Chapter 4: Probable Cause to Search

[1] USSC: Florida v. Harris (2013) 568 US 237, 243 ["A police officer
has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to
him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
that contraband or evidence of a crime is present."].

[2] USSC: Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily (1978) 436 US 547, 555 ["[the State's
interest in enforcing the criminal law and recovering evidence is
the same whether the third party is culpable or not"];
Los Angeles County v. Rettele (2007) 550 US
609, 615 ["Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent"].
CAL: Pen. Code§1524(b); P v.
Watson (1979) 89 CA3 376, 385 ["It is irrelevant that the
affidavit did not directly implicate appellant in the sale of
heroin."]; Frazzini v. Superior Court (1970)
7 CA3 1005, 1013 ["It was not necessary that the facts in the
affidavit show that the cabin was defendant's residence, nor that
he had rented it, nor that he had exclusive possession of it."].
9th CIR: US v. Kelley (9C 2007) 482 F3
1047, 1055 [a location "can be searched for evidence of a crime
even if there is no probable cause for arrest"]; US
v. Elliott (9C 2003) 322 F3 710, 716 ["Probable
cause to believe that a person conducts illegal activities
in the place where he is to be searched is not necessary; the
proper inquiry is whether there was probable cause to believe that
evidence of illegal activity would be found in the
search."]. OTHER: US v. Roland (7C 2023) 60 F4 1061,
__ ["there can be probable cause to search a space belonging to
someone who is not—or at least not yet—suspected of committing a
crime as long as the facts establish a fair probability that the
search will uncover evidence that will aid the police in their
investigation"]; US v. Artez (10C 2004) 389 F3 1106, 1113
["if probable cause to search exists, it is immaterial that the
suspect had no connection to the premises"].

[3] CAL: P v.
Easley (1983) 34 C3 858, 870 ["There is no logical
inconsistency in the conclusion that an affidavit establishes
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be in any
one of a suspect's homes or vehicles"]; P v.
Miller (1978) 85 CA3 194, 204 [the "magistrate's further
conclusion that those items would probably be found in either of
the two cars used by defendant or the apartment which he
apparently maintained alone, had a substantial basis in fact"];
P v. McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 901 [officers had
probable cause to believe "that the murder weapon and/or
ammunition would be located in Noor's vehicle used during the
shooting, in the apartment where Noor lived, or in his mother's
house where Noor obtained the murder weapon."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Hillyard (9C 1982) 677 F2 1336, 1339
[officers "need not confine themselves to chance by choosing only
one location for a search"]. OTHER:
US v. Barajas (8C 2013) 710 F3 1102, 1109 ["Warrants
frequently authorize a search of more than one place, and one set
of facts may provide probable cause for both searches."];
US v. Wagers (6C 2006) 452 F3 534, 539 ["Even
if the home were only one of two locations—home and office—served
by Insight, there would be sufficient evidence to support probable
cause."].

[4] USSC: Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily (1978) 436 US 547, 556 ["The critical
element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the
property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and
seized are located on the property to which entry is sought."].
CAL: P v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 C3 1179,
1206 ["Mere evidence of a suspect's guilt provides no cause to
search his residence."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Pitts (9C 1993) 6 F3 1366, 1369 ["Probable cause to believe
that a suspect has committed a crime is not by itself adequate to
obtain a search warrant for the suspect's home."]. OTHER:
US v. Baker (6C 2020) 976 F3 636, 646 ["the existence of
probable cause to arrest will not necessarily establish probable
cause to search"]; Green v. Reeves (6C
1996) 80 F3 1101, 1106 ["The two determinations [probable cause to
arrest and search] are measured by similar objective standards but
contain different inquiries."]. ALSO SEE:
US v. Baker (6C 2020) 976 F3 636, 645 ["The test for an
arrest asks whether there is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt specific to the suspect. This test is less complex than the
one for a search."].

[5] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Spilotro (9C 1986) 800 F2 959, 964. CAL:
P v. Senkir (1972) 26 CA3 411, 421
["reasonable inferences may be indulged as to the presence of
articles known to be usually accessory to or employed in the
commission of a specific crime"]; P v. Farley (2009) 46 C4
1053, 1099 [because there was probable cause to believe that the
suspect shot and killed fellow employees at his workplace, it was
reasonable to infer the existence of "photographs and documents"
related to the business, and documents "concerning his employment
at [the business]."]; P v. Barnum (1980) 113 CA3 340, 347
["the government could have narrowed most of the descriptions in
the warrant by describing in greater detail the items one commonly
expects to find on premises used for the criminal activities in
question"].

[6] CAL: P v. Sloss (1973) 34 CA3
74, 82-83; P v. McNabb (1991) 228 CA3 462, 46 [infer
receipts for laboratory equipment and meth precursors].
9th CIR: US v. Storage Spaces (9C 1985) 777 F2 1363,
1368 ["The affidavit demonstrates that [the suspect's] main
operating location was [address], and that its inventory of
products was stored there."].

[7] CAL: P v.
Tuadles (1992) 7 CA4 1777, 1782, 1785 [infer "pay and owe
records, customer lists with addresses and phone numbers, and
similar identifying information concerning confederates"];
Fenwick and West v. Superior Court (1996) 43 CA4 1272, 1279
['we agree that corporate counsel is likely to retain client
records of the nature sought by the district attorney"];
P v. McEwen (1966) 244 CA2 534, 536. 9th CIR:
US v. Vasquez (9C 2011) 654 F3 880, 883
[reasonable to believe that the president of a motorcycle club
maintained minutes of club meetings]; US v. Gomez-Soto (9C
1984) 723 F2 649, 654 [Since the DEA sought articles it claims are
typically found in the possession of narcotics traffickers, the
warrant could have named or described those particular
articles."]. OTHER: US v. Riley (2C 1990) 906 F2
841, 844, fn.1 [infer "records of the distribution of cocaine
including records of the investment of proceeds of drug
trafficking in tangible or intangible objects and things"];
US v. Sumlin (6C 2020) 956 F3 879, 887 [court notes that
the affiant "knew from his personal experience and training that
drug dealers like Sumlin routinely keeps drug-related items (i.e.
records of their drug transactions"]; US v. Burgess (10C
2009) 576 F3 1078, 1091 [the search "was limited to the kind of
drug and drug trafficking information likely to be found on a
computer, to wit (as the warrant says): 'pay-owe sheets, address
books, rolodexes' and 'personal property which would tend to show
conspiracy to sell drugs"]; US v.
Scharfman (2C 1971) 448 F2 1352, 1355 [it was reasonable
"to conclude that books and records would be utilized as
instrumentalities in connection with the crime of disposing of
hundreds of fur garments through a façade of legitimacy"].

[8] CAL: P v.
Simpson (1998) 65 CA4 854, 862 ["Illegal drugs and guns are
a lot like sharks and remoras. And just as a diver who spots a
remora is well-advised to be on the lookout for sharks, an officer
investigating cocaine and marijuana sales would be foolish not to
worry about weapons."]. OTHER: US v.
Perry (4C 2009) 560 F3 246, 251.

[9] CAL: P v.
Rogers (1986) 187 CA3 1001, 1009 ["common experience tells
us that houses and vehicles ordinarily contain evidence
establishing the identities of those occupying or using them"];
P v. Stafford (1973) 29 CA3 940, 948 ["since the
police officers had probable cause to believe that the Pontiac was
stolen they were justified in searching the vehicle to ascertain
the identity of the owner"]. 9th CIR: US v.
Crews (9C 2007) 502 F3 1130, 1137 [reasonable to believe
that the registration for the suspect's car was in his house].
NOTE: The term "indicia" generally refers to documents and
other things in a home, car, or other place that tend to identify
the people who own or control that place. Indicia is especially
relevant when officers have probable cause to believe that a
certain place is being used to conduct criminal activities, in
which case the indicia will help prove the identities of the
perpetrators.

[10] CAL: P v.
Suennen (1980) 114 CA3 192, 203.

[11] CAL: P v. Suarez (2020) 10
C5 116, 153 ["The description of Y.M.'s attack in the trailer,
together with her injuries, made it substantially probable that
there was specific property lawfully subject to seizure presently
located in the trailer"]; P v. Schilling (1987) 188
CA3 1021 [evidence such as fingerprints, powder burns, blood,
blood spatters, photographs, measurements, bullet holes, hairs,
fibers"]; P v. Frank (1985) 38 C3 711, 722 [the existence
of pliers, rope, and pieces of flesh was proven by the condition
of the victim's body and police reports that the she had been tied
up and tortured]; P v. Webb (1993) 6 C4 494, 521 [because
duct tape had been used to bind the murder victims, the existence
of additional duct tape in the suspect's car was proven
circumstantially]; P v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151
CA4 85, 101 ["based on his training and experience, Officer Wahl
suspected that valuable trace evidence might be found in Nasmeh's
vehicle"].

[12] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Meek (9C 2004) 366 F3 705. OTHER: US
v. Gleich (8C 2005) 397 F3 608 ["photographs,
pictures, visual representations, or videos in any form that
include sexual conduct by a minor"]; US v. Colbert (8C
2018) 605 F3 573, 578 ["There is an intuitive relationship between
acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of
child pornography ... For individuals seeking to obtain sexual
gratification by abusing children, possession of child pornography
may very well be a logical precursor to physical interaction with
a child"]; US v. Clark (7C 2012) 668 F3 934, 939 ["the
target of the search's demonstrable sexual interest in children,
along with the use of a computer in acting on that interest,
sufficiently connects him to the 'collector' profile" to establish
probable cause].

[13] OTHER:
Virgin Islands v. John (3C 2011) 654 F3 412, 419 [affidavit
lacked an "assault-pornography correlation"];
US v. Cordero-Rosario (1C 2015) 786 F3 64, 70 ["Cordero was
not being investigated for possession of illegal pornography. He
was being investigated for committing certain lewd acts."];
US v. Falso (2C 2008) 544 F3 110, 123 ["That the law
criminalizes both child pornography and the sexual abuse (or
endangerment) of children cannot be enough. They are separate
offenses and nothing in the affidavit draws a correlation between
a person's propensity to commit both types of crimes"];
US v. Hodson (6C 2008) 543 F3 286, 292 ["Detective Pickrell
established probable cause for one crime (child molestation) but
designed and requested a search for evidence of an entirely
different crime (child pornography)."].

[14] OTHER: US v. Wagers (6C
2006) 452 F3 534, 540 ["evidence that a person has visited or
subscribed to websites containing child pornography supports the
conclusion that he had likely downloaded, kept, and otherwise
possessed the material"].

[15] OTHER: US v. Ramonda (2C
2015) 780 F3 105.

[16] 9th CIR:
Dougherty v. City of Covina (9C 2011) 654 F3 892, 899;
In re US v. Weber (9C 1990) 923 F2 1338, 1343.
OTHER: US v. Mark Scott (7C 2018) 901 F3 842, 844
["the line between [child pornography and child erotica] is
hazy"]. COMPARE: US v. Hansel (8C 2008) 524 F3 841,
846, fn.3.

[17] 9th CIR: US v.
Holzman (9C 1989) 871 F2 1496, 1506 [officers "had probable
cause to believe that appellants were participants in a wide
scheme of credit card fraud. Certain items carried by appellants
at the time of their arrest—numerous counterfeit credit and
identification cards, large amounts of cash—suggested that
additional items of that sort existed elsewhere."]. OTHER:
US v. Soto (1C 2015) 799 F3 68, 85 ["Given the laptop's
proximity to the forged documents and its location in a
fraudulently registered vehicle, it was reasonable to believe that
the laptop… might contain additional evidence"].

[18] CAL: P v.
Barnum (1980) 113 CA3 340, 347 ["the government could have
narrowed most of the descriptions in the warrant either by
describing in greater detail the items one commonly expects to
find on premises used for the criminal activities in question,"
such as, "Records relating to loan sharking and gambling,
including pay and collection sheets, lists of loan customers, loan
accounts and telephone numbers, line sheets, bet slips, tally
sheets, and bottom sheets."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Spilotro (9C 1986) 800 F2 959, 964. OTHER:
US v. Santarelli (11C 1985) 778 F2 609
[officers knew that loan sharks ordinarily kept business records
such as loans outstanding, interest due, and payments received];
US v. Johnson (8C 1976) 541 F2 1311, 1314
["the term 'paraphernalia' is not unknown in criminal"].

[19] USSC: Wyoming v.
Houghton (1999) 526 US 295, 300 [because officers saw a
hypodermic syringe in the driver's shirt pocket, they reasonably
believed there were drugs in the vehicle].

[20] USSC: Texas v.
Brown (1983) 460 US 730, 743 ["the distinctive character of
the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contents—particularly
to the trained eye of the officer"]; US v.
Jacobsen (1984) 466 US 109, 121 ["it was just like a
balloon the distinctive character of which spoke volumes as to its
contents"]. CAL: P v. Zabala (2018) 19 CA5 335, 344
[the discovery of four baggies under the front seat that were
filled with a white substance provided probable cause to believe
there were drugs in the car, even though it was later learned that
the substance was not an illegal drug]; P v. Holt (1989)
212 CA3 1200, 1205 ["Courts have recognized certain containers as
distinctive drug carrying devices which may be seized upon
observation: heroin balloons, paper bindles and marijuana smelling
brick-shaped packages]; P v. Chapman (1990) 224 CA3 253,
257 ["Probable cause to believe a container holds contraband may
be adequately afforded by its shape, design, and the manner in
which it is carried."]; P v. Parra (1973) 30
CA3 729, 735 ["translucent condoms containing a powdery substance
and tied off at the ends"]; P v. Banks (1990) 217
CA3 1358, 1364 [Zip-lock bags "are routinely used to carry rock
cocaine"]; P v. Arango (1993) 12 CA4 450, 455
["distinctively shaped and wrapped kilos of cocaine"];
P v. Rodriquez (1969) 274 CA2 770, 776 ["balloons or
contraceptives are often used to carry narcotics because they can
be swallowed to avoid detection"]; P v.
Clayton (1970) 13 CA3 335, 337-38 ["small usable quantities
of heroin are customarily carried in 'bindles,' small intricately
folded papers aptly described by the police officer of our case as
a 'pharmaceutical paper'"]. 9th CIR: US v.
Ayon-Meza (9C 1999) 177 F3 1130, 1133 ["duct tape covering
was favored by drug dealers"]; US v.
$42,500 (9C 2002) 283 F3 977, 982 ["the money was wrapped
in cellophane [which is] commonly used to conceal the smell of
drugs"].

[21] CAL: P v.
Holt (1989) 212 CA3 1200, 1205 ["Other common carriers,
however, such as pill bottles, cigarette packs, plastic bags, film
canisters are seen as more generic and may not be seized merely
because they may be used to store narcotics."]; P v.
Valdez (1987) 196 CA3 799, 806-7 [film canister].

[22] CAL:
Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 C4 1218, 1240 [plain
smell "is well established by cases that have found the smell of
contraband sufficient to establish probable cause necessary for
police to obtain a search warrant"]; P v. Weaver (1983) 143
CA3 926, 931 ["odor of PCP"]; P v. Benjamin (1999) 77 CA4
264, 273 ["Odors may constitute probable cause if the magistrate
finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one
sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance."];
P v. Shandloff (1985) 170 CA3 372, 381 ["odor associated
with cocaine"].

[23] CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Moore) (1980) 104 CA3 1001, 1010 ["Our
courts have, in effect, pragmatically accepted the 'expertise' of
a dog whose sense of smell led to the detection of marijuana"].
9th CIR: Grant v. Long Beach (9C 2002) 315 F3 1081,
1085-86 ["we have routinely held that a canine identification or
alert of illegal narcotics provides probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, so long as the dog's reliability is
established"]; US v. $42,500 (9C 2002) 283 F3 977, 983
["Sutter's alert is afforded greater weight due to the undisputed
evidence that Sutter had sophisticated training and would not
alert to generally circulated currency."]. OTHER:
US v. Ludwig (10C 2011) 641 F3 1243, 1250-51 ["a positive
alert by a certified drug dog is generally enough, by itself, to
give officers probable cause to search a vehicle"].

[24] 9th CIR: US v.
$42,500 (9C 2002) 283 F3 977, 983 ["Sutter's alert is
afforded greater weight due to the undisputed evidence that Sutter
had sophisticated training and would not alert to generally
circulated currency."]. OTHER: US v. Grupee (1C
2012) 682 F3 143, 147 ["The reasonableness of relying on the
behavior of a police dog depends on what one knows about the dog
and the person who handles it"].

[25] USSC:
Florida v. Harris (2013) 568 US 237, 246 ["evidence of a
dog's satisfactory performance in a certification or training
program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert"].
9th CIR: US v. Gadson (9C 2014) 763 F3 1189, 1203
["Investigator Moore and Marley were certified as a K–9
team in June 2010. Investigator Moore testified that he had been a
canine handler since May 2010 and had received four-and-a-half
weeks of training. Marley had been trained by another officer to
detect marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. According
to Investigator Moore, Marley had practiced in a variety of
training scenarios to ensure that he was reliably detecting the
presence of various odors rather than simply associating them with
one specific set of circumstances."]. OTHER:
US v. Tuton (8C 2018) 893 F3 562, 570 [the officer
"testified that he and Hemi completed a 320–hour training course
in 2013, and that Hemi had earned a high accuracy rating for
positive and negative alerts and had trained in varied
environments"]; US v. Bentley (7C 2015) 795 F3 630, 636
[K9's 59.5% field-accuracy rate "is good enough to support a
finding of his reliability"]; US v. Holleman (8C 2014) 743
F3 1152, 1157 ["in-field" accuracy record of 57%];
US v. Ruiz (10C 2012) 664 F3 833, 841 [70% reliability rate
was sufficient]; US v. Ludwig (10C 2011) 641 F3 1243, 1252
[K9's 58% accuracy rate was sufficient to establish probable
cause].

[26] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Simpkins (1C 2020) 978 F3 1, 9. OTHER:
US v. Perez (8C 2022) 29 F4 975, 986 [despite false
positives, the K9's reliability was "higher than the accuracy
rates of other drug-sniffing dogs which have been deemed
reliable"].

[27] CAL: P v. Crenshaw (1992) 9
CA4 1402, 1415 ["the suspicious door panel was not an unlikely
repository of narcotics"]. 9th CIR: US v. Ewing (9C
2011) 638 F3 1226, 1233, fn.6 ["Courts frequently have noted the
use of hidden compartments in drug trafficking operations."
Citations omitted.]. OTHER: US v. Guevara (8C 2013)
731 F3 824, 832 ["we think a hidden compartment in a car,
particularly one hidden inside an engine, is far less likely to
contain non-contraband or have a non-illegal purpose than a
miscellaneous bulge in someone's clothing"];
US v. Anderson (10C 1997) 114 F3 1059, 1066 ["Evidence of a
hidden compartment can contribute to a finding of probable cause
to search."]; US v. Strickland (11C 1990) 902 F2 937, 943
["The tire's bent rim, extreme weight, and flopping sound,
provided the officer with at least probable cause to believe that
something had been secreted in the tire."]; US v. Price (5C
1989) 869 F2 801, 804 ["Once the agents had discovered the secret
compartment they had probable cause to search the compartment
itself."]. Also see US v. Santana-Aguirre (8C 2008) 537 F3
929, 933 ["the layering of the candle was inconsistent, there were
bumps separating the different layers of the candle. The original
packaging had been removed, torn, and then re-taped. There were
also holes around the candlewick."].

[28] CAL: P v.
Gonzales (1989) 216 CA3 1185, 1189, 1191; P v.
Guy (1980) 107 CA3 593, 598 ["Armed with the belief
defendant was intoxicated, [the officer] had the right to conduct
a reasonable search for intoxicants in the interior of
defendant's car."]; P v. Black (1985) 173 CA3 506,
509 ["fair to poor" response on FSTs plus odor of marijuana].
9th CIR: US v. Ewing (9C 2011) 638 F3
1226, 1232 [that the suspect appeared to be under the influence of
a stimulant "helps to establish a fair probability that a search
of the car would yield evidence of contraband"].

[29] OTHER: US v. Coleman (8C
2012) 700 F3 329, 337 ["Once Trooper Bauer observed the
weapons-type bag in plain view during the lawful protective sweep,
and the bag was readily identifiable as a gun case, the trooper
had probable cause to believe the bag contained contraband"].

[30] CAL: P v.
DeCosse (1986) 183 CA3 404, 411. OTHER: US
v. Doward (1C 1994) 41 F3 789, 793 [officer saw a
gun cleaning kit].

[31] CAL: P v. Tran (2019) 42
CA5 1, 34 [the officer "logically focused on the dashboard camera,
a device with the capability to record the events leading to the
collision"].

[32] CAL: P v. Carpenter (1999)
21 C4 1016, 1043 [because the crimes under investigation were
serial murders that occurred on or near hiking trails in Marin
County, the existence of maps, books, and schedules pertaining to
hiking in the area was proven circumstantially]. 9th CIR;
US v. Wong (9C 2003) 334 F3 831, 836 [the existence of a
map of a certain remote area in Nevada was based on information
that the murder suspect had driven the victim's body from Pinole
to that area; therefore, it was reasonable to believe he would
have needed a map].

[33] CAL: P v. Golden (1971) 20
CA3 211, 218-19 (dis. opn. of Kaus. J.) ["We have all handled
enough narcotics cases and thus gained knowledge of the habits of
peddlers, that we may perhaps reasonably suspect that such a
person who deals a small amount of merchandise from his home, has
more where it came from."]

[34] EXAMPLES: The discovery of the
following evidence has been found to establish probable cause to
search for more:

Drugs: See P v. Dey (2000) 84 CA4
1318, 1322 ["We find that a person of ordinary caution would
conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion that even if
defendant makes only personal use of the marijuana found in his
day planner, he might stash additional quantities for future use
in other parts of the vehicle, including the trunk."];
P v. Hunt (1990) 225 CA3 498, 509 [discovery of two
rocks of cocaine provided probable cause to search trunk for
more]; P v. Brocks (1981) 124 CA3 959, 963
["It requires no perspicacious intellect to reason the person
smoking one marijuana cigarette may well want another and will
carry sufficient marijuana to satisfy his appetite of the
moment."]; US v. Briscoe (8C 2003) 317 F3 9065, 908 ["Many
of our cases recognize that the recovery of drugs or drug
paraphernalia from the garbage contributes significantly to
establishing probable cause."];
P v. Superior Court (Marcil) (1972) 27 CA3 404, 413
["Numerous cases have upheld search warrants on the theory that
one who sells narcotics may have more at his residence or place of
operations."]; US v. Brooks (6C 2010) 594 F3 488, 494
[officers are not required "to assume that Brooks had just smoked
his last bit of marijuana immediately before the officers
arrived"]; US v. Carswell (7C 2021) 996 F3 785, 792 ["The
trash pull found drugs, drug residue, drug packaging materials,
and a receipt for a firearm and ammunition, providing substantial
reason to think one might find drug-distribution and firearm
evidence in the Carswell residence."]; US v. Jones (4C
2020) 951 F3 153, 159 [from the discovery of a lit marijuana
cigarette in the suspect's home, officers could reasonably infer
that the cigarette "was most likely but a single portion of a
larger quantity that was stored elsewhere in the house"];
P v. Coleman (1991) 229 CA3 321, 327 ["Clearly there was
probable cause to believe Brocks possessed more contraband in the
pocket in which he had disposed of his roach and clip."].

Exception: Drugs for personal use: The discovery of drugs
for personal use in the suspect's possession will not, without
more, provide grounds to search for additional drugs. CAL:
P v. Lee (2019) 40 CA5 853, 861 ["we attach fairly minimal
significance to the presence of a legal amount of [marijuana] on
Lee's person"]; P v. Pressey (2002) 102 CA4 1178, 1190 [in
the absence of additional proof, illegal drug use "does not
necessarily provide probable cause to search the user's
residence"]. OTHER: US v. McPhearson (6C 2006) 469
F3 518, 525 ["In the absence of any facts connecting McPhearson to
drug trafficking, the affidavit in this case cannot support an
inference that evidence of wrongdoing would be found in
McPhearson's home because drugs were found on his person."]. Also
see P v. Thuss (2003) 107 CA4 221, 235.

Open beer can: P v. McNeal (1979) 90 CA3 830,
841; P v. Chapman (1990) 224 CA3 253, 256;
P v. Suennen (1980) 114 CA3 192, 202; P v.
Carter (1985) 163 CA3 1183, 1185; P v.
DeCosse (1986) 183 CA3 404, 410-11.

Illegal weapons: Messerschmidt v. Millender (2012)
565 US 535, 549 ["given Bowen's possession of one illegal gun, his
gang membership, his willingness to use the gun to kill someone,
and his concern about the police, a reasonable officer could
conclude that there would be additional illegal guns"]; P
v. Osborne (2009) 175 CA4 1052, 1065 [illegal
possession of firearm provided grounds to search for "additional
items related to the crime"]; P v. Benites (1992) 9
CA4 309, 328 [when the deputy "found the loaded shotgun, probable
cause to search the rest of the van was created"]; P v.
Nicholson (1989) 207 CA3 707, 712 [handgun under the front
seat]; P v. Superior Court (Sanders) (1979) 99 CA3
130, 134 [concealed weapon and cartridges in passenger
compartment]; P v. Stafford (1973) 29 CA3 940, 948
["Being possessed of probable cause that the automobile contained
stolen property and dangerous weapons, the officers were
reasonably justified in continuing their search for other property
that might have been stolen or other dangerous
instrumentalities"]; P v. DeCosse (1986) 183 CA3
404, 411.

Bombs and incendiary devices: US v.
Noster (9C 2009) 573 F3 664, 675 ["The discovery of this
[incendiary] device provided probable cause to search the truck
and camper for additional evidence of criminal activity."].

Blood: P v. Kraft (2000) 23 C4 978, 1044.

Stolen property: US v. Holzman (9C
1989) 871 F2 1496, 1506 [they were carrying "numerous counterfeit
credit and identification cards, large amounts of cash
[suggesting] that additional items of that sort existed
elsewhere."]; P v. Evans (1973) 34 CA3 175,
180 [upon finding $21,000 in cash in the suspect's car, and
suspecting it might be loot from a robbery, officers could search
for more]; US v. Jones (3C 1993) 994 F2 1051,
1057 ["The presence of some stolen property in Daniel's residence
reasonably could have suggested to the magistrate judge that other
contraband was not far away."].

Child pornography: US v. Schesso (9C 2013) 730 F3
1040, 1045 [having probable cause that defendant uploaded child
pornography from his home computer, "there was probable cause to
believe Schesso had other child pornography material as well";
court also noted that "Schesso did not merely possess a commercial
child pornography video, which might have resulted from a onetime
accidental downloading or inadvertent receipt"]. But also see
US v. Raymonda (2C 2015) 780 F3 105, 117 ["a single
incident of access does not create a fair probability that child
pornography will still be found on a suspect's computer months
after all temporary traces of that incident have likely cleared"].

Only part of evidence left behind: If the perpetrator left
behind only a portion of some evidence, the existence of the
remainder of the item may be reasonably inferred. For example, in
P v. Webb (1993) 6 C4 494, 521 the court ruled that because
duct tape had been used to bind the murder victims, it was
reasonable for officers to infer that the remainder of the role
still existed.

[35] CAL: P v. Frank (1985) 38
C3 711, 727 ["the standard of probable cause is whether the
affidavit [1] states facts [2] that make it substantially probable
[3] that there is specific property [4] lawfully subject to
seizure [5] presently located [6] in the particular place for
which the warrant is sought"].

[36] CAL: P v. Garcia (2003) 111
CA4 715, 721 ["The affidavit must establish a nexus between the
criminal activities and the place to be searched."];
P v. Superior Court (Haflich) (1986) 180 CA3 759, 766 ["to
have a valid search the officers must have probable cause to
believe the object of the search is in the particular place to be
searched."]. 9th CIR: US v. Crews (9C 2007) 502 F3
1130, 1136-37 ["For probable cause, an affidavit must establish a
reasonable nexus between the crime or evidence and the location to
be searched."]; US v. Fernandez (9C 2004) 388 F3 1199, 1254
["we require only a reasonable nexus between the activities
supporting probable cause and the location to be searched"].
OTHER: US v. Orozco (4C 2022) 41 F4 403, 409 ["There
must also be some nexus between the suspected crime and the place
to be searched—a substantial likelihood that evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place."]; US v. Baker (6C
2020) 976 F3 636, 646 ["The search inquiry requires courts to ask
whether a 'nexus' exists between a crime and the place to be
searched"]; US v. Crawford (6C 2019) 943 F3 297, 308
["Generally speaking, to find probable cause justifying a warrant,
we require a 'nexus' between the place to be searched and the
evidence sought."]; US v. Berry (6C 2009) 565 F3 332, 338
["To meet the nexus requirement of probable cause, the
circumstances must indicate why evidence of illegal activity will
be found in a particular place."]; US v. Terry (6C 2008)
522 F3 645, 648 ["there must be some nexus between the illegal
activity suspected and the property to be searched"].

[37] QUOTE FROM: US v. Gann (9C
1984) 732 F2 714, 722. CAL: P v.
Sandlin (1991) 230 CA3 1310, 1315 ["A magistrate is
entitled to rely upon the conclusions of experienced law
enforcement officers ... as to where evidence of crime is likely
to be found."]; 9th CIR: US v. Kvashuk (9C 2022) 29
F4 1077, 1085 ["The nexus between the items to be seized and the
place to be searched can rest on normal inferences as to where a
criminal would likely hid evidence of his crimes."];
Johnson v. Walton (9C 2009) 558 F3 1106, 1111
["A better warrant application in this case would have explicitly
stated that, in [the officer's] investigative experience, she
knows that owners of prostitution houses often keep evidence of
these illegal businesses… in their homes."]; US
v. Ayers (9C 1991) 924 F2 1468, 1479 ["a magistrate
may rely on the conclusions of experienced law enforcement
officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be
found"]; US v. Elliott (9C 2003) 322 F3 710,
717 [officer stated "that drug traffickers commonly carry related
evidence on their person"]. OTHER: US v.
Jones (3C 1993) 994 F2 1051, 1056 ["probable cause can be,
and often is, inferred by considering the type of crime, the
nature of the items sought, the suspect's opportunity for
concealment and normal inferences about where a criminal might
hide stolen property"]; US v. Pitts (8C 1993) 6 F3
1366, 1369 ["A magistrate may draw reasonable inferences about
where evidence is likely to be kept"].

[38] CAL: P v. Cleland (1990)
225 CA3 388, 392-93 [seizure of "significant amount of contraband
from a suspect's person, combined with an expert's opinion as to
the likelihood that additional contraband might be found at that
suspect's residence, can justify the issuance of a search warrant
for that suspect's residence"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Lopez-Soto (9C 2000) 205 F3 1101, 1105 ["An officer
is entitled to rely on his training and experience in drawing
inferences from the facts he observes, but those inferences must
also be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational
explanation."]. OTHER: US v. Orozco (7C 2009) 576 F3
745, 750 [the judge who issued the search warrant "was entitled to
credit [the officer's] lengthy experience and high degree of
confidence that the sought-after evidence was very likely to be
found in Orozco's home"].

[39] CAL: P v. Koch (1989) 209
CA3 770, 779 ["the total circumstances surrounding an arrest or
other criminal conduct can, without more, support a magistrate's
probable cause finding that the culprit's home is a logical place
to search for specific contraband"]; P v. Johnson (1971) 21
CA3 235, 243 ["Of importance here is the statement of the officer
that such persons routinely maintain their major stockpile away
from their residence and a smaller quantity at or near their
residence for the purpose of immediate sale."]. OTHER:
US v. Norey (8C 2022) 31 F4 631, 637 ["an officer and an
issuing judge may logically infer that a drug dealer would store
contraband at his residence"]; US v. Sumlin (6C 2020) 956
F3 879, 886] ["we have even gone so far to determine the existence
of a nexus between a defendant's residence and illegal drug
activity with no facts indicating that the defendant was
dealing drugs from his residence," citation omitted]; US
v. Carney (6C 2012) 675 F3 107, 1013 ["Just as a
thief may be expected to have stolen goods in his home, or a drug
dealer may be expected to have evidence of drug activity in his
home, a purveyor of counterfeit bills of different denominations
on different occasions may be expected to have evidence of that
activity in his home"]; US v. Aljabari (7C
2010) 626 F3 940, 946 ["When probable cause exists to believe an
individual has committed a crime involving physical evidence, and
when there is no articulable, non-speculative reason to believe
that evidence of that crime was not or could not have been hidden
in that individual's home, a magistrate will generally be
justified in finding probable cause to search that individual's
home."]; US v. Jones (3C 1993) 994 F2 1051, 1055-56 ["If
there is probable cause to believe that someone committed a crime,
then the likelihood that that person's residence contains evidence
of the crime increases."]. ALSO SEE: US v. White (6C
2021) 990 F3 488, 490 [the seller's "visit to White's house
between the offer and the same raised a common-sense inference and
a fair probability that he obtained drugs from White's house"];
US v. Artez (10C 2004) 389 F3 1106, 1110 [probable cause to
search existed when an officer twice saw an informant exit the
defendant's residence during a drug transaction].
NOTE: Suspect moved: If officers had probable cause to
believe that the evidence was in the suspect's home, but the
suspect subsequently moved, it may be reasonable to believe that
he took the evidence to his new home. See
P v. Lazarus (2015) 238 CA4 734, 765 [court rejects the
argument that the suspect's "move from one residence to another
precluded a finding of a nexus between her current home and the
evidence sought, the warrants specifically sought photographs,
journals and diaries. A person does not normally discard such
items, even after several moves"]; US v. Summage (8C 2007)
481 F3 1075, 1078.

[40] EXAMPLES: Where there is probable
cause to believe the suspect possesses the following evidence, it
is usually reasonable to believe he keeps it at his home:

Stolen property: P v.
Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145 [reasonable to believe that
fruits and instrumentalities of recent burglary would be found in
defendant's home]; P v. Schilling (1987) 188 CA3
1021, 1030 ["there was a fair probability that her purse could be
located at defendant's residence"]; P v.
Schoennauer (1980) 103 CA3 398, 410 [stolen stereo
speakers]; US v. Lucarz (9C 1970) 430 F2
1051, 1055 [stolen registry envelopes]; US v.
Jones (3C 1993) 994 F2 1051, 1056 ["cash is the type of
loot that criminals seek to hide in secure places like their
homes"]; US v. Hendrix (7C 1985) 752 F2 1226,
1231 ["it was likely that they would conceal the cash [from a bank
robbery] in the apartment rather than in some less secure and
accessible place"]; US v. Jackson (9C 1985)
756 F2 703, 705 ["It was a reasonable inference that Jackson might
keep stolen currency in his apartment from a bank robbery two
months earlier."]; US v. Laury (5C 1993) 985
F2 1293, 1314 [affiant stated that "individuals who commit bank
robberies tend to keep evidence and instrumentalities of their
robberies [in] their homes."].

Business records: US v. Khan (10C 2021) 989 F3 806,
816 [reasonable to believe that a physician would take business
records to his home]; P v. Ulloa (2002) 101 CA4 1000, 1007
["But home computers are now common, and the officers had specific
information that defendant had been communicating with the minor
by computer."]; US v. Kvashuk (9C 2022) 29 F4 1077, 1086
["based on the affiant's training and experience, people often
keep personal, financial, and tax records in their home, including
Bitcoin private keys"]; Peffer v. Stephens (6C 2018) 880 F3
256, 272 ["Computers are similar to guns, however, in that they
are both personal possessions often kept in their owner's
residence and therefore subject to the presumption that a nexus
exists between an object used in a crime and the suspect's current
residence."]; US v. Haymond (10C 2012) 672 F3 948, 959
[officer "observed a user with an IP address linked to Mr.
Haymond's residence who had numerous files of child pornography
available for other LimeWire users"]; US v. Perez (5C 2007)
484 F3 735, 741 [the witness "stated that the images she observed
appeared to be videos played on a television screen transmitted
via a web cam. There was therefore a basis to believe that the
suspect would have such videos in his residence"].

Letters: Would have established murder suspect's obsession
with victim's former lover: P v. Lazarus (2015) 238 CA4
734, 765 ["The affidavit also presented evidence of appellant's
apparent motive: her romantic obsession with the victim's
husband."].

Clothing, masks, disguises: P v.
Miller (1978) 85 CA3 194, 204 ["from the nature of the
crimes and the items sought, a magistrate can reasonably conclude
that a suspect's residence is a logical place to look for specific
incriminating items"]; US v. Gann (9C 1984)
732 F2 714, 722; US v. Collins (9C 1977) 559
F2 561, 565.

Firearms and other weapons: P v. Lee (2015) 242 CA4
161, 173 ["it is no great leap to infer that the most likely place
to keep a firearm is in one's home"]; P v.
Kraft (2000) 23 C4 978, 1049; P v.
McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 901; US v.
Crews (9C 2007) 502 F3 1130, 1137; P v.
Bennett (1998) 17 C4 373, 388; US v.
Gann (9C 1984) 732 F2 714, 722; Bastida v.
Henderson (5C 1973) 487 F2 860, 863; US v.
Williams (6C 2008) 544 F3 683, 688 ["Much like a bank
robber would keep the proceeds and instrumentalities of his
robbery in his home, so too could Williams be expected to keep the
instrumentalities of his [robbery] at his residence."].

Drugs and sales paraphernalia: P v.
Pressey (2002) 102 CA4 1178, 1185 ["evidence of drug
dealing, by itself, can furnish probable cause to search the
dealer's residence"]; P v. Garcia (2003) 111 CA4
715, 721 ["The right of access to the residence leads to a
reasonable inference that the seller of controlled substances will
store the controlled substances at his residence."]; P v.
Koch (1989) 209 CA3 770, 780 [officer reasonably concluded
"that because defendant was a trafficker in illegal drugs his
residence was a likely depository for more contraband or
evidence"]; US v. Job (9C 2017) 851 F3 889, 901 ["a
magistrate is allowed to draw a reasonable inference that in the
case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the
dealers live"]; US v. Cardoza (DCC 2013) 713 F3 656, 661
["the conclusion that there was probable cause to believe Cardoza
was involved in drug trafficking leads to the further conclusion
that there was probable cause to search Cardoza's apartment"];
P v. Thuss (2003) 107 CA4 221, 235 ["The discovery
of recently cut marijuana stems and leaves in [a suspected
grower's trash can] establishes a fair probability that contraband
may be found in his residence."]; P v.
Flores (1979) 100 CA3 221, 233-34 [it was reasonable to
believe that drugs would be found in suspect's motel room];
P v. Cleland (1990) 225 CA3 388, 392-93 [seizure of
"significant amount of contraband from a suspect's person,
combined with an expert's opinion as to the likelihood that
additional contraband might be found at that suspect's residence,
can justify the issuance of a search warrant for that
suspect's residence"]; P v.
Superior Court (Marcil) (1972) 27 CA3 404, 414 ["Numerous
cases have upheld search warrants on the theory that one who sells
narcotics may have more at his residence or place or
operations."]; US v. Archibald (6C 2012) 685 F3 553, 558
["we have previously found that a single controlled purchase is
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that drugs are
present at the purchase location," citations omitted]; US
v. Spencer (DCC 2008) 530 F3 1003, 100 ["For the
vast majority of drug dealers, the most convenient location to
secure items is the home. After all, drug dealers don't tend to
work out of office buildings."]; US v. Chavez-
Miranda (9C 2002) 306 F3 973, 978 ["we have recognized that
in narcotics cases evidence is likely to be found where the
dealers live"]; US v. Fernandez (9C 2004) 388
F3 1199, 1254 ["a magistrate is allowed to draw the reasonable
inference that in the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to
be found where the dealers live"]; US v. White (6C 2021)
990 F3 488, 490 [drug seller twice visited the home of his
suspected source shortly before selling drugs to an undercover
officer]; US v. Orozco (7C 2009) 576 F3 745,
750 ["The issuing magistrate judge was entitled to credit [the
officer's] lengthy experience and high degree of confidence that
the sought-after evidence was very likely to be found in Orozco's
home."]; US v. Biglow (10C 2009) 562 F3 1272,
1283 ["[The agent] noted, in his affidavit, that drug dealers
often keep evidence related to their illegal activities at their
homes."]; US v. Brown (6C 2015) 801 F3 679, 689 [search OK
but a "close" case because "the affidavit contained no evidence
that Brown distributed narcotics from his home, that he used the
residence to store narcotics" or that a controlled purchase was
made at the home]; US v. Sanchez (10C 2009)
555 F3 910, 914 ["And we think it merely common sense that a drug
supplier will keep evidence of his crimes at his home."];
US v. Grossman (4C 2005) 400 F3 212, 218 ["it
is reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores drugs in a home
to which he owns a key"].

Torture devices: P v. Frank (1985) 38 C3 711,
728.

Explosives: P v. Barnum (1980) 113 CA3 340,
346.

Arson evidence: US v. Aljabari (7C
2010) 626 F3 940 [reasonable to search defendant's apartment for
evidence of an arson-caused fire at his store].

Child pornography: US v. Clark (7C
2012) 668 F3 934, 943 ["We have held that in child pornography
cases, an issuing judge may reasonably assume that a recipient or
collector of child pornography would store that content in his
home"]; US v. Potts (10C 2009) 586 F3 823;
US v. Hay (9C 2000) 231 F3 630, 635;
US v. Perez (5C 2007) 484 F3 735, 740-41.

[41] CAL: P v. Farley (2009) 46
C4 1053, 1101 [after a disgruntled employee murdered several
people at a business, it was reasonable to believe that documents
pertaining to defendant's employment at the business would be
found at the business and in defendant's work area]. OTHER:
US v. Harris (10C 2013) 735 F3 1187 [it was reasonable to
believe evidence of a murder would be found in a certain auto shop
because "the auto shop had been the front for illegal activity
before; that suspects in violent crimes sometimes use places like
the shop to hide incriminating evidence; and that on the very same
day [the officers] sought the warrant application [the suspect]
sought to evade police before proceeding to the shop"];
US v. Berry (6C 2009) 565 F3 332, 339 [officers had
probable cause to believe that the suspect had rented the location
under an alias and that he paid his rent in cash"];
US v. Word (6C 1986) 806 F2 658, 662 ["Since these
individuals were patients of the defendant, probable cause existed
for believing that their medical records would be located at the
defendant's office."]. COMPARE:
Fenwick & West v. Superior Court (1996) 43 CA4 1272,
1279 [insufficient link to law office].

[42] CAL: P v. Farley (2009) 46
C4 1053, 1100 [it was reasonable to believe that evidence
pertaining to the murder of several people at a business would be
found in a storage locker rented by the suspect three days before
the killings. Said the court, "in light of the circumstance that
any items stored in the locker were placed there sometime during
the three days preceding the shootings, a magistrate reasonably
could conclude there was probable cause to believe incriminating
evidence would be found in the storage locker"]. OTHER:
US v. Riley (2C 1990) 906 F2 841, 845 ["A
storage locker is surely a location where drugs held for
distribution or items purchased with drug proceeds might
reasonably be stored"]; US v. Curry (7C 2008) 538 F3 719,
729-30 [officers had probable cause to search a storage locker
rented by a bank robbery suspect because, shortly after the
robbery, witnesses had seen him dumping a bag from the locker into
a dumpster, and upon searching the dumpster, officers found that
the bag was "covered in a red dye consistent with the dye in the
bank's dye packs."].

[43] CAL: P v.
Dumas (1973) 9 C3 871, 885 ["we cannot disregard the
likelihood that a person who holds stolen property he wishes to
sell will attempt to conceal it in a place under his control that
is nearby and apparently secure"]. OTHER: US
v. Brown (DCC 2004) 374 F3 1326, 1329 ["Everyone
knows that drivers who lawfully purchase items at stores often
place their purchases in the trunks of their cars. Nothing in
common experience suggests that criminals act any differently."].

[44] USSC: New Jersey v.
T.L.O. (1985) 469 US 325, 345-46 ["if she did have
cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find
them"]. CAL: In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 CA4
1735, 1741-42 ["A student who carries a gun to school will
generally keep the gun in one of three places: (1) a locker, (2) a
backpack or purse or (3) on his person."]; P v.
Brocks (1981) 124 CA3 959, 963 [because the officers saw
the defendant smoking marijuana, they reasonably believed there
was more inside his change purse]. 9th CIR: US
v. Laury (5C 1993) 985 F2 1293, 1314 ["[The FBI
agent stated] that, based on his training, experience ...
individuals who commit bank robberies tend to keep evidence and
instrumentalities of their robberies in their personal possession,
as well as their homes."]; US v. Elliott (9C
2003) 322 F3 710, 717 ["The combined effect of information about
Elliott's recent drug activity and the declaration that drug
traffickers commonly carry related evidence on their person allows
a reasonable inference that evidence was likely to be kept on
Elliott's person."]; US v. Gomez-Soto (9C
1984) 723 F2 649, 655 ["The briefcase would be a logical container
for any of the many things specifically described in the
warrant."]. OTHER: US v. Gomez-Soto (8C 1984)
723 F2 649, 655 ["The briefcase would be a logical container for
any of the many things specifically described in the warrant."].

[45] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Eggerson (8C 2021) 999 F3 1121, 1127.

[46] USSC:
Riley v. California (2014) 573 US 373, 388 ["it is
reasonable to expect that incriminating information will be found
on a phone regardless of when the crime occurred"]. CAL:
P v. Meza (2023) __ CA5 __ [2023 WL 2923161] ["It was
reasonable for the magistrate to conclude the perpetrators were
carrying cell phones the morning of the murder and used them in
coordinating their movements [and] such an inference was
reasonable in today's society,"]; P v. Tousant (2021) 64
CA5 804, 819 [it was reasonable to believe that the suspect's
cellphone was used "to communicate plans for assault, to retain
photos of themselves with weapons, and to brag about completed
assaults"]. OTHER: US v. Eggerson (8C 2021) 999 F3
1121, 1127 ["It would be unreasonable and impractical to demand
that judges evaluating probable cause must turn a blind eye to the
virtual certainty that drug dealers use cell phones."].

[47] CAL: P v.
Ulloa (2002) 101 CA4 1000, 1007 ["It was reasonable to
assume that the computer would contain relevant incriminating
information, and that the computer would be located in defendant's
home."]; P v. Rangel (2012) 206 CA4 1310, 1316 [search for
gang indicia]. 9th CIR: US v. Kvashuk (9C 2022) 29
F4 1077, 1085 ["the nature of cybercrime—specifically, its
reliance on computers and personal electronic devices—is relevant
to probable cause for searching the suspect's residence"];
US v. Cartier (8C 2008) 543 F3 442 [although
no one saw child pornography on defendant's computer, it was
reasonable to believe it was there]; US v.
Gomez-Soto (9C 1984) 723 F2 649, 655 ["A microcassette is
by its very nature a device for recording information in
general.... The failure of the warrant to anticipate the precise
container in which the material sought might be found is not
fatal."]; US v. Riccardi (9C 2005) 405 F3
852, 860 ["The presence of a computer with an internet hook-up and
a Kinko's receipt indicating Mr. Riccardi had converted Polaroid
photos into digitized format, gives rise to a fair inference that
the computer will contain images similar to the photographs."].
OTHER: US v. Schave (8C 2022) 55 F4 671, 676 ["Given
the number of IP addresses and the reality that child pornography
is frequently stored in digital format, there was a fair
probability that child pornography would be located on multiple
devices within the Como residence"]; US v. Green (8C 2020)
954 F3 1119, 1123-24 [it was reasonable to believe that child
pornography was stored in suspect's cellphone];
US v. Soto (1C 2015) 799 F3 68, 85 ["Given the laptop's
proximity to the forged documents and its location in a
fraudulently registered vehicle, it was reasonable to believe that
the laptop might also be an instrument of [defendant's] criminal
activity and thus might contain additional evidence."]; US
v. Terry (6C 2008) 522 F3 645, 648 ["if a
pornographic image has originated or emanated from a particular
individual's email account, it logically follows that the image is
likely to be found on that individual's computer or on storage
media associated with the computer"]; US v. Alexander (8C
2009) 574 F3 484, 490 ["it was a fair inference that [child
pornography] would be found on digital devices"];
US v. Rogers (1C 2008) 521 F3 5, 10 ["the term 'photos'
reasonably includes images captured on videotapes or by a digital
camera"]; US v. Hager (8C 2013) 710 F3 830, 835 [warrant to
search for child pornography impliedly authorizes a search of VHS
tapes"]; US v. Cartier (8C 2008) 543 F3 442 [FBI agents had
probable cause to search the defendant's home computer for child
pornography because they received information from Spanish law
enforcement that child pornography originating in Spain had been
downloaded to that computer."]; US v. Vosburgh (3C 2010)
602 F3 512, 527 [it was reasonable to believe that data or
graphics are now stored on a certain computer because officers
established that the data or graphics were sent to or received by
the IP address assigned to that computer];
US v. Riccardi (8C 2005) 405 F3 852, 860 ["The presence of
a computer with an internet hook-up and a Kinko's receipt
indicating Mr. Riccardi had converted Polaroid photos into
digitized format, gives rise to a fair inference that the computer
will contain images similar to the photographs."];
US v. Haymond (10C 2012) 672 F3 948, 959 [officer "observed
a user with an IP address linked to Mr. Haymond's residence who
had numerous files of child pornography available for other
LimeWire users"]; US v. Khanani (11C 2007) 502 F3 1281,
1290 [tax records in tax preparer's office computer].

[48] CAL: P v. Lazarus (2015)
238 CA4 734, 765 ["A person does not normally discard such items,
even after several moves."].

[49] CAL: P v.
Dumas (1973) 9 C3 871, 885 ["When the officers were unable
to discover the bonds in defendant's apartment, his automobile,
parked outside on the street, quite naturally became an object of
strong suspicion."]; P v. Carrillo (1995) 37 CA4
1662, 1669 [because the drugs were not found on the suspect's
person, the officer could reasonably believe they were inside his
car]. 9th CIR: US v. Spearman (9C
1976) 532 F2 132, 133 ["we have upheld many searches where the
nexus between the items to be seized and the place to be searched
rested not on direct observation"]; US v.
Vesikuru (9C 2002) 314 F3 1116, 1123 [where evidence could
logically be in one of two places, and where officers eliminated
one of those places, probable cause to search the other was
established]. OTHER: US v. Rasberry (1C 2018) 882 F3
241, 250 ["The officers had been told by Rasberry's accomplice
that there were drugs in the motel room and, after scouring the
room in vain, the only place that had not yet been searched was
Rasberry's person."]; US v. Anchondo (10C
1998) 156 F3 1043, 1045 ['Even if the subsequent fruitless search
of the car diminished the probability of contraband being in the
car, it increased the chances that whatever the dog had alerted to
was on the defendants' bodies."].

[50] CAL: P v. Cooks (1983) 141
CA3 224, 298 ["an affidavit in support of a search warrant must
provide probable cause to believe the material to be seized is
still on the premises to be searched when the warrant is sought"].
OTHER: US v. Knox (10C 2018) 883 F3 1262, 1276-77
["Whether information is sufficiently stale to foreclose probable
cause depends on the nature of the criminal activity, the length
of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized."];

[51] CAL: P v. Gibson (2001) 90
CA4 371, 380 ["The general rule is that information that is remote
in time may be deemed to be stale and therefore unreliable."];
P v. McDaniels (1994) 21 CA4 1560, 1564;
P v. Mesa (1975) 14 C3 466, 470. OTHER:
US v. Johnson (DCC 2006) 437 F3 69, 72 ["Everything else
being equal, dated information is less likely to show probable
cause than fresh evidence."]. NOTE: Although staleness
usually depends on the time lapse between the circumstances in the
affidavit and the issuance of the warrant, the courts may also
consider the amount of time that lapsed between issuance
and execution. If, however, the court finds that the listed
evidence was probably at the place to be searched at the time the
warrant was issued, it will be presumed the evidence remained
there for ten days after issuance. Pen. Code§ 1534(a);
P v. Cleland (1990) 225 CA3 388, 394;
P v. Kibblewhite (1986) 178 CA3 783, 785. The defense may
rebut this presumption. P v. Hernandez (1974) 43 CA3 581,
590, fn.3; P v. Clayton (1993) 18 CA4 440, 447.

[52] OTHER:
Andresen v. State (1975) 24 Md.App. 128, 172 ["The
likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place is a
function not simply of watch and calendar but of variables that do
not punch a clock: the character of the crime (chance encounter in
the night or regenerating conspiracy?), of the criminal (nomadic
or entrenched?), of the thing to be seized (perishable and easily
transferable or of enduring utility to its holder?), of the place
to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure
operational base?), etc. The observation of a half-smoked
marijuana cigarette in an ashtray at a cocktail party may well be
stale the day after the cleaning lady has been in; the observation
of the burial of a corpse in a cellar may well not be stale three
decades later. The hare and the tortoise do not disappear at the
same rate of speed."]; US v.
Morales-Aldahondo (1C 2008) 524 F3 115, 119 ["When
evaluating a claim of staleness, we do not measure the timeliness
of information simply by counting the number of days that have
elapsed. Instead, we must assess the nature of the information,
the nature and characteristics of the suspected criminal activity,
and the likely endurance of the information."]; US
v. Urban (3C 2005) 404 F3 754, 774 ["we must also
examine the nature of the crime and the type of evidence"];
US v. Steeves (8C 1975) 525 F2 33, 38
["While the lapse of time involved is an important consideration
and may in some cases be controlling, it is not necessarily so."].

[53] Blood traces:
P v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 101.

[54] Business records (including drug
sales: Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 US 463, 478, fn.9
["it is eminently reasonable to expect that such [business]
records would be maintained in those offices for a period of time
and surely as long as the three months"]; US v. Kvashuk (9C
2022) 29 F4 1077, 1087 ["Given the long memory of computers,
evidence of a crime typically remains on a computer even if the
defendant attempts to delete it."];
McKirdy v. Superior Court (1982) 138 CA3 12, 26 ["what the
Fraud Unit sought was no evanescent contraband but rather business
and professional records which presumably would be retained
unaltered for periods of several years"];
US v. Johnson (DCC 2006) 437 F3 69, 72 [records of drug
sales]; US v. Nguyen (8C 2008) 526 F3 1129, 1134 ["Nguyen
would have needed to maintain accurate records about how much he
had purchased and the status of the account balances"];
US v. Word (6C 1986) 806 F2 658, 662 ["the documents sought
were business records prepared and kept in the ordinary course of
business."]; US v. Dozier (9C 1988) 844 F2 701, 707 ["The
documentary records sought are the type of records typically found
to be maintained over long periods of time."].

[55] 9th CIR: US v. Kvashuk (9C
2022) 29 F4 1077, 1087.

[56] Child pornography:
US v. Schesso (9C 2013) 730 F3 1040, 1047 [the affiant
"explained that individuals who possess, distribute, or trade in
child pornography 'rarely, if ever, dispose of sexually explicit
images of children' because these images are treated as 'prized
possessions'"]; US v. Irving (2C 2006) 452 F3 110, 125
["When a defendant is suspected of possessing child pornography,
the staleness determination is unique because it is well known
that images of child pornography are likely to be hoarded by
persons interested in those materials in the privacy of their
homes."]; US v. Johnson (8C 2017) 848 F3 872, 877 ["the
affidavit alleges a number of very detailed occurrences of sexual
assault against a minor over a period of time"];
US v. Morgan (8C 2016) 842 F3 1070, 1074 ["Periods much
longer than 75 or 51 days have not rendered information stale in
computer-based child-pornography cases."]; US v.
Vosburgh (3C 2010) 602 F3 512, 528 [4 months]; US
v. Estey (8C 2010) 595 F3 836, 840 [5 months];
US v. Pappas (7C 2010) 592 F3 799, 803 [18
months]; US v. Lemon (8C 2010) 590 F3 612,
614 ["Possession of child pornography is a crime that is
continuing in nature"]; US v. Potts (10C
2009) 586 F3 823, 831 ["possessors of child pornography are likely
to hoard their materials and maintain them for significant periods
of time"]; US v. Paull (6C 2009) 551 F3 516,
522 ["the same time limitations that have been applied to more
fleeting crimes do not control the staleness inquiry for child
pornography"]; US v. Morales-Aldahondo (1C
2008) 524 F3 115, 119 [three years OK]; US v.
Terry (6C 2008) 522 F3 645, 650, fn.2 [warrant OK even
though it was executed five months after the computer was used to
transmit child pornography]; US v. Gourde (9C en
banc 2006) 440 F3 1065, 1072 [collectors of child pornography "are
inclined to download and keep such images for a long period of
time, and they rarely, if ever, dispose of their sexually explicit
materials"]; US v. Newsom (7C 2005) 402 F3
780, 783 ["Information a year old is not necessarily stale as a
matter of law, especially where child pornography is concerned."];
US v. Hay (9C 2000) 231 F3 630, 636
[affidavit explained that collectors and distributors of child
pornography value their sexually explicit material highly, rarely
if ever dispose of it, and store it for long periods in a secure
place."].

[57] Clothing: US v. Laury (5C
1993) 985 F2 1293, 1314, fn.25 [clothes worn during bank robbery];
US v. Steeves (8C 1975) 525 F2 33, 38 [ski mask];
US v. Gann (9C 1984) 732 F2 714, 722;
US v. Collins (9C 1977) 559 F2 561, 565.

[58] Firearms and ammo:
P v. Bryant (2014) 60 C4 335, 369 ["Particularly with
regard to the staleness question, the affidavit recites that guns
are valuable and difficult to obtain, particularly by ex-convicts
and parolees. Suspects often retain guns along with ammunition,
documents, and gun-related equipment after a crime is
committed."]; P v. Weston (1981) 114 CA3 764, 775
[it was reasonable to believe that a firearm would be inside a
getaway four days after robbery]; P v. Cooks (1983)
141 CA3 224, 298 [the evidence consisted of "weapons and
instruments used in the commission of numerous murders and
shootings"]; US v. Hicks (7C 2011) 650 F3
1058, 1068 ["evidence of the sighting of a gun (or related items)
does not automatically grow stale as time passes"]; US
v. Neal (8C 2008) 528 F3 1069, 1074 [individuals who
possess firearms tend to keep them for long periods of time"];
US v. Maxim (8C 1995) 55 F3 394, 397
["firearm enthusiasts tend to keep their weapons for long periods
of time"]; US v. Perry (8C 2008) 531 F3 662,
666 ["our case law suggests that firearms may be retained for long
periods of time"]; US v. Diecidue (5C 1979)
603 F2 535, 560 [it was reasonable to believe that bullets fired
four months earlier would be in the walls and floors of a house
because "floor and walls of a house are relatively permanent
fixtures and would not likely be subject to removal over a period
of four months"].

[59] Fruits and instrumentalities:
P v. Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 163-64 [it was reasonable
to believe that fruits and instrumentalities of burglary—stolen
checks and keys—would be at defendant's home two months after
burglary]; P v. Gee (1982) 130 CA3 174, 182 [gloves and
pillowcase used by burglar];
P v. Superior Court (Brown) (1975) 49 CA3 160, 167;
P v. Cooks (1983) 141 CA3 224, 298;
P v. Frank (1985) 38 C3 711, 728; US v. Laury (5C
1993) 985 F2 1293, 1314 [handcuffs]. Compare
US v. Steeves (8C 1975) 525 F2 33, 38 ["there was little
reason to believe that any of the bank's money or the money bag
would still be in the home [three months after the robbery"]].

[60] Identity theft: Like business and
financial records, evidence of identity theft may be retained for
longer periods. P v. Jones (2013) 217 CA4 735, 791 ["This
ongoing operation… provided probable cause in September
2004, when the warrant was issued, that evidence of crime would be
found in defendant's residence."].

[61] Stolen property: P v.
Weston (1981) 114 CA3 764, 775 [stolen jewelry four days
after robbery]; P v. Cletcher (1982) 132 CA3 878,
883 [art stolen two years earlier]; US v.
Gann (9C 1984) 732 F2 714, 722 [stolen credit cards];
P v. Superior Court (Brown) (1975) 49 CA3 160, 167
[stolen antiques and credit cards]. Also see State
v. Multaler (Wis. 2002) 643 NW2 437, 446 [there was
probable cause to believe that evidence of murder victims'
possessions would be in the home of the suspected serial killer
even though the murders occurred 20 years earlier].

[62] CAL: P v. Hulland (2003)
110 CA4 1646, 1652 ["If circumstances would justify a person of
ordinary prudence to conclude that an activity had continued to
the present time, then the passage of time will not render the
information stale."]; P v. Medina (1985) 165 CA3 11,
20 [court notes "the ongoing nature of the activity on the
premises"]; P v. Lim (2000) 85 CA4 1289, 1298;
9th CIR: US v. Foster (9C 1983) 711 F2
871, 878 ["large-scale ongoing criminal organization"].
OTHER: US v. Huerra (5C 2018) 884 F3 511, 516
["older tips are not stale if the affidavit clearly shows a
long-standing, ongoing pattern of criminal activity"];
US v. Perry (6C 2017) 864 F3 412, 415 ["We have recognized
a general principle that when 'the affidavit properly recites
facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a
course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less
significant."]; US v. Roach (10C 2009) 582 F3
1192, 1201 ["As is only logical, ongoing and continuous activity
makes the passage of time less critical"]; US v.
Palega (8C 2009) 556 F3 709, 715 ["continuing pattern of
behavior"]; US v. Newton (6C 2004) 389 F3
631, 635-36 ["with continuing criminal operations, any issue of
staleness [of information regarding past criminal activity], or
the lack of a direct known link between the criminal activity and
residence, becomes minimal"]; US v. Urban (3C
2005) 404 F3 754, 775 [bribery was "routine and continuous"].

[63] USSC: US v.
Russell (1973) 411 US 423, 432 ["The illicit manufacture of
drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident"]. CAL:
P v. Wilson (1986) 182 CA3 742, 755
["methamphetamine factory"].

[64] CAL: P v.
Mikesell (1996) 46 CA4 1711, 1719 ["ongoing drug sales"];
P v. Gray (1976) 63 CA3 282, 289 ["These
factual observations give rise to the reasonable inference that
Gray was using the apartment on a continuous basis to engage in
illegal marijuana activities and that the apartment contained
marijuana."]; P v. Murphy (1974) 42 CA3 81, 87
["continuous course of conduct in the sale of heroin at Murphy's
house"]; P v. Hernandez (1974) 43 CA3 581, 586
[possession for sale; 12 days OK but "on the fringe of
unreasonableness"]. 9th CIR: US v.
Fernandez (9C 2004) 388 F3 1199, 1254 ["in cases involving
ongoing narcotics businesses, lapses of several months—and up to
two years in certain circumstances—are not sufficient to render
the information in an affidavit too stale to support probable
cause"]. OTHER: US v. Crawford (6C 2019) 943 F3 297,
309 [controlled buy of drugs]; US v. Faulkner (6C 2016) 826
F3 1139, 1146-47 ["ongoing drug-dealing activity"];
US v. Davis (8C 2017) 867 F3 1021, 1028 ["Because the
underlying criminal activity was continuing in nature, probable
cause did not dissipate during the ten-day period between the last
identified drug-related activity and execution of the warrant."];
US v. Brown (6C 2015) 801 F3 679, 690 ["The character of
the crime suggests an ongoing drug trafficking conspiracy"];
US v. Garcia (10C 2013) 707 F3 1190, 1195 ["The affidavit's
statements regarding continuous criminal activity situate this
case within the case law making the passage of time less
critical."]; US v. Archibald (6C 2012) 685 F3 553, 558
[probable cause was not stale three days after controlled buy];
US v. Hyde (5C 1978) 574 F2 856, 865
[reasonable to infer "that if criminal conversations had been
occurring over this telephone line over the past 2 years, they had
not mysteriously stopped within the past month"]; US
v. Feliz (1C 1999) 182 F3 82, 87 [3 months OK].
COMPARE: P v. Hirata (2009) 175
CA4 1499, 1504 [8-week delay between suspect's purchase of $7,000
in cocaine from a drug organization rendered the information stale
because there was insufficient information to indicate the suspect
was anything other than a customer]; P v.
Hulland (2003) 110 CA4 1646, 1653 ["nothing about the
nature of the transaction here supports an inference that Hulland
continued to sell marijuana"].

[65] CAL: P v.
Hepner (1994) 21 CA4 761, 782-83 [ongoing insurance fraud].
OTHER: US v. Snow (10C 1990) 919 F2
1458, 1460 ["ongoing, continuous operation to defraud the
government"]; US v. Henson (6C 1988) 848 F2
1374, 1382 [odometer-tampering scheme].

[66] NOTE: See "Ongoing criminal
activity" (Child pornography), above.

[67] CAL: P v. Cooks (1983) 141
CA3 224, 298 [instrumentalities used in "numerous murders and
shootings over a period of six or seven months"];
P v. Miller (1978) 85 CA3 194, 204 ["continuing and ongoing
crime spree"]. 9th CIR: US v. Fries (9C 2015) 781 F3
1137, 1150 ["continuing pattern of vandalizing the homes"].

[68] CAL: Wood v.
Emmerson (2007) 155 CA4 1506, 1522.

[69] CAL: P v.
Stipo (2011) 195 CA4 664, 672-73.

[70] CAL: P v.
Webb (1993) 6 C4 494, 521 ["defendant had been in custody
on drug charges during the three and a half months since the
murders had occurred, thus suggesting he had not removed any
evidence from the car in the interim"].