Chapter 48: Questioning Accomplices (Aranda-Bruton)
Generally
The legal issue: When officers question a suspect who gives a statement that incriminates an accomplice, the statement may, of course, be considered by officers in establishing probable cause to arrest or search the accomplice.[1] The statement may not, however, be used against the accomplice at trial if the suspect and accomplice are tried together, except under the circumstances discussed in this chapter.[2]
Purpose of rule: The main reasons are (1) the suspect's out-of-court statement is inherently unreliable because criminals routinely try to shift blame onto their accomplices; and (2) the accomplice would be unable to test the suspect's reliability via cross-examination at a joint trial because the suspect will probably not testify.[3]
Why it matters to officers: If officers know how the rule works, they may be able to obtain a special type of statement from the suspect that would be admissible against the declarant at a joint trial. Actually, there are two types of such statements—known as "Aranda statements" and "adoptive admissions"—which are discussed below.
Importance of joint trials: It is well worth the time and effort for officers to seek an Aranda Statement or adoptive admission because joint trials "conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities,"[4] and "generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative culpability."[5]
Terminology: The following terms are used in this chapter:
Declarant: The "declarant" is the suspect who made the statement.
Accomplice: The "accomplice" is the suspect who was incriminated by the declarant's statement.
Types of Admissible Statements
: There are five types of statements by declarants that may be admissible at a joint trial:
"Aranda statements"
Defined: An "Aranda statement" is a taped or written statement in which the declarant (1) explained only his role in planning and carrying out the crime, and (2) said nothing to suggest that he even had an accomplice.[6] Aranda statements are often admitted in joint trials because they prejudice only the declarant and, furthermore, the declarant can testify at the joint trial and explain why the accomplice was lying.
Practice note: An officer who takes an Aranda statement will usually start by obtaining a full statement in which the declarant describes the roles of all perpetrators. Then the officer will ask the declarant to give a second statement (the Aranda statement) that covers only the declarant's role in the crime; e.g., "I did this .... Then this …." Note, however, that obtaining Aranda statements can be frustrating because suspects tend to revert to the "and then we . . ." mode. When this happens, officers might try to get the declarant to make another attempt and, if that fails, prosecutors may be able to convert the statement into an "Arandized" statement.
Adoptive admissions: The declarant's statement may be admissible at a joint trial if the accomplice essentially acknowledged it was true. These are known as "adoptive admissions" (i.e., the accomplice "adopts" the declarant's statement as true) and they usually result when the following occurs: (1) officers allowed the accomplice to hear the declarant's statement or the declarant and the accomplice were questioned together; and (2), after hearing the part of the statement that incriminated him, the accomplice acknowledged it was true ("express adoption")[7] or did not deny it ("adoption by silence").[8]
"Arandized statements"
Defined: An "Arandized" statement—also known as a "redacted" or "sanitized" statement—is a statement that originally contained information that incriminated the accomplice but which was edited (usually by prosecutors or at the direction of the trial judge) so as to eliminate all direct and indirect references to the accomplice.[9]
Officers' role: Officers have only a limited role in obtaining an Arandized statement because all of the redacting is done by prosecutors or judges.
When admissible: An Arandized statement may be admissible at a joint trial only if the statement on its face did not incriminate the accomplice.[10]
Statement later became incriminating: An Arandized statement is admissible if it incriminated the accomplice only when considered in light of circumstantial evidence that was subsequently admitted at trial.[11]
Statement more incriminating to declarant: An Arandized statement cannot be used at a joint trial if it was more incriminating to the declarant than the redacted version,[12] or if it "impliedly overstated" the declarant's role,[13] or if it undermined the declarant's credibility because it was inconsistent with other evidence that was admitted.[14]
Accomplice referred to by neutral term: In the past, Arandized statements were admissible if all references to the accomplice were replaced by a blank space or neutral term such as "deleted," "the other guy" or a personal pronoun.[15] These types of redacted statements are no longer admissible. See this endnote.[16]
Accomplice made identical statement: The declarant's statement may be admissible if the accomplice, when questioned by officers, made a statement that was substantially identical with that of the declarant.[17] Statements are not, however, identical if they were merely "interlocking"; i.e., there were certain similarities between the two. What counts is whether the accomplice expressly or impliedly acknowledged the truth of that part of the declarant's statement that incriminated the accomplice.[18]
Declarant and accomplice were co-conspirators: A statement by one co-conspirator to another is not "testimonial" and is therefore not suppressible under Aranda-Bruton.[19]
Notes
[1] USSC:
Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 US 154, 164 ["probable cause
may be founded upon hearsay"]. CAL:
P v. Navarro (2006) 138 CA4 146, 174 ["it is inappropriate
to apply the rules of evidence as a criterion to determine
probable cause"]; Humphrey v. Appellate Division (2002) 29
C4 569, 573 ["police officers may rely on hearsay (an informant's
statements) in obtaining a warrant to search for incriminating
evidence"].
[2] USSC: Bruton v.
US (1968) 391 US 123. CAL: P v.
Aranda (1965) 63 C2 518. NOTE: This rule was first
announced by the California Supreme Court in P v.
Aranda (1965) 63 C2 518. Three years later, the US Supreme
Court essentially adopted the rule as a matter of constitutional
law in Bruton v. US (1968) 391 US 128.
Consequently, in California it is commonly known as the
Aranda-Bruton Rule. ALSO SEE: P v.
Boyd (1990) 222 CA3 541, 561 ["The premise of
Aranda is essentially the same as that of Bruton"].
NOTE: Aranda-Bruton applies to both admissions and
confessions. P v. Anderson (1987) 43 C3 1104,
1123. NOTE: Aranda-Bruton also applies when the
declarant and the accomplice both make statements that, when
considered together, incriminate the accomplice because they are
inconsistent. See P v. Fulks (1980) 110 CA3
609, 617 [inconsistent statements are highly incriminating because
they "carried the unmistakable message that each was a hastily
contrived fabrication"].
[3] USSC: Bruton v. US (1968) 391
US 123, 136; Lee v. Illinois (1986) 476 US 530, 541.
CAL: P v. Burney (2009) 47 C4 204, 230.
[4] USSC: Bruton v. US (1968) 391
US 123, 134.
[5] USSC:
Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 US 200, 210.
[6] CAL: P v. Aranda (1965) 63 C2
518, 530; P v. Hajek (2014) 58 C4 1144, fn. 5 [the
Aranda/Bruton rule applies to a "nontestifying
codefendant's extrajudicial statement that inculpates the other
defendant"]; P v. Mitcham (1992) 1 C4 1027, 1047
[the officer "requested that [the declarant] provide another
statement referring solely to his own involvement in the crimes
and omitting any reference to [Mitcham]."].
[7] CAL: CALCRIM 357; Evid. Code§
1221; P v. Castille (2005) 129 CA4 863, 876 ["There
are only two requirements for the introduction of adoptive
admissions: (1) the party must have knowledge of the content of
another's hearsay statement, and (2) having such knowledge, the
party must have used words or conduct indicating his
adoption of, or his belief in, the truth of such
hearsay statement." Quoting from P v. Silva
(1988) 45 C3 604, 623]. Note: Survives Crawford:
Because an adoptive admission is, as a matter of law, a statement
by the accomplice (not the declarant), its admission into evidence
does not violate Crawford v. Washington.
P v. Castille (2005) 129 CA4 863, 877-81;
P v. Combs (2004) 34 C4 821, 842-43.
[8] CAL: P v.
Jennings (2010) 50 C4 615, 664 ["statements made by [the
declarant] that were met by defendant's silence, or by equivocal
or evasive responses on his part, properly are viewed as adoptive
admissions."]; CALCRIM 357.
[9] CAL: P v. Washington (2017)
15 CA5 19, 27 ["a trial court faced with a prosecutor's request to
admit a codefendant's confession at a joint trial must resort to
other options beyond a limiting instruction, such as redacting the
codefendant's confession in a way that both omits the defendant
but does not prejudice the codefendant"].
[10] USSC: Gray v.
Maryland (1998) 523 US 185.
[11] USSC: Richardson v.
Marsh (1987) 481 US 200, 208-9. CAL: P v.
Johnson (1989) 47 C3 1194, 1230-31; P v.
Orozco (1993) 20 CA4 1554, 1564; P v.
Mitcham (1992) 1 C4 1027, 1045-46.
[12] CAL: P v.
Douglas (1991) 234 CA3 273, 285; P v.
Tealer (1975) 48 CA3 598.
[13] CAL: P v.
Lewis (2008) 43 C4 415, 457.
[14] CAL: P v.
Stallworth (2008) 164 CA4 1079, 1096.
[15] CAL: P v.
Orozco (1993) 20 CA4 1554; P v.
Vasquez Diaz (1991) 229 CA3 1310, 1313-16; P v.
Bolden (1996) 44 CA4 707, 713-14.
[16] NOTE: Referring to the accomplice
by a neutral term (e.g., "the other guy") didn't work because
jurors would figure out that the purpose of these devices was to
hide the identity of another person—and the most likely candidate
was the declarant's codefendant. See Gray v.
Maryland (1998) 523 US 185, 193; P v.
Schmaus (2003) 109 CA4 846, 855 [Sixth Amendment violation
occurs "if references to defendant's name are merely replaced by a
symbol or by a blank space in place of defendant's name."];
P v. Burney (2009) 47 C4 203, 231 ["when,
despite redaction, a codefendant's statement obviously refers
directly to the defendant and implicates him or her in the charged
crimes, the Bruton rule applies and introduction of the
statement at a joint trial violates the defendant's rights under
the confrontation clause"]. As a result, prosecutors would delete
everything that could possibly be interpreted to mean that the
declarant had an accomplice. But this didn't work either because
it resulted in strange and awkward sentences; e.g., "Well, first
broke open, opened up the lock with bolt cutters"; "and then
opened the back of the car and got the body out and left the body
near some rocks." P v. Archer (2000) 82 CA4 1380, 1390.
Also see P v. Washington (2017) 15 CA5 19;
US v. Parks (9C 2002) 285 F3 1133, 1139 ["The combination
of an obviously redacted statement with the language implying the
existence of a third party reasonably could lead the jury to
conclude that the unnamed third party must be the codefendant
before them."]. COMPARE: US v. Javell (7C 2012) 695
F3 707, 712 ["nor did any part of the statement even reference
Javell indirectly by redacting and replacing his name with a more
innocuous phrase"].
[17] USSC: Lee v.
Illinois (1986) 476 US 530, 545 ["Obviously, when
codefendants' confessions are identical in all material respects,
the likelihood that they are accurate is significantly
increased."].
[18] USSC: Lee v.
Illinois (1986) 476 US 530, 545-46.
[19] 9th CIR: US v.
Allen (9C 2005) 425 F3 1231, 1235 ["co-conspirator
statements are not testimonial and therefore beyond the compass of
Crawford's holding"]. OTHER: US v.
Delgado (5C 2005) 401 F3 290, 299; US
Rashid (8C 2004) 383 F3 769, 777.