Appendix B: Citation Guide
Note on snippets: To reduce clutter, snippets of text from published cases are not case sensitive, and punctuation may have been deleted or modified.
Proposition 8
Pursuant to California's Proposition 8, evidence may be suppressed only if it was obtained in violation of the U.S. Constitution unless the suppression remedy was enacted in the legislature by a two-thirds vote of both houses.[1]
Binding Precedent
The rulings and other language in published appellate court opinions are binding authority as follows:
Stare Decisis: Under the doctrine of stare decisis, lower courts must accept the law as decreed by courts of superior jurisdiction.[2]
United States Supreme Court: Its decisions are binding on all California courts on questions of federal constitutional law.[3]
Plurality decisions: Not binding,[4] except as to the "position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."[5]
Overturning its own decisions: It is unlikely that the Court would overturn a previous decision by inference rather than making its intention clear.[6]
Concurring opinions: Not binding.[7]
California Supreme Court: Its decisions are binding on all California courts.[8] Plurality decisions are not binding.[9]
California Court of Appeal
Binding on Superior Courts: Published decisions of every district are binding on all superior court judges.[10]
Not binding on Court of Appeal: Justices are not required to follow the opinions of Justices in other appellate divisions or districts, although they will usually do so unless there is good reason to disagree.[11]
9th Circuit and other federal appellate courts: Not binding on California courts, but may have persuasive value.[12]
U.S. District Courts: Not binding, even as to cases decided in the same judicial district.[13]
Superior Court Appellate Departments: Not binding, but may have persuasive value.[14]
Attorney General's Opinions: Not binding, but may have persuasive value.[15]
Out-of-State Decisions: In the absence of California authority on point, courts may consider decisions from other states for their persuasive value.[16]
Binding force of the points discussed by the court: Not everything said in a published opinion is binding on other courts.[17]
Dicta
Defined: Dicta is language that was not necessary in reaching the decision.[18]
Not binding: Dicta is not binding precedent.[19] Conversely, statements that were necessary in reaching the decision are binding.[20]
But not irrelevant
Supreme Court dicta: To be considered "with deference."[21]
California Supreme Court dicta: "Highly persuasive," entitled to "great deference,"[22] but there is no obligation to follow dicta that is not compelling.[23]
California Court of Appeal dicta: May be highly persuasive, "particularly when made by an able court after careful consideration, or in the course of an elaborate review of authorities, or when it has been long followed."[24]
Footnotes: A footnote has the same force as matter in the body of the opinion.[25] However, an ambiguous statement in a footnote that is contrary to settled law should not be interpreted as a change in the law.[26]
Dissenting and concurring opinions: Statements in dissenting and concurring opinions do not constitute precedent.[27]
Inferences: Inferences from a court's discussion have no force.[28]
Consider words in context: A court's words should be considered in context.[29]
Failure to analyze: A court's ruling is not apt to be given much, in any, weight if it neglected to provide an analysis.[30]
Minute orders: Not binding.[31]
Slip opinions: A "slip" opinion is a decision that will not be published or which the decision to publish has not yet been made. Judicial decisions go through three different stages of printing: slip opinions, advance sheets, and final bound reports.[32]
Issue not raised: If an issue could have been raised but was not, this may indicate the legal profession's view that the issue does not apply under such facts.[33]
Lawfulness does not necessarily define unlawfulness: A ruling that a search was lawful does not automatically mean that searches unlike it are unlawful.[34]
Consequences of subsequent actions: The binding force of a published case may be affected by subsequent actions, as follows:
Petition for Review granted: If the California Supreme Court grants review of a published case, it remains citable authority unless it was subsequently depublished or overturned.[35]
Petition for Review denied: Denial of review of a case by the California Supreme Court is not an expression of approval, but a denial is not without significance as to the views of the members of the court.[36] Denial of review may be taken as approval of the conclusion of the Court of Appeal but not necessarily all of its reasoning.[37] Denial of review has no weight if the case conflicts with a decision of the California Supreme Court.[38]
Certiorari denied: The Supreme Court's denial of a writ of certiorari "imports no expression of opinion upon merits of the case."[39]
Nonpublication
: Nonpublished cases of the California Court of Appeal are not to be cited or considered as having precedential value.[40] The court's analysis in an unpublished opinion may, however, be properly considered for its persuasive value.[41]
Non-Binding Precedent
: In the absence of binding Supreme Court or California authority, courts may consider the decisions of the federal circuit courts to the extent that they establish a "constitutional norm" on the issue.[42]
Statutory Construction
Legislative intent: If the language of a statute is clear, legislative intent is irrelevant.[43] But if the language is subject to different interpretations, legislative intent may be considered.[44]
Considering multiple codes: Different code sections pertaining to an issue may be considered together.[45]
No Case on Point?
: Because probable cause and reasonable suspicion are usually based on a variety of circumstances, officers and prosecutors are seldom able to find a published case exactly on point.[46]
Notes
[1] CAL: P v. Hull (1995)
34 CA4 1448, 1455; P v. Brannon (1973) 32 CA3 971, 975
["Evidence obtained in violation of a statute is not inadmissible
per se unless the statutory violation also has a constitutional
dimension."]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 C3 873; P v.
May (1988) 44 C3 309; P v. Plyler (1993) 18
CA4 535, 544; P v. Deltoro (1989) 214 CA3 1417,
1423-24; P v. Rosales (1987) 192 CA3 759, 767;
P v. Banks (1990) 217 CA3 1358, 1362-63.
9th CIR: US v. Ani (9C 1998) 138 F3 390, 392
["Absent a constitutional violation or a congressionally created
remedy, violation of an agency regulation does not require
suppression of evidence."]; US v. Davis (9C 1991) 932 F3
752, 758 ["For cases arising in California, the application of
state standards would in any even prove redundant because the
California State Constitution no longer affords independent state
grounds for excluding relevant evidence."]. ALSO SEE: P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849, 880 ["Our
preoccupation with restrictions on police activity has become so
great that an impression circulates that the chief end of criminal
law is to prevent invasions by police rather than invasions by
criminals. Unquestionably, this preoccupation has led to the
release of patently guilty criminals and thereby weakened the
deterrent effect of criminal law."].
[2] CAL: Auto Equity Sales
v. Superior Court (1962) 57 C2 450, 455;
P v. Brown (1985) 169 CA3 728, 736; P v.
Lopez (1986) 176 CA3 545, 550.
[3] CAL: P v. Daan (1984)
161 CA3 22, 28; P v.
Superior Court (Williams) (1992) 8 CA4 688, 702;
Calderon v. City of Los Angeles (1971) 4 C3
251, 264; Del Monte v. Wilson (1992) 1 C4
1009, 1023; General Motors Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles (1995) 35 CA4 1736, 1749.
[4] USSC: Texas v.
Brown (1983) 460 US 730, 737 ["While not a binding
precedent, as the considered opinion of four Members of this Court
it should obviously be the point of reference for further
discussion of the issue."]; Horton v.
California (1990) 496 US 128, 136. CAL: P v.
Camilleri (1990) 220 CA3 1199, 1206 ["Reasoning that does
not command the assent of a majority of the United States Supreme
Court is not a holding."].
[5] QUOTE FROM: Marks v.
US (1977) 430 US 188, 193 ["When a fragmented Court decided
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds."]. 9th CIR: US
v. Williams (9C 2006) 435 F3 1148, 1158 ["This
narrower test—which excludes confessions made after a deliberate,
objectively ineffective midstream warning—represents
Seibert's holding."]. OTHER: US v.
Mashburn (4C 2005) 406 F3 303, 308-9; US v.
Stewart (7C 2004) 388 F3 1079, 1090; US v.
Aguilar (8C 2004) 384 F3 520, 525; US v.
Fellers (8C 2005) 397 F3 1090, 1098.
[6] USSC: Whren v. US (1996) 517
US 806, 812 ["It would, moreover, be anomalous, to say the least,
to treat a statement in a footnote in the per curiam
Bannister opinion as indicating a reversal of our prior
law"].
[7] OTHER: US v. Freeman (8C
2020) 964 F3 774, 780, fn.4. ["Though it may be persuasive, we are
not bound by a Supreme Court concurrence when it accompanies a
majority opinion."]; US v. Duvall (DCC 2013) 740 F3 604,
610.
[8] CAL: P v.
Harvey (1980) 112 CA3 132, 138; P v.
Neer (1986) 177 CA3 991, 999; P v.
Linkenauger (1995) 32 CA4 1603, 1613.
[9] CAL: P v. Ovieda (2019) 7 C5
1034, 1045] [in plurality decisions, "neither its holding nor its
reasoning constitutes binding precedent"];
Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 C4 816, 829;
Board of Supervisors v.
Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 C4 903, 918 [a
plurality opinion "lacks authority as precedent"];
Roy Supply, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (1995)
39 CA4 1051, 1067.
[10] CAL:
Hale v. Superior Court (1975) 15 C3 221, 229, fn.3;
Department of Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court (1977) 71
CA3 97, 99; P v. Superior Court (Clark) (1994) 22 CA4 1541,
1547-49.
[11] CAL:
In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 CA3 1464, 1471 ["One district
or division may refuse to follow a prior decision of a different
district or division."]; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
County of Santa Clara (1986) 187 CA3 480, 485;
McGlothlen v. DMV (1977) 71 CA3 1005, 1017;
P v. Bennett (1983) 139 CA3 767, 771; Henry
v. Associated Indemnity Corp. (1990) 217 CA3 1405,
1416.
[12] CAL: P v. Leon (2020) 8 C5
831, 844 ["Defendant's reliance on federal appellate cases is also
unavailing. The cases are not controlling precedent."];
Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 222
CA3 869, 879 ["Where the federal circuits are in conflict, the
authority of the Ninth Circuit (which decides appeals from the
federal courts in California) is entitled to no greater weight
than decisions from other circuits. Where there is more than one
appellate court decision, and such appellate decisions are in
conflict, the court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must
make a choice between the conflicting decisions." Citing
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 C2 450, 456]; P v.
Bradford (1997) 15 C4 1229, 1305 ["Such decisions, as we
often have observed, provide persuasive rather than binding
authority."]; P v. Rooney (1985) 175 CA3 634, 644;
P v. MacAvoy (1984) 162 CA3 746, 767, fn.13;
P v. Daan (1984) 161 CA3 22, 28, fn.2; P
v. Neer (1986) 177 CA3 991, 1000-1; P v.
Wallace (1992) 9 CA4 1515, 1519, fn.3; P v.
Crawford (1990) 224 CA3 1, 8; P v.
Figueroa (1992) 2 CA4 1584, 1587;
Myers Building Industries, Ltd.
v. Interface Technology, Inc. (1993) 13 CA4 949, 971,
fn.19; Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1994)
24 CA4 990, 997, fn.2; P v. Cahan (1955) 44 C2 434,
450-51 ["if the federal cases indicate needless limitations on the
right to conduct reasonable searches and seizures or to secure
warrants, this court is free to reject them"].
[13] USSC: Camreta v.
Greene (2011) 563 US 692, 709 fn.7.
[14] CAL: Suastez
v. Plastic Dress-Up Co. (1982) 31 C3 774, 782, fn.9;
P v. Corners (1985) 176 CA3 139, 146. ALSO SEE: Neary v.
Regents of University of California (1992) 3 C4 273, 282.
[15] CAL: P v. Garth
(1991) 234 CA3 1797, 1800; Tafoya v.
Hastings College (1987) 191 CA3 437, 445, fn.7;
State of C ex rel. State Lands Com. v.
Superior Court (1995) 11 C4 50, 71.
[16] CAL:
Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 CA4 1499,
1508, fn.2;
Acco Contractors Inc. v. McNamara & Peppe Lumber (1976)
63 CA3 292, 296;
Intellidata Inc. v. State Board of Education (1983) 139 CA3
594, 599; J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K. (1991) 52
C3 1009, 1027.
[17] CAL: P v.
Riddle (1978) 83 CA3 563, 572 ["Neither contracts nor court
opinions are to be interpreted mechanically and literally but due
attention must be paid to what is implied within them and to the
factual situations to which they are addressed."].
[18] OTHER: US v.
Yoon (6C 2005) 398 F3 802, 806 ["Dicta is language that
that is only incidental to the holding." Quoting from
Darrah v. City of Oak Park (6C 2001) 255 F3
301, 309].
[19] USSC: Maryland v.
Wilson (1997) 519 US 408, 412-13 ["We agree with respondent
that the former statement was dictum, and the latter was contained
in a concurrence, so that neither constitutes binding
precedent."]; Texas v. Cobb (2001) 532 US
162, 169 ["Constitutional rights are not defined by inferences
from opinions which did not address the question at issue."].
CAL: P v. Mendoza (2000) 23 C4 896, 915 ["A
decision is not authority for everything said in the opinion but
only for the points actually involved and actually decided."];
Bryant v. Superior Court (1986) 186 CA3 483,
495; United Steelworkers of America
v. Board of Education (1984) 162 CA3 823, 834; P v.
Deay (1987) 194 CA3 280, 288; P v.
Mata (1986) 180 CA3 955, 958, fn.5 ["A decision is not
authority for a proposition not considered."]; McGee
v. Superior Court (1985) 176 CA3 221, 226;
P v. Superior Court (Williams) (1992) 8 CA4 688, 703
[if the facts of a case are fairly distinguishable, the case is
not precedent]; In re Chavez (2003) 30 C4 643, 656 ["As is
well established, a case is authority only for a proposition
actually considered and decided therein."].
[20] CAL: Bryant v.
Superior Court (1986) 186 CA3 483, 495; Johnson
v. Superior Court (1989) 208 CA3 1093, 1097.
ALSO SEE: P v. Garcia (2002) 97 CA4
847, 853 ["An appellate court is not required to address all of
the parties' respective arguments, discuss every case or fact
relied upon by the parties, distinguish an opinion just because a
party claims it is apposite, or express every ground for rejecting
every contention advanced by every party."].
[21] CAL: P v.
Calderon (1997) 54 CA4 766, 770. OTHER:
Alston v. Redman (3C 1994) 34 F3 1237, 1246 [although
dicta, "we must consider it with deference, given the High Court's
paramount position in our three-tier system of federal courts"].
[22] CAL: P v.
Miller (1999) 69 CA4 190, 200; P v.
Godwin (1996) 50 CA4 1562, 1571; P v.
Wade (1996) 48 CA4 460, 467; Lawler
v. City of Redding (1992) 7 CA4 778, 784 ["Dicta of he
Supreme Court should not be disregarded by an intermediate
appellate court without a compelling reason."].
[23] CAL:
County of San Bernardino v. Superior Court (1994) 30 CA4
378, 388.
[24] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Lozano (1987) 192 CA3 618, 632 [quoting from 9 Witkin,
Procedure (3d ed. 1985) ¶ 785, p 756]. CAL: P
v. Lucatero (2008) 166 CA4 1110, 1116 ["dicta
carries persuasive weight when it demonstrates thorough analysis
of issue or reflects compelling logic"; quoting from Smith
v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 CA3 266, 297];
Mero v. Sadoff (1995) 31 CA4 1466, 1473
["[Dicta is] without force as precedent. As noted by Witkin,
however, 'to say that dicta are not controlling ... does not mean
that they are to be ignored; on the contrary, dicta are often
followed. A statement which does not possess the force of a square
holding may nevertheless be considered highly persuasive,
particularly when made by an able court after careful
consideration, or in the course of an elaborate review of the
authorities, or when it has been long followed." Citing (9 Witkin,
C Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal,§ 785]; Masry
v. Masry (2008) 166 CA4 738, 741 ["Dicta may not
decide a case but can be persuasive and influence later cases."].
[25] CAL: P v.
Jackson (1979) 95 CA3 397, 412.
[26] USSC: Whren
v. US (1996) 517 US 806, 812 ["It would be anomalous, to
say the least, to treat a statement in a footnote in the
per curiam Bannister opinion as indicating a
reversal of our prior law."].
[27] USSC: Maryland v.
Wilson (1997) 519 US 408, 412-13 ["We agree with respondent
that the former statement was dictum, and the latter was contained
in a concurrence, so that neither constitutes binding
precedent."]. CAL: P v. Ceballos (1974) 12 C3
470, 483; P v. Superior Court (Persons) (1976) 56
CA3 191, 194; P v. Gard (1978) 76 CA3 998, 1005;
P v. Stewart (1985) 171 CA3 59, 65.
[28] USSC: Texas v.
Cobb (2001) 532 US 162, 169 ["Constitutional rights are not
defined by inferences from opinions which did not address the
question at issue."].
[29] USSC: Illinois v.
Lidster (2004) 540 US 419, 424 ["We must read [general
language in opinions] as referring in context to circumstances
similar to the circumstances then before the Court and not
referring to quite different circumstances that the Court was not
then considering."]; Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co. (1995) 513 US 561, 562 ["A word is known by the
company it keeps."].
[30] USSC: US v.
Robinson (1973) 414 US 218, 229 [Court noted that "one
unexplained and unelaborated sentence" in one of its opinions
should not be interpreted a "novel and far-reaching" departure
from its other rulings]. CAL: Henslee v.
DMV (1985) 168 CA3 445, 453 ["However, we do not find this
case to be persuasive authority since the court failed to provide
any analysis underlying its decision."].
[31] CAL: In re Scott (2003) 29
C4 783, 815, fn.5.
[32] OTHER SOURCE: See US
Supreme Court website:
www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/info_opinions.html.
[33] USSC: US v.
Ross (1982) 456 US 798, 819.
[34] USSC: US v.
Knights (2001) 534 US 112, 117 [the Court uses the term
"dubious logic" to describe a ruling "that an opinion upholding
the constitutionality of a particular search implicitly holds
unconstitutional any search that is not like it"].
[35] CAL: Rules of Court, Rule 8.1105.
[36] CAL: Renfrew v.
Loysen (1985) 175 CA3 1105, 1109; McClothlen
v. DMV (1977) 71 CA3 1005, 1017;
Fire Ins. Exchange v. Abbott (1988) 204 CA3
1012, 1024; In re Eli F. (1989) 212 CA3 228, 234-35
["While the denial of review by the Supreme Court does not
normally add weight to the opinion of the District Court of Appeal
it does not follow that such a denial is without significance."
Citing DiGenova v.
State Board of Education (1962) 57 C2 167, 178].
[37] CAL: P v.
Bolden (1990) 217 CA3 1591, 1598.
[38] CAL: P v.
Triggs (1973) 8 C3 884, 890.
[39] QUOTE FROM: Teague
v. Lane (1989) 489 US 288, 296.
[40] CAL: P v.
Russo (2001) 25 C4 1124, 1133, fn.1; Jenson
v. Kenneth Mullen Co. (1989) 211 CA3 653, 658;
Faitz v. Ruegg (1981) 114 CA3 967, 970; Cal
Rules of Court, rule 977.
[41] CAL: P v.
McDaniels (1994) 21 CA4 1560, 1566, fn.2 ["analysis in an
unpublished opinion may properly be considered."].
[42] OTHER: US v. Katzin (3C
2014) 769 F3 163, 186.
[43] CAL: In re Lance W. (1985)
37 C3 873, 886; In re York (1995) 9 C4 1133, 1142.
[44] CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Ferguson) (2005) 132 CA4 1525,
1532-33. ALSO SEE: Conroy v.
Aniskoff (1993) 507 US 511, 519 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.)
["The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.
We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators."];
US v. Smith (9C 1998) 155 F3 1051, 1056, fn.9 ["As
is most often the case, the legislative history is of no help
whatsoever."]; Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
US Secret Service (5C 1994) 36 F3 457, 462 ["But, when
interpreting a statute as complex as the Wiretap Act, which is
famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity, we consider it
appropriate to note the legislative history for confirmation of
our understanding of Congress' intent."]. €ƒ
[45] CAL: P v.
Ashley (1971) 17 CA3 1122, 1126 ["It is a well settled rule
of statutory construction that the separation of the various
statutes into codes is for convenience only, and the codes are to
be read together and regarded as blending into each other thereby
forming but a single statute."].
[46] USSC: Ornelas v.
US (1996) 517 US 690, 698 ["because the mosaic which is
analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or probable cause inquiry is
multi-faceted, one determination will seldom be a useful precedent
for another"]. 9th CIR: John v.
City of El Monte (9C 2007) 515 F3 936, 941 ["The existence
of probable cause necessarily turns upon the particular facts of
the individual case, and prior decisions generally are of little
help in deciding a specific case."]. OTHER:
US v. Dortch (8C 2017) 868 F3 674, 681 ["it is natural for
cases that resemble each other in certain ways or at a high level
of generality to come out differently as a result of key details
that weigh differently in one than in the other"]; Davis
v. US (D.C.App. 2000) 759 A2 665, 674 ["The Supreme
Court has recognized, and so have we, the difficulties inherent in
'case-matching' in Fourth Amendment litigation."].