the more likely
he is to be able to resist pressure during an interrogation."];
US v. Richardson (7C 2011) 657 F3 521, 525
[court notes the suspect's "frequent-flyer status with the
criminal justice system—evidenced by his career offender status"];
US v. Vinton (8C 2011) 631 F3 476, 483 ["A
history of interaction with the criminal justice system supports
an inference that an interviewee is familiar with his
constitutional rights and that his statements to the police are
voluntary."]; US v. Chaney (1C 2011) 647 F3
401, 408 ["It is reasonable to infer that a veteran of the
criminal justice system will be less likely than most to be
intimidated by the agents' show of force."].

[82] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Williams (1997) 16 C4 635. 659. USSC: Stein
v. New York (1953) 346 US 156, 185-86 ["These men
were not young, soft, ignorant or timid. They were not
inexperienced in the ways of crime"].

[83] CAL: P v. Duff (2014) 58 C4
527, 556 ["it appears Duff confessed to shooting Riley and Hagan
not because his will was overborne, but because he was capable of
making, and made, the rational choice to offer his side of events,
in which he shot Riley and Hagan in self-defense, rather than out
of a premeditated desire to obtain revenge for pas slights"];
P v. Guerra (2006) 37 C4 1067, 1096 ["Defendant then
decided to speak with the detectives, in an effort, the record
indicates, to clear himself of suspicion."]; P v.
Thompson (1990) 50 C3 134, 169-70 [suspect's willingness to
continue the interview after officers offered to end it indicates
he did not feel coerced]; P v. Holloway (2004) 33 C4
96. 114 ["Aware his alibi had collapsed, he wanted to tell the
detectives why he had asked Cruz to lie about his whereabouts."];
P v. Bradford (1997) 14 C4 1005, 1041 ["The tapes
clearly indicate an eagerness to talk all right, and just tell
everything that probably could be told"]; P v.
Mickey (1991) 54 C3 612, 650 ["it was generally defendant
who was active and [the officers] who were passive: he opened the
discussion and directed its course"]; P v.
Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563, 581 [suspect "sought out the
police to talk to them, rather than vice versa, as is usually the
case"]; In re Brian W. (1981) 125 CA3 590, 601 [suspect
gave "three prior statements that he wanted to talk to the
officers"]; P v. Maury (2003) 30 C4 342, 412.
OTHER: US v. Jacobs (6C 2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL
2661363] ["the timeline and substance of the interview suggest
that Jacobs confessed because of the strength of the evidence
against him and the prospect of a long sentence—not because of any
coercive conduct"]; US v. Medunjanin (2C 2014) 752 F3 576,
588 ["Medunjanin was eager to speak with the agents]; US
v. Richardson (7C 2011) 657 F3 521, 525 [the suspect
"eagerly shared" his criminal activities]. COMPARE:
Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 401
["the undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey wanted
not to answer Detective Hust"]; P v.
Esqueda (1993) 17 CA4 1450, 1486 ["Esqueda really did not
want to talk"]; Doody v. Ryan (9C 2011) 649
F3 986, 1011 ["Doody was virtually non-responsive despite being
peppered with a barrage of questions, exhortations, and
commands."].

[84] CAL: P v.
Richardson (2008) 43 C4 959, 993 [defendant's invocation of
his Miranda right to counsel is "contrary to his
characterization of himself as a helpless, easily confused
naïf"]. OTHER: US v. Boskic (1C 2008)
545 F3 69, 81 [suspect's subsequent refusal to give a written
statement reflects "an understanding of his right not to cooperate
or talk"].

[85] USSC: Gallegos v.
Colorado (1962) 370 US 49, 55 ["There is no guide to the
decision in cases such as this [defendant was 14 years old],
except the totality of circumstances"]; Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 226 ["Some of the
factors taken into account have included the youth of the
accused"]; Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 US
707, 725 ["juvenile's age" is relevant]; Haley v.
Ohio (1947) 332 US 596, 599 ["What transpired would make us
pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when,
as here, a mere child [15 years old]—an easy victim of the law—is
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be
used."]. CAL: P v. Delgado (2018) 27 CA5 1092, 1107
[16-year old "presents as a mature and savvy youth; he never
appears cowed or browbeaten."]; In re Joseph H. (2015) 237
CA4 517, 553-54. ["Admissions and confessions of juveniles require
special caution, and courts must use special care in scrutinizing
the record to determine whether a minor's custodial confession is
voluntary."]; In re Aven S. (1991) 1 CA4 69, 75
[interrogation is "likely to have a more coercive effect on a
child than an adult"]; re Jessie L. (1982) 131 CA3 202, 215
["The admissibility of such a statement depends not upon his age
alone but a combination of that factor with other circumstances
such as his intelligence, education, experience, and ability to
comprehend the meaning and effect of his statements."];
P v. Boyette (2002) 29 C4 381, 412 [youth is a
relevant factor]; P v. Johnson (1969) 70 C2 469, 479
["[Minority] alone would not invalidate a confession knowingly and
intelligently made but it is relevant to the question of his
maturity and awareness of rights."]. 9th CIR: Doody
v. Ryan (9C 2011) 649 F3 986, 1016.

[86] USSC: Yarborough v.
Alvarado (2004) 541 US 652, 668 [suspect's
intelligence was relevant]. CAL:
In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 CA4 517, 535 [although the minor
"suffers from ADHD and other mental disabilities," but it
"is not evidence that Joseph was, in fact, suggestible or
confused."]; P v. Thomas (2012) 211 CA4 987, 1013
["Although Satterwhite, who was 15 years of age during the
interview, was young, according to Dr. Friedman he was only mildly
mentally retarded. The record shows he earned his high school
diploma in 2007 while in custody."]; P v.
Richardson (2008) 43 C4 959, 993 [although suspect's IQ was
73, his responses during questioning did not indicate "mental
defect"]; P v. Anthony J. (1980) 107 CA3 962
[suspect was 16-years old "functioning as an 11-year old, thinking
in concrete, not abstract terms," had a "borderline normal IQ,"
and "could not simultaneously handle several variables, such as
the Miranda warnings"; but his statement was voluntary
mainly because "there were no promises of lenient treatment, nor
an unduly long interrogation"]; In re Brian W. (1981) 125
CA3 590 [statement of 15-year old boy was voluntary even though he
had an IQ of 80 and the understanding of a 10-year old; "There was
no atmosphere of coercion, no prolonged questioning or coercive
tactics, no threats or promises of leniency. He was not
threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver by any promise of the
police."]; P v. Kelly (1990) 51 C3 931, 951-54
["defendant's low intelligence and psychiatric symptoms, standing
alone, do not render his waiver of Miranda rights
involuntary"]; In re Norman H.,(1976) 64 CA3 997, 1003
["Here although defendant's intelligence was very low, there is no
showing whatever that he truly did not want to talk, or that his
desire was in any way overcome by reason of the police or anyone
else taking unfair or unlawful advantage of his ignorance, mental
condition, or vulnerability to persuasion."]. OTHER:
US v. Montgomery (7C 2009) 555 F3 623, 632 ["[Borderline
intelligence] alone does not result in a finding of coercion."];
US v. Lamy (10C 2008) 521 F3 1257, 1262
[below average intelligence but "capable of understanding the
agents' questions"]. NOTE: As for criminals who are simply
not too bright, the New Jersey Supreme Court said: "It is
consonant with good morals, and the Constitution, to exploit a
criminal's ignorance or stupidity in the detectional process. This
must be so if Government is to succeed in its primary mission to
protect the first right of the individual to live free from
criminal attack." State v. McKnight (N.J
1968) 243 A2 240, 250-51

[87] USSC: Blackburn v.
Alabama (1960) 361 US 199, 207 [suspect was "insane"].

[88] CAL: P v.
Spears (1991) 228 CA3 1, 27-28 ["emotionally distraught"
but no evidence of coercion]; P v.
Richardson (2008) 43 C4 959, 993 [defendant was not
distraught but, instead, "became increasingly agitated as he was
caught in one lie after another"]; P v.
Gurley (1972) 23 CA3 536, 541-42 [consent voluntary even
though the suspect was emotionally distraught because his wife had
just died from an overdose]; P v. Hogan (1982) 31 C3
815, 839 ["Appellant was sobbing uncontrollably throughout his
statement and vomited."]; P v. Hinds (1984) 154 CA3
222, 238 [suspect was "distraught and remorseful; on several
occasions during the interrogation he broke down and sobbed"];
P v. Esqueda (1993) 17 CA4 1450, 1485
["Esqueda was emotionally distraught and exhausted, yet [the
officers] unremittingly pressured their prey until he finally
yielded."]; P v. Boyde (1988) 46 C3 212, 240
["The evidence does not indicate Boyde was so distraught that his
will to resist confession was overborne."]. 9th CIR:
Henry v. Kernan (9C 1999) 197 F3 1021, 1027
["Throughout his interrogation, petitioner was shaken, confused,
and frightened, crying in parts and frequently asking for
forgiveness."]. OTHER: US v. Duran (7C
1992) 957 F2 499, 503 ["absent a showing that her emotional
distress was so profound as to impair her capacity for
self-determination or understanding of what the police were
seeking, it is not enough to tip the balance towards finding that
her consent was involuntary."].

[89] USSC: US v.
Mendenhall (1980) 446 US 544, 558 ["respondent, who was 22
years old and had an 11th-grade education, was plainly capable of
a knowing consent"]; Yarborough v. Alvarado
(2004) 541 US 652, 668 [relevant circumstances include the
suspect's education] Davis v.
North Carolina (1966) 384 US 737, 742 ["a third of fourth
grade education"]; Reck v. Pate (1961) 367 US
433, 435 ["He dropped out of school at the age of 16]. CAL:
P v. Neal (2003) 31 C4 63, 84; P v.
Sanchez (1969) 70 C2 562, 573 ["only a fifth or sixth grade
education"]; P v. Williams (1984) 157 CA3 145, 152
["Although undereducated and virtually illiterate ... Williams was
neither insane not incompetent when questioned."]. OTHER:
US v. Vinton (8C 2011) 631 F3 476, 482
["Although lack of education and lower-than-average intelligence
are factors in the voluntariness analysis, they do not dictate a
finding of involuntariness, particularly when the suspect is
clearly intelligent enough to understand his constitutional
rights."].

[90] CAL: P v.
Perdomo (2007) 147 CA4 605, 617 ["Nothing on the tape shows
appellant's thinking was impaired by the medications."];
P v. Cox (1990) 221 CA3 980 [suspect was apparently
under the influence of meth but the questioning was "short and
simple"]; P v. Weaver (2001) 26 C4 876, 921
["the mere fact defendant was taking medication prescribed by the
prison medical staff is insufficient to establish a claim of
involuntariness"]; P v. Garcia (1964) 227 CA2 345,
350-51 ["the fact that the defendant was under the influence of a
narcotic did not necessarily preclude the giving of a voluntary
consent"]; P v. Brewer (2000) 81 CA4 442, 456
[suspect was under the influence of marijuana; no coercion];
P v. Maury (2003) 30 C4 342, 411 ["absent state
coercion, defendant cannot complain that any self-induced
intoxication rendered his statements involuntary"].
9th CIR: US v. Heller (9C 2009) 551 F3
1108, 1113 ["there is no other evidence to suggest that the type,
dosage, or timing of the Tylenol III influenced Heller's will to
resist questioning."]; US v. Coleman (9C
2000) 208 F3 786, 791 ["Although Defendant's heroin withdrawal
caused lethargy and physical discomfort, such symptoms alone are
insufficient to establish involuntariness."]. OTHER:
US v. Taylor (2C 2013) 736 F3 661, 670 [statement
involuntary because "Taylor was in and out of consciousness while
giving his statement, and in a trance or a stupor most of the time
when not actually asleep. Thus, the officers' persistent
questioning took undue advantage of Taylor's diminished mental
state, and ultimately overbore his will."]; US v.
Montgomery (6C 2010) 621 F3 558, 571 [although a shooting
victim had been given morphine, his consent was voluntary mainly
because a nurse testified that he "remained alert and oriented"
and that the morphine "did not affect [his] ability to answer
questions"].

[91] OTHER: US v. Mercado (7C
2020) 53 F4 1071, 1087 [expert testified that "Mercado's regular
use of an ounce of marijuana per week likely caused him to develop
a tolerance for it"].

[92] USSC: Mincey v.
Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 398 ["[Mincey] had been
seriously wounded [shot] just a few hours earlier, and had arrived
at the hospital depressed almost to the point of coma" and he
"complained to [the officer] that the pain in his leg was
'unbearable.'"]; Reck v. Pate (1961) 367 US
433, 441-42 ["He was physically weakened and in intense pain."].
CAL: P v. Adams (1983) 143 CA3 970, 985
[suspect was "feeling very weak and her chest was very tight"];
P v. Barker (1986) 182 CA3 921, 934 [although
the suspect was in "severe pain" from a bullet wound, it did not
appear that he was suffering from pain severe enough to impair his
ability to make a voluntary confession]; P v.
Perdomo (2007) 147 CA4 605, 612 [statement not involuntary
merely because defendant, who had been severely injured in a car
accident four days earlier, was in "obvious pain" and was possibly
under the influence of morphine]; In re Walker (1974) 10 C3
764, 777 ["such pain does not appear from the officers' testimony
to have reflected on his competency"]. OTHER:
US v. Cash (10C 2013) 733 F3 1264, 1282 [the officer
"testified that Mr. Cash did not appear injured or confused during
the conversation" following a fight]; US v. Siddiqui (2C
2012) 699 F3 690, 707 ["Siddiqui was lucid and able to engage the
agents in coherent conversation despite the pain attendant to her
injury."].

[93] OTHER: US v. Richards (7C
2014) 741 F3 843, 849 [consenting person appeared to have "all his
mental faculties about him"].

[94] USSC: Spano v.
New York (1959) 360 US 315, 322 ["slowly mounting fatigue
does, and is calculated to, play its part"]; Haley
v. Ohio 1947) 332 US 596, 598 ["Beginning shortly
after midnight this 15-year-old lad was questioned by the police
for about five hours."]. CAL: P v. Hensley (2014) 59
C4 788, 814 ["his responses were coherent and responsive"];
P v. Montano (1991) 226 CA3 914, 936 ["his
pleas of fatigue and lack of sleep [were] ignored"].
9th CIR: Doody v. Ryan (9C 2011) 649
F3 986, 1012 ["sleep deprived" juvenile]. OTHER: US
v. Holmes (4C 2012) 670 F3 586, 592 ["But even if
Holmes was tired on the day of his interrogation, suppression is
not required every time a defendant has a diminished mental
state."]. COMPARE: P v. Anderson (1990) 52 C3
453, 470 ["Although he testified that he had been awake for 30
hours prior to confessing, other facts support a finding of
voluntariness, including his age at the time of the offense (27),
his high IQ (136), and his reflective actions during the course of
the offenses charged, including the careful and methodical way in
which he obtained entry into [the victim's] house only a few hours
prior to his confession."].

[95] USSC: Bobby v.
Dixon (2011) 565 US 23, 29 ["he received several breaks"].
CAL: P v. Peoples (2016) 62 C4 718, 741 [Ten hour
interview but defendant "was given numerous breaks, drinks, and
food"]; P v. Cunningham (2015) 61 C4 609, 644 ["the initial
interview was spread over a four-hour period with the detectives
offering defendant both food and drink"];
P v. Linton (2013) 56 C4 1146, 1178 [two hour and 15 minute
interview, "multiple breaks were taken"]; P v.
Hill (1992) 3 C4 959, 981 [the interview was conducted in
five sessions with breaks between them that "were not of
insignificant duration."]; P v.
Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 175 [8-hour interview but
defendant "spoke with confidence, and her answers were coherent.
Moreover, the police repeatedly offered defendant food and
beverages, provided her with four separate breaks"]; P v.
Rundle (2008) 43 C4 76, 123 [no evidence that officers
"exploited the slowly mounting fatigue resulting from prolonged
questioning"]; P v. Jablonski (2006) 37 C4
774, 815 ["the interrogation was spread over a four-hour period
from midmorning to midafternoon with a refreshment break and a
lunch break"]; P v. Simpson (1991) 2 CA4 228,
233 [three to four hour interrogation "was not extraordinarily
lengthy"]. 9th CIR: Clark v.
Murphy (9C 2003) 331 F3 1062, 1073 [eight-hour interview,
but the conduct of the officers was "unimpeachable" and the
suspect "never asked for food or water, or to use the
facilities"]. OTHER: Williams v.
Norris (8C 2009) 576 F3 850, 868-69 ["Questioning a suspect
for thirteen hours is not unconstitutional per se, particularly
when a crime victim has disappeared and may still be alive.
Williams received a two-hour respite during the car trip, several
breaks, and food, water and cigarettes."]; Martin
v. Wainwright (11C 1985) 770 F2 918, 927 ["Martin
was questioned off and on rather than continuously, and fatigue
does not appear to have been a factor in Martin's decision to
confess."]; US v. Ross (7C 2007) 510 F3 702,
710 ['The entire interview lasted five hours but Ross's confession
came within ten to fifteen minutes after inspectors initiated
questioning"]. OTHER: US v.
Dehghani (8C 2008) 550 F3 716, 721 ["the interrogation
lasted approximately five and a half hours, which is not
sufficient to render the confession involuntary per se"].
COMPARE: Blackburn v. Alabama (1960)
361 US 199, 204 ["the examination had begun at approximately one
o'clock in the afternoon and had continued until ten or eleven
o'clock that evening, with about an hour's break for dinner."];
P v. Esqueda (1993) 17 CA4 1450, 1485
[intensive eight-hour interview of suspect who "had been drinking
and was obviously distraught"]; Doody v.
Ryan (9C 2011) 649 F3 986, 1012 ["nearly thirteen-hour
interrogation of a sleep-deprived juvenile"].

[96] CAL: P v.
Dykes (2009) 46 C4 731, 753 [two-hour wait because
investigating officer was out of town];
In re Aven. S. (1991) 1 CA4 69, 77 ["[An officer] checked
on the minor periodically."]. OTHER: Hardaway
v. Young (7C 2002) 302 F3 757, 767 ["If we were a
state appellate court, we might well find that on balance the
psychological tension caused by leaving a boy of 14 alone in an
interview room [for eight hours], hungry, scared, and tired, was
enough to exclude the confession."].

[97] QUOTE FROM:
Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 US 157, 164. CAL:
P v. Krebs (2019) 8 C5 265, 301 [no motivating cause since
defendant had acknowledged that he confessed because the victim's
blood was found in his car, and that he had learned of the blood
before the questioning which he claimed was coercive];
P v. Maury (2003) 30 C4 342, 404-405 ["The statement and
the inducement must be causally linked."];
P v. McCurdy (2014) 59 C4 1063, 1088 [although the deputy
impliedly promised leniency, "nothing in the record suggests that
was defendant's motivation to speak with the officers"];
P v. Williams (2010) 49 C4 405, 437 ["A confession is not
involuntary unless the coercive police conduct and the defendant's
statement are causally related."]; P v. Tully (2012) 54 C4
952, 986 ["the statements were gratuitous and untethered to any
promise made by [the officer]."]; P v. Rundle (2008) 43 C4
76, 114 ["Coercive police tactics by themselves do not render a
defendant's statements involuntary if the defendant's free will
was not in fact overborne by the coercion and his decision to
speak instead was based upon some other consideration."];
P v. Benson (1990) 52 C3 754, 778-79 ["The requisite causal
connection between promise and confession must be more than 'but
for': causation-in-fact is insufficient."];
P v. Jones (2017) 7 CA5 787, 813 [significant time lapse
between implied promise of leniency]. OTHER:
US v. Prigmore (6C 2021) 15 F4 768, 779 ["coercive police
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confessions is not voluntary"]; Miller v. Fenton (3C 1986)
796 F2 598, 604 [the test "is not a but-for test: we do not ask
whether the confession would have been made in the absence of the
interrogation. Few criminals feel impelled to confess to the
police purely of their own accord, without any questioning at
all"]. COMPARE: P v. Neal (2003) 31 C4 63, 84 [the
evidence "indicates that [the officer's] misconduct played the
dominant role, with defendant"].

[98] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Mickey (1991) 54 C3 612, 650. CAL:
P v. Krebs (2019) 8 C5 265, 303 [defendant acknowledged
that "he confessed because the police had recovered blood from his
vehicle's seat"]; P v. Cunningham (2015) 61 C4 609, 644
["defendant indicated several times that, for various personal
reasons, he had decided beforehand to talk to the detectives"];
P v. Bradford (1997) 14 C4 1005, 1041 [Trial court:
"The tapes clearly indicate an eagerness to talk all right, and
just tell everything that probably could be told"]; P
v. Guerra (2006) 37 C4 1067, 1097 [defendant
testified he made a statement because of his fear of officers in
his native Guatemala; this circumstance, said the court,
"established only that his 'pressure' sprang from within
himself"—not from the officers].

[99] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Benson (1990) 52 C3 754, 782. CAL: P
v. Ray (1996) 13 C4 313, 341 [suspect's objective
appears to have been a desire "to atone for his life of crime"].

[100] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Rundle (2008) 43 C4 76, 117. CAL:
P v. Linton (2013) 56 C4 1146, 1177 ["The record reflects
that defendant wanted to tell [the officers] about the killing"].

[101] CAL: P v. Storm (2002) 28
C4 1007, 1035-36 ["there seems no doubt that defendant's statement
stemmed not from police coercion but from his own troubled
conscience, his assumption he would inevitably be caught, and a
desire to minimize his culpability"]; P v. Jones (2017) 7
CA5 787, 814 ["Given that Jones continued to minimize his role in
the shootings throughout the interview, the record does not
support his claim that deceptive tactics used by the detectives
resulted in an unreliable confession."].

[102] CAL: P v. Linton (2013)
56 C4 1146, 1177 ["When [the officer] promised leniency to
defendant, defendant did not immediately respond by admitting his
sexual interest in or sexual conduct with Melissa, which would
have reflected his reliance on such a promise."]; P
v. Scott (2011) 52 C4 452, 480 [statement was not
causally related to alleged promise because, among other things,
it was made after a break and during questioning by a different
officers]; P v. Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145,
170 [one hour delay]; P v. Thompson (1990) 50 C3
134, 169 ["defendant did not make his incriminating statements
until several hours after the conversation had turned [to other
subjects]"]; P v. Coffman (2004) 34 C4 1, 58
[a "considerable period"]; P v. Wall (2017) 3 C5 1048, 1067
["Before the detective [made his implied promise of leniency],
Wall had already begun to tell the detectives about [the
murders]"]; P v. Cahill (1994) 22 CA4 296, 316
["several hours"]; P v. Johns (1983) 145 CA3
281, 293 [four day lapse]; P v.
Williams (2010) 49 C4 405, 445 ["he continued to deny
responsibility in the second interview"].

[103] CAL: P v. Linton (2013)
56 C4 1146, 1172 ["the record does not establish that at the time
defendant waived his Miranda rights he was doing so based
on an understanding that [the officers] had earlier promised him
that he would not be subject to the death penalty"]; P
v. Dykes (2009) 46 C4 731, 753 ["there is no
indication of police exploitation of" defendants young age and
inexperience with police]; P v. Smith (2007)
40 C4 483, 502 ["The record does not convince us that the
interrogating officers were aware of, or exploited, defendant's
claimed psychological vulnerabilities"]; In re
Norman H. (1976) 64 CA3 997, 1003 [there was no showing
that his power of resistance "was in any way overcome"];
In re Brian W. (1981) 125 CA3 590, 603 [re the questioning
of a 15-year old boy, "there was no atmosphere of coercion, no
prolonged questioning or coercive tactics, no threats or promises
of leniency"]. OTHER: Hardaway v.
Young (7C 2002) 302 F3 757, 765 [courts should exercise
caution "when it appears the officer or agent has attempted to
take advantage of the suspect's youth"]; US v.
Hughes (1C 2011) 640 F3 428, 439 [suspect's panic attack
did not render the subsequent interview involuntary because "at
the first sign of distress, the troopers halted their questioning,
fetched a wet cloth as the defendant requested, and summoned
medical assistance"].

[104] CAL: P v.
Williams (1997) 16 C4 635, 661 [suspect made the
incriminating statement inadvertently; i.e., a "slipup"];
P v. Thompson (1990) 50 C3 134, 169 [the suspect
"twice declined the interrogators' suggestion that the discussion
stop"; "From this fact the trial court concluded, and reasonably
so, that defendant's incriminating statements were not induced by
any implied threat or promise made hours earlier."]; P v.
Badgett (1995) 10 C4 330, 354, fn.6 ["The trial record
indicates that Jasik decided to cooperate with the police while
she was in jail because of a discussion she had with her mother,
and not because of any discussion Jasik had with the authorities
about her release"].

[105] CAL: P v.
Sanchez (1969) 70 C2 562, 574 ["there is a presumption that
the influences of the prior improper treatment continues to
operate on the mind of the defendant"]; P v.
Johnson (1969) 70 C2 541, 547 ["Where an accused makes one
confession and then testifies or upon subsequent questioning again
confesses, it is presumed that the testimony or second confession
is the product of the first."]; P v. Brommel (1961)
56 C2 629, 634 ["The subsequent confessions and admissions
followed almost immediately in time upon the first"].

[106] QUOTE FROM: P v.
McElheny (1982) 137 CA3 396, 402. CAL: P
v. McWhorter (2009) 47 C4 318, 360 ["sufficient
indices of attenuation" include (1) defendant was properly
Mirandized, (2) second statement was made more than a week
after the first statement, (3) officers who obtained the second
statement were not the same as the officers who obtained the first
statement, (4) the officers who obtained the second statement
"made no attempt to exploit any information obtained in the first
statement," and (5) defendant's "maturity and ability to again
handle himself in a fashion that reflects maturity and
sophistication and articulation served to cleanse any taint," and
(6) the second statement "was furnished in an effort to recant his
earlier confession."]; P v. Badgett (1995) 10 C4
330, 348 ["it falls to the People to demonstrate, in the case of
successive confessions or statements, that the 'taint' of the
first, involuntary statement has been attenuated"]; P v.
Montano (1991) 226 CA3 914, 937 [prosecution must prove
"the connection between the [tainted] first interrogation and the
[subsequent statement] has become so attenuated as to dissipate
the taint"]; P v. Douglas (1990) 50 C3 468,
505 [taint of coercive questioning by Mexican police that produced
a confession was dissipated when suspect was turned over to US
authorities to whom he gave a second confession].

[107] USSC: Kansas v.
Ventris (2009) 556 US 586, 590 [the Fifth Amendment "is
violated whenever a truly coerced confession is introduced at
trial, whether by way of impeachment or otherwise"];
Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 US 344,
351 ["We have mandated the exclusion of reliable and probative
evidence for all purposes only when it is derived from
involuntary statements."]; Blackburn v.
Alabama (1960) 361 US 199, 210; Mincey v.
Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 398; New Jersey
v. Portash (1979) 440 US 450, 459. CAL:
P v. Peevy (1998) 17 C4 1184, 1193;
P v. Benson (1990) 52 C3 754, 778; P v.
Andersen (1980) 101 CA3 563, 574; P v.
Adams (1983) 143 CA3 970, 984; P v.
Vasila (1995) 38 CA4 865, 873; P v.
Ditson (1962) 57 C2 415, 436. NOTE: A conviction
will not automatically be reversed if it was based in part on an
involuntary statement by the defendant; instead, California courts
now apply the federal "harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt"
standard. Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 US
279, 303; P v. Cahill (1993) 5 C4 478, 510.

[108] USSC: Michigan v.
Tucker (1974) 417 US 433, 448, fn.23 ["Thus a State which
has obtained a coerced or involuntary statement cannot argue for
its admissibility on the ground that other evidence demonstrates
its truthfulness."]; Rochin v.
California (1952) 342 US 165, 173 [coerced confessions "are
inadmissible under the Due Process clause even though statements
contained in them may be independently established as true."];
Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 US 534, 544
[the determination of voluntariness is "to be answered with
complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the
truth"]; Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 361 US
199, 206 ["we have rejected the argument that introduction of an
involuntary confession is immaterial where other evidence
establishes guilt or corroborates the confession"]. CAL:
P v. Ditson (1962) 57 C2 415, 437 [the US
Supreme Court has given "no consideration" to the issue "of
whether or not the confession was trustworthy"]. NOTE: In
P v. Ray (1996) 13 C4 313, 340 the court
said, "The courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys
which, under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend
to produce a statement that is both involuntary and
unreliable." Emphasis added. As noted, the US Supreme Court has
ruled otherwise; i.e., that involuntary statements will be
suppressed regardless of their reliability.

[109] CAL: P v.
Atchley (1959) 53 C2 160, 170 ["All these reasons for
excluding involuntary confessions apply to involuntary admissions
as well."]; P v. Leach (1985) 41 C3 92, 103
["we assume it to be immaterial that Linda's statement was not a
confession"].

[110] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Badgett (1995) 10 C4 330, 348. CAL:
P v. Smith (2018) 4 C5 1134, 1169-70 ["the case law fails
to support defendant's premise that a third party witness's
statements are rendered inadmissible against a defendant if
induced by improper offers of leniency,", quoting
P v. Ervin (2000) 22 C4 48, 83, 91]; P v.
Boyer (2006) 38 C4 412, 444 ["the defendant must
demonstrate how such misconduct, if any, has directly impaired the
free and voluntary nature of the anticipated testimony in the
trial itself"]; P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 968;
P v. Douglas (1990) 50 C3 468, 500
["defendant can prevail on his suppression claim only if he can
show that the trial testimony given by Hernandez was involuntary
at the time it was given"]; P v. Lee (2002)
95 CA4 772, 788 ["defendant must show some connection between the
coercion and the evidence"]; In re Jessie L. (1982) 131 CA3
202, 209; P v. Lee (2002) 95 CA4 772, 781;
In re J. Clyde K. (1987) 192 CA3 710, 716 ["the minors may
seek exclusion of the confession and tainted fruits on the basis
of an involuntary confession by another"].

[111] CAL: P v.
Badgett (1995) 10 C4 30, 354 ["All immunized witnesses are
offered some quid pro quo, usually an offer of leniency. We have
never held, nor has any authority been offered in support of the
proposition, that an offer of leniency in return for cooperation
with the police renders a third party statement involuntary or
eventual trial testimony coerced."]; P v.
Daniels (1991) 52 C3 815, 863 ["There is nothing improper
in confronting a suspect with the predicament he or she is in or
with an offer to refrain from prosecuting the suspect if the
witness will cooperate with the police investigation."].

[112] USSC: Michigan v.
Harvey (1990) 494 US 344, 351 ["We have mandated the
exclusion of reliable and probative evidence for
all purposes only when it is derived from involuntary
statements."]. CAL: P v. Vasila (1995) 38 CA4
865, 877 ["the weapons should have been suppressed as the fruits
of an unlawful interrogation"]; In re
J. Clyde K. (1987) 192 CA3 710, 716-18; P v.
Whitfield (1996) 46 CA4 947, 955; P v.
Nicholas (1980) 112 CA3 249, 264; P v.
Ditson (1962) 57 C2 415, 439.

[113] CAL: P v.
Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 968.

[114] USSC: Colorado v.
Connelly (1986) 479 US 157, 167 ["coercive police activity
is a necessary predicate"]. CAL: P v.
Smith (2007) 40 C4 483, 502 ["a confession must result from
coercive state activity before it may be considered involuntary"].
9th CIR: Mickey v. Ayers (9C 2010) 606
F3 1223, 1234 [no suppression without "coercive police activity"].

[115] CAL: P v.
Edelbacher (1989) 47 C3 983, 1005; P v.
Simpson (1991) 2 CA4 228, 232; P v.
Torrez (1987) 188 CA3 723, 730-31; P v.
Jimenez (1978) 21 C3 595, 604.

[116] USSC: Lego v.
Twomey (1972) 404 US 477, 489. CAL: P
v. Sapp (2003) 31 C4 240, 455 ["Under federal
standards, the prosecution must demonstrate the voluntariness of a
confession by a preponderance of the evidence. California courts
use this standard for crimes committed after the June 8, 1982
enactment of [Proposition 8]."]; P v.
Cahill (1994) 22 CA4 296, 310 ["Since in this case the
homicide occurred after enactment of [Proposition 8], the
voluntariness of the statements must be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence."]; P v. Rundle (2008) 43 C4
76, 114 ["the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the statements were, in fact, voluntary"];
In re Aven S. (1991) 1 CA4 69, 75 [preponderance of the
evidence standard applies if the defendant was a juvenile].
NOTE: To establish the voluntariness of a statement by a
third person, the prosecution's burden is also preponderance of
the evidence. See P v. Leach (1985) 41 C3 92,
104.

[117] USSC: Jackson v.
Denno (1964) 378 US 368.