Chapter 31: Vehicle Searches
Generally
Chapter structure
(1) Probable Cause Searches
(2) Reasonable Suspicion Searches
(3) Instrumentality Searches
(4) Inventory Searches
(5) Protective Searches
(6) ID and Registration Searches
(7) Other Vehicle Searches
Main issues
(1) Legal justification: Did officers have grounds to conduct the type of search they conducted?
(2) Scope: Was the search reasonable in its scope and intensity?
Related subjects covered elsewhere
Consent searches: Chapter 16 Consent Searches
Exigent circumstances: Chapter 19 Exigent Circumstance Searches.
Probation and parole searches: Chapter 25 Probation and Parole Searches
Probable Cause Searches
Generally: If officers have probable cause to search a vehicle located in a public place, they may search it without a warrant.[1] This is commonly known as the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.
Exigent circumstances not required: It does not matter that officers had sufficient time to secure the vehicle and apply for a warrant.[2]
Time limit: So long as probable cause continues to exist, the right to search does not expire.[3] But officers may not retain the car or container for an unreasonable amount of time, especially if the owner has requested its return.[4]
Search after vehicle towed: Officers may conduct the search at the scene or tow it and search later.[5]
Search of immobilized vehicle: There is no requirement that the vehicle be readily capable of moving.[6]
Search of private plane: The Second Circuit ruled that a small private plane could be searched for drugs without a warrant because the officers had probable cause.[7]
Misdemeanors and felonies: Neither the Supreme Court nor the California courts have ruled that probable cause vehicle searches are permitted only if the crime under investigation was a felony.
Marijuana searches: See Chapter 22 Marijuana Searches.
Scope of the search: Officers may search any place or thing in the vehicle in which the sought-after evidence could reasonably be found, as follows.[8]
Containers in the passenger compartment: Officers may search a container in the passenger compartment—including the glove box and console—if it is large enough to hold the evidence for which probable cause exists.[9] This includes containers belonging to passengers.[10] A search would not be permitted if it reasonably appeared that the container, as the result of its size, bulk, or weight, was incapable of holding the evidence.
Searching occupants: Officers may not search the clothing worn by the occupants unless they had reason to believe that the evidence was located in the occupant’s clothing.[11]
Trunk: Officers may search the trunk, including containers in which the evidence might reasonably be found.[12]
Under seats, floor mats: Officers may search under the seats, under the floor mats, and within the recesses of the seats if the evidence could have fit in these places.[13]
No cellphone searches: A search warrant is required to search cellphones and other electronic communications devices located in a vehicle; i.e., merely having probable cause is no longer sufficient. See Chapter 39 Electronic Communications and Records Searches.
Other option: If officers believe they have probable cause to search the phone, they may seize it and seek a warrant.[14]
Cursory examination: Because a weapon might be disguised as a cellphone, officers may conduct a physical examination of its exterior and case.[15]
Searching vehicle Event Data Recorders:
California law: Information stored in an Event Data Recorder (a.k.a. “Black box” or “Sensing and Diagnostic Module”) may not be downloaded or otherwise retrieved unless officers had obtained (1) a search warrant or other court order, or (2) the registered owner consented.[16] Officers may, however, seize the recorder and seek a warrant to search it if they reasonably believed that (1) evidence stored in the camera’s memory constituted evidence of a crime, and (2) they reasonably believed the evidence might be destroyed if they waited for a warrant to seize it.[17]
Fourth Amendment: Officers may download or otherwise search a black box if they had probable cause to believe the stored data was evidence of a crime.[18]
Limited probable cause: If officers know that the evidence is located only in a certain area or container in the vehicle, they may search that area or open that container but they may not search elsewhere.[19] For example, if officers were tracking a container of drugs, and if they saw someone put the container in a vehicle, they would have probable cause to enter the vehicle, seize the container and search it. But they could not ordinarily search anything else.
Causing damage: Officers may conduct a “probing” or reasonably thorough search.[20] Causing damage to the vehicle is permissible only if reasonably necessary and only if the damage was not excessive; e.g., OK to take paint samples from hit-and-run vehicle.[21] Suggestion: If damage will be necessary, seek a warrant if there is time.
Inventory Searches
Purpose of search: Unlike investigative vehicle searches whose objective is to find evidence of a crime, vehicle inventory searches are classified as “community caretaking” searches because the objectives of these searches are to (1) provide a record of the property inside the vehicle so as to furnish the owner with an accounting; (2) protect officers, their departments (and ultimately taxpayers) from false claims that property in the vehicle was lost, stolen, or damaged; and (3) protect officers and others from harm if the vehicle contained a dangerous device or substance.[22] An inventory search is permissible even though the vehicle will be stored in a secure location, such as an impound garage.[23]
Requirements: Vehicle inventory searches are permitted if (1) it was reasonably necessary to tow the vehicle under the circumstances, and (2) the search was conducted in accordance with standard procedures.[24]
Towing reasonably necessary
Generally
Vehicle Code authorization to tow: Although it is relevant that towing was permitted by one or more of the Vehicle Code sections that authorize towing under certain circumstances,[25] this does not automatically render the towing reasonably necessary.[26]
Towing per departmental policy: It is relevant that departmental policy required or permitted officers to tow the vehicle under the circumstances. In fact, a decision to tow is “more likely to satisfy the Fourth Amendment than one not made pursuant to standardized criteria,” but the “ultimate determination” is whether the decision to tow was objectively reasonable.[27]
Discretion permitted: A reasonable departmental policy does not become unreasonable merely because it gave officers some discretion in determining whether to tow under the circumstances.[28]
Noncompliance with policy: Searches that “materially deviate” from departmental policy may render the search unlawful. “However, minor noncompliance with department policy does not invalidate an otherwise lawful inventory search.”[29]
No “least intrusive means” test: Towing will not be deemed unreasonable merely because there was a less intrusive way of protecting the vehicle or its contents; e.g., locking the vehicle. See Chapter 8 Investigative Detentions (Duration of Detentions, No “least intrusive means” test).
No standardization requirement: If officers reasonably believed that towing was necessary, an inventory search will not be invalidated because towing was not authorized or required pursuant to standard procedures.[30]
Officer’s motivation
Mixed motivations: If towing was reasonably necessary, it is immaterial that the officers’ decision to tow was based in part on their suspicion that the vehicle contained evidence.[31]
Pretext towing: Even though towing was permitted by statute or departmental policy, an inventory search will be invalidated if officers towed the vehicle solely for the purpose of conducting a search.[32]
Reasonable necessity: The following are examples of circumstances that have been found to constitute reasonable necessity:
Traffic hazard: The vehicle constituted a traffic hazard or obstruction.[33]
Abandonment: The vehicle had been abandoned.[34]
Driver incapacitated: The driver has been incapacitated by injuries or illness.[35]
Driver arrested: Although the Vehicle Code authorizes towing when officers have arrested the driver or other person in control of the vehicle,[36] towing is permitted only if it was also reasonably necessary under the circumstances.[37]
Threat of theft or vandalism: Towing would ordinarily be reasonable if the vehicle was away from the arrestee’s home, especially if it was in a high-crime area where there existed a significant threat of theft or vandalism, or the car was in an isolated area, or the car could not be secured.[38]
Exception: Legally parked, safe: Towing would not ordinarily be reasonable if the vehicle could be parked and secured in a safe place.[39]
Exception: Passenger able to take car: There would usually be no need to tow a vehicle if the arrestee wanted a friend to take possession, provided the friend was licensed, insured, and could arrive within a reasonable amount of time.[40]
Vehicle on private property: If towing was reasonably necessary to protect the vehicle, it is immaterial that the vehicle was parked on private property.[41]
Vehicle forfeiture: Officers may tow a vehicle subject to forfeiture.[42]
Expired registration: The Vehicle Code authorizes towing if (1) the vehicle was on a street or public parking facility; and (2) the registration expired over six months earlier, or the registration sticker or license plate was issued for another vehicle or was forged.[43]
Unregistered autonomous vehicle: The vehicle was being operated autonomously without valid autonomous vehicle registration.[44]
Citations for Vehicle Code § 14601 or § 12500: The driver was given a notice to appear for violating either of these statutes.[45] The question arises: May officers tow a registered vehicle if the violator was going to be cited and release and there was a licensed and insured passenger who was willing to drive it? See this endnote.[46]
Vehicle in handicapped parking space: It is arguable that it is reasonably necessary to tow a vehicle that is illegally parked in a handicap parking spot.[47]
Standard search procedures: The second requirement is that the scope and intensity of the search must have been restricted by means of “standardized criteria or established routine.”[48]
Generally
Purpose of requirement: The Second Circuit explained the purpose of this requirement as follows: “When a police department adopts a standardized policy governing the search of the contents of impounded vehicles, the owners and occupants of those vehicles are protected against the risk that officers will use selective discretion, searching only when they suspect criminal activity and then seeking to justify the searches as conducted for inventory purposes.”[49]
Written and unwritten departmental policies: In the absence of a written departmental policy, it may suffice that there existed an unwritten departmental policy or standard procedure for conducting inventory searches.[50]
Seizing evidence in plain view: While conducting an inventory search, officers may seize any item in the vehicle if they have probable cause to believe it was contraband or other evidence of a crime. See Chapter 53 Plain View.
Second inventory searches: Officers may conduct a second inventory search at a later time if there was reason to believe that the first search was inadequate.[51] If a second search was reasonable, it is immaterial that the officer’s departmental search procedure did not expressly authorize a second inventory search.[52]
How to prove the existence of a policy: The most common way of proving the existence of a standard policy is to provide the court with a copy of the policy (if it was written) or present testimony from an officer that the department had implemented a policy—written or unwritten—on how inventory searches should be conducted.[53] See the endnote for an excerpt from a transcript of an officer’s testimony on this issue.[54]
What the policy must contain
CHP 180 form: A department may satisfy the “standardization” requirement by mandating that officers complete a CHP 180 form. This form requires, among other things, that officers list all “property” in the vehicle, including radios, tape decks, firearms, tools, and ignition keys; and list damage to the vehicle.[55]
Customized policy
General guidelines are sufficient: Agencies need not mandate the precise scope of the search.[56] Nor must the policy require a listing of every object in the vehicle.[57] It must, however, restrict the search to what is reasonably necessary “to produce an inventory.”[58]
Officer discretion is permitted: The policy may permit officers to exercise discretion in determining what to search, but officers must exercise their discretion based on community caretaking objectives—not investigative interests.[59] For example, a second inventory search may reasonably be necessary if officers had reason to believe they had overlooked valuable items inside during the first search.[60] Also see “Towing per departmental policy” (Officer discretion is permitted), above.
Thorough search: The policy may require a “thorough” search.[61]
Photographing property: If the vehicle contains so much property that a listing of each item would take an excessive amount of time, the policy may permit officers to photograph the property inside the vehicle.[62]
Items to be released to a third party: The policy may authorize a search of an item that, per the suspect’s request, will be turned over to a friend or other third party for safekeeping.[63]
Rental cars: The policy may authorize an inventory of property in rental cars.[64]
Where items commonly found: The policy may authorize officers to search places and things in which property will likely be found, including the glove box, consoles, under the seats.[65]
Searching trunk: The policy may authorize a search of the trunk.[66]
Searching motorcycles: The policy may authorize a search of motorcycles.[67]
Searching the engine compartment: There is authority to search the engine compartment.[68]
Searching under spare tire: There is authority to search under the spare tire.[69]
Searching closed containers: The policy may require a search of all containers, or prohibit officers from searching any containers, or it may give officers some discretion in determining which containers to search. If discretion is given, the policy should provide officers with some guidelines on how to exercise it; e.g. officers may search only those containers whose contents cannot be determined from the outside.[70]
Search under console: In one case, the court ruled it was reasonable for officers to believe that the space under the vehicle’s console was being used for storage.[71]
Containers belonging to non-suspects: Officers may search a container even if it did not belong to the driver or owner of the vehicle.[72]
No search of hidden compartments: Suspected hidden compartments in the vehicle may not be searched.[73]
Where items not commonly found: The policy may authorize officers to search areas and things in which property is not commonly found if they were aware of facts that reasonably indicated that property subject to inventorying would be found there.[74]
Searching places and things not in plain view: The policy need not limit the search to an inspection of things in plain view.[75]
Reading documents: The policy may require or permit officers to read documents in the vehicle,[76] and to look through notebooks and other multi-page documents to “ensure that there was nothing of value hidden between the pages.”[77]
No damage: Because inventory searches are based mainly on the need to protect the vehicle and its contents, the policy may not authorize officers to cause damage.[78]
Protective Searches
(searches for weapons)
When permitted: A protective vehicle search for weapons (a.k.a. “vehicle frisk”) may be conducted if the following circumstances existed:
(1) Lawful detention: Officers had lawfully detained an occupant of the vehicle.[79]
Compare: Occupant arrested: A protective search would not be permitted if the occupant had been subjected to a “full custodial arrest,” because he would (presumably) have been unable to access the vehicle’s interior.[80] But also see “Other Vehicle Searches” (Searches incident to arrest), below.
(2) Weapon inside: Officers had reason to believe that a conventional or virtual “weapon” was located in the passenger compartment.
Observation of a weapon: An officer’s observation of a weapon in the passenger compartment will satisfy this requirement. In this context, there are two types of “weapons”:
Conventional weapons: Conventional weapons consist mainly of instruments that are made for the purpose of harming or killing people; e.g., firearms, knives, brass knuckles, saps, billy clubs, and nunchakus.[81] If a conventional weapon is inside the passenger compartment, it is immaterial that the suspect legally possessed it.[82]
Virtual weapons: Virtual weapons are objects that can readily be used as weapons, although they are manufactured for other purposes; e.g., baseball bats, crowbars. In determining whether an object was a virtual weapon, officers may consider the nature of the object and its location; e.g., baseball bat located between bucket seats.[83]
Behavior indicating presence of weapon: An officer’s belief that there was a weapon in the passenger compartment may be based on circumstantial evidence; e.g., secretive movement following by sound of “metal on metal”[84] Also see Chapter 24 Pat Searches (When Permitted, Armed or dangerous detainee).
Officer did not feel threatened: If there was a weapon in the vehicle, there is no requirement that officers prove that the detainee presented a threat to them.[85]
If detainee remained inside his vehicle: If officers reasonably believed that a weapon was inside the vehicle, it is immaterial that the detainee was outside the vehicle when the search occurred.[86]
Reasonable Suspicion Searches
: If officers have lawfully arrested an occupant of a vehicle, they may search the vehicle for evidence pertaining to the crime for which he was arrested if they had reasonable suspicion that such evidence was inside the vehicle; i.e., probable cause to search is not required.[87]
Contemporaneous search: We are not aware of any ruling that the search must occur at the location where the vehicle was seized, and not after the vehicle had been towed.
Scope of search: Officers may search the entire passenger compartment and all containers in the passenger compartment. The California Court of Appeal has ruled that officers need not restrict the search to places and things in which the evidence might be found.[88] Officers may search the hatchback area.[89] It is likely that the trunk is also searchable.[90]
Exception: Cellphones: Officers may not search a cellphone in the vehicle without a warrant or consent. See Chapter 39 Electronic Communications and Records Searches.
Instrumentality Searches
: If officers have probable cause to believe that a vehicle, itself, was the means by which a crime was committed (e.g., hit-and-run vehicle, kidnap vehicle) they may search it under an exception to the warrant requirement known as the “instrumentality exception.”[91] As a practical matter, the instrumentality exception has become superfluous because, as discussed above (see Probable Cause Searches), officers who have probable cause to believe that a vehicle was an instrumentality of a crime will necessarily have probable cause to search it for the fruits and instrumentalities of that crime.[92]
Searches for ID:
The need to obtain ID and registration information by conducting a search of a person or thing does not constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.[93] However, the following procedures may alleviate the need for a warrant:
Criminal investigations: Officers may search a vehicle for ID if (1) the detainee had been arrested, and (2) they had reasonable suspicion that the suspect’s ID constituted evidence pertaining to the crime under investigation. See “Reasonable Suspicion Searches,” above.
Traffic stops: Officers may search a vehicle or detainee for ID only under the following circumstances:
ID constitutes evidence: In the unlikely event that a traffic violator’s ID could constitute evidence pertaining to the traffic infraction under investigation,[94] officers may search for it without a warrant. This is because, as noted earlier, if officers have probable cause to search a vehicle located in a public place, they may search it without a warrant. Also see Chapter 4 Probable Cause to Search.
Suspicion of false ID: A search for ID is permissible if officers have probable cause to believe that the detainee has lied about his ID.[95]
Consent: The driver consented to the search.[96]
Exigent circumstances: A search is also permitted if knowing the suspect’s identity is necessary to alleviate an exigent circumstance; e.g., search for medical alert.[97] Also see Chapter 19 Exigent Circumstances.
Arrest detainee: “If no other path seems prudent or permissible, the officer can arrest the detainee and take him or her to be booked into jail for the traffic violation.”[98]
Question the detainee or companion: Officers “can ask for identifying information such as the driver’s full name and its spelling, address, and date of birth,” in order to conduct a database search; e.g. DMV records.[99]
Thumbprint: “In the absence of other satisfactory identification,” an officer may require the suspect to “place a right thumbprint on the notice to appear.”[100]
Registration searches: The California Supreme Court has ruled that the restrictions applicable to searches for ID do not pertain to searches for vehicle registration.[101]
Search procedure
Order occupants out: Before beginning the search, officers may order the driver and passengers to exit.[102]
Searchable places: If a search is permitted, it must be limited to places and things in which officers may reasonably find ID or registration.[103] This would include such places as the glove box, above the visor, and under the seats.[104] Officers need not limit the search to places in which such documents are “usually” or “traditionally” found.[105]
No trunk search: Officers may not search the trunk for ID unless they have probable cause.[106]
Other Vehicle Searches
Consent searches: See Chapter 16 Consent Searches.
Exigent circumstances: Officers may enter and search a vehicle if reasonably necessary to protect lives from imminent danger or property from imminent damage; e.g., child locked in vehicle, sick or injured person inside, gun or dangerous chemical inside. It may also be necessary for officers to enter a vehicle that has been burglarized or is otherwise insecure for the purpose of locking it or searching for registration that will enable them to notify the owner. See Chapter 19 Exigent Circumstance Searches.
Probation and parole searches: Search conditions for all parolees and most probationers authorize warrantless searches their vehicles and property under their control, which would necessarily include vehicles they owned. See Chapter 25 Probation and Parole Searches.
Searches incident to arrest: In the past, officers were permitted to search the passenger compartment of vehicles for weapons and evidence whenever they made a custodial arrest of an occupant. These were known as “Belton” searches.[107] But in 2009, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant ruled that Belton searches would be permitted only if, at the time the search was conducted, the arrestee had immediate access to the passenger compartment.[108] Because officers seldom permit arrestees to have unfettered access to anything, Belton searches have become virtually extinct.[109] As the result, most vehicle searches are based on probable cause, inventory search of towed vehicle, or consent.
Searches by vehicle theft investigators: Officers whose primary responsibility is to conduct vehicle theft investigations may search unoccupied vehicles to determine the lawful owner if the vehicle is located “on a highway or in any public garage, repair shop, terminal, parking lot, new or used car lot, automobile dismantler’s lot, vehicle shredding facility, vehicle leasing or rental lot, vehicle equipment rental yard, vehicle salvage pool, or other similar establishment.”[110]
VIN searches: Regardless of whether there are grounds to do so, officers may look through the windshield of a vehicle to inspect the VIN plate located on the dash if the car is located in a public place.[111] If the vehicle was stopped for a traffic violation, and if the VIN plate was covered, officers may enter the vehicle and remove the covering in order to record the VIN number.[112]
Notes
[1] USSC: US v.
Ross (1982) 456 US 798, 809 [“[A vehicle] search is not
unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of
a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.”].
CAL: P v. Carpenter (1997) 15 C4 312, 365 [“The police
had probable cause to search the vehicle. Under the ‘automobile exception’ to
the warrant requirement, they did not need a warrant at all.”]; P v.
Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 100 [“When the police
have probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence
they may search the automobile and the containers within it without a
warrant.”]. COMPARE: P v. Rorabaugh (2022) 74 CA5 296, 311
[“the record is devoid of any indication police had a lawful right of access to
defendant’s car that was on Christensen’s private property with the latter’s
knowledge and consent”].
[2] USSC: Maryland v.
Dyson (1999) 527 US 465, 467 [“the automobile exception does not have a
separate exigency requirement”]; Pennsylvania v. Labron
(1996) 518 US 938, 940 [Court rejects the argument that probable cause searches
are permissible only if there are “unforeseen circumstances”]. CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Valdez) (1983) 35 C3 11, 16 [“While
it may well have been possible for the police, after discovering the Oldsmobile
on the premises, simply to have seized the vehicle and to have postponed a search
of its trunk until after a warrant had been obtained, a prompt on-the-scene
warrantless search of the automobile does not violate the state or federal
Constitutions.”]. OTHER: US v. Smith (6C 2007) 510 F3 641, 650
[search OK even though “officers were in control of both the keys to the vehicle
and the operator of the vehicle”].
[3] USSC: US v.
Johns (1985) 469 US 478, 487, 487 [“where police officers are entitled
to seize the container and continue to have probable cause to believe that is
contains contraband, we do not think that delay in the execution of the
warrantless search is necessarily unreasonable”]. CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 101 [“the length of time
during which the police held Nasmeh’s Jeep Cherokee did not make the search
unreasonable”]. 9th CIR: US v. Noster (9C 2009)
590 F3 624 [search eight days later OK because probable cause continued to
exist].
[4] USSC: US v.
Johns (1985) 469 US 478, 487.
[5] USSC: California v.
Acevedo (1991) 500 US 565, 570 [“if the police have probable cause
to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may
conduct either an immediate or a delayed search”]; Chambers v.
Maroney (1970) 399 US 42, 52 [vehicle may be searched “on the spot when it
was stopped” or “at the station house”]; Texas v. White
(1975) 423 US 67, 68 [“the probable-cause factor that developed at the scene still
obtained at the station house”]; US v. Ross (1982) 456 US
798, 807, fn.9 [“if an immediate search on the scene could be conducted, but not
one at the station if the vehicle is impounded, police often simply would search
the vehicle on the street—at no advantage to the occupants, yet possibly at
certain cost to the police”]. CAL: P v. Panah (2005)
35 C4 395, 469 [“The probable cause to search had not dissipated even after the
vehicle had been impounded.”]; P v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007)
151 CA4 85, 98 [“The vehicle can be taken to a crime laboratory for the time
reasonably needed to undertake and complete the search.”]; P v.
Nicholson (1989) 207 CA3 707, 712 [“delay in the search beyond the original
stop does not render the seizure constitutionally invalid”]; P v.
Decker (1986) 176 CA3 1247, 1251 [“When there is probable cause to search
at the scene, there is still probable cause later back at the police station.”].
OTHER: US v. Soderman (8C 2020) 983 F3 369, 376 [“The automobile
exception may apply even when there is little to no chance that the vehicle will be
moved or its contents destroyed. Officers armed with probable cause may conduct a
warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police
custody.”]; US v. Donahue (3C 2014) 764 F3 293, 300 [5-day lapse OK];
US v. Powell (5C 2013) 732 F3 361, 373 [“Furthermore, because law enforcement
had probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle, moving the car to a safer
location—the Midland Police station—did not undermine the constitutionality of the
search.”].
[6] USSC: Pennsylvania v. Labron
(1996) 518 US 938, 940 [“But the Court has never held that only a readily mobile
automobile may be searched without a warrant.”]; Michigan v. Thomas (1982)
458 US 259, 261 [grounds to search do “not vanish once the car has been immobilized;
nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each
particular case that the car would have been driven away”]. OTHER: US v.
Short (8C 2021) 2 F4 1076, 1079 [“an easily repairable flat tire did not cause
the vehicle to lose its inherent mobility”].
[7] OTHER: US v. Bodnar (2C 2022)
37 F4 833, 841.
[8] USSC: Wyoming v.
Houghton (1999) 526 US 295, 302 [“When there is probable cause to search
for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers to examine packages
and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.”].
[9] USSC: California v.
Acevedo (1991) 500 US 565, 580 [“The police may search an automobile and
the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or
evidence is contained.”]; US v. Ross (1982) 456 US 798, 824
[“Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage
will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe
that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless
search of a suitcase.”]. CAL: P v. Thompson (2010) 49 C4
79, 112; P v. Chavers (1983) 33 C3 462, 470 [“Probable cause
to search for a stolen television set would not justify a search of the glove
compartment.”]; P v. Chapman (1990) 224 CA3 253, 259 [with
probable cause to search for an open container, it was not OK to search a “small
metal case” or “rolled up grocery bag” that “did not appear to contain heavy glass
bottles or beer cans.”]; P v. Carter (1985) 163 CA3 1183, 1186
[probable cause to believe that an open container is located in the passenger
compartment, would not justify a search of a paper bag which, because of its size
and weight, could not reasonably be expected to hold an alcoholic beverage container];
P v. Gallegos (2002) 96 CA4 612, 626 [“The officers did not seek an
elephant in a breadbox, but limited their search to areas that reasonably might have
contained the documents specified in the warrant.”]; P v. Nicholson
(1989) 207 CA3 707, 711 [“Probable cause not only justifies a search of the entire
vehicle, but also all of its contents, including containers found therein that might
conceal the suspected contraband.”]; P v. Hart (1999) 74 CA4 479, 487
[“containers in a vehicle are searchable if the vehicle is searchable”]; P v.
Decker (1986) 176 CA3 1247, 1251 [search of purse]; P v.
Schunk (1991) 235 CA3 1334, 1342 [“small duffel bag”]; P v.
Sandoval (1985) 164 CA3 958, 954 [“zipped duffel bag”]; P v.
Rodrigues-Fernandez (1991) 235 CA3 543, 548 [trash bags]; P v.
Carrillo (1995) 37 CA4 1662 [bag and pouch]; P v. Black (1985)
173 CA3 506, 510 [plastic bags]; P v. Hunt (1990) 225 CA3 498, 509
[paper containers].
[10] USSC: Wyoming v.
Houghton (1999) 526 US 295, 307 [“We hold that police officers with probable
cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are
capable of concealing the object of the search.”]. 9th CIR: US v.
Soyland (9C 1993) 3 F3 1312, 1314 [“There was not a sufficient link between
Soyland [a passenger] and the odor of methamphetamine or the marijuana cigarettes,
and his mere presence did not give rise to probable cause to arrest and search
him.”].
[11] CAL: P v. Temple
(1995) 36 CA4 1219, 1227 [“Temple’s pockets were part of his person and therefore
were not ‘containers’ within the scope of the vehicle search.”]; P v.
Valdez (1987) 196 CA3 799, 806 [“the officer’s entry into the individual’s
pocket can only be justified if the officer’s sensorial perception, coupled with the
other circumstances, was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the
defendant for possession of narcotics before the entry into the pocket”]; P
v. Reyes (1990) 223 CA3 1218, 1227 [the record “does not suggest any
prior ‘sensorial perception’ by the officer that defendant had drugs in his
pockets”].
[12] USSC: US v. Ross (1982) 456 US
798, 821 [“When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its
limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and
containers, in the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the
interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.”]. CAL:
P v. Varela (1985) 172 CA3 757, 762; P v. Hunter
(2005) 133 CA4 371. NOTE: Old limitation: Drugs for personal use:
In the past, it was the rule in California that officers could not search the trunk
based on the discovery of a small amount of drugs in the passenger compartment
(e.g., two rocks of cocaine) as this would indicate the drugs were for personal use
only, which meant it was unlikely that additional drugs would be found in the trunk.
See, for example, P v. Wimberly (1976) 16 C3 557, 572-73;
P v. Gregg (1974) 43 CA3 137, 142. But because this rule is
contrary to the US Supreme Court’s rule that officers may search any place in which
the evidence might reasonably be located, it has been abrogated. See P
v. Dey (2000) 84 CA4 1318, 1321-22 [“The holdings of Gregg and
Wimberly have never been expressly repudiated. However, in light of
Ross… we do not think these holdings have continued validity”]; P
v. Hunter (2005) 133 CA4 371, 379 [“On Wimberly’s validity, we
agree with Dey’s rejection of both it and [Gregg].”]; P v.
Hunt (1990) 225 CA3 498, 509 [OK to search trunk based on discovery of two rocks
of cocaine in passenger compartment]; US v. Loucks (10C 1986) 806
F2 208, 211 [“personal use” restriction impliedly abrogated by Ross]. BUT ALSO
SEE: Chapter 22 Marijuana Searches.
[13] CAL: P v. Weston (1981)
114 CA3 764 [recesses of the seats]; P v. Kraft (2000) 23 C4 978,
1043 [under the floor mats]; P v. Odom (1980) 108 CA3 100, 106
[under the seats]; P v. Franklin (1985) 171 CA3 627, 634 [under the
seats].
[14] USSC: Riley v. California (2014)
573 US 373, 388 [“Both Riley and Wurie concede that officers could have seized and
secured their cell phones to prevent destruction of evidence while seeking a
warrant. That is a sensible concession.”]. OTHER: US v. Henry (1C
2016) 827 F3 16, 27 [“the officers did exactly what the Supreme Court [in
Riley] suggested they do: seize the phones to prevent destruction of evidence
but obtain a warrant before searching the phones”].
[15] USSC: Riley v. California (2014)
573 US 373, 387 [“Law enforcement officers remain free to examine the physical
aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon.”].
[16] CAL: Veh. Code§ 9951(c).
ALSO SEE: P v. Ferguson (2011) 194 CA4 1070, 1086, fn.4 [“Vehicle
Code§ 9951, subdivision (b), defines such recording devices as one “installed
by the manufacturer of the vehicle and [that] does one or more of the following, for
the purpose of retrieving data after an accident: (1) Records how fast and in which
direction the motor vehicle is traveling. (2) Records a history of where the motor
vehicle travels. (3) Records steering performance. (4) Records brake performance,
including, but not limited to, whether brakes were applied before an accident. (5)
Records the driver’s seatbelt status. (6) Has the ability to transmit information
concerning an accident in which the motor vehicle has been involved to a central
communications system when an accident occurs.” ].
[17] USSC: US v. Place (1983) 462 US
696, 701 [“exigent circumstances can justify the seizure of a container without a
warrant, but the container, once seized, cannot be searched without issuance of a
warrant to examine its contents”]. CAL: P v. Tran (2019) 42 CA5 1,
34 [exigent circumstances permitted the seizure of a dash cam because the driver had
removed it from the vehicle while the accident was under investigation].
[18] CAL: P v. Diaz (2013) 213 CA4
743, 754 [court notes trial court ruled “there was probable cause to download the
SDM, because speed and braking are always relevant in determining the causes of a
collision”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Ross (1982) 456 US 798,
809 [“[A vehicle] search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify
the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.”].
[19] USSC: California v.
Acevedo (1991) 500 US 565; US v. Ross (1982)
456 US 798, 824. CAL: P v. Rodriguez-Fernandez (1991)
235 CA3 543, 548; P v. Schunk (1991) 235 CA3 1334, 1340-43.
[20] QUOTE FROM: California
v. Acevedo (1991) 500 US 565, 570 [officers may conduct a
“probing search”]. USSC: US v. Ross (1982) 456 US
798, 820 [Court notes that “contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or
floor of a car”]. OTHER: US v. Snow (2C 1995) 44 F3
133, 135 [“The word ‘search’ carries a common meaning to the average person.
Dictionary definitions furnish some guide: ‘to go over or look through for the
purpose of finding something; explore, rummage; examine,’ ‘to examine closely and
carefully; test and try; probe,’ ‘to find out or uncover by investigation'”].
[21] USSC: US v. Ramirez
(1998) 523 US 65, 71 [“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the
course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment”]; US v.
Ross (1982) 456 US 798, 818 [Court notes that in Carroll v.
US (1924) 267 US 132 it ruled that prohibition agents who had probable cause
to believe there was contraband hidden under the upholstery did not violate the
Fourth Amendment by ripping open the upholstery]; Cardwell v.
Lewis (1974) 417 US 583 [paint samples]. CAL: P v.
Robinson (1989) 209 CA3 1047, 1055 [paint samples]. OTHER: US v.
Guevara (8C 2013) 731 F3 824, 831 [“once the troopers discovered the hidden
compartment, they had probable cause to search the vehicle in a destructive way”];
US v. Strickland (11C 1990) 902 F2 937, 942-43 [reasonably
necessary to cut spare tire]; US v. Patterson (7C 1995) 65 F3
68, 71 [“In order to take apart the tailgate of Patterson’s GMC Jimmy, the officers
needed to have probable cause to believe that drugs were inside the vehicle.”].
ALSO SEE: Liston v. County of Riverside (9C
1997) 120 F3 965, 979 [“officers executing a search warrant occasionally must damage
property in order to perform their duty”]; US v. Bravo
(9C 2001) 295 F3 1002, 1007-8 [officers unbolted and hammered open the defendant’s
tool box in border search].
[22] USSC: Whren v. US
(1996) 517 US 806, 811, fn.1 [“An inventory search is the search of property
lawfully seized and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure
valuable items such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false
claims of loss or damage.”]; Cooper v. California (1967) 386
US 58, 61-62 [“It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain
the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their
own protection, to search it.”]. CAL: P v. Scigliano
(1987) 196 CA3 26, 29 [“the police have a duty to protect a vehicle, like any
other personal property, which is in the possession of an arrestee”]. OTHER:
US v. Sanders (10C 2015) 796 F3 1241, 1245 [impoundments are lawful if
“required by the community-caretaking functions of protecting public safety and
promoting the efficient movement of traffic]; US v. Kanatzar
(8C 2004) 370 F3 810, 813 [consider “the likelihood of theft or vandalism”].
[23] USSC: Colorado v. Bertine (1987)
479 US 367, 373 [“But the security of the storage facility does not completely
eliminate the need for inventorying; the police may still wish to protect
themselves or the owners of the lot against false claims of theft or dangerous
instrumentalities.”].
[24] USSC: Cady v. Dombrowski (1973)
413 US 433; Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 US 367. CAL:
Halajian v. D&B Towing (2012) 209 CA4 1, 15 [community caretaking
exception applied to towing of unregistered vehicle in convenience store parking
lot]; P v. Shafrir (2010) 183 CA4 1238, 1247 [“the ultimate
determination is properly whether a decision to impound or remove a vehicle,
pursuant to the community caretaking function, was reasonable under all the
circumstances”]; P v. Torres (2010) 188 CA4 775, 790 [the
officer “did not offer any community caretaking function served by impounding
defendant’s truck”]; P v. Williams (2006) 145 CA4 756, 762
[towing is permitted if it was “reasonable in light of the justification for the
impound and inventory exception to the search warrant requirement.”]; P
v. Steeley (1989) 210 CA3 887, 892 [it “was not unreasonable for [the
officer] to conclude that the appropriate way to protect the vehicle was
impoundment”]; P v. Andrews (1970) 6 CA3 428, 433 [“It is said
that upon police impoundment of an automobile, the police undoubtedly become an
involuntary bailee of the property and responsible for the vehicle and its
contents.”]. 9th CIR: Miranda v. City of Cornelius
(9C 2005) 429 F3 858, 864 [“Whether an impoundment is warranted under this
community caretaking doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police
officers’ duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or being a
target for vandalism or theft.”]. OTHER: US v.
Rodriguez-Morales (1C 1991) 929 F2 780, 786 [“Framed precisely, the critical
question in cases such as this is not whether the police needed to impound the
vehicle in some absolute sense, or could have effected an impoundment more
solicitously, but whether the decision to impound and the method chosen for
implementing that decision were, under all the circumstances, within the realm of
reason.”]; US v. Smith (3C 2008) 522 F3 305, 314 [court adopts
the rule “focusing on the reasonableness of the vehicle impoundment”]; US
v. Coccia (1C 2006) 446 F3 233, 239 [“impoundments of vehicles for
community caretaking purposes are consonant with the Fourth Amendment so long as
the impoundment decision was reasonable under the circumstances”]. NOTE: In
some federal circuits, towing is permitted if there is both a legitimate community
caretaking purpose and the towing was authorized by standardized criteria. See
US v. Sanders (10C 2015) 796 F3 1241 [comprehensive discussion of the
issue].
[25] CAL: Veh. Code§§ 22651-22711.
[26] CAL: Veh. Code§§ 22650(b) [towing
OK “if the removal is necessary to achieve the community caretaking need, such as
ensuring the safe flow of traffic or protecting property from theft of vandalism”];
P v. Torres (2010) 188 CA4 775, 790 [“But statutory
authorization to impound a vehicle does not, in and of itself, determine the
constitutional reasonableness of an inventory search.”]. 9th CIR:
Sandoval v. County of Sonoma (9C 2018) 912 F3 509, 516 [“the community
caretaking exception does not categorically permit government officials to impound
private property simply because state law does”].
[27] QUOTES FROM: P v.
Shafrir (2010) 183 CA4 1238, 1247. CAL: P v. Wallace (2017)
15 CA5 82, 92 [insufficient justification given for towing the vehicle];
Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (2014)
232 CA4 907, 916 [“Setting such uniform criteria falls within the broad discretion
of the police chief. City officials may set policies that are consistent with state
law and constitutional standards.”].
[28] USSC: Colorado v.
Bertine (1987) 479 US 367, 375 [immaterial that “departmental regulations
gave the police officers discretion to choose between impounding his van and
parking and locking it in a public parking place.”]. CAL: P v.
Benites (1992) 9 CA4 309, 326 [immaterial that departmental policy leaves
“the decision to the officer’s discretion”]; P v. Steeley
(1989) 210 CA3 887, 892 [“The fact that the statute gives the officer the
discretion to decide whether to impound or to otherwise secure the vehicle does not
mean that the procedure is unreasonable in Fourth Amendment terms.”]. OTHER:
US v. Davis (1C 2018) 909 F3 9, 17 [“The standard for vehicle impoundments
explicitly contemplates room for police discretion based on the circumstances.”].
[29] QUOTE FROM: US v. Magdirila
(9C 2020) 962 F3 1152, 1157.
[30] OTHER: US v. Lyle (2C 2019)
919 F3 716, 731 [“the impoundment here was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
even absent standardized procedures”].
[31] CAL: P v. Uribe (1993)
12 CA4 1432, 1438-39. 9th CIR: US v. Anderson (9C 2022) 56 F4
748, 758 [“Moreover, an otherwise reasonable inventory search is not invalid
merely because the police have a mixed motive for the search.”]. OTHER:
US v. Sylvester (1C 2021) 993 F3 16, 24 [“The presence of both
investigatory and community caretaking motives does not render unlawful an
objectively reasonable decision to impound”]; US v. Trujillo (10C 2021)
993 F3 859, 871 [even if the officer “was motivated in part by an investigatory
motive, that would still be insufficient ground to require suppression”];
US v. Williams (1C 2019) 930 F3 44, 57 [“if a search of an impounded car
for inventory purposes is conducted under standardized procedures, as this one
way, that search falls under the inventory exception to the warrant requirement,
not withstanding a police expectation that the search will reveal criminal
evidence”]; US v. Harris (8C 2015) 795 F3 820, 822 [officers “may keep
their eyes open for potentially incriminating items that they might discover in
the course of an inventory search, as long as their sole purpose is not to
investigate a crime”]; US v. Lopez (2C 2008) 547 F3 364, 372 [“officers
will inevitably be motivated in part by criminal investigative objectives. Such
motivation, however, cannot reasonably disqualify an inventory search that is
performed under standardized procedures for legitimate custodial purposes.”];
US v. Rodriguez-Morales (1C 1991) 929 F2 780, 787 [“That the
impoundment of defendant’s vehicle stemmed in part from an investigatory motive
does not change either the analysis or the result.”]; US v. Coccia (1C
2006) 446 F3 233, 240-41 [“A search or seizure undertaken pursuant to the
community caretaking exception is not infirm merely because it may also have been
motivated by a desire to investigate crime.”]; US v. Khoury (11C 1990)
901 F2 948, 959 [“a legitimate non-pretextual inventory search is not made
unlawful simply because the investigating officer remains vigilant for evidence
during his inventory search”]; US v. Marshall (8C 1993) 986 F2 1171,
1175-76 [“The police are not precluded from conducting inventory searches when
they lawfully impound the vehicle of an individual that they also happen to
suspect is involved in illegal activity.”].
[32] USSC: Colorado v.
Bertine (1987) 479 US 367, 372 [“there was no showing that the police, who
were following standard procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
investigation”]. CAL: P v. Wallace (2017) 15 CA5 82, 90 [“A
purported inventory search must not be a pretext concealing an investigatory
police motive”]. COMPARE: US v. Snoddy (6C 2020) 976 F3 630, 636
[“The problem for Snoddy is that, regardless of [the officer’s] motivations and
beliefs, [he] was going to have the car towed no matter what. Snoddy was the sole
occupant of the car, and the car would have been left out on the side of the
highway near an intersection in the middle of the night where it could be stolen
or vandalized, or hit by another vehicle.”]; P v. Torres (2010) 188 CA4
775, 792 [pretext tow was unreasonable because “the record shows a concededly
investigatory motive and no community caretaking function”]; US v.
Johnson (9C 2018) 889 F3 1120, 1128 [the officers admitted “that they
searched and seized items from Johnson’s car specifically to gather evidence of a
suspected crime (and not to further such permissible caretaking motives”].
[33] USSC: Cady v. Dombrowski (1973)
413 US 433, 443 [the “vehicle was disabled as a result of the accident, and
constituted a nuisance along the highway”]. CAL: Veh. Code§§ 22651(a)-(b).
9th CIR: Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9C 2005) 429 F3 858, 864
[towing will usually be deemed reasonable if it “fits within the authority of
police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or
threatening public safety and convenience.”]. OTHER: US v.
Sylvester (1C 2021) 993 F3 16, 23-24 [the car Sylvester was driving when he
was stopped and arrested was on the verge of a busy highway…]; US v.
Trujillo (10C 2021) 993 F3 859, 869 [officer testified that the Mustang
“prevented other cars from passing by to enter the gated community”]; US v.
Nevatt (8C 2020) 960 F3 1015, 1021 [motorcycle “created a safety hazard”];
US v. Coccia (1C 2006) 446 F3 233, 238 [“the community caretaking function
encompasses law enforcement’s authority to remove vehicles that impede traffic or
threaten public safety and convenience”]; US v. Duguay (7C 1996) 93 F3
346, 352 [“Impoundments by the police may be in furtherance of public safety or
community caretaking functions…”]. COMPARE: US v. Cervantes (9C
2012) 678 F3 798, 805 [no testimony vehicle “was parked illegally, posed a safety
hazard, or was vulnerable to vandalism of theft”].
[34] CAL: Veh. Code§ 22669.
[35] CAL: Veh. Code§ 22651(g).
[36] CAL: Veh. Code§ 22651(h)(1). 9th
CIR: US v. Garay (9C 2019) 938 F3 1108, 1111 [“The contents of the
wrecked car had to be removed and safeguarded before the car was towed from the
site. That is the essence of an inventory search.”].
[37] CAL: Blakes v. Superior Court
(2021) 72 CA5 904, 914 [“There was no evidence petitioner’s car blocked traffic or
was at risk of theft or vandalism…”]. 9th CIR: US v. Ruckes (9C
2009) 586 F3 713 [towing reasonably necessary because the driver and only occupant
was under arrest]. OTHER: US v. Haldorson (7C 2019) 941 F3 284, 293
[“Once Haldorson was lawfully arrested, his car could not be left unattended
indefinitely at the entrance of a public high school.”].
[38] CAL: P v. Shafrir (2010) 183 CA4
1238, 1248 [reasonable to tow the vehicle when alternative was to leave it in a
high-crime area]; P v. Scigliano (1987) 196 CA3 26, 30 [towing of a Corvette
was reasonable because the owner had been arrested]; P v. Benites (1992) 9
CA4 309, 326 [car parked off the highway in an isolated area]. 9th CIR:
Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9C 2005) 429 F3 858, 864 [“Whether an
impoundment is warranted depends on the location of the vehicle and risk of theft or
vandalism.”]. OTHER: US v. Coccia (1C 2006) 446 F3 233 [towing OK
where car was in psychiatrist’s driveway]; US v. Staller (5C 1980) 616 F2
1284, 1289-90 [mall lot impound OK]; US v. Kornegay (10C 1989) 885 F2 713,
716 [reasonable where arrestee’s car was in a parking lot]. NOTE: In US v.
Venezia (10C 2021) 995 F3 1170, the Tenth Circuit ruled there was insufficient
reason to tow a vehicle even with numerous risk factors — an opinion widely viewed
as unreasonable and erroneous.
[39] CAL: P v. Lee (2019) 40 CA5 853,
868 [“The car was parked in or alongside an apartment complex… Lee offered to
have someone else come pick it up so it would not need to be impounded.”];
P v. Williams (2006) 145 CA4 756, 762 [“car legally parked in front of
appellant’s residence…”]. 9th CIR: US v. Anderson (9C 2022) 56 F4
748, 757 [“Nor is there a valid community caretaking purpose where vehicle is
legally parked in a residential neighborhood”]; Miranda v. City of Cornelius
(9C 2005) 429 F3 858, 864; US v. Caseres (9C 2008) 533 F3 1064, 1075 [car
legally parked near home]. OTHER: US v. Rosario-Acosta (1C 2020) 968
F3 123, 127 [“The car was parked legally on a quiet residential street…”];
US v. Sanders (10C 2015) 796 F3 1241, 1250 [store lot impound invalid];
US v. Pappas (10C 1984) 735 F2 1232, 1234 [“car was parked on private
property and there was no need for impound”].
[40] USSC: Colorado v. Bertine (1987)
479 US 367, 372 [“no showing that the police acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation”]. CAL: P v. Green (1996) 46 CA4 367, 373
[“there was no other person with a valid license present to take control of the
automobile while defendant was taken to jail”]. 9th CIR: Sandoval v.
County of Sonoma (9C 2018) 912 F3 509, 516 [“Once Ruiz provided a licensed
driver, the City’s community caretaking function was discharged.”]; US v.
Maddox (9C 2010) 614 F3 1046, 1050 [“Maddox offered to have his friend move
the vehicle”]. OTHER: US v. Trujillo (10C 2021) 993 F3 859, 870;
US v. Rosario-Acosta (1C 2020) 968 F3 123, 128; US v. Hockenberry
(6C 2013) 730 F3 645, 660; US v. Duguay (7C 1996) 93 F3 346, 353.
ALSO SEE: P v. Lee (2019) 40 CA5 853, 858. COMPARE: US v.
Frasher (8C 2011) 632 F3 450, 454. NOTE: Officers are not required to
let arrestees call someone to retrieve the car. See US v. Coccia (1C 2006)
446 F3 233, 240 fn.7; US v. Arrocha (8C 2013) 713 F3 1159, 1164.
[41] CAL: Halajian v. D&B Towing
(2012) 209 CA4 1, 15; P v. Scigliano (1987) 196 CA3 26, 29 [officers “have
a duty to protect a vehicle… which is in the possession of an arrestee”];
P v. Auer (1991) 1 CA4 1664, 1669 [towing legitimate even on private
property]; P v. Trejo (1994) 26 CA4 460, 462-63 [not basis for
suppression]. OTHER: US v. Coccia (1C 2006) 446 F3 233, 241 fn.9
[“impoundment on private property not per se unreasonable”]; US v. Staller
(5C 1980) 616 F2 1284, 1290 [risk of theft in mall lot]. ALSO SEE: Veh.
Code§ 22653.
[42] USSC: Florida v. White (1999)
526 US 559, 566; Cooper v. California (1967) 386 US 58. OTHER:
US v. Smith (6C 2007) 510 F3 641, 651 [“a pre-forfeiture inventory search of
a vehicle does not require a warrant”].
[43] CAL: Veh. Code§ 22651(o)(1)(A);
P v. Suff (2014) 58 C4 1013, 1056. ALSO SEE: US v.
McCartney (E.D.C. 2008) 550 FS2 1215, 1225.
[44] CAL: Veh. Code§ 22651(o)(1)(D).
[45] CAL: Veh. Code§ 22651(p).
[46] NOTE: If a licensed passenger can take
control of a cited (not arrested) driver’s car, officers may still impound to
prevent reoffense. See P v. Burch (1986) 188 CA3 172, 180. ALSO
SEE: US v. Walker (5C 2022) 49 F4 903, 910 [“officers gave Walker a
chance to release the vehicle to his girlfriend; she arrived too late”].
[47] OTHER: US v. Davis (1C 2018)
909 F3 9, 17.
[48] QUOTE FROM: Florida v. Wells
(1990) 495 US 1, 4 [search must follow “standardized criteria or established
routine”]. USSC: Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 US 367, 374 fn.6;
South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 US 364, 372; Cady v. Dombrowski
(1973) 413 US 433, 447. CAL: P v. Nottoli (2011) 199 CA4 531, 546;
P v. Williams (1999) 20 C4 119, 127; P v. Green (1996) 46 CA4 367,
374. OTHER: US v. Davis (8C 1989) 882 F2 1334, 1339; US v.
Khoury (11C 1990) 901 F2 948, 958; US v. Rodriguez-Morales (1C 1991)
929 F2 780, 785; US v. Arango-Correa (2C 1988) 851 F2 54, 59.
[49] QUOTE FROM: US v. Lopez (2C 2008)
547 F3 364, 371. OTHER: US v. Marshall (8C 1993) 986 F2 1171, 1176
[“When the police follow standardized inventory procedures… the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is satisfied.”].
[50] CAL: P v. Williams (1999) 20 C4
119, 127; P v. Steeley (1989) 210 CA3 887, 891; P v. Green (1996)
46 CA4 367, 375; P v. Needham (2000) 79 CA4 260, 266; P v. Benites
(1992) 9 CA4 309, 327-28. OTHER: US v. Lopez (2C 2008) 547 F3 364,
370; US v. Kornegay (10C 1989) 885 F2 713, 717; US v. Tackett (6C
2007) 486 F3 230, 233; US v. Duguay (7C 1996) 93 F3 346, 351; US v.
Smith (6C 2007) 510 F3 641, 651. ALSO SEE: P v. Burch (1986) 188
CA3 172, 180.
[51] OTHER: US v. Perez (8C 2022) 29 F4
975, 985; US v. Williams (2C 2019) 930 F3 44, 50.
[52] OTHER: US v. Perez (8C 2022) 29 F4
975, 985; US v. Williams (2C 2019) 930 F3 44, 55.
[53] OTHER: US v. Bradley (3C 2020)
959 F3 551, 558 [“…police would have discovered the cocaine in an inventory
search.”].
[54] EXAMPLE: The following shows how officers
can prove an inventory search followed standard procedures.
DA: What was your purpose of doing the inventory search; why did you do it?
Ofr.: Policy of Moss Point PD — when you arrest someone out of their vehicle, you tow it and do an inventory search to protect the city.
DA: Is that standard operating procedure?
Ofr.: Yes, ma’am.
DA: Is this policy followed in every case?
Ofr.: Yes, ma’am.
DA: What do you mean by protecting the City?
Ofr.: So the arrestee doesn’t later claim missing property. US v. Andrews (5C 1994) 22 F3 1328, 1335.
ALSO SEE: P v. Green (1996) 46 CA4 367, 375; P v. Aguilar (1991) 228 CA3 1049, 1053.
[55] CAL: P v. Williams (1999) 20 C4
119, 123; 9th CIR: US v. Anderson (9C 2022) 56 F4 748, 761.
[56] OTHER: US v. Williams (2C 2019)
930 F3 44, 54; US v. Morris (8C 2019) 915 F3 552, 555; US v.
Lopez (2C 2008) 547 F3 364, 371.
[57] OTHER: US v. Lopez (2C 2008) 547
F3 364, 371 [“No need to list every object found as a precondition for accepting
search as inventory search.”].
[58] QUOTE FROM: Florida v. Wells
(1990) 495 US 1, 4 [“an inventory search must not be a ruse for general
rummaging…”]. OTHER: US v. Khoury (11C 1990) 901 F2 948, 958
[“An inventory search is not a surrogate for investigation…”].
[59] USSC: Florida v. Wells (1990)
495 US 1, 4; Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 US 367, 375. CAL:
P v. Steeley (1989) 210 CA3 887, 892; P v. Williams (1999) 20 C4
119, 127. OTHER: US v. Hockenberry (6C 2013) 730 F3 645, 661; US
v. Lopez (2C 2008) 547 F3 364, 370; US v. Rodriguez-Morales (1C 1991)
929 F2 780, 787.
[60] OTHER: US v. Williams (2C 2019)
930 F3 44, 55 [second inventory search OK when officers believed they missed
items].
[61] OTHER: US v.
Edwards (5C 1978) 577 F2 883, 894 [“we refuse to necessarily equate thoroughness with unreasonableness”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Torres (10C 1981) 663 F2 1019, 1027 [“permission to search contemplates a thorough search. If not thorough it is of little value”].
[62] OTHER: US v. Taylor (8C 2011) 636 F3 461.
[63] CAL: P v. Needham (2000) 79 CA4 260, 267 [policy properly required the search of “bags and other containers before turning them over to the person claiming them because of the possibility that the property may contain a concealed weapon”]. OTHER: US v. Tackett (6C 2007) 486 F3 230, 233 [the officer “stated that he would not release personal effects to anyone but a relative or spouse, and even if he did pass a bag to someone, he would inventory it to ‘cover myself and the sheriff’s department”]; US v. Beal (8C 2005) 430 F3 950, 954 [departmental policy reasonably permitted an inventory search of car even though the vehicle was to be released to the suspect’s friend].
[64] 9th CIR: US v. Mancera-Londono (9C 1990) 912 F2 373, 376 [“The DEA could properly take custody of the rented vehicle following the arrest of the two suspects [and] conduct a lawful inventory search”]. OTHER: US v. Petty (8C 2004) 367 F3 1009, 1012 [“The police had a sufficient basis to conclude that the rental car should be impounded pursuant to their standard policy, and that exercise of the community caretaking function was warranted.”].
[65] USSC: South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 US 364, 372-76 [glove compartment is a “customary place” for the “temporary storage of valuables”]. OTHER: US v. Andrews (5C 1994) 22 F3 1328, 1336 [“inventory policies must be adopted which sufficiently limit the discretion of law enforcement officers to prevent inventory searches from becoming evidentiary searches”]; US v. Edwards (5C 1978) 577 F2 882, 894 [officers “may ordinarily inspect the glove compartment, the trunk, on top of the seats as well as under the front seats, and the floor of the automobiles”].
[66] OTHER: US v. Johnson (5C 1987) 815 F2 309, 314 [“This Court has expressly approved the inspection of an automobile trunk as a valid inventory search.” Citations omitted.]; US v. Tueller (10C 2003) 349 F3 1239, 1244 [“police department’s written guidelines directed officers to inventory both locked and unlocked trunks”].
[67] CAL: P v. Smith (2020) 46 CA5 375, 394; P v. Needham (2000) 79 CA4 260, 267 [“We see no reason to treat motorcycles differently from cars”].
[68] OTHER: US v. Pappas (8C 2006) 452 F3 767, 772 [“the engine compartment is a proper area for an inventory search”]; US v. Lumpkin (6C 1998) 159 F3 983, 987-88 [inventory search “may include the engine compartment”].
[69] OTHER: US v. Johnson (5C 1987) 815 F2 309 [OK for Secret Service agent to look under spare tire as agent testified that “valuable tools are often stored in that location”].
[70] USSC: Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 US 1, 4 [“while policies of opening all containers or of opening no containers are unquestionably permissible, it would be equally permissible, for example, to allow the opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers’ exteriors”]. CAL: P v. Salcero (1992) 6 CA4 720, 723 [per departmental policy, “all closed containers must be inventoried prior to being released.”]; P v. Williams (1999) 20 C4 119, 138 [“when relevant, the prosecution must also prove a policy or practice governing the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search”]. OTHER: US v. Bradley (3C 2020) 959 F3 551, 558 [“Police have discretion to inventory a closed container but only where there is evidence of a policy or regulation sufficiently limiting the scope of that discretion.”]; US v. Morris (8C 2019) 915 F3 552, 556-57 [“Because the policy required an inventory of the entire vehicle, it was reasonable for the deputies to open containers believed to have items valued at $25 or more.”]; US v. Matthews (4C 2009) 591 F3 230, 237 [departmental policy impliedly authorized search of closed containers because it required a “complete inventory”].
[71] OTHER: US v. Kendall (10C 2021) 14 F4 1116.
[72] CAL: P v. Needham (2000) 79 CA4 260, 268.
[73] CAL: P v. Zabala (2018) 19 CA5 335, 341 [“A concealed area behind the dashboard console is not an area where people commonly put items or value, nor is it a closed container”].
[74] OTHER: US v. Edwards (5C 1978) 577 F2 883 [officer could lawfully search under carpet because he reasonably believed the driver put something there]. COMPARE: US v. Lugo (10C 1992) 978 F2 631, 637 [searching behind door panel “does not serve the purpose of protecting the car and its contents under any normal construction of those terms”].
[75] OTHER: US v. Edwards (5C 1978) 577 F2 883, 894 fn. 23 [“We reject the defendant’s contention that the police may only inventory items found in plain view within the cabin of the automobile.”].
[76] CAL: P v. Hovey (1988) 44 C3 543, 571 [“it was necessary to read the car receipt in order to properly identify and inventory it”]. COMPARE: US v. Khoury (11C 1990) 901 F2 948 [not OK to continue reading after agents identified the documents].
[77] QUOTE FROM: US v. Khoury (11C 1990) 901 F2 948, 959. OTHER: US v. Andrews (5C 1994) 22 F3 1328, 1335 [“Cash, credit cards, negotiable instruments, and any number of other items could be hidden between the pages of a notebook, and could give rise to a claim against the city if lost.”]; US v. Arango-Correa (2C 1988) 851 F2 54 [OK to open two notebooks].
[78] OTHER: US v. Edwards (5C 1978) 577 F2 883, 893 [“The complete dismantling of an automobile, or parts thereof, would not withstand constitutional scrutiny”]; US v. Lugo (10C 1992) 978 F2 631, 636 [an officer’s act of “bending over the corner of the vent in the door panel and looking inside” was “not constitutionally justifiable”].
[79] USSC: Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 US 1032, 1052 [a protective vehicle search is permitted because “the officer remains particularly vulnerable” and the officer “must make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger”]; Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 US 325.
[80] OTHER: US v. Vaccaro (7C 2019) 915 F3 431, 437 [“if Vaccaro had been under arrest, Arizona v. Gant would control” which would mean the search would have been unlawful unless the detainee had access to the passenger compartment”].
[81] USSC: Michigan v.
Long (1983) 463 US 1032, 1049-51. CAL: P v.
King (1989) 216 CA3 1237; P v. Lafitte (1989)
211 CA3 1429, 1433; P v. Williams (1988) 45 C3 1268,
1303; P v. Perez (1996) 51 CA4 1168, 1173 [as passenger
stepped outside, a gun fell to the seat]; P v. Molina (1994)
25 CA4 1038, 1042 [“Once the officers discovered the knives, they had
reason to believe that their safety was in danger and, accordingly,
were entitled to search the [passenger] compartment and any containers
therein for weapons.”]. OTHER: US v.
Graham (6C 2007) 483 F3 431; US v. Nash
(7C 1989) 876 F2 1359, 1361 [furtive gesture plus a jacket covered
area to which defendant was reaching]. ALSO SEE: P v.
Superior Court (Torres) (1977) 67 CA3 620, 625. NOTE:
At one point in Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 US 1032 the
Court said a protective vehicle search is permitted only if officers
have reason to believe (1) the detainee is dangerous and (2) that he
“may gain immediate control of weapons.” At p. 1049. At another point,
it indicated the search is permissible “so long as [the officers]
possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the
suspect is potentially dangerous.” At p. 1051. As a practical matter,
there seems to be a single requirement that the officer reasonably
believe a weapon is inside the passenger compartment. See, for example,
Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 US 1032; P v.
Lafitte (1989) 211 CA3 1429; P v. Kraft (2000)
23 C4 978, 1040 [“the seizure of the knife clearly was proper so that
defendant’s passenger would not be able to reach it and thereby
jeopardize the officers’ safety”]. As for the “may gain control”
requirement, the Court in Long noted that a detainee will
usually have the ability to gain control of a weapon until he is taken
into custody because until then he may forcibly re-enter the car and
grab the weapon. At pp. 1051-52. Consequently, California courts
usually uphold protective searches whenever officers reasonably
believed a weapon was located inside a lawfully stopped vehicle. See,
for example, P v. Lafitte (1989) 211 CA3 1429, 1433
[“In Long, as here, the discovery of the weapon is the crucial
fact which provides a reasonable basis for the officers’ suspicion.”].
NOTE: Defense attorneys may cite Arizona v.
Gant (2009) 556 US 332 as authority for prohibiting protective
vehicle searches unless the detainee has actual access to the
passenger compartment at the time the search occurred. But
Gant’s requirement of actual access should not be imported into
the field of protective searches because, as the Court observed in
Long, officers who have detained a suspect do not have as much
control over the suspect as officers who have arrested a suspect; that
an officer who has detained a suspect “remains particularly vulnerable
in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the
officer must make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and
others from possible danger.” At p. 1051. The Court also noted that
unlike arrestees, detainees may be permitted to enter the car before
officers depart. At p. 1052. ALSO SEE: US v.
Graham (6C 2007) 483 F3 431, 440 [although the detainee was
“cuffed and secured in the back of the cruiser,” the protective vehicle
search was permitted because he “was merely detained, but not under
arrest. Had the officers not searched the car and simply let him, go,
Graham would immediately have had access to the weapon once he
reentered the car.”].
[82] USSC: Michigan v.
Long (1983) 463 US 1032, 1052 [“Assuming arguendo that Long
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that
the validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is
possessed in accordance with state law.”]. CAL: P v.
Lafitte (1989) 211 CA3 1429, 1433 [“legal” four-inch knife];
P v. Perez (1996) 51 CA4 1168, 1178-79 [“The issue is not
whether defendant had a right to have the gun; rather, it is the
officers’ right to conduct a limited search for weapons.”]. OTHER:
US v. Vinton (DCC 2010) 594 F3 14, 21 [“Even a
lawfully-possessed fishing knife can be used as a dangerous weapon.”].
[83] CAL: P v. Avila
(1997) 58 CA4 1069, 1074 [“a long black metal object” similar to a Mag
flashlight located approximately nine inches from defendant’s left hand
in his truck]; P v. Methey (1991) 227 CA3 349, 358
[detainee was carrying a pry bar].
[84] CAL: P v. King
(1989) 216 CA3 1237, 1240 [“in addition to King’s movement, we have the
contemporaneous sound of metal on metal and the driver’s fear created by
the increased level of gang activity in the area”]. OTHER:
US v. Orth (1C 2017) 873 F3 349, 356 [presence of oversized
flashlight with “odd response” about its purpose (“for sport”), plus
“body language” and display of “aggression”]; US v. Morgan (8C
2013) 729 F3 1086, 1090 [furtive gesture]; US v.
Goodwin-Bey (8C 2009) 583 F3 1117 [officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe that one of the occupants had recently displayed a
firearm].
[85] CAL: P v. Lafitte (1989)
211 CA3 1429, 1433 [“In Long, as here, the discovery of the
weapon is the crucial fact which provides a reasonable basis for the
officers’ suspicion.”]; P v. Molina (1994) 25 CA4 1038, 1042
[“Once the officers discovered the knives, they had reason to believe
that their safety was in danger and, accordingly, were entitled to
search the [passenger] compartment and any containers therein for
weapons.”]. OTHER: US v. Guerrero (1C 2021) 19 F4 547, 561.
[86] OTHER: US v. Vaccaro (7C
2019) 915 F3 431, 438 [“By admitting that he would have been allowed to
return to his car, Vaccaro conceded that he could have gained ‘immediate
control of weapons’ inside the vehicle”]; US v. Orth (1C 2017) 873
F3 349, 358 [“the fact that Appellant had been removed from the car does
not hinder the legality of a [protective] search”]; US v. Scott
(8C 2016) 818 F3 424, 431 [“we have rejected the notion that
Gant’s requirements apply when no arrest has taken place”]. NOTE:
As Orth and Scott (above) demonstrate, the Supreme Court did
not, in its decision in Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 US 332 intend to
import a requirement of actual physical access to the vehicle.
[87] USSC: Arizona v.
Gant (2009) 556 US 332, 335 [“circumstances unique to the vehicle
context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle”]. CAL: P v. Johnson (2018) 21 CA5 1026, 1035 [“the
arrestee’s inability to access the car does not preclude a search under
Gant if the police reasonably believe it contains evidence
of the offense for which the individual has been arrested”]; P v. Zabala
(2018) 19 CA5 335, 344 [suspect arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia,
reasonable suspicion to search existed]; P v. Lopez (2016) 4 CA5 815,
82; P v. Nottoli (2011) 199 CA4 532, 554 [“When a driver
is arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance, the
officers could reasonably believe that evidence relevant to that offense might
be found in the vehicle.”]. OTHER: US v. Stegall (8C 2017) 850
F3 981, 984; US v. Edwards (7C 2014) 769 F3 509, 514 [“Gant
permits a search of a vehicle incident to an arrest if ‘it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest.’ The automobile exception requires probable cause that the vehicle
contains evidence of criminal activity.”]; US v. Smith (7C 2012) 697
F3 625, 630 [“the agents arrested Evans and Swanson for bank robbery and they
had every reason to believe there was evidence of the offense in the green
Cadillac”]; US v. Sloan (7C 2011) 636 F3 845, 849-50
[grounds to search based on arrest for drug conspiracy]; US v.
Johnson (6C 2010) 627 F3 578, 584 [discovery of firearm in vehicle
constituted reasonable suspicion to search for additional firearms or ammo];
US v. Vinton (DCC 2010) 594 F3 14, 25 [“Presumably, the
‘reasonable to believe’ standard requires less than probable cause, because
otherwise Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely duplicate the
‘automobile exception,’ which the Court specifically identified as a distinct
exception to the warrant requirement.”]; US v. Barnum
(8C 2009) 564 F3 964 [arrest for possession of crack pipe, search of passenger
compartment permitted under Gant]. COMPARE: US v. Beene
(5C 2016) 818 F3 157, 162 [“In this case, the crime was resisting arrests.
Beene’s vehicle would not contain evidence of that crime.”].
[88] CAL: P v.
Nottoli (2011) 199 CA4 531, 556-58.
[89] OTHER: US v. Stegall (8C
2017) 850 F3 981, 985 [“we, along with several of our Sister Circuits,
have clearly held the hatchback or rear hatch area of a vehicle is a part
of the passenger compartment as long as an occupant could have reached
that area while inside the vehicle” Emphasis added. Citations
omitted.].
[90] NOTE: The reason we think a search
of the trunk is lawful is that a search based on reasonable suspicion is
more akin to a probable cause search than one which does not permit a trunk
search (i.e., search incident to arrest). Therefore, the scope of the search
should be the same as the scope of probable cause searches. See US v.
Ross (1982) 456 US 798, 821 [“When a legitimate search is under way,
and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice
distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a
home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped
packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the
prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.”]. ALSO SEE:
US v. Stegall (8C 2017) 850 F3 981, 985 [it is unsettled whether the
trunk may be searched].
[91] CAL: P v. Diaz (2013) 213
CA4 743, 756 [“defendant’s vehicle was itself an instrumentality of the
crime of vehicular manslaughter”].
[92] CAL: P v. Griffin (1988) 46
C3 1011, 1023, fn3 [Court notes that, although the search was
based on the instrumentality exception, the search “would have
been constitutionally valid” under the probable cause exception].
[93] CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5
353 3 [“the Fourth Amendment does not contain an exception to the
warrant requirement for searches to locate a driver’s
identification following a traffic stop.”]. NOTE: The
restrictions imposed by the court in Lopez do not apply to
searches for vehicle registration. See Lopez, supra,
at p. 360, fn.2 [“The portion of Arturo D. upholding a
search for registration documents is not at issue in this case.”]
ALSO SEE: Veh. Code§ 12951(b) [“The driver of a motor
vehicle shall present the registration or identification card or
other evidence of registration of any or all vehicles under his or
her immediate control for examination upon demand of any peace
officer” who has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation.”].
NOTE: No “least intrusive means” limitation: A
search will not be invalidated merely because officers might have
been able to use a less intrusive means of obtaining the ID or
registration information; e.g., radio or computer check. See
Chapter 8
Investigative Detentions
(Duration of Detentions, No “least intrusive means” test).
[94] CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5
353, 372 [“Ordinarily, a driver’s license or other identification
will supply no evidence of a traffic violation.”].
[95] CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5
353, 372 [“an officer may search a vehicle upon probable cause to
believe evidence of such lying will be found therein”].
[96] CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5
353, 371 [“The officer may also seek the driver’s consent to
search the vehicle for identification.”].
[97] CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5
353, 372.
[98] QUOTE FOM:
P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 372. USSC:
Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) 532 US 318, 323. CAL:
Veh. Code§ 40302.
[99] QUOTE FROM:
P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 373. NOTE: The court in
Lopez observed that such verification is especially likely
to be effective as the result of advances in technology.
[100] CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8
C5 353, 371 fn.7.
[101] CAL: P v. Lopez (2019) 8
C5 353, 360, fn.2 [“The portion of Arturo D. upholding a
search for registration documents is not at issue in this case.”].
[102] CAL:
P v. Webster (1991) 54 C3 411, 431 [“it was
reasonable for [the officer] to remove the passengers and find the
documentation himself”].
[103] CAL:
In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 C4 60, 78, fn.19 [reversed on
other grounds in P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 381.
[104] CAL:
In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 C4 60, 81 [“the area under
Arturo’s seat was a location where registration or identification
documentation reasonably might be expected to be found,” reversed
on other grounds in P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 381
P v. Webster (1991) 54 C3 411, 431 [“visor
and glove compartment” are traditional repositories for auto
registrations]; P v. Turner (1994) 8 C4 137,
182 [glove box]; P v. Martin (1972) 23 CA3
444, 447 [“on the sun visors”]; P v.
Chavers (1983) 33 C3 462, 470 [“a glove compartment is a
traditional depository of a vehicle registration”].
[105] CAL:
In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 C4 60, 78 [search need not be
limited to “traditional repositories”], reversed on other grounds
in P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 381.
[106] CAL:
In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 C4 60, 86, fn.25 [“the trunk of a
car is not a location where required documentation reasonably
would be expected to be found,” reversed on other grounds in
P v. Lopez (2019) 8 C5 353, 381].
[107] USSC: New York v.
Belton (1981) 453 US 454.
[108] USSC: Arizona v.
Gant (2009) 556 US 332.
[109] USSC: Arizona v.
Gant (2009) 556 US 332, 350 [“We now know that articles
inside the passenger compartment are rarely within the area into
which an arrestee might reach.”].
[110] CAL: Veh. Code§ 2805.
[111] CAL: P v.
Lindsey (1986) 182 CA3 772, 779 [“The car was located in a
public parking lot and [the officer] was standing outside of the
car. Thus, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information obtained during this initial inspection.”].
[112] USSC: New York v.
Class (1986) 475 US 106.