Chapter 2: Probable Cause: Reliability of Information

[1] QUOTE FROM: Beck v.
Ohio (1964) 379 US 89, 91. USSC:
US v. Harris (1971) 403 US 573, 582 ["the inquiry is
whether the informant's present information is truthful or
reliable," edited]. CAL: P v. Cedeno (1963) 218 CA2
213, 219 ["The reliability of the informer goes to the very heart
of the concept of reasonable cause."]. OTHER:
US v. Hansmeier (7C 2017) 867 F3 807, 811 ["when an
informant serves as the source of information in an affidavit, the
probable-cause determination turns on the informant's
credibility"]; US v. Hauk (10C 2005)
412 F3 1179, 1188 ["Information is only as good as its source"];
US v. Croto (1C 2009) 570 F3 11, 14 ["There
is nothing wrong with a police officer relying on information
provided by others to support the warrant application he makes, so
long as the affidavit provided to the court establishes a
sufficient basis for crediting the informant's reliability and his
basis for knowledge of the facts supplied."].

[2] USSC:
Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 US 143 ["The informant was
known to him personally and had provided him with information in
the past."]. CAL: P v. Spencer (2018) 5 C5 642, 664
["An informant's veracity or reliability may be established by her
having provided tips that proved true."];
P v. Terrones (1989) 212 CA3 139, 146 ["If the informant
has provided accurate information on past occasions, he may be
presumed trustworthy on subsequent occasions."]. OTHER:
US v. Knutson (8C 2020) 967 F3 754, 758 ["Known informants
are generally more credible because they can be held accountable
for false statements."]; US v. Nolen (8C 2008) 536 F3 834,
840 ["Reliable informants are individuals who have a track record
of supplying reliable information to law enforcement officers.
Information supplied by such parties may be sufficiently reliable
to support a probable cause finding."]; US v. Elmore (2C
2007) 482 F3 172, 181 ["Where the informant is known from past
practice to be reliable, no corroboration will be required to
support reasonable suspicion."]; US v. Trinh (1C 2011) 665
F3 1, 10-11 ["Because [the DEA agent] supported his statement of
the [informant's] reliability with reference to the latter's
history of providing information to authorities, we have at least
some assurance of reliability."]; US v. Jones (1C 2012) 700
F3 615, 621-22 ["The past reliability of an informant is a
significant factor permitting reliance on information that would
not otherwise be sufficiently corroborated."]. COMPARE:
P v. French (2011) 201 CA4 1307, 1317 ["the affidavit
states nothing about [the informant's] reliability, and the
informant's knowledge rests on hearsay, not personal
observation"].

[3] 9th CIR: US v. Elliot (9C
2003) 322 F3 710, 716 [the informant's "record of providing six
reliable drug-related tips in the preceding three months was
sufficient to overcome any doubts raised by his motives and prior
criminal and personal behavior"]. OTHER:
US v. Trinh (1C 2011) 665 F3 1, 10-11 ["Because Agent Ulmer
supported his statement of the CS's reliability with reference to
the latter's history of providing information to authorities, we
have at least "some assurance of reliability."]. COMPARE:
P v. French (2011) 201 CA4 1307, 1317 [the affidavit was
"without any indication of how often CRI-2's past information was
corroborated"].

[4] CAL: P v. Cedeno (1963) 218
CA2 213, 219 ["an arrest and search may be made solely on the
basis of information received from a single reliable informant"];
P v. Gray (1976) 63 CA3 282, 288 ["While one past
incident showing reliability is not sufficient to compel a
magistrate to accept the reported observations of an informant as
true, he does not abuse his discretion if he arrives at that
conclusion"]; P v. Berkoff (1985) 174 CA3 305, 309
[once]; P v. Barger (1974) 40 CA3 662, 667-68
[once].

[5] USSC:
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 230 ["basis of
knowledge" is "highly relevant"]. CAL:
P v. Silveria (2020) 10 C5 195, 237 [the informant's
"personal knowledge" was based on his "knowledge of the suspects'
names, current location, and [their] apparel"];
P v. Brown (2015) 61 C4 968, 981 ["a caller's personal
knowledge lends significant support to the tip's reliability"].
9th CIR: US v. Landis (9C 1984) 726 F2 540, 543
["her current information was based on her personal observation"].
OTHER: US v. Valentine (3C 2000) 232 F3 350, 354
["the officers in our case knew that the informant was reporting
what he had observed moments ago, so the officers could expect
that the informant had a reasonable basis for his beliefs,"
edited]; US v. McCants (3C 2019) 920 F3 169, 175 ["the 911
caller gave a firsthand account of ongoing criminal activity"].
COMPARE: US v. Dismuke (7C 2010) 593
F3 582, 587 [affiant "offered no explanation" about how the
informant knew there were firearms in defendant's home];
US v. Gifford (1C 2013) 727 F3 92, 100 ["without any
statements as to the informant's basis of knowledge, there is no
means of determining whether that information was obtained
first-hand or through rumor"].

[6] CAL: P v. Dumas (1973)
9 C3 871, 876 ["It is sufficient that the prior information was
accurate or was of such substance as to cause a reasonable person
to conclude that it is reliable."]. COMPARE:
US v. Dismuke (7C 2010) 593 F3 582, 587 [the officer's
affidavit "described the confidential informant as 'reliable'
without offering any explanation for that assertion"].
ALSO SEE: Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 233
["If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual
reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal
activities in the locality, his failure, in a particular case, to
thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause"].
NOTE: An informant does not automatically become unreliable
because he furnished information that led to an unproductive
warrant. This is because "an informant can only describe past
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe
narcotics presently may be found at a particular place.
Circumstances change: narcotics dealers move about, sell and use
up their narcotics supplies, or they cache them in new places."
P v. Murphy (1974) 42 CA3 81, 87.

[7] EXAMPLES:

• The informant's "record of providing six reliable
drug-related tips in the preceding three months was sufficient to
overcome any doubts raised by his motives and prior criminal and
personal behavior." US v. Elliott (9C 2003) 322 F3 710,
716.

• The affiant said that the informant "had supplied him with
information on five prior occasions, leading to the recovery of a
large quantity of heroin and the arrest of nine persons."
P v. Neusom (1977) 76 CA3 534, 537.

• "The assertion that the informant had given information to
the affiant in excess of ten times over the last two years
resulting in the issuance of search warrants, the seizure of
controlled substances and the arrest of numerous suspects,
establishes the reliability of the informant."
P v. Mayer (1987) 188 CA3 1101, 1117.

• "The affidavit stated facts showing that the informant had
provided accurate information concerning another murder."
P v. Barger (1974) 40 CA3 662, 667.

• "The fact that [the informant] had previously given
information which led to the arrest of a forgery suspect is
additional justification for regarding him as a reliable
informant." P v. Superior Court (Johnson) (1972) 6 C3 704,
714. Also see US v. Medrano (4C 2021) 3 F3 708, 717
[informant's tips "led to several successful arrests"].

• "Particular details of [the suspect's] drug-trafficking
operation" included "the price [the suspect] would need to pay to
purchase a large amount of cocaine, as well as the per-ounce
price." US v. Crawford (6C 2019) 943 F3 297, 307.

• The informant "had provided trustworthy information and had
demonstrated his knowledge of the drug trade in the Portland
area." US v. Brown (1C 2007) 500 F3 48, 55.

[8] CAL:
Swanson v. Superior Court (1989) 211 CA3 594, 599 [although
"sufficient information must be given in the written affidavit to
establish that the information given by the informant is
reliable," it may be necessitate to limit any details that might
reveal his identity"].

[9] OTHER: US v. Taylor (1C 1985
F2 3, 5-6 ["an informant's reliability need not invariably be
demonstrated through a detailed narration of the information
previously furnished to law enforcement—for example, by listing
the number or names of persons arrested or convicted as a
consequence of the informant's prior assistance"].

[10] USSC:
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 239 [an officer's
statement that an informant is "credible" is "inadequate"].
CAL: P v. French (2011) 201 CA4 1307, 1317 [the
"simple assertion" that the informant was "reliable" is inadequate
"because the affidavit contains no facts in support"];
P v. Hansborough (1988) 199 CA3 579, 584 ["It would have
been the better practice for the affiant to have stated the
details surrounding the informant's reliability in a more factual
fashion."]; P v. Superior Court (McCaffrey) (1979) 94 CA3
367, 374 ["the entire affidavit is infected [with conclusions]
beginning with its bald description of the informant as a
'confidential reliable informant'," edited]. OTHER:
US v. Fleury (1C 2016) 842 F3 774, 778 [the affiant "needed
to accurately describe the CI's actions so that the magistrate
could form his own opinion"]: US v. Dismuke (7C 2010) 593
F3 582, 587 ["A complication here is that [the officer's]
affidavit described the confidential informant as 'reliable'
without offering any explanation for that assertion."].

[11] CAL: P v. Kurland (1980) 28
C3 376, 395 ["when the affiant knows or should know of specific
facts which bear adversely on the informant's probable accuracy in
the particular case, those facts must be disclosed"].

[12] CAL: P v. Kurland (1980) 28
C3 376, 394 ["in most cases, the issue of possible unreliability
is adequately presented to the magistrate when the affidavit
reveals that the affiant's source of information is not a
citizen-informant but a garden-variety police tipster. In such
circumstances, predictable details of the informer's criminal past
will usually be cumulative and therefore immaterial"];
P v. Lopez (1985) 173 CA3 125, 134 ["the magistrate was put
on notice in the statement of probable cause that the informant
was in the sheriff's custody. This fact alone was sufficient to
warn the magistrate that a typical citizen-informant situation was
not at hand."]; P v. Webb (1993) 6 C4 494, 522 ["we deem it
unrealistic to require that a warrant affidavit include an
informant's detailed drug and psychiatric history, or every past
act that can be considered unlawful or dishonest"];
P v. Gallo (1981) 127 CA3 828, 841 [because the informant
was a "garden variety police tipster," there was "no reasonable
probability that the details of his criminal record would have
[mattered]."].

[13] CAL: P v. Kurland (1980) 28
C3 376, 393 ["All familiar with law enforcement know that the tips
they provide may reflect their vulnerability to police pressure or
may involve revenge, braggadocio, self-exculpation, or the hope of
compensation."]; P v. Lopez (1985) 173 CA3 125, 134
[information from the informant is "suspect on its face"];
P v. Brunner (1973) 32 CA3 908, 913 ["It is a fact
of life that the quality of veracity and honor among thieves and
murderers leaves something to be desired."];
P v. Kershaw (1983) 147 CA3 750, 755 [police informants are
frequently "criminals, drug addicts or professional 'stool
pigeons'"]; Higgason v. Superior Court (1985) 170 CA3 929,
952 (conc. opn. of Crosby, J.) ["Any rookie officer knows
uncorroborated, unknown tipsters cannot provide probable cause for
an arrest or search warrant."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Bernal-Obeso (9C 1993) 989 F2 331, 333 ["By
definition, criminal informants are cut from untrustworthy
cloth"]. OTHER: US v. Medrano (4C 2021) 3 F4 708,
716 ["Some corroboration is still required with no track record of
reliability."]; US v. Feekes (7C 1989) 879 F2 1562, 1564
["it seems self-evident that informants are often an unsavory lot.
The value of an informant stems from his opportunity to gain the
confidence of participants in a criminal enterprise and glean
information therefrom, an opportunity seldom available to
ordinary, honest, law-abiding citizens"]; US v. Powell (5C
2013) 732 F3 361, 370 ["informants in criminal investigations are
rarely removed from all aspects of the underlying criminality"].
NOTE: The courts understand that the criminal justice
system needs police informants. See On Lee v. US (1952) 343
US 747, 756 ["Society can ill afford to throw away the evidence
produced by the falling out, jealousies, and quarrels of those who
live by outwitting the law."]; US v. Bernal-Obeso (9C 1993)
989 F2 331, 335 ["Without informants, law enforcement authorities
would be unable to penetrate and destroy organized crime
syndicates, drug trafficking cartels, bank frauds, telephone
solicitation scams, public corruption, terrorist gangs, money
launderers, espionage rings, and the likes."];
US v. Simpson (9C 1987) 813 F2 1462, 1464 ["It is
unrealistic to expect law enforcement officers to ferret out
criminals without the help of unsavory characters."].

[14] CAL: P v. Spencer (2018) 5
C5 642, 664, 667 ["Neither we nor the police presumed her
information to be reliable. Instead, the police substantiated her
tip—and garnered sufficient corroboration to establish a
substantial basis for crediting her information."];
P v. Levine (1984) 152 CA3 1058, 1065 ["Corroboration is
not limited to a given form but includes within its ambit any
facts, sources, and circumstances which reasonably tend to offer
independent support for information claimed to be true."].
OTHER: US v. Glover (7C 2014) 755 F3 811, 818
["Where information about credibility is not available, other
factors such as extensive corroboration may overcome the doubt
inherent in relying on an informant without a track record."].

[15] USSC: Illinois v.
Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 244 ["Because an informant is
right about some things, he is more probably right about other
facts."]. OTHER: US v. Ford (8C 2018) 888 F3 922,
926 ["While anonymous tips are treated with some mistrust, when an
informant is shown to be reliable because of independent
corroboration, then it is a permissible inference that the
informant is reliable and that therefore other information that
the informant provides, though uncorroborated, is also
reliable."]; US v. Shabazz (11C 2018) 887 F3 1204, 1214
["when there is sufficient independent corroboration of an
informant's information, there is no need to establish the
veracity of the informant"]; US v. Barnard (1C 2002) 299 F3
90, 94 ["We note that the risk that an informant is lying or in
error need not be wholly eliminated. Instead, we must be confident
that the likelihood of lying or an inaccurate informant is
sufficiently reduced by corroborated facts and observation."].

[16] CAL: P v.
Kershaw (1983) 147 CA3 750, 758 ["What [the informant]
supplied was more akin to a full scenario naming the cast of
characters, the castle at Elsinore and the modus operandi of the
crimes."]; P v. Wells (2006) 38 C4 1078, 1088 ["relatively
precise and accurate description"]; P v.
Rosales (1987) 192 CA3 759, 768 ["a wealth of specific
information about the shooting."]; P v. Dolly (2007) 40 C4
458, 467 [the caller provided "an accurate and complete
description of the perpetrator and his location"];
In re Richard G. (2009) 173 CA4 1252, 1258 ["The caller
described the individuals involved and their clothing, and
reported that they were walking toward Colonia Park."];
P v. Lindsey (2007) 148 CA4 1390, 1400 ["The caller
accurately described the defendant as being a Black man with small
ponytails, and correctly identified his location."].
9th CIR: US v. Williams (9C 2016) 846 F3 303, 310
[the tipster "identified Williams's location, car, and appearance
and also stated that Williams was sleeping in the car in an
adjacent apartment building's lot, even though Williams did not
live there"]; US v. Sierra-Hernandez (9C
1978) 581 F2 760, 763 ["The tip here was neither vague as to the
time of the criminal activity, nor imprecise as to the kind of
crime being committed."]; US v. Jennen (9C
2010) 596 F3 595, 598 ["The anonymous tip described how Jennen and
his girlfriend were doing drugs in the presence of children. It
disclosed where Jennen resided; the types of drugs, including
methamphetamine and cocaine, being used"];
US v. Edwards (9C 2014) 761 F3 977, 984 [caller provided a
"detailed description of the suspect"]. OTHER:
US v. Cruz (10C 2020) 977 F3 998, 1005 [the CI provided "a
description of the location of Mr. Cruz's home; providing a phone
number for Mr. Cruz; and identifying him in a photograph"];
US v. Veloz (1C 2020) 948 F3 418, 426 ["confidential
informant had provided a detailed description of the illegal
scheme's operations and Veloz's role in them"];
US v. Hansmeier (7C 2017) 867 F3 807, 812 ["Walker's
information was detailed: he knew the type of drugs that Hansmeier
dealt, the quantity that he could get from Hansmeier, and the
price that Hansmeier charged."]; US v. Gregory (7C 2015)
795 F3 735, 741 [the informant "conveyed a very detailed
understanding of how Defendants' cannabis operation worked"];
US v. Aviles-Vega (1C 2015) 783 F3 69, 76 [the caller
provided "the make, model, color, and occupancy of the car, as
well as its apparent trajectory and part of its license plate"];
US v. Brown (1C 2007) 500 F3 48, 55 ["a tip that describes
the criminal activity in detail is more likely to be reliable"].
COMPARE: P v. Jordan (2004) 121 CA4
544, 560 ["the reliability of the tip in this case is not
supported by details about how and when the informant learned the
information"]; US v. Roberson (3C 1996) 90 F3
75, 80 ["bare-bones tip"]; Junkert v. Massey (7C 2010) 610
F3 364, 368 ["generalized assertions of Junkert's wrongdoing"].

[17] CAL: P v.
Kershaw (1983) 147 CA3 750, 759 ["In this situation it may
be more accurate to say that the informer's statement corroborated
the police investigation rather than the other way around."].

[18] USSC:
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 245, fn.14 [the fact
that officers determined that some of the informant's information
was not accurate does not necessarily mean the informant was
unreliable]. 9th CIR: US v. Villasenor (9C 2010) 608
F3 467, 474 ["not everything about the tip played out exactly as
the [informant] described it."].

[19] QUOTE FROM:
Alabama v. White (1990) 496 US 325, 332.

[20] EXAMPLES: Here are some examples
of corroborated "inside" information that constituted
circumstantial evidence of an informant's reliability:

• CI said that his drug supplier delivered drugs in a white
van; confirmed by controlled buy. US v. Ibarra (11C 2020)
947 F3 1343, 1349-50. Also see US v. Simpkins (1C 2020) 978
F3 1, 7.

• CI knew that the suspects used a stun gun during a robbery.
P v. Spencer (2018) 5 C5 642, 664, 665.

• CI knew the routine that a suspected drug dealer would
follow in retrieving drugs. P v. Aston (1985) 39 C3 481,
496. Also see US v. Stearn (3C 2010) 597 F3 540, 557
[officers saw conduct consistent with drug dealing after receiving
tip from informant].

• CI said that a drug trafficker would be staying at a
certain hotel and would use a certain false name when he
registered.
US v. Brown (1C 2007) 500 F3 48, 56.

• CI had "independent information as to a crime detail not
reported to the news media." P v. McCarter (1981) 117 CA3
902. Also see US v. Elmore (2C 2007) 482 F3 172, 182
[informant knew the motive for the shooting but the motive "was
not publicly known"].

• CI knew how the suspect had committed two burglaries and
how he had bypassed an alarm. P v. Costello (1988) 204 CA3
431. Also see P v. Stewart (1983) 140 CA3 11,15 [the
informant's "knowledge of the precise details of the ICX burglary
and the theft of the Corvette justified the magistrate's finding
that his information was reliable"]; P v. Zepeda (1980) 102
CA3 1, 4 [a woman who reported that her husband had committed two
burglaries provided details as to how he committed them].

• CI knew the approximate time a murder victim had been shot.
P v. Lara (1967) 67 C2 365.

• CI knew where the body of a murder victim had been dumped.
P v. Cooks (1983) 141 CA3 224.

• CI knew the location of certain stolen property.
P v. Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 CA3 69, 75.

• CI said the suspect possessed certain railroad bonds, and
officers confirmed that, in the crime under investigation, such
bonds had been stolen. P v. Dumas (1973) 9 C3 871, 876.
Also see Massachusetts v. Upton (1984) 466 US 727, 733
[officers verified that property fitting the description furnished
by the caller had, in fact, been taken in recent burglaries].

• After the informant claimed that the suspect was
manufacturing methamphetamine, officers learned that the suspect
had purchased meth precursors under false name."
P v. Glenos (1992) 7 CA4 1201, 1207.

• CI knew that the suspect was a parole violator, and that
warrants for his arrest had been issued. US v. Hauk (10C
2005) 412 F3 1179, 1191.

• A witness to a shooting possessed information that the
suspects were members of the Elm Street Gang; the shooter was
known as "Big Tudy"; one of the other men in the truck was
Rodriguez and that he was getting ready to flee to Texas. Officers
knew that Rosales was known as Big Tudy, that he was a member of
the Elm Street Gang, and that he had fled to Texas several years
earlier when he was wanted for robbery. P v. Rosales (1987)
192 CA3 759.

[21] USSC: Florida v.
J.L. (2000) 529 US 266, 272 ["An accurate description of a
subject's readily observable location and appearance… does
not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal
activity."]; Alabama v. White (1990) 496 US
325, 332 ["Anyone could have 'predicted' [that a certain make of
car would be in front of a certain building] because it was a
condition presumably existing at the time of the call."].
CAL: P v. French (2011) 201 CA4 1307,
1320 ["the police investigation primarily corroborated the
pedestrian facts provided by the informants regarding defendant's
residence and vehicle"]; Higgason v.
Superior Court (1985) 170 CA3 929, 940 ["The police
verified petitioner's physical description, his residence and his
vehicles. The courts take a dim view of the significance of such
pedestrian facts."]; Bailey v.
Superior Court (1992) 11 CA4 1107, 1112 ["Independent
police investigation merely confirmed that Ms. Bailey lived at the
address in question."]; P v. Lissauer (1985) 169 CA3
413, 423 [the informant's information "was such as could be
acquired by any casual observer"]. 9th CIR: US
v. Mendonsa (9C 1993) 989 F2 366, 369 ["The fact
that a suspect lives at a particular location nor drives a
particular car does not provide any indication of criminal
activity."]. OTHER: US v. Soto-Cervantes
(10C 1998) 138 F3 1319, 1323 ["The verification of facts readily
observable to anyone on the street, without more, is
insufficient"]; US v. Nelson (3C 2002) 284 F3
472, 484 ["what distinguished particularized facts that do support
a reasonable suspicion from generalized facts that do not, is
whether 'anyone' could have provided the information on which the
police relied, and whether the details were known to the general
public"].

[22] USSC: Alabama v.
White (1990) 496 US 325, 332 ["What was important was the
caller's ability to predict [White's]
future behavior, because it demonstrated inside
information—a special familiarity with [her] affairs."];
Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 246
["corroboration of major portions of the letter's predictions
provides just this probability"]. CAL:
P v. Turner (2013) 219 CA4 151, 168 [corroboration sufficed
when officers saw the suspect at a time and place where he was
reportedly going to shoot a football coach; P v.
Jordan (2004) 121 CA4 544, 559 ["The ability to predict an
individual's future actions indicates the informant has some
familiarity with that individual's affairs."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Villasenor (9C 2010) 608 F3 467, 473-74
[officers confirmed informant's statement that a certain car would
cross the border and go to a certain location]. OTHER:
US v. Oliver (8C 2020) 950 F3 556 [informant correctly
predicted date when drugs and a car would arrive];
US v. Gonsalves (1C 2017) 859 F3 95, 104 ["the tip included
details of Joshua and Shaw's future activities ordinarily not
easily predicted, and almost all of these details were
corroborated by police surveillance before Joshua's car was
stopped"]; US v. Powell (5C 2013) 732 F3 361, 371 ["The
specificity, predictive value, and recency of Bracy's tip are
sufficiently strong to balance the flaws in Bracy's personal
credibility and reliability."]; US v. Zamora-Lopez (8C
2012) 685 F3 787, 790 ["The supplier earlier described to law
enforcement a very specific pattern of long-standing
conduct… The deputies' surveillance observations during the
controlled buy confirmed the supplier's account in virtually every
detail."]; US v. Nolen (8C 2008) 536 F3 834,
841 [informant's tip included "an accurate description of Clark's
travel plans" and a "reasonably accurate description of the type
of vehicle that would pick-up Clark at the airport"].
COMPARE: Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 US
266, 271 ["The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no
predictive information and therefore left the police without means
to test the informant's knowledge or credibility."].
ALSO SEE: US v. Hauk (10C 2005) 412 F3 1179, 1189
["Predictive information is defined broadly as knowledge that the
informant could not acquire from any source but the suspect,
whether directly or indirectly, providing reason to believe that
the informant has 'inside' information"].

[23] EXAMPLES: Here are some examples
of corroboration of an informant's predictions:

• Officers confirmed an informant's tip that the suspects
were planning to leave town. P v. Spencer (2018) 5 C5 642,
665.

• An anonymous informant notified officers that, at a
particular time, Vanessa White would be driving a certain car from
her home to a certain motel for the purpose of selling drugs,
which she kept in a brown attaché case. Officers stopped the car
just before White arrived at the motel.
Alabama v. White (1990) 496 US 325,

• Officers saw the suspect at a time and place where an
informant said the suspect was going to shoot someone.
P v. Turner (2013) 219 CA4 151, 168.

• Officers confirmed an informant's tip that a certain car
driven by a drug trafficker would cross the Mexico border and
travel to a certain location. US v.
Villasenor (9C 2010) 608 F3 467, 473-74.

• Officers confirmed a tip that they would find stolen
property at a certain place. US v. Pulliam (10C 2014) 748
F3 967, 971.

• Officers confirmed an informant's tip that a suspected drug
trafficker would be making a delivery to Midland, Texas in a
certain type of car. US v. Powell (5C 2013) 732 F3 361, 371
["The specificity, predictive value, and recency of Bracy's tip
are sufficiently strong to balance the flaws in Bracy's personal
credibility and reliability."]. Also see
US v. Zamora-Lopez (8C 2012) 685 F3 787, 790 ["The supplier
earlier described to law enforcement a very specific pattern of
long-standing conduct… The deputies' surveillance
observations during the controlled buy confirmed the supplier's
account in virtually every detail."].

• Officers confirmed a 911 caller's report that a certain car
that was used in a shooting was heading southbound on a certain
street. US v. Johnson (3C 2010) 592 F3 442, 450.

• Tip that the defendant was armed was sufficiently
corroborated when, upon seeing officers approach his car, he made
a furtive gesture as if he was putting something under the seat.
US v. Graham (6C 2007) 483 F3 431, 439.

• Informant said defendant possessed counterfeit money;
before seizing defendant's car, officers saw several counterfeit
bills.
US v. Silva (1C 2014) 742 F3 1, 6-7.

• Informant said that his roommate had put a cellphone in the
window "as a surveillance device"; officers saw a cellphone in the
window. US v. Ford (8C 2018) 888 F3 922, 927.

[24] CAL: P v. Mason (1982) 132
CA3 594, 599 [the informant "bought a controlled substance [but]
there is no evidence he ever provided any information to the
police [and therefore] there is nothing in the affidavit to
establish the reliability and credibility of [the informant]"].

[25] USSC: Illinois v.
Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 245, fn.13 [the suspect's
"seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in the light of the
initial tip."]; Massachusetts v. Upton (1984)
466 US 727; Alabama v. White (1990) 496 US
325, 331-32. CAL: P v. Jordan (2004) 121 CA4
544, 558 ["Where police officers follow up an anonymous tip and
observe suspicious behavior, the totality of the circumstances may
generate a reasonable suspicion that justifies a [detention]."];
P v. Costello (1988) 204 CA3 431, 446 ["Even
observations of seemingly innocent activity suffice alone, as
corroboration, if the anonymous tip casts the activity in a
suspicious light."]; P v. Lara (1967) 67 C2 365, 374-75
["Such corroboration need not itself amount to reasonable cause to
arrest; its only purpose is to provide the element of reliability
missing when the police have had no prior experience with the
informant."]; P v. Ramirez (1996) 41 CA4 1608, 1619
[officers were able to corroborate "every physical detail given by
the informant," and "the activity that the men were engaged in,
conversing in the car, was consistent with the information in the
tip (dealing drugs from that car), even though not innately
suspicious in and of itself"]. OTHER:
US v. Greenburg (1C 2005) 410 F3 63, 69 ["Corroboration of
apparently innocent activity can establish the reliability of the
informant because the activity might come to appear suspicious in
light of the initial tip."]; US v. Warford (8C 2006) 439 F3
836, 842 ["although a number of these details did not pertain
directly to the alleged criminal activity under investigation, the
verification enhanced the general credibility of the sources"].

[26] EXAMPLES: Here are some examples
of corroboration based on suspicious conduct:

• When a patrol car arrived, the suspect "broke away" from a
group of men and started walking away. P v. Turner (2013)
219 CA4 151, 168. Also see P v. Johnson (1987) 189
CA3 1315 [burglary suspects ran]; US v. Sanchez (10C. 2008)
519 F3 1208, 1214-15 ["While quickly departing vehicles do not, in
and of themselves, suggest criminal activity, it is a suspicious
circumstance [and here] it becomes more significant when coupled
with a number of people pointing at the vehicles as if to say
'that's them'"]; US v. Hauk (10C 2005) 412 F3 1179, 1192
[suspect's "effort to retreat into his house reinforced the
officers' reasonable suspicion"].

• Caller said that one of two men involved in a disturbance
at a particular location was armed; officers saw the suspect
walking toward a park frequented by a street gang, and in which a
shooting had occurred "days before."
In re Richard G. (2009) 173 CA4 1252, 1258.

• Outside a garage where an informant said drug users were
shooting heroin, officers found "balloon fragments, many of which
were knotted in the end." P v. Sotelo (1971) 18 CA3
9.

• "Upon arriving, Deputy Hayes saw conduct he believed, based
on his training and experience, was a drug transaction—the
criminal conduct explicitly alleged in the telephone call."
P v. Butler (2003) 111 CA4 150, 162.

• Anonymous report that someone was doing or selling drugs in
the hallways of a building; when officers arrived, they saw
defendant in a dark hallway, unresponsive, not coming or going.
P v. Johnson (1991) 231 CA3 1, 11.

• Suspect matched the description of a man who had just fired
a gun, and he "was holding what appeared to be something heavy in
his pocket or waistline, in an unusual manner, where a gun was
ultimately found." P v. Lindsey (2007) 148 CA4 1390.

• Following up on a report that the defendant was selling
drugs, officers saw him engage in an exchange of money for two
balloons containing a tan powder. P v. Medina (1985) 165
CA3 11, 18-19.

• A physician, who was a suspected drug dealer, had recently
made several phone calls to suppliers of chemicals that were
"apparently unrelated to medical practice." US v.
Landis (9C 1984) 726 F2 540.

• "Sandoval's location in front of room 217 in the motel's
parking lot; his evasive actions in the car; [and] his refusal to
obey the officers' commands" were consistent with an anonymous
caller's tip that a man was pointing a gun at a woman in front of
room 217. US v. Sandoval (9C. 2004) 390 F3
1077.

• A 911 caller said he had just been informed by an anonymous
man that two men in a black Ford Focus were now parked in a
Denny's parking lot and were handling a gun. When officers
arrived, one of the men "quickly began making furtive motions with
his right shoulder and arm that officers testified were consistent
with trying to either hide or retrieve a weapon."
US v. Mosley (10C 2014) 743 F3 1317, 1321.

• "The agents were able to verify that a connection existed
between the house at 31 Saugus Street and the silver Toyota, and
that the house and car were occupied and owned by individuals
implicated in the very illegal activity [drug sales] that the
informant had described." US v. Jones (1C 2012) 700 F3 615,
624.

• After the informant said that the suspect was selling meth
from his motel room, officers knocked on the door and "heard
considerable movement, opening and closing of doors, and a toilet
flushing." US v. Hendrix (10C 2011) 664 F3
1334, 1339.

• Officers responding to a report of a heated argument
outside a car, encountered an occupant of the vehicle who would
not voluntarily move away from it. US v.
Whittaker (7C 2008) 546 F3 902, 911.

• Grounds for the pat search a detainee existed when, after
receiving information from an informant that the suspect was a
drug dealer who was sometimes armed, the detainee reached "in and
out of his jacket pocket, a movement that could be interpreted by
an officer as a retrieval of a weapon." US v.
Thomas (7C 2008) 512 F3 383, 388.

• Suspect engaged in countersurveillance driving. US
v. Fiasche (7C 2008) 520 F3 694, 698.

• Suspect was sneaking around in a deserted parking lot,
"sort of peeking around." US v. Thompson (DCC 2000) 234 F3
725, 727.

• Tip that the defendant was armed was sufficiently
corroborated when defendant, upon seeing officers approach his
car, made a furtive gesture as if he was putting something under
the seat.
US v. Graham (6C 2007) 483 F3 431, 439.

• "As the deputies approached, they saw one of the men
briefly disappear behind the wall. Although the officers did not
observe the man drop anything behind the wall, the action could
support an inference that the man had left to hide something upon
spotting the officers." US v. Soto-Cervantes
(10C 1998) 138 F3 1319, 1323.

• Officers responding to an assault in progress "possibly
involving a weapon" saw a suspect who started walking toward them
"with his hands in his pockets." US v. Simmons (2C 2009)
560 F3 98, 108.

• The informant's tip that defendant was taking bets over the
telephone for professional football games was partially
corroborated when the informant engaged in a conversation
(overheard by officers) in which they discussed "point spreads for
professional football games." P v. Rooney (1985) 175 CA3
634, 648.

• ICE agents confirmed a tip from an arrested drug smuggler
that his associates would enter California from Mexico at about
the same time, and they would be driving a Toyota Tacoma and PT
Cruiser. US v. Villasenor (9C 2010) 608 F3
467, 473-74.

• After the informant told officers that the suspects were
"loading a truck with growing equipment," officers saw the men
"putting equipment into a van." US v. Trinh (1C 2011) 665
F3 1, 11.

[27] CAL: P v.
Coulombe (2000) 86 CA4 52, 58 ["Here we have not one, but
two independent tips."]; P v. Camarella (1991) 54 C3
592, 606 [sufficient corroboration may exist even though
information for second informant was somewhat stale]; P v.
Balassy (1973) 30 CA3 614, 621 ["one 'unreliable'
informer's statements may be corroborated by those of another, if
they were interviewed independently, at a different time and
place"]; P v. Hirsch (1977) 71 CA3 987, 991, fn.1
["The totality of information coming from a number of independent
sources, may be sufficient even though no single item meets the
test of reliability. If the smoke is heavy enough, the deduction
of a fire becomes reasonable."]; P v. Green (1981)
117 CA3 199, 205 ["corroboration of an unreliable informant's
statements may be met by those of another, if they were
interviewed independently"]; P v. Terrones (1989) 212 CA3
139, 149 [two citizen informants];
In re Christopher R. (1989) 216 CA3 901, 904 [officer plus
two citizen informants]. 9th CIR: US v.
Nielsen (9C 2004) 371 F3 574, 580 ["the veracity of [the
three police informants] is buttressed by the similarity of their
accounts"]; US v. Landis (9C 1984) 726 F2
540, 543 ["Interlocking tips from different confidential
informants enhance the credibility of each."]. OTHER:
US v. Knutson (8C 2020) 967 F3 754, 759 ["The two
informants verified each other by independently providing
highly-detailed, nearly-identical accounts."];
US v. Hampton (7C 2009) 585 F3 1033, 1039 ["Three people in
addition to Smith had called 911"]; US v.
Whittaker (7C 2008) 546 F3 902, 909 [two 911 calls];
US v. Nelson (3C 2002) 284 F3 472, 482-83
[the second anonymous call "served both to confirm the type of
activity reported in the first call"]; US v. Copening (10C
2007) 506 F3 1241, 1246 [five calls].

[28] USSC: US v.
Harris (1971) 403 US 573, 583. CAL: Evid. Code§
1230; In re Christopher R. (1989) 216 CA3 901, 904;
P v. Cooks (1983) 141 CA3 224, 295; P v.
Nicholas (1980) 112 CA3 249, 261; P v.
Greenberger (1997) 58 CA4 298, 335 ["a statement's content
is most reliable in that portion which inculpates the declarant"];
P v. Gordon (1990) 50 C3 1223, 1251. 9th CIR:
US v. Villasenor (9C 2010) 608 F3 467, 474 [by "admitting
his involvement in a larger drug trafficking operation, the
[informant] may have invited more severe criminal penalties"];
US v. Nielsen (9C 2004) 371 F3 574, 578
["[The informant's] statement that she had purchased
methamphetamine from Nielsen and used it with him on many
occasions was contrary to her penal interest… an additional
indication of truthfulness."]. OTHER:
US v. Hansmeier (7C 2017) 867 F3 807, 812 ["His statements
were unimmunized and against his penal interest: he admitted
buying 4 ounces of methamphetamine twice a week from Hansmeier,
far more than the sixty-eight grams that police caught him
with."]; US v. Clark (7C 2011) 657 F3 578, 582 ["Specific
information from a person who has turned on her partner in crime
and told the police about their malfeasance (thus implicating
herself as well as her partner) goes a long way toward
establishing probable cause."]. BUT ALSO SEE:
US v. Lopez (7C 2018) 907 F3 472, 484 ["the fact that an
informant's statement is against his penal interest merely serves
as one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis"].

[29] CAL: P v.
Campa (1984) 36 C3 870, 882; In re
Larry C. (1982) 134 CA3 62, 69; P v.
Greenberger (1997) 58 CA4 298, 327-42 ["Clearly the least
reliable circumstance is one in which the declarant has been
arrested and attempts to improve his situation with the police by
deflecting criminal responsibility onto others."].

[30] CAL: Pen. Code§§ 1526(a),
1526(b)(1), 1528(a), 1529, 1534, 1537; Skelton v.
Superior Court (1969) 1 C3 144, 153; P v.
Goldberg (1984) 161 CA3 170, 183; P v.
Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 CA3 520, 526 [one advantage of
having a judge hear the witness's own words is that the judge will
hear "all the inflections, intonations and pauses that add meaning
to bare words"]. OTHER: US v. Evans (8C 2021) 4 F4
633, 637] ["the presence of the source before both the officer and
the issuing judge—and the source's willingness to swear to the
facts he provided under oath—further support reliability."].

[31] OTHER: US v. Simpkins (1C
2020) 978 F3 1, 7 [CI made "two telephone calls aimed at arranging
another meeting"]; US v. Trinh (1C 2011) 665 F3 1, 12,
["authorities independently corroborated many of the CS's details
through intercepted phone conversations and [surveillance]"];
US v. Clark (7C 2011) 657 F3 578, 582 [the officers
"listened in on her phone call with Clark and heard her place an
order for a significant amount of cocaine"].

[32] CAL: P v Rooney (1985) 175
CA3 634, 648 [bookmaking prior]; P v. Murphy (1974) 42 CA3
81, 87 [drug prior]; P v. Kershaw (1983) 147 CA3 750, 760
[drug prior]; P v. Hill (1970) 3 CA3 294, 299 [drug prior].
9th CIR: US v. Ayers (9C 1990) 924 F2 1468, 1478
[drug prior]. OTHER: US v. Veloz (1C 2020) 948 F3
418, 426 [kidnapping suspect used GPS trackers in current and
previous cases]; US v. Taylor (1C 1993) 985 F2 3, 6
[marijuana growing prior]; US v. Morrison (8C 2010) 594 F3
626, 632 [previous arrest for possession of pseudoephedrine with
intent to manufacture, "a charge implicating the same conduct that
the informant alleged"]; US v. Jones (1C 2012) 700 F3 615,
623.

[33] CAL: P v. Rosales (1987)
192 CA3 759, 768 [officer learned that the suspects were members
of a gang that was "out for revenge" against the victims' gang].

[34] 9th CIR:
US v. Villasenor (9C 2010) 608 F3 467, 474 ["he spoke with
the officers face to face"]. OTHER: US v. Torres (3C
2020) 961 F3 618, 624 ["The tipster waved down Officer Pickel and
adamantly explained what he had personally witnessed."];
US v. Barnard (1C 2002] 299 F3 90, 93 [the informant "was
known to the police and could be held responsible if his
assertions proved inaccurate or false"];
Hennessy v. Bagley (6C 2011) 644 F3 308, 318 ["An in-person
tip gives the officer an opportunity to observe the informant's
demeanor and credibility."]; US v. Blauvelt (4C 2011) 638
F3 281, 288 ["Courts have had no difficulty distinguishing between
cases involving face-to-face encounters with informants and cases
involving anonymous tipsters."]; US v. Salazar (2C 1991)
945 F2 47, 50-51 ["a face-to-face informant must, as a general
matter, be thought more reliable than an anonymous telephone
tipster, for the former runs the greater risk that he may be held
accountable if his information proves false"];
US v. Nelson (3C 2002) 284 F3 472, 482 [that the informant
could have been identified "increased the reliability of the
caller"].

[35] CAL: P v. Aho (1985)
166 CA3 984, 991 ["These statements by Russell must be presumed
reliable since they were unwittingly made to an undercover police
officer."]; P v. Hutchins (1979) 100 CA3 406, 412
["Wynn supplied the information to Deputy Carpenter believing him
to be a narcotic trafficker."]; P v. Fleming (1981)
29 C3 698, 708; P v. Love (1985) 168 CA3 104,
110; P v. Duncan (1987) 189 CA3 1348; P v.
Christian (1972) 27 CA3 554, 560.

[36] 9th CIR:
John v. City of El Monte (9C 2007) 505 F3 907.

[37] USSC:
Navarette v. California (2014) 572 US 393, 400 ["A 911 call
has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers,
and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with
immunity."]. CAL: P v. Brown (2015) 61 C4 968, 982
[a call to 911 constitutes "another indicator of veracity"];
P v. Dolly (2007) 40 C4 458, 467 ["merely calling
911 and having a recorded telephone conversation risks the
possibility that the police could trace the call or identify the
caller by his voice"]; P v. Lindsey (2007) 148 CA4
1390, 1398 ["It is unlikely that a caller would phone in a 'hoax'
when police can travel to the person's home after receiving only a
[911] hang-up call."]; Lowry v. Gutierrez (2005) 129 CA4
926, 941 ["modern caller identification methods" will help
"minimize the number of false reports the police actually act
upon]. 9th CIR: US v. Edwards (9C 2014) 761 F3 977,
985 [the caller "used the 911 emergency system, also lending
further credibility to his allegations"]; US v.
Terry-Crespo (9C 2004) 356 F3 1170, 1175 ["the Portland
police recorded both of Mr. Domingis's 911 calls and provided the
court with a recording and transcription"]. OTHER:
US v. Ruidiaz (1C 2008) 529 F3 25, 31 ["the
police were well aware of the trace capabilities of the 911
system, so they knew that a caller could be tracked down if he
provided false information."]; US v. Copening (10C 2007)
506 F3 1241, 1247 ["though the caller declined to provide his
name, he called 911 from an unblocked telephone number [and he]
should have expected that 911 dispatch tracks incoming calls and
that the originating phone number could be used to investigate the
caller's identity"]. ALSO SEE: US v. Hicks (7C 2008)
531 F3 555, 561 ["any body of law requiring 911 operators to
carefully make credibility determinations would unacceptably delay
the necessary responses to all emergency calls, including genuine
ones"]; US v. Wooden (7C 2008) 551 F3 647, 650 ["A 911
system designed to provide an emergency response to telephone tips
could not operate if the police had to verify the identity of all
callers and test their claim to have seen crimes in progress."].

[38] OTHER: US v. Cutchin (DCC
1992) 956 F2 1216, 1217 [if the 911 caller appears to be reliable,
"a dispatcher may alert other officers by radio, who may then rely
on the report, even though they cannot vouch for it"].

[39] USSC: Florida v.
J.L. (2000) 529 US 266, 273-74 ["We do not say, for
example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the
indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying
a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a
frisk."]. CAL: P v. Lindsey (2007) 148 CA4 1390,
1397 ["the conduct of shooting a gun on a residential street posed
a grave and immediate risk to anyone nearby"];
P v. Coulombe (2000) 86 CA4 52, 58 [report of man with a
gun "in a throng of thousands of New Year's Eve celebrants"];
P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849, 883 ["Nor can we ignore the
seriousness of the offense involved, which is a highly
determinative factor in any evaluation of police conduct."];
P v. Brown (2015) 61 C4 968, 984 [fight in progress,
somebody saw a gun]; P v. Wells (2006) 38 C4 1078,
1083 ["a citizen's tip may itself create a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to justify a temporary vehicle stop or detention,
especially if the circumstances are deemed exigent by reason of
possible reckless driving or similar threats to public safety"];
P v. Superior Court (Meyer) (1981) 118 CA3 579, 585
["Officer Perkins reasonably concluded that a vehicle driven
recklessly on the freeway by a man pointing a gun at other cars
was the kind of hazard which required him to proceed immediately
to find the car and question its occupants."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Terry-Crespo (9C 2004) 356 F3 1170,
1176 [threat with a firearm]; US v. Edwards (9C 2014) 761
F3 977, 985 [the caller said "someone was 'shooting at cars as
they are going down the street,' implying that the shooting was
still taking place as he called 911"]. OTHER:
US v. Aviles-Vega (1C 2015) 783 F3 69 [complainant seeing
that a passenger in a moving vehicle was holding a handgun was an
exigent circumstance]; US v. Williams (7C 2013) 731 F3 678,
684 ["ongoing emergency," not "general criminality"]; US
v. Wheat (8C 2001) 278 F3 722, 732, fn.8 ["The
rationale for allowing less rigorous corroboration of tips
alleging erratic driving is that the imminent danger present in
this context is substantially greater (and more difficult to
thwart by less intrusive means) than the danger posted by a person
in possession of a concealed handgun."]; US v.
Gomez (5C 2010) 623 F3 265 [possible carjacking];
US v. Hampton (7C 2009) 585 F3 1033, 1038
["multiple gunshots fired in broad daylight and a gunman on the
loose"]; US v. Simmons (2C 2009) 560 F3 98,
105 ["We agree with our sister circuits that an anonymous 911 call
reporting an ongoing emergency is entitled to a higher degree of
reliability and requires a lesser showing of corroboration than a
tip that alleges general criminality."]; US v.
Whittaker (7C 2008) 546 F3 902, 911 [brandishing a weapon
was an "ongoing emergency"]; US v. Hicks (7C
2008) 531 F3 555, 558-59 ["Every circuit to consider the question
has distinguished [Florida v. J.L.] when the
tip is not one of general criminality, but of an ongoing
emergency." Citations omitted.]; US v.
Holloway (11C 2002) 290 F3 1331, 1339 ["when an emergency
is reported by an anonymous caller, the need for immediate action
may outweigh the need to verify the reliability of the caller"].

[40] USSC:
Navarette v. California (2014) 572 US 393, 398 ["The
initial question in this case is whether the 911 call was
sufficiently reliable"]; Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 US 266,
271 [a "moderate indicia of reliability" is "essential"].
CAL: P v. Saldana (2002) 101 CA4 170, 175 ["an
anonymous telephone tip" with "no internal indicia of the basis
for or reliability of the informant's information"]. OTHER:
US v. Swinney (7C 2022) 28 F4 864, 866-67 ["the Supreme
Court has identified three factors that make an anonymous tip
reliable enough to create reasonable suspicion: the tipster (1)
asserts eyewitness knowledge of the reported event; (2) reports
contemporaneously with the event; and (3) uses the 911 emergency
system, which permits call tracing"].

[41] USSC:
Massachusetts v. Upton (1984) 466 US 727, 734 ["Lieutenant
Beland noted that the caller 'admitted she was the girl I had
named'"]. CAL: P v. Silveria (2020) 10 C5 195, 237
["In addition, the caller identified himself and appears to have
given his phone number and described what he was wearing" and
these circumstances "enhanced his credibility."];
P v. Brown (2015) 61 C4 968, 972 ["the caller confirmed his
address with the dispatcher"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Vandergroen (9C 2020) 964 F3 876, 880 ["Witness 2
provided his name and employment position, making him a known, and
therefore more reliable, witness."]; US v. Williams (9C
2016) 846 F3 303, 309 [the tipster "telephoned a police hotline
and provided his name, address, and phone number];
US v. Terry-Crespo (9C 2004) 356 F3 1170, 1174 [caller gave
his name and thus, the call "was not anonymous"]. OTHER:
US v. Ruidiaz (1C 2008) 529 F3 25, 31 [the caller
identified himself as a neighbor and "confirmed his telephone
number"]; US v. Johnson (3C 2010) 592 F3 442, 449 [911
caller "freely and repeatedly provided the police dispatcher with
her name and telephone number, and the location of her home"];
US v. Elmore (2C 2007) 482 F3 172, 181 ["Despite the fact
that [the callers'] identities were not definitively confirmed,
the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits did not treat the
information as anonymous"; citations omitted];
US v. Gomez (5C 2010) 623 F3 265, 279 ["When asked his
name, Mike readily offered it to the 911 operator."];
US v. Conner (10C 2012) 699 F3 1225, 1229 ["Here, the
caller did not disclose his name but provided enough information
to render himself readily identifiable—he gave the operator his
phone number and address."].

[42] CAL: P v.
Dolly (2007) 40 C4 458, 464 ["residents, also fearful of
the consequences, may not always wish to identify themselves"];
P v. Stanley (1999) 72 CA4 1547, 1555 [the
person "requested anonymity for reasons of personal safety"].
OTHER: US v. Holloway (11C 2002) 290
F3 1331, 1339 ["some callers, particularly neighbors, may be
understandably reticent to give identifying information for fear
of retaliation or danger. Thus, the fact that a 911 caller chooses
to remain anonymous may have little bearing on the veracity of the
caller."]; US v. Colon (2C 2001) 250 F3 130,
132 [911 caller: "If I leave you my name, and they start saying my
name over there. I don't wanna be, you know, I don't want no
problems because I have three children."].

[43] CAL: P v. Brown (2015) 61
C4 968, 986 ["The caller gave a specific address"]; OTHER:
US v. Woods (8C 2014) 747 F3 552, 557 ["Officer Jamieson
recontacted the 911 caller, the caller indicated that he was still
in the vicinity and was watching the officers. It was at that time
the caller directed the officers to Woods and the other man in the
black cap seated at the bus stop."]; US v.
Chavez (10C 2011) 660 F3 1215, 1222 [the caller "told them
he was a Wal–Mart employee at a specific Wal–Mart store and
thereby provided the police with information to discover his
identity"]; US v. Hampton (7C 2009) 585 F3
1033, 1039 ["Smith gave a location where the officers could meet
him and hold him accountable if the information he gave was
false"]; US v. Torres (3C 2008) 534 F3 207,
211-12 [the caller said he was following the suspect in a taxi,
and he was "contemporaneously describing the movement of the
vehicle"].

[44] QUOTE FROM: P v.
Dolly (2007) 40 C4 458, 467, fn.2.

[45] USSC:
Navarette v. California (2014) 572 US 393, 400 [it is
relevant that the caller reported "a startling event—such as
getting run off the road—made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement that it caused"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Edwards (9C 2014) 761 F3 977, 984 ["Additionally, at
one point during the call, he exclaimed: 'Oh, my god.' Thus, there
are indications that the call… was made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement that it caused"]; US
v. Terry-Crespo (9C 2004) 356 F3 1170, 1176 [the
caller was "laboring under the stress of recent excitement"].

[46] CAL: P v. Brown (2015) 61
C4 968, 982 ["Indeed, the dispatcher confirmed she could hear
people screaming in the background of the call, further
corroborating the caller's account."]. OTHER:
US v. Centeno-Gonzalez (1C 2021) 989 F3 36, 45 ["the
dispatcher herself had overheard gunfire while on the phone"].

[47] USSC:
Navarette v. California (2014) 572 US 393, 399 ["That
timeline of events suggests that the caller reported the incident
soon after she was run off the road. That sort of contemporaneous
report has long been treated as especially relevant."].
CAL: P v. Jordan (2004) 121 CA4 544, 557 ["In
Florida v. J.L., the police officers reached
the bus stop approximately six minutes after being [dispatched]"].
9th CIR: US v. Terry-Crespo (9C 2004)
356 F3 1170, 1177 [the caller "sought immediate police assistance
within minutes of being threatened"]; US v. Sandoval (9C
2004) 390 F3 1077, 1080 ["short interval of time between the
telephone call and the officers' arrival"]. OTHER:
US v. Swinney (7C 2022) 28 F4 864, 867 ["the police knew
that the man just pulled a large gun out of his pocket and just
walked into the AIDA liquor store," and the caller's language
"indicated that the caller had observed these actions as they were
happening"]; US v. Patterson (2022) 25 F4 123, 139 ["the
very nature of the crime—threatening a person with a gun—is one
that a victim would likely report promptly"]; US v.
Wheat (8C 2001) 278 F3 722, 731 ["The time interval between
receipt of the tip and location of the suspect vehicle [goes]
principally to the question of reliability"]; US v.
Valentine (3C 2000) 232 F3 350, 354 ["the officers in our
case knew that the informant was reporting what he had observed
moments ago… So the officers could expect that the
informant had a reasonable basis for his beliefs"].

[48] 9th CIR:
US v. Vandergroen (9C 2020) 964 F3 876, 880 ["The existence
of multiple tipsters, though anonymous, mitigates the specter of
an unknown, unaccountable informant seeking to harass another by
setting in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search by
relaying false information."].

[49] CAL: P v.
Dolly (2007) 40 C4 458, 468 [reliability "was further
enhanced by the tipster-victim's second call to 911"].

[50] CAL: Lowry v.
Gutierrez (2005) 129 CA4 926, 941 [court notes the
importance of "training patrol officers, 911 operators and police
dispatchers"]. COMPARE: US v.
Colon (2C 2001) 250 F3 130, 138. ["the record here contains
no evidence of whether or how 911 operator training is directed in
any way to developing that ability, and thus contains nothing from
which to conclude that the operator taking the call was capable of
determining whether reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk
existed"].

[51] USSC: US v.
Ventresca (1965) 380 US 102, 111 ["Observations of fellow
officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are
plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their
number."]. CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Brown) (1975) 49 CA3 160, 167 ["A police
officer is presumptively reliable in the official communication of
matters within his direct knowledge."]; P v.
Hill (1974) 12 C3 731, 761 [the officers are "presumed to
be reliable"].

[52] CAL: Mueller v.
DMV (1985) 163 CA3 681, 686 ["one police officer who has
received a report from a citizen-informant of a crime's
commission, and who has passed the information on to a brother
officer in the crime's investigation, will be deemed to have
reliably done so"]; P v. Hogan (1969) 71 C2 888, 891
["Reliable information furnishing probable cause for an arrest
does not lose its reliability when it is transmitted through
official channels to arresting officers."]. OTHER:
US v. Graham (6C 2007) 483 F3 431, 440 [court
rejects argument that a tip was unreliable because the arresting
officer "received it from another officer, rather than a
face-to-face"].

[53] 9th CIR: Harper v.
City of Los Angeles (9C 2008) 533 F3 1010.

[54] CAL: P v. Reserva
(1969) 2 CA3 151, 156-57 [fingerprint records]; P v.
Aho (1985) 166 CA3 984, 992 [rap sheet]; P v.
Kershaw (1983) 147 CA3 750, 760 [rap sheet]; P v.
Zepeda (1980) 102 CA3 1, 5 [police reports]; P v.
Cleland (1990) 225 CA3 388, 390-91 [PG&E records];
P v. Rooney (1985) 175 CA3 634, 648 [phone records];
P v. Andrino (1989) 210 CA3 1395, 1400 [phone trap
data]; P v. Hill (1970) 3 CA3 294, 298 [military
records]. OTHER: US v. Halverson-Weese (8C 2022) 30
F4 760, 765 ["The Bulletin's reliability was facially apparent: it
was issued on the Marshall County Sheriff's Office letterhead and
states the information was received by MIDTF. The officers'
reliance on the Bulletin was sufficient for reasonable suspicion
that Halverson-Weese might be armed and dangerous."]; US
v. McDonald (5C 1979) 606 F2 552, 554 [NCIC
printouts]. ALSO SEE: Ev. Code§§ 1270
et seq.

[55] CAL: P v. Stanley (2017) 18
CA5 398, 405 ["Unlike information provided by an anonymous tip,
information from a true citizen informant is considered reliable
because the citizen informant can be held responsible if her
allegations turn out to be fabricated."]; P v.
Hill (1974) 12 C3 731, 761 [citizen informant "is
presumptively reliable" even though his reliability "has not
previously been tested"]; P v. Kershaw (1983) 147
CA3 750, 754 ["citizen informants, in contrast to criminal
informants, are assumed to supply reliable information"];
P v. Lombera (1989) 210 CA3 29, 32 ["citizen
informant is presumptively reliable"].

[56] CAL: P v. Herdan (1974) 42
CA3 300, 305 [citizen informants are "usually, but not always"
people who "unexpectedly" witnessed a crime or were the victim];
P v. Ramey (1976) 16 C3 263, 269 ["it may be stated
as a general proposition that private citizens who are witnesses
to or victims of a criminal act, absent some circumstance that
would cast doubt upon their information, should be considered
reliable"]; Mueller v. DMV (1985) 163 CA3
681, 685 ["A report to a police officer, by a citizen-informant
who has witnessed a crime's commission, will ordinarily be
supportive of probable cause for an arrest."]; P v.
Superior Court (Bingham) (1979) 91 CA3 463, 471 ["An
informant who alleges he is an eyewitness to an actual crime
perpetrated demonstrates sufficient reliability of the person."];
P v. Amos (1977) 70 CA3 562, 566-67 ["neither a
previous demonstration of reliability nor subsequent corroboration
is ordinarily necessary when witnesses to or victims of criminal
activities report their observations in detail to the
authorities"]; P v. Kershaw (1983) 147 CA3 750, 754
["The prototypical citizen informant is a victim reporting a crime
that happened to him or a witness who personally observed the
crime."].

[57] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of victims and witnesses who have been deemed citizen
informants:

• A robbery or rape victim provided information about the
crime to officers. P v. Rigsby (1971) 18 CA3 38 42 [rape];
P v. McCluskey (1981) 125 CA3 220, 226-28 [robbery];
P v. Adams (1985) 175 CA3 855, 861 [robbery].

• A witness to a shooting reported that the perpetrators had
just fled in a certain direction. P v. Rico (1979) 97 CA3
124, 131.

• A man drove up to a patrol car and notified officers that
he had just seen an occupant of a vehicle (which he described)
point a gun at other cars.
P v. (Superior Court) (Meyer) (1981) 118 CA3 579, 584.

• The manager of a bowling alley notified officers that he
saw a gun in the defendant's locker. P v. Baker (1970) 12
CA3 826, 841. Also see P v. Duren (1973) 9 C3 218, 239 [a
bartender reported that a customer was carrying a gun].

• A teacher reported that a student was smoking in the
lavatory.
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 US 325, 345.

• A student told the school principal that another student
had given him illegal drugs.
Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009) 557 US
364, 372.

• A telephone company installer reported seeing drugs inside
the defendant's home. P v. Paris (1975) 48 CA3 766, 773-74.

• A high school student notified sheriff's deputies that his
mother and father were using marijuana. P v. Schulle (1975)
51 CA3 809, 813].

• A motel housekeeper reported seeing drugs in a motel room.
Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 C3 418, 421-22.

• A woman reported that her parents possessed drugs.
P v. Schulle (1975) 51 CA3 809, 815.

• A person reported seeing drug activity in the neighborhood.
P v. Terrones (1989) 212 CA3 139, 147-49.

• An employee of a meat-repackaging operation notified
officers of illegal practices at the firm.
US v. Greenburg (1C 2005) 410 F3 63, 67.

• A man told officers that his roommate was planning to bomb
the police station. US v. Croto (1C 2009) 570 F3 11, 14.

[58] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of non-eyewitnesses who have been deemed citizen
informants:

• An employee of a rent-a-car company reported that a rented
vehicle was overdue. US v. Dorais (9C 2001) 241 F3 1124,
1130.

• An insurance company investigator told officers about some
of the evidence he had uncovered in the course of an arson
investigation. P v. Superior Court (Bingham) (1979) 91 CA3
463, 472.

• A civil engineer said he had worked on a machine after the
defendant claimed it had been destroyed in a fire.
P v. Superior Court (Bingham) (1979) 91 CA3 463, 472.

• A store security officer provided officers with employment
information about a suspect. P v. Jordan (1984) 155 CA3
769, 779-80.

• A high school football coach notified officers that he had
learned from his aunt that the defendant was carrying a gun on the
school grounds. P v. Turner (2013) 219 CA4 151, 167.

• A woman told officers that her son reported seeing a fellow
student with a handgun. In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 CA4 1735

• A co-worker of a murder suspect told officers that the
suspect came to work "dressed as a ninja, carrying a sword, a long
knife and a gun" and that he said he had "recently stabbed
someone."
P v. Scott (2012) 52 C4 452, 483-84.

• The registered owner of car gave police the name of the
person who was using the car. P v.
Moore (1970) 51 CA3 610, 616.

[59] USSC: Illinois v.
Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 227 ["the veracity of persons
supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and
unknowable"]; Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 US 266, 270 ["an
anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of
knowledge or veracity"]. CAL: P v.
Ramey (1976) 16 C3 263, 269 ["the rule presupposes that the
police be aware of the identity of the person"]; P v.
Kershaw (1983) 147 CA3 750, 756 ["In the case of
confidential citizen informers, the mere fact that they make their
identity known to the police is, itself, some indication of their
honesty."]; P v. Coulombe (2000) 86 CA4 52,
58 ["The officers had the opportunity to see the tipsters, observe
them face-to-face and evaluate their credibility."]; P
v. Jordan (2004) 121 CA4 544, 556, fn.6 ["Generally,
information provided to the police in person is regarded as more
reliable than an anonymous telephone call because, among other
factors, the anonymity of the informant is compromised by the
ability of police to subsequently identify someone they have met
face-to-face."]; P v. Brueckner (1990) 223
CA3 1500, 1504-5 ["Reliability is indicated where the informer's
identity is known to the police, as the informer exposes himself
or herself to potential liability for malicious prosecution or
false reporting."]. OTHER: US v.
Elmore (2C 2007) 482 F3 172, 182 ["Mazza gave the police
enough information about herself to allow them to identify her and
track her down later to hold her accountable if her tip proved
false."]; US v. Christmas (4C 2000) 222 F3
141, 144 ["a witness who directly approaches a police officer can
also be held accountable for false statements"]; US
v. Hudson (6C 2005) 405 F3 425, 432 ["Rarely can an
anonymous tip by itself constitute a basis for reasonable
suspicion"]; US v. Cruz-Mendez (10C 2006) 467
F3 1260, 1268 ["[Anonymous] tips are in themselves entitled to
little weight."].

[60] USSC: Illinois v.
McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 332 ["The police had had an
opportunity to speak with [the witness] and make at least a very
rough assessment of her reliability."]. CAL: P v.
Jordan (2004) 121 CA4 544, 556, fn.6 ["the anonymity of the
informant is compromised by the ability of police to subsequently
identify someone they have met face-to-face"]; P v.
Superior Court (Meyer) (1981) 118 CA3 579, 584 ["When the
informant approached the officer, he had no way of knowing that
the officer would elect to begin the pursuit without waiting to
record the identity of the informant."]; P v.
Coulombe (2000) 86 CA4 52, 58 ["The citizens who supplied
the information subjected themselves to scrutiny and the risk of
losing their anonymity by directly approaching the police officers
rather than calling in their information."]; P v.
Amos (1977) 70 CA3 562, 568 ["The police were not required
to elicit the informant's curriculum vitae to
determine whether the informant's credentials were sufficiently
impressive"]. OTHER: Henness v.
Bagley (6C 2011) 644 F3 308, 318 ["An officer may rely on a
complaint made by an individual whose name the officer does not
know, but who made the complaint in open view of the officer."];
US v. Watson (7C 2009) 558 F3 702, 703 ["The
tip in this case was only quasi-anonymous, since the police could
easily have identified the tipster—and that is important."];
US v. Thompson (DCC 2000) 234 F3 725, 729
["The informant in this case subjected himself to ready
identification by the police when he approached them in his car;
the police need only have asked for his identification or simply
noted the license plate on his car."].

[61] CAL: P v. Rowland (2022) 82
CA5 1099, 1103 ["although the search warrant affidavit did not
name the employee who submitted two child pornography cybertips to
[NCMEC] or the person who forwarded the cybertips from NCMEC to
the police, the totality of the circumstances supported a
determination that the cybertips came from unbiased citizen
informants who could be presumed reliable and thus did not need
any independent corroboration"].

[62] CAL: P v.
Ramey (1976) 16 C3 263, 269 [reliability depends on the
absence of "some circumstance that would cast doubt upon their
information, should be considered reliable."]; Ming
v. Superior Court (1970) 13 CA3 206, 213 ["In the
good citizen-informer cases, credit is given to the hearsay
statement because of the lack of any circumstances which cast
doubt on the integrity or motivation of the declarant."].
OTHER: US v. Elmore (2C 2007) 482 F3 172, 180 ["The
veracity of identified private citizen informants… is
generally presumed in the absence of special circumstances
suggesting that they should not be trusted."].

[63] CAL: P v.
Schulle (1975) 51 CA3 809, 814-15 ["experienced stool
pigeons or persons criminally involved or disposed are not
regarded as citizen-informants because they are generally
motivated by something other than good citizenship"].

[64] CAL:
Ming v. Superior Court (1970) 13 CA3 206, 213 ["If a
narcotics trafficker is in custody at the time he gives
information implicating others, his statement cannot form the
basis for an arrest because his obvious motivation is to
ingratiate himself with the police for purely selfish reasons."];
P v. Hill (1974) 12 C3 731, 761 [witness was a
citizen informant in a murder case even though he accompanied the
victim to the murder scene to buy drugs]; P v.
Gray (1976) 63 CA3 282, 287-88 [court notes "the absence of
anything in the affidavit which tends to connect [the informant]
with the illegal narcotics activity going on in Gray's
apartment"].

[65] CAL: Gillan v.
City of San Marino (2007) 147 CA4 1033, 1045.

[66] 9th CIR: Peng v.
Hu (9C 2003) 335 F3 970, 979 ["inconsistencies in
incidental facts [are] to be expected where different people are
called upon to remember startling events"]. OTHER:
US v. Pontoo (1C 2011) 666 F3 20, 27 ["But a
witness's statement need not be a letter-perfect replica of an
earlier statement in order to be given credence."].

[67] CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Haflich) (1986) 180 CA3 759, 767;
P v. Rigsby (1971) 18 CA3 38, 42.

[68] CAL: P v.
Ramey (1976) 16 C3 263, 269 ["there was evidence that [the
citizen] had dealt with the Sacramento police on other occasions
without raising doubts as to his trustworthiness"].