Chapter 16: Consent Searches

[1] USSC: US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 178 [“the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence”]. CAL: P v. James (1977) 19 C3 99, 106, fn.4 [“The People may discharge the foregoing burdens by a preponderance of the evidence.”].

[2] CAL: P v. Gorg (1955) 45 C2 776, 782 [“evidence must be presented that will enable the court to determine for itself whether consent was in fact given”]. OTHER: US v. Worley (6C 1999) 193 F3 380, 386 [“we must examine the content of that statement to ensure that it unequivocally (and specifically) indicates that the defendant consented”]; US v. Sanchez (8C 1998) 156 F3 875, 878 [the issue is whether “the police reasonably believe the search to be consensual”]; US v. Guerrero (10C 2007) 472 F3 784, 789-90 [“Consent may instead be granted through gestures or other indications of acquiescence, so long as they are sufficiently comprehensible to a reasonable officer.”]. COMPARE: P v. Poole (1986) 182 CA3 1004, 1012 [“Six or seven officers strode into Poole’s apartment in order to ‘talk’ to him, without so much as a by-your-leave.”].

[3] CAL: P v. James (1977) 19 C3 99, 113 [“there is no talismanic phrase which must be uttered by a suspect in order to authorize a search”]; Nerell v. Superior Court (1971) 20 CA3 593, 599 [“specific words of consent are not necessary”]. OTHER: US v. Carter (6C en banc 2004) 378 F3 584, 589 [“Fundamentally, Carter asks us to hold as a matter of law that consent must be given verbally, perhaps by some ‘magic words’ formula. This we decline to do.”]; US v. Worley (6C 1999) 193 F3 380, 387 [“there is no ‘magic’ formula or equation that a court must apply in all cases to determine whether consent was validly and voluntarily given”].

[4] OTHER: US v. Garcia-Garcia (8C 2020) 957 F3 887, 897.

[5] CAL: P v. Perillo (1969) 275 CA2 778, 782 [“I don’t care”]. OTHER: US v. Radford (7C 2017) 856 F3 1147, 1150 [“I guess so”]; US v. Pollly (2011) 630 F3 991, 998 [“I don’t care.”]; US v. Canipe (6C 2009) 569 F3 597, 604 [it “wouldn’t be a problem”]; US v. $117,920 (8C. 2005) 413 F3 826, 828 [“I guess if you want to”]; US v. Zubia-Melendez (10C. 2001) 263 F3 1155, 1163 [“Yeah, no matter”]; US v. Franklin (1C. 2011) 630 F3 53, 60 [“do what you got to do”].

[6] OTHER: US v. Pena-Ponce (8C 2009) 588 F3 579, 584 [“Pena-Ponce conversed without difficulty for a substantial portion of the conversation”].

[7] CAL: Nerell v. Superior Court (1971) 20 CA3 593, 599 [“Specific words of consent are not necessary; actions alone may be sufficient to establish that the defendant freely consented.”]; P v. Perillo (1969) 275 CA2 778, 782 [“consent is established by words or conduct which import that it has been given”]; P v. Martino (1985) 166 CA3 777, 791 [“Consent to enter a residence may be given nonverbally.”]. 9th CIR: Pavao v. Pagay (9C 2002) 307 F3 915, 919 [“In determining whether consent was given in a particular case, we must therefore consider the totality of the circumstances.”]. OTHER: US v. Guerrero (10C 2007) 472 F3 784, 789-90 [“Consent may instead be granted through gestures or other indications of acquiescence, so long as they are sufficiently comprehensible to a reasonable officer.”].

[8] EXAMPLES: Consent implied by gesture:

• “The video shows that when Frye asked Kennedy if he could pat him down, Kennedy responded by raising his hands above his head.” US v. Kennedy (8C 2022) 35 F.4th 1129, 1134.

• “Here, however, Sabo did not simply answer the door. He stepped back and to the side so that McCune could enter. What is more, Sabo’s actions came in direct response to McCune’s request to enter.” US v. Sabo (7C 2013) 724 F3 891, 894.

• When asked if his son could retrieve a weapon in a tent, the suspect “nodded affirmatively.” US v. Basher (9C 2011) 629 F3 1161, 1168.

• Suspecting that the occupants of an apartment were using drugs, an officer knocked on the door. When a woman opened the door, the officer “displayed his badge and said he was a police officer.” The woman “stepped back, and the officer entered.” P v. Quinn (1961) 194 CA2 172, 175. Also see US v. Greer (8C 2010) 607 F3 559, 563 [when the defendant “opened the door to the porch and stepped back, he impliedly invited the officers to enter”]; US v. Carter (6C en banc 2004) 378 F3 584, 588 [“Any ordinary caller, under like circumstances, would understand assent to have been given, and the police are not held to a higher standard in this regard than an ordinary person.”]; US v. Guillen (10C 2021) 995 F3 1095, 1104 [defendant “impliedly consented to the entry by stepping away from the doorway and allowing the agents to enter the house”]; P v. Martino (1985) 166 CA3 777, 791 [“Martino’s nonverbal gesture of opening the door wider and stepping back for Detective Girt to enter constituted substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Martino consented to the initial entry.”]; P v. Superior Court (Arketa) (1970) 10 CA3 122, 127 [“Implied consent has frequently been found in the overt conduct of a defendant which permits entry into the subject premises such as where the defendant stands back from a doorway or otherwise beckons or nods to officers who wish to enter.”].

• Standing on the porch of the suspect’s house, an officer asked the suspect if he could speak with him inside about a runaway juvenile. The suspect “made no verbal response, but he stepped aside and made a gesture, as if to say, ‘Come in, follow me.'” P v. Harrington (1970) 2 C3 991, 995, 995.

• Standing outside a woman’s apartment, an officer asked her if she would phone her son at work so the officer could ask him about a missing girl in the apartment complex. The woman agreed, unlocked the door and entered. The officer followed her inside. P v. Panah (2005) 35 C4 395, 467 [entry “was plainly with the implied consent of [the woman]”].

• Responding to a report of domestic violence in an apartment, an officer knocked on the door. A woman answered; her face was “bruised and swollen.” When the officer asked who had injured her, “she stepped back and pointed to defendant lying on the couch inside.” The officer entered. P v. Frye (1998) 18 C4 894, 990.

• Officers went to the suspect’s apartment to question him about a report that he had brandished a gun. When the suspect opened the door slightly, one of the officers told him they wanted to talk about the incident. The suspect then opened the door fully, stepped back and said, “Does it look like there’s a disturbance going on?” P v. Cove (1964) 228 CA2 466, 468, 470.

• When an officer asked him if he would consent to a search of his truck, the suspect handed over his keys. See P v. Carvajal (1988) 202 CA3 487, 497. Also see US v. Zapata (1C 1994) 18 F3 971, 977 [“the act of handing over one’s car keys, if uncoerced, may in itself support an inference of consent to search the vehicle”]..

• Defendant’s “palms-up” signal indicated consent to search his car. US v. Guerrero (10C 2007) 472 F3 784, 790.

• A woman who had been shot in the leg (accidentally, she claimed), told an officer that the gun was inside her car. When asked, “Would you open the vehicle?” she opened the door. In re D.M.G. (1981) 120 CA3 218, 224-25.

[9] EXAMPLES: Officers told the suspect what they were looking for, and the suspect told them that it was located in that place or thing:

• When asked if she had any weapons, the suspect said yes and pointed to the headboard of a bed; the officer opened a compartment in the headboard and found a gun. US v. Reynolds (1C 2011) 646 F3 63, 73.

• A woman shot and killed a man inside her apartment. An officer who had lawfully entered, asked her, “Where’s the gun?” She said it was in a dresser drawer in her bedroom. P v. Superior Court (Henry) (1974) 41 CA3 636, 639 [“we think it clear that Henry’s statement about the location of the gun amounted to an implied consent to look for it”].

• “All right, you’ve got me. It’s in the case.” Nerell v. Superior Court (1971) 20 CA3 593, 598-99.

• Officer asked, “Where is the registration?” The defendant replied, “It should be in the glove compartment.” P v. Smith (1962) 210 CA2 252, 254

[10] CAL: P v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 CA4 1004, 1013 [“inviting police to respond to an emergency may, depending upon the circumstances, be regarded as implied consent to enter and search for suspects and victims”]. OTHER: US v. Risner (7C 2010) 593 F3 692, 694 [“Any reasonable person would infer from Dean’s communications that she consented to the police entry into her home to arrest Risner.”].

[11] CAL: P v. Nelson (1985) 166 CA3 1209, 1215 [“consent cannot be implied from defendant’s mere failure to object to a search”]; P v. Superior Court (Arketa) (1970) 10 CA3 122, 127 [“The search cannot be validated upon an implied consent based upon the failure of defendant Gonzales to protest the entry into the shed.”]; P v. Timms (1986) 179 CA3 86, 90 [consent “may not be implied merely from a person’s failure to object to the search”]. 9th CIR: Pavao v. Pagay (9C 2002) 307 F3 915, 919 [“a defendant’s failure to object to police entry is not sufficient to establish free and voluntary consent”].

[12] USSC: Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) 391 US 543, 548 [the prosecution “has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given”]; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 US 491, 497 [consent must have been “freely and voluntarily given”]. OTHER: US v. Dilly (5C 2007) 480 F3 747, 749 [“Once the government has demonstrated consent, the next issue is whether it was voluntary.”].

[13] USSC: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 228 [consent must “not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force”]; Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 US 429, 438 [“‘Consent’ that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all.”]. CAL: Mann v. Superior Court (1970) 3 C3 1, 8 [consent is involuntary if it was induced by “compulsion, intimidation, oppressive circumstances”]; P v. Hernandez (1988) 199 CA3 1182, 1187 [consent must be “unaffected by duress or coercion”]. OTHER: US v. Kimoana (10C 2004) 383 F3 1215, 1225 [“Consent is voluntary is there is no indication of either force or intimidation.”].

[14] USSC: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 223-24 [courts look to voluntariness of confessions cases “for initial guidance on the meaning of ‘voluntariness’ in the present context”; i.e., consent]. CAL: P v. Avalos (1996) 47 CA4 1569, 1578 [“in Schneckloth the Court adopted the voluntariness test from the coerced confession cases”].

[15] USSC: US v. Drayton (2002) 536 US 194, 207 [“the Court has repeated that the totality of the circumstances must control”]; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 227, 233 [“it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced”]. CAL: P v. Henderson (1990) 220 CA3 1632, 1651 [“The determination of voluntariness requires careful examination of all facts surrounding the consent,” edited.]. 9th CIR: US v. Morning (9C 1995) 64 F3 531, 533 [“Every encounter has its own facts and its own dynamics. So does every consent.”]; US v. Soriano (9C 2004) 361 F3 494, 502 [“these factors are only guideposts, not a mechanized formula to resolve the voluntariness inquiry”]. OTHER: US v. Worley (6C 1999) 193 F3 380, 387 [“there is no ‘magic’ formula or equation that a court must apply in all cases to determine whether consent was validly and voluntarily given. Indeed, such an argument has been flatly rejected by this court and the Supreme Court,” citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, above]. NOTE: The “Five-Factor” test: In determining whether consent was voluntary, the courts occasionally cite the so-called “five-factor test” of US v. Carbajal (9C 1992) 956 F2 924. See, for example, P v. Ramirez (1997) 59 CA4 1548, 1558; US v. Gipp (8C 1998) 147 F3 680, 685. It would be better to disregard this “test” because limiting the inquiry to five factors or any other fixed set of circumstances is contrary to the US Supreme Court’s instructions that all relevant circumstances be considered.

[16] CAL: P v. Perillo (1969) 275 CA2 778, 782 [“I don’t care”]. OTHER: Robbins v. MacKenzie (1C 1966) 364 F2 45, 50 [“Bowing to events, even if one is not happy about them, is not the same thing as being coerced.”]; US v. Gorman (1C 1967) 380 F2 158, 165 [“the pressure exerted on a criminal by the realization that the jig is up is far different from the deliberate or ignorant violation of personal right that renders apparent consent ineffective”]; US v. Carter (6C 2004) 378 F3 584, 589 [“trumpets need not herald an invitation [to search]”]; US v. Faruolo (2C 1974) 506 F2 490, 495 [“No person, even the most innocent, will welcome with glee and enthusiasm the search of his home by law enforcement agents.”].

[17] CAL: See P v. James (1977) 19 C3 99, 112 [“there may be a number of “rational reasons” for a suspect to consent to a search even though he knows the premises contain evidence that can be used against him”]; P v. Meredith (1992) 11 CA4 1548, 1562, “While it may be unusual for a rational narcotics courier to consent to a police search of the place where his cargo is stowed, any number of rational, if not particularly wise, reasons might have motivated Meredith to consent.” The following are some EXAMPLES:

It’s just a test: The suspect may figure that the officers are just testing him; and that if he consents, they’ll think he must be innocent and not bother with a search, or at least they’ll conduct a superficial one.

It’s well hidden: The suspect may think that the evidence is likely to be overlooked. This occurred in P v. Wheeler (1971) 23 CA3 290 where a cocky murder suspect told an LAPD homicide detective, “Let’s go search my apartment. You can search the shit out of it. I’ll even help you.” The detective accepted the invitation and found the murder weapon hidden behind a stereo speaker.

It ain’t mine: He may think that, even if the officers find it, he’ll claim it belonged to some dude whose name he can’t remember.

It’s curtains: “The jig is up. But if I cooperate, maybe I’ll get leniency.” These examples from P v. James (1977) 19 C3 99, 114. Also see US v. Radford (7C 2017) 856 F3 1147, 1150 [“In all likelihood she answered his questions because she knew the jug was up.”];US v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 US 544, 559, fn.7 [“It is arguable that the respondent may have thought she was acting in her self-interest by voluntarily cooperating with the officers in the hope of receiving more lenient treatment.”]; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 243 [“there is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person’s voluntarily allowing a search”]; P v. Ibarra (1980) 114 CA3 60, 65 [“Defendant claims evidence of coercion from the fact that he consented to the search when he knew that the car contained heroin. This point has never been dispositive of the issue of consent.”]; P v. Munoz (1972) 24 CA3 900, 906 [“While it can be argued generally that no sane person would voluntarily consent to a search knowing that contraband can be easily found”]; P v. Cartwright (1999) 72 CA4 1362, 1372, fn.11 [court rejects the argument that it would be unreasonable to believe the defendant consented to a search of a purse containing drugs; P v. Tremayne (1971) 20 CA3 1006, 1017 [the defendant “assumed the role of the interested husband seeking to assist the police to find the murderer of his wife in the hope this tactic would divert suspicion from him”]; P v. Linke (1968) 265 CA2 297, 306 [suspect may be trying to “bluff or beguile” the officers]; P v. Doerr (1968) 266 CA2 36, 39 [“a clumsy bluff”]; P v. Wheeler (1971) 23 CA3 290, 305 [a clumsy bluff by “a crude rather than a clever” gambler]; US v. Kim (9C 1994) 25 F3 1426, 1432, fn.4 [“[Kim] may have concluded from the outset that consensual compliance was a sound strategy”]; US v. Torres (10C 1981) 663 F2 1019, 1027 [“the defendant may have thought that the officers might overlook that money”]; US v. Carter (6C en banc 2004) 378 F3 584, 588-89 [“His decision [to consent] may have been rash and ill-considered, but that does not make it invalid. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to counsel a suspect to consider his options with care”]; US v. Gorman (2C 1965) 355 F2 151, 159 [“Acceptance of this contention would mean that expressions of consent could relieve officers of the need of obtaining a warrant only when the speak was not aware that the search would disclose damaging evidence”]. NOTE: Another explanation is that the suspect may not be very bright. But, as the court stated in State v. McKnight (N.J. 1968) 243 A2 240, 250 [“It is consonant with good morals, and the Constitution, to exploit a criminal’s ignorance or stupidity in the detectional process.”

[18] CAL: P v. Fields (1979) 95 CA3 972, 976 [“There is a world of difference between requesting one to open a trunk and asking one’s permission to look in a trunk.”]; P v. Engel (1980) 105 CA3 489, 499 [“Anita only yielded the key to the front door after Deputy Spinner had directed her to do so—a submission to apparent authority, and a negation of consent.”]; P v. Poole (1986) 182 CA3 1004, 1012 [“Police Department, open the door”; entry not consensual]. 9th CIR: US v. Winsor (9C en banc 1988) 846 F2 1569, 1573, fn.3 [“compliance with a police command is not consent”]. OTHER: US v. Conner (8C 1997) 127 F3 663, 666 [“an unconstitutional search occurs when officers gain visual or physical access to a motel room after an occupant opens the door not voluntarily, but in response to a demand under color of authority”].

[19] CAL: Parrish v. Civil Service Commission (1967) 66 C2 260, 270-5 [threat to terminate welfare benefits]. 9th CIR: US v. Washington (9C 2004) 387 F3 1060, 1069 [“[The officer] thrice repeated that Washington faced an arrestable charge of failing to register with the RPD.”]; US v. Soriano (9C 2003) 361 F3 494 502 [threat to take away consenting person’s children]. OTHER: Edison v. Owens (10C 2008) 515 F3 1139, 1146 [threat of detentions].

[20] 9th CIR: US v. Castrillon (9C 1983) 716 F2 1279, 1283, fn.1 [“To look only to Castrillon’s subjective fears, without considering the reasonableness of his alleged state of mind, would unduly hamper application of the totality of the circumstances test.”]. OTHER: US v. Guerrero (10C 2007) 472 F3 784, 790 [voluntariness “turns on whether a reasonable person would believe he was free to deny the officer’s request to search,” edited].

[21] CAL: P v. Duren (1973) 9 C3 218, 241 [“While defendant’s wife may have been at a disadvantage psychologically, it does not appear [she was coerced].”].

[22] CASE REFERENCED: P v. Reyes (2000) 83 CA4 7 [suspect was confronted by officers “attired in full ninja-style raid gear, including black masks and bulletproof vests emblazoned with POLICE markings.”]. CAL: Estes v. Rowland (1993) 14 CA4 508, 527 [consent to search a prison visitor was intimidating when it was obtained “in a coercive atmosphere, with guards wearing ‘combat gear’ and restraining chained dogs”]; P v. McKelvy (1972) 23 CA3 1027, 1034 [the suspect was “standing in a police spotlight, surrounded by four officers all armed with shotguns or carbines.”]; P v. Dickson (1983) 144 CA3 1046, 1051-52 [“A ‘request’ from a half dozen uniformed police officers moving up one’s stairs with pistols drawn hardly invites the expression of free will]. OTHER: US v. Robertson (4C 2013) 736 F3 677, 680 [“Officer Welch’s initial, accusatory question, combined with the police-dominated atmosphere, clearly communicated to Mr. Robertson that he was not free to leave or to refuse Officer Welch’s request to conduct a search.”]; US v. Gillespie (7C 1981) 650 F2 127, 128-29 [“heavily armed” agents approached defendant’s house in “ready” position”]. COMPARE: US v. Chaney (1C 2011) 647 F3 401, 407 [consent was given after “the excitement of the initial entry had passed”].

[23] CAL: P v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058, 1067 [“Neither does it appear, as a matter of law, that the persistence of the officers constituted coercion.”]; Tidwell v. Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 780, 786 [“The initial refusal did not vitiate the subsequent consent. After the refusal the officers gave reason for their desire to come inside—the heat.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Cormier (9C 2000) 220 F3 1103, 1109 [the officer “was not unreasonably persistent in her attempt to obtain access to Cormier’s motel room”]. OTHER: US v. Guerrero (10C 2007) 472 F3 784, 790 [an officer is not required “to refrain from renewing his request for consent after a defendant has at first denied it”]; US v. Zubia-Melendez (10C 2001) 263 F3 1155, 1163 [“The fact that Appellant initially told [the officer] he could not search the car does not, however, render his subsequent consent involuntary.”]. COMPARE: US v. Jerez (7C 1997) 108 F3 684, 692 [“The deputies’ persistence, in the face of the refusal to admit, transformed what began as an attempt to engage in a consensual encounter into an investigatory stop.”].

[24] CAL: P v. Gurtenstein (1977) 69 CA3 441, 451 [only one officer spoke to defendant about a search]; P v. Munoz (1972) 24 CA3 900, 905 [“The fact there were four officers does not in itself carry an implied assertion of authority that the occupants should not be expected to resist.”]; P v. Weaver (2001) 26 C4 876, 924 [consent was voluntary despite “six or seven officers presented themselves at [defendant’s] home”]; P v. Ibarra (1980) 114 CA3 60, 65 [“Defendant claims coercion from the fact that he was surrounded by police cars when originally stopped. But again, police domination does not necessarily vitiate consent.”]. 9th CIR: Orhorhaghe v. I.N.S. (9C 1994) 38 F3 488, 500 [consent not involuntary merely because there were four officers]. OTHER: US v. Williams (8C 2014) 760 F3 811, 816 [“‘police-dominated’ atmosphere arising from the execution of a search warrant by a group of armed agents likewise is not sufficient to establish an overborne will”]; US v. Price (3C 2009) 558 F3 270, 279 [“Most officers on the scene were deliberately kept away so as not to overwhelm [the consenting person].”]; US v. Comstock (8C 2008) 531 F3 667, 677 [“While several law enforcement officers were present, no evidence suggested the officers physically intimidated, threatened, or coerced Defendant in any manner.”]. COMPARE: US v. Conner (8C 1997) 127 F3 663, 666, fn.2 [consent involuntary because, among other things, four officers “were positioned at or near the door”]; P v. Poole (1986) 182 CA3 1004, 1012 [six or seven officers plus additional coercive circumstances].

[25] CAL: P v. Challoner (1982) 136 CA3 779, 782 [“Consent to search given in response to a request by an armed officer who gun is drawn is suspect.”]; P v. Fields (1979) 95 CA3 972, 976 [an assertion of authority is especially likely when “the police have shown their weapons”].

[26] CAL: P v. Parker (1975) 45 CA3 24, 31 [“Here while the officers had entered the room with guns drawn, they had holstered their arms before interrogating [the suspect].”]; P v. Ratliff (1986) 41 C3 675, 686 [“the evidence did not indicate that any of [the officers] kept their guns drawn when the actual request for consent to search was made.”]; P v. Williams (1980) 114 CA3 67, 71 [officer “replaced his revolver in his holster when he handcuffed defendant”]; P v. Challoner (1982) 136 CA3 779, 782 [“Evidence of the drawn gun is not itself sufficient to establish that her consent was the product of coercion”]; P v. Martino (1985) 166 CA3 777, 791 [consent was not involuntary merely because an officer concealed his gun behind his leg]. OTHER: US v. Kimoana (10C 2004) 383 F3 1215, 1225 [when consent was given, the atmosphere in the room was “calm” and the officers had reholstered their weapons]; US v. Faruolo (2C 1974) 506 F2 490, 495, fn.9 [“With respect to the drawn gun the district court found that it ‘had no lasting effect.'”]. BUT ALSO SEE: P v. Aguilar (1996) 48 CA4 632, 640 [it appears the officers’ guns were drawn but consent was deemed voluntary].

[27] CAL: P v. Monterroso (2004) 34 C4 743, 758 [“the fact that a defendant is under arrest and in handcuffs at the time of giving consent is but one of the factors”]; P v. Ratliff (1986) 41 C3 675, 686 [“the fact that defendant was handcuffed when his consent was sought does not demonstrate that his consent to a search was involuntary”]. OTHER: US v. Bearden (8C 2015) 780 F3 887, 895 [defendant was handcuffed but “he offers no evidence to counter the officers’ testimony that he was not threatened, punished, intimidated, or promised anything for his consent and that he had been cooperative”].

[28] USSC: US v. Watson (1976) 423 US 411, 424 [“custody alone has never been enough to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search”]. CAL: P v. Ramirez (1997) 59 CA4 1548, 1559 [“custody in itself has never been held sufficient to demonstrate appellant’s consent was not voluntary”]; P v. James (1977) 19 C3 99, 109 [“custody” is of “particular significance,” but “not conclusive”]; P v. Williams (1980) 114 CA3 67, 71 [“the fact that a defendant is under arrest and in handcuffs at the time a consent is given does not make a consent to search involuntary as a matter of law”]; P v. Strawder (1973) 34 CA3 370, 377 [“California courts have not made a definitive distinction between consent to search given by a person who is not in custody and one who is, but, rather, have considered the factor of custody to be a significant circumstance”]; P v. Miller (1999) 69 CA4 190, 203 [“The fact that defendant was detained at the time he consented is not determinative.”]; P v. Ibarra (1980) 114 CA3 60, 65 [“custody does not necessarily vitiate consent”]; P v. Woolsey (1979) 90 CA3 994, 1000 [“custody of the defendant may be of significance, but it is not determinative”]. OTHER: US v. Salvo (6C 1998) 133 F3 943, 953 [“But, even if Salvo was in custody, that by itself would not be enough to vitiate an otherwise valid consent to search.”].

[29] USSC: North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 US 369, 373. CAL: P v. Ramirez (1997) 59 CA4 1548, 1558. ALSO SEE: US v. Castillo (9C 1989) 866 F2 1071, 1082 [Butler analysis applies to consent searches].

[30] USSC: Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) 391 US 543, 550 [“When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion.”]. CAL: P v. Baker (1986) 187 CA3 562, 571 [“Baker’s consent cannot be disentangled from the news that a search warrant was imminent.”]. OTHER: US v. Jacobs (6C 2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 2661363] [“Detective Agee did warn that he’d obtain a warrant to search Jacobs’s father’s house and Jacobs’s car. But a threat to perform a lawful search isn’t objectively coercive.”]; Trulock v. Freeh (4C 2001) 275 F3 391, 402 [police agent told the suspect that “the FBI had a search warrant”].

[31] CAL: P v. Ward (1972) 27 CA3 218; P v. Goldberg (1984) 161 CA3 170, 188 [“consent to search is not necessarily rendered involuntary by the requesting officers’ advisement that they would try to get a search warrant should consent be withheld”]. 9th CIR: US v. Whitworth (9C 1988) 856 F2 1268, 1279 [“McElwee’s statement indicating that a search warrant would likely be sought and the mobile home secured could not have, by itself, rendered Whitworth’s consent involuntary as a matter of law.”]; US v. Rodriguez (9C 2006) 464 F3 1072, 1078 [“A statement indicating that a search warrant would likely be sought and the apartment secured could not have, by itself, rendered [the] consent involuntary as a matter of law.”]. OTHER: US v. Mumme (1C 2021) 985 F3 25, 37 [“the officers’ statements of their intent to secure the home while they applied for a search warrant did not render his consent involuntary”]; US v. Lucas (6C 2011) 640 F3 168, 174 [having probable cause, the officer’s “warning that a search warrant would be sought if Lucas did not grant consent to search was a proper statement that did not taint the subsequent search”]; US v. Alexander (7C 2009) 573 F3 465, 478 [“an officer’s factually accurate statement that the police will take lawful investigative action in the absence of cooperation is not coercive conduct”]; US v. Larson (8C 1992) 978 F3 1021, 1023 [consent is not necessarily coerced when “officers state they will attempt to obtain a warrant if the person does not consent”]; Davis v. Novy (7C 2006) 433 F3 926, 930 [the officer’s statement that he would impound Davis’s truck if he did not consent “wasn’t a baseless threat”].

[32] CAL: P v. Rodriguez (2014) 231 CA4 288, 303 [“the trial court was entitled to find this was only a declaration of the officer’s legal remedies”]; P v. McClure (1974) 39 CA3 64, 69 [“The police in good faith believed they could obtain a search warrant.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Rodriguez (9C 2006) 464 F3 1072, 1078 [“when probable cause to justify a warrant exists, the weight of [this factor] is significantly diminished”]; US v. Kaplan (9C 1990) 895 F2 618, 622 [“consent is not likely to be held invalid where an officer tells a defendant that he could obtain a search warrant if the officer had probable cause upon which a warrant could issue”]. OTHER: US v. Hicks (7C. 2011) 630 F3 1058, 1066 [“the ultimate question is the genuineness of the stated intent to get a warrant”]; US v. Lucas (6C 2011) 640 F3 168, 174 [having probable cause, the officer’s “warning that a search warrant would be sought if Lucas did not grant consent to search was a proper statement that did not taint the subsequent search”]; Davis v. Novy (7C. 2006) 433 F3 926, 930 [officer’s statement that he would impound Davis’s truck if he did not consent “wasn’t a baseless threat.”]; US v. Duran (7C 1992) 957 F2 499, 502 [“Although empty threats to obtain a warrant may at times render a subsequent consent involuntary, the threat in this case was firmly grounded.”]; US v. Alexander (7C 2009) 573 F3 465, 478 [“There is no reason to doubt that the officers would have obtained a search warrant had they applied for one”]; Edison v. Owens (10C 2008) 515 F3 1139, 1146 [“An officer’s threat to obtain a warrant may invalidate the suspect’s eventual consent if the officers lack the probable cause necessary for a search warrant.”]; US v. Cruz-Mendez (10C 2006) 467 F3 1260, 1267 [officers’ statement that they would “obtain” or “seek” a warrant did not render consent involuntary because it appeared they had probable cause].

[33] USSC: Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 US 491, 497 [consent is involuntary when it is “a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority”]; Lo-Ji Sales v. New York (1979) 442 US 319, 329 [“Any ‘consent’ given in the face of colorably lawful coercion cannot validate the illegal acts shown here.”]. CAL: P v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 CA4 817, 832 [the search “cannot stand” when “the circumstances indicate that a suspect consents because he believes resistance to be futile”]; Crofoot v. Superior Court (1981) 121 CA3 717, 726 [“Because the purported consent was given under legal compulsion, it is deemed in law to be involuntary”]; P v. Henderson (1990) 220 CA3 1632, 1651 [the consenting person “must not merely be submitting to a claim of lawful authority”]; Parrish v. Civil Service Commission (1967) 66 C2 260, 268 [“implied assertions of superior authority” may render consent involuntary]. 9th CIR: Orhorhaghe v. I.N.S. (9C 1994) 38 F3 488, 500 [“there can be no effective consent to a search or seizure if that consent follows a law enforcement officer’s assertion of an independent right to engage in such conduct”]. COMPARE: US v. Shrum (10C 2018) 908 F3 1219, 1238] [“the facts suggest Defendant’s consent to search was the direct result of the illegal seizure of his home rather than an act of free will”].

[34] CAL: P v. Monterroso (2004) 34 C4 743, 758.

[35] CAL: P v. Munoz (1972) 24 CA3 900, 906 [“asked by Munoz if he had a search warrant he answered he had not. This, in light of Munoz’ subsequent consent to search did not, as a matter of law, require the trial court to draw an inference that the consent was involuntary.”].

[36] CAL: P v. Crofoot (1981) 121 CA3 717, 725; Lane v. Superior Court (1969) 271 CA2 821, 825. 9th CIR: Orhorhaghe v. I.N.S. (9C 1994) 38 F3 488, 500.

[37] CAL: Crofoot v. Superior Court (1981) 121 CA3 717, 725 [“implicit in the officer’s statement is the threat that by exercising his right to refuse the search, [defendant] would be incriminating himself”].

[38] QUOTE FROM: Gorman v. US (1C 1967) 380 F2 158, 165.

[39] OTHER: US v. Erwin (6C 1998) 155 F3 818, 823 [“Although it was not a neutral question, it plainly sought Erwin’s permission to search the vehicle; the defendant still could have refused to consent to the search.”]; US v. Ledesma (10C 2006) 447 F3 1307, 1315 [“Nothing about this line of questioning suggests coercion or intimidation,” edited.].

[40] USSC: US v. Drayton (2002) 536 US 194, 206 [asking suspects “if they objected” to the search indicated “that he or she was free to refuse”]. CAL: P v. James (1977) 19 C3 99, 116 [“when a person of normal intelligence is expressly asked to give his consent to a search of his premises, he will reasonably infer he has the option of withholding that consent if he chooses”]; P v. Fields (1979) 95 CA3 972, 976 [“asking permission [is] an indicia of voluntariness”]; In re D.M.G. (1981) 120 CA3 218, 225 [court notes the “importance of asking permission“]; P v. Parker (1975) 45 CA3 24, 31 [“Their request for permission to search was phrased in terms indicating that Williams could deny them permission”]; P v. Bustamonte (1969) 270 CA2 648, 653 [seeking consent “carries the implication that the alternative of a refusal existed”]. OTHER: US v. Radford (7C 2017) 856 F3 1147, 1149 [“there was no need to tell her that she did not have to answer his questions or consent to a search—that was implicit in his asking her questions without telling her that she was required to answer them”].

[41] USSC: US v. Drayton (2002) 536 US 194, 206 [“The Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.”]; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 227 [“While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as a sine qua non of an effective consent.”]; Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 US 33, 39-40. CAL: P v. Tully (2012) 54 C4 952, 983, fn.10; P v. Monterroso (2004) 34 C4 743, 758. OTHER: US v. Guillen (10C 2021) 995 F3 1095, 1105 [although the agents did not inform the suspect that he could refuse to consent, he “was a legal adult who knew enough about his rights to ask the agents if they had a warrant to enter his home”].

[42] USSC: US v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 US 544, 559 [“the fact that the officers themselves informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her consent substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive”]; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 249 [“the suspect’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account”]. CAL: P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849 [“the delivery of such a warning weighs heavily in favor of finding voluntariness and consent”]. 9th CIR: US v. Rodriguez (9C 2006) 464 F3 1072, 1077. OTHER: US v. Duran (7C 1992) 957 F2 499, 503 [such notice was “particularly” important]. ALSO SEE: US v. Washington (1977) 431 US 181, 188 [“Indeed, it seems self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his answers were compelled.”].

[43] QUOTE FROM: US v. Russell (9C 2012) 664 F3 1279, 1282.

[44] CAL: P v. Williams (2007) 156 CA4 949, 961 [the officers “went out of their way to be courteous”]; P v. Franklin (1987) 192 CA3 935, 941 [“It is not the nature of the question or request made by the authorities, but rather the manner or mode in which it is put to the citizen that guides us in deciding whether compliance was voluntary or not; P v. Linke (1968) 265 CA2 297, 302 [defendant’s wife “testified that the officers were polite and courteous”]. OTHER: US v. Guillen (10C 2021) 995 F3 1095, 1105 [“the agents spoke in a casual, rather than aggressive, manner”]; US v. Duran (7C 1992) 957 F2 499, 503 [the officer was “gentlemanly”]; US v. Ledesma (10C 2006) 447 F3 1307, 1314 [relevant circumstances include “an officer’s pleasant manner and tone of voice that is not insisting”]. COMPARE: P v. Boyer (1989) 48 C3 247, 268 [“The manner in which the police arrived at defendant’s home, accosted him, and secured his ‘consent’ to accompany them suggested they did not intend to take ‘no’ for an answer.”]; Orhorhaghe v. INS (9C 1994) 38 F3 488, 495 [the officer “acted in an officious and authoritative manner that indicated that Orhorhaghe was not free to decline his requests”].

[45] CAL: P v. Weaver (2001) 26 C4 876, 924; P v. Avalos (1996) 47 CA4 1569, 1578 [“Defendant was also given a Spanish-language consent-to-search form, which he read and signed.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Rodrigues (9C 2006) 464 F3 1072, 1078 [“execution of a consent form is one factor that indicates that consent was voluntary”]. OTHER: US v. Budd (7C 2008) 549 F3 1140 [the officer “observed Budd take the time to pause and read both consent forms”]. ALSO SEE: North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 US 369, 373 [“An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”].

[46] CAL: P v. Smith (2010) 190 CA4 572, 577 [when asked by officers if they could enter her home to look for a wanted suspect, the resident said, “You can check but [the suspect] is not here”]; P v. Rupar (1966) 244 CA2 292, 298 [“Defendant’s attitude during the entire time that the officers were at her home indicated a desire to fully cooperate with them”]; P v. Ramos (1972) 25 CA3 529, 536 [“defendant suggested that the police officers search his home for weapons before any actual request was made by the officers to do so”]. 9th CIR: US v. Morning (9C 1995) 64 F3 531, 533 [“the evidence showed that he had actually decided to cooperate even before any request was made”]. OTHER: US v. Sandoval-Vasquez (7C 2006) 435 F3 739, 744-45 [court noted the defendant’s “additional cooperation with law enforcement beyond merely signing the consent form”].

[47] CAL: P v. Ramos (1972) 25 CA3 529, 536 [“defendant suggested that the police officers search his home for weapons before any actual request was made by the officers to do so”]; P v. Wheeler (1971) 23 CA3 290, 304. 9th CIR: US v. Brown (9C 2009) 563 F3 410, 413 [“Rishel volunteered consent without any prompting whatsoever.”]; US v. Sealey (9C 1987) 830 F2 1028, 1032 [defendant “requested that [the officer] find the gun, wherever it might be.”].

[48] CAL: P v. Aguilar (1996) 48 CA4 632, 640 [“The fact that Daniel refused consent to search appellant’s room shows that he was aware of his right to refuse consent and shows that his consent to search the rest of the home was not the product of police coercion.”]; Tidwell v. Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 780, 786 [“Robert knew his right to refuse entry. At first he did so refuse”]. 9th CIR: US v. Mesa-Corrales (9C 1999) 183 F3 1116, 1125 [defendant “had demonstrated by his prior refusal to consent that he knew that he had such a right—a knowledge that is highly relevant in our analysis of whether consent is voluntary”]; US v. Welch (11C 2012) 683 F3 1304, 1309 [“But Welch must not have felt coerced into consenting when they first asked, because he declined to consent.”]; US v. Lucas (6C 2011) 640 F3 168, 175 [“Lucas’s initial response to the request for consent to search [hesitation in signing consent form] indicates to us that Lucas knew he had a right to refuse the search and that he contemplated exercising that right”]; US v. Sandoval-Vasquez (7C 2006) 435 F3 739, 744 [defendant “initially declined to consent to a search, indicating he knew of his right to refuse”].

[49] USSC: Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 US 707, 726 [“He was a 16½-year-old juvenile with considerable experience with the police.”]; CAL: P v. Williams (1997) 16 C4 635. 659 [“The [trial] court described defendant as a ‘street kid, street man,’ in his ‘early 20’s, big, strong, bright, not intimidated by anybody, in robust good health,’ and displaying ‘no emotionalism [or signs of] mental weakness'”]; P v. M.S. (2019) 32 CA5 1177, 1187 [15-year old consented to search of her cellphone ]; P v. Coffman (2004) 34 C4 1, 58-59 [“given Marlow’s maturity and criminal experience (he was over 30 years old and a convicted felon at the time of the interrogation) it was unlikely Marlow’s will was thereby overborne”]; In re Aven S. (1991) 1 CA4 69, 77 [“The minor, while young, was experienced in the ways of the juvenile justice system.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Soriano (9C 2003) 361 F3 494, 502 [“While a court must look at the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents, the court must also look at the reasonableness of that fear.”]. OTHER: US v. Chaney (1C 2011) 647 F3 401, 408 [“It is reasonable to infer that a veteran of the criminal justice system will be less likely than most to be intimidated by the agents’ show of force.”]; US v. Gardner (6C 2018) 887 F3 780, 784 [“But the apprehension of ‘getting into trouble’ presents itself in every consent-to-search investigation into illegal conduct.”]; US v. Vinton (8C 2011) 631 F3 476, 482 [“Although lack of education and lower-than-average intelligence are factors in the voluntariness analysis, they do not dictate a finding of involuntariness, particularly when the suspect is clearly intelligent enough to understand his constitutional rights.”].

[50] CAL: P v. McClure (1974) 39 CA3 64, 70 [a Miranda warning “was an additional factor tending to show the voluntariness of appellant’s consent.”]. OTHER: US v. Steinmetz (8C 2018) 900 F3 595, 599 [“Even assuming that Steinmetz was not free to leave, he gave consent after receiving Miranda warnings].

[51] CAL: P v. $48,715 (1997) 58 CA4 1507, 1515 [scope “is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of circumstances.”]; P v. Engel (1980) 105 CA3 489, 504 [scope “may be determined equally from reasonable implications derived from a person’s express words and conduct”]. OTHER: US v. Turner (1C 1999) 169 F3 84, 87 [“We therefore look beyond the language of the consent itself, to the overall context”].

[52] CAL: P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 974 [prosecution must prove that “the scope of the consent given encompassed the item searched”]; P v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 CA4 1403, 1409 [“A consensual search may not legally exceed the scope of the consent supporting it.”]; P v. Oldham (2000) 81 C4 1, 11 [prosecution must prove that “the warrantless search was within the scope of the consent given”]. OTHER: US v. Brooks (10C 2005) 427 F3 1246, 1249 [“the scope of a search is limited by the breadth of the consent given”].

[53] USSC: Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 252 [“A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.”]. OTHER: US v. Zapata (11C 1999) 180 F3 1237, 1242 [“a search is impermissible when an officer does not conform to the limitations imposed by the person giving consent”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Bowden (6C 2004) 380 F3 266, 271 [“If a property owner restricts the police from searching a certain area of the property, the police are not necessarily unreasonable in concluding that the areas which were not included in the restriction are within the scope of consent.”].

[54] USSC: Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 251 [“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”]. CAL: P v. $48,715 (1997) 58 CA4 1507, 1515 [scope “is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of circumstances.”]; P v. Engel (1980) 105 CA3 489, 504 [scope “may be determined equally from reasonable implications derived from a person’s express words and conduct”]. OTHER: US v. Kimoana (10C 2004) 383 F3 1215, 1223 [“We apply an objective reasonableness test to measure the scope of a person’s consent.”]; US v. Zapata (11C 1999) 180 F3 1237, 1242 [“When an individual provides a general consent to search, without expressly limiting the terms of his consent, the search is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass.”]; US v. Strickland (11C 1990) 902 F2 937, 941 [“When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless. Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass.”]; US v. Snow (2C 1995) 132 F3 133, 135 [“It is self-evident that that a police officer seeking general permission to search a vehicle is looking for evidence of illegal activity.”]; US v. Coleman (4C 2009) 588 F3 816 [unrestricted consent authorized a search under a mattress].

[55] CAL: Beach v. Superior Court (1970) 11 CA3 1032, 1035-36 [officers could not reasonably believe that the defendants’ sister had common authority over his room and personal effects]; P v. Stage (1970) 7 CA3 681, 683 [common authority over a place or thing by determining the nature of their relationship. arty’onsenting person was the suspect'”Mullen’s consent to search the car was not consent to search Stage’s jacket. This is particularly so where the officer knew the jacket belonged to Stage rather than Mullen.”]; P v. Cruz (1964) 61 C2 861, 866 [“The general consent given by Ann and Susan that the officers could ‘look around’ did not authorize [the officers] to open and search suitcases and boxes that he had been informed were the property of third persons.”]; P v. Boyd (1990) 224 CA3 736, 749; P v. Egan (1967) 250 CA2 433, 436 [the consenting person “claimed no right, title, or interest in the kit bag. He made it abundantly clear that it was not his, and that [the suspect] had left it there.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Davis (9C 2003) 332 F3 1163, 1169, fn.4 [“nothing in the record here indicates that [the consenting roommate] had mutual use of and joint access to or control over Davis’ bag, the bed under which it was stored, or even the bedroom in which it was discovered”]; US v. Welch (9C 1993) 4 F3 761, 763-65 [consent by a male to search his car would not ordinarily authorize a search of a female’s purse located in the vehicle]; US v. Ruiz (9C 2005) 428 F3 877, 881 [the consenting co-occupant of a trailer “had at least joint control over the gun case on the shelf of the trailer’s living room”]. OTHER: US v. Peyton (DCC 2014) 745 F3 546, 554 [defendant’s grandmother “told the police that Peyton kept his ‘personal property’ in the area around the bed, where the shoebox was found. In light of this clear statement that there was an area of the room that was not hers, it was not reasonable for the police to believe that [the grandmother] shared use of the closed shoebox.”]; US v. Taylor (6C 2010) 600 F3 678, 681-82 [presumption rebutted because the consenting person was a female, and she had consented to a search of a spare bedroom containing men’s clothing].

[56] USSC: Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 251 [“The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.”]. CAL: P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 975 [“a general consent to search includes consent to pursue the stated object of the search”]; P v. Avalos (1996) 47 CA4 1569, 1579 [the officers “disclosed they were looking for ‘other contraband,’ which was entirely accurate and reasonably alerted defendant the object of the search would include narcotics”]. OTHER: US v. Kimoana (10C 2004) 383 F3 1215, 1223 [“Consent to search for specific items includes consent to search those areas or containers that might reasonably contain those items.”]; US v. Zapata (11C 1999) 180 F3 1237, 1243 [“A general consent to search for specific items includes consent to search any compartment or container that might reasonably contain those items.”]. COMPARE: US v. Dichiarinte (7C 1971) 445 F2 126, 129 [“Government agents may not obtain consent to search on the representation that they intend to look only for certain specified items and subsequently use that consent as a license to conduct a general exploratory search.”].

[57] CAL: P v. Miller (1999) 69 CA4 190, 203 [“The scope of a consensual search for narcotics is very broad and includes closets, drawers, and containers.”]. OTHER: US v. Lopez-Mendoza (8C 2010) 601 F3 861, 867 [because drugs “can be hidden in different parts of a car, searching those areas is objectively reasonable”].

[58] EXAMPLES: Searches for drugs have been found to include the following:

Behind door panels. US v. Mayo (8C 2010) 627 F3 709, 715.

In groin area: US v. Russell (9C 2012) 664 F3 1279, 1282-83.

Inside readily-opened closed containers (such as paper bags, boxes). See Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 251 [closed paper bag on the floor of the suspect’s car]; P v. Egan (1967) 250 CA2 433, 436 [“small kit bag”]; P v. Carvajal (1988) 202 CA3 487, 497 [boxes]; US v. Gutierrez-Mederos (9C 1992) 965 F2 800, 803-4 [a locked compartment in the suspect’s car]; US v. Springs (DCC 1991) 936 F2 1330, 1331-32 [container of baby powder].

Inside the suspect’s suitcase, including all compartments and containers. P v. Shandloff (1985) 170 CA3 372. Also see P v. $48,715 (1997) 58 CA4 1507, 1515.

Inside compartments in household furniture and furnishings. P v. Egan (1967) 250 CA2 433, 436.

Behind the driver’s seat in a truck. P v. Avalos (1996) 47 CA4 1569, 1579.

Under the suspect’s car. US v. Anderson (10C 1997) 114 F3 1059, 1065; US v. Perez (9C 1994) 37 F3 510, 516.

Under loose carpeting. US v. McWeeney (9C 2006) 454 F3 1030, 1035.

Between the bed liner and the side of the suspect’s pickup. P v. $48,715 (1997) 58 CA4 1507, 1516.

Inside a door vent and interior door panels. P v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 CA4 1402, 1415 [“to an experienced officer the suspicious door panel was not an unlikely repository of narcotics”]; P v. Zapata (11C 1999) 180 F3 1237, 1243; US v. Torres (10C 1981) 664 F3 1019 [officers were permitted to remove “the air-vent cover in the side of the door”]; P v. Gutierrez-Mederos (9C 1992) 965 F2 800, 804 [behind a cardboard divider in the cargo area of the suspect’s hatchback].

Behind a TV in vehicle. US v. Saucedo (7C 2012) 688 F3 863, 865 [officer used a “flashlight and screwdriver to remove screws holding the molding in place that covered a hidden compartment in the tractor”].

Inside a false compartment in cargo area. P v. Barragan (8C 2004) 379 F3 524, 530.

Where documents are located. Although a search for drugs would not permit officers to read or otherwise inspect documents (see US v. Dichiarinte (1971) 445 F2 126, 128-29), they can lawfully inspect the places in which documents were kept because, as the court pointed out in P v. Miler (1999) 69 CA4 190, 203, “narcotics could have been hidden in and among the stacks of papers and books.” Compare P v. Harwood (1977) 74 CA3 460, 468 [search for drugs in a residence did not permit officers to intercept phone calls to the premises]; US v. Turner (1C 1999) 169 F3 84 [consent to search for evidence of an assault did not impliedly authorize a computer search].

[59] 9th CIR: US v. McWeeney (9C 2006) 454 F3 1030, 1035. OTHER: US v. Correa (7C 2018) 908 F3 208, 215] [the suspect knew that the officer “was looking for ‘anything illegal,’ so he had to have known that the officers could be looking for drugs”]; US v. Canipe (6C 2009) 569 F3 597, 606.

[60] EXAMPLES: The courts have ruled that consent to search for a weapon permitted a search of the following:

A “travel bag.” US v. Sealey (9C 1987) 830 F2 1028, 1032.

A “triangular, cloth case.” US v. Ruiz (9C 2005) 428 F3 877. 882.

In clothing. US v. Anderson (8C 2012) 674 F3 821, 827 [“Firearms easily could be located in clothing hanging in a closet, particularly in outerwear such as a coat, jacket, or vest, and most particularly in a blaze orange hunting vest.].

A briefcase. P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 976. Also see US v. Gutierrez-Mederos (9C 1991) 965 F2 800, 804 [consent to search for weapons authorized a search of “any container within the car that reasonably could contain contraband”].

The trunk of a car. US v. McWeeney (9C 2006) 454 F3 1030, 1035.

[61] OTHER: US v. Comstock (8C 2008) 531 F3 667, 676 [“Defendant’s position that his consent only signaled permission to sweep the area immediately surrounding the seating area—and not the basement or other rooms in the house—is nonsensical”]; US v. Gould (5C 2004) 364 F3 578, 589.

[62] OTHER: US v. Gallegos-Espinal (5C 2020) 970 F3 586, 593.

[63] CAL: P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 976 [“the announced object of the search was evidence connected with the murder of a police officer thus including weapons that could be hidden in a briefcase”].

[64] USSC: Frazier v. Cupp (1969) 394 US 731, 740 [defendant claimed that, even if the consenting person had common authority over a duffle bag, he did not have authority over a certain compartment that was used only by defendant; the Court responded, “We will not, however, engage in such metaphysical subtleties in judging the efficacy of [the consent].”]; Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 252 [there is “no basis” for requiring that officers “separately request permission to search each container”]. CAL: P v. Schmeck (2005) 37 C4 240, 281 [consenting co-occupant of a residence shared with the suspect routinely used and accessed items that were owned by the suspect]; P v. Reed (1967) 252 CA2 994, 995-96 [consenting co-occupant had authority to permit a search under a sofa]; P v. McClelland (1982) 136 CA3 503, 507 [renter of apartment could consent to a search of a closet in a common area in which a temporary occupant kept his clothing]; P v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 CA4 1403, 1409 [“But if his consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.”]; P v. Tully (2012) 54 C4 952, 984 [consent to search for drugs encompassed search of coin pocket]; P v. Williams (1980) 114 CA3 67, 74 [unrestricted consent to search a car “authorized a search of all compartments in the automobile and of any containers found within those compartments”]; P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 976 [search of briefcase was warranted when officer obtained consent to search for evidence in a shooting since a briefcase “is obviously a container that readily may contain incriminating evidence, including weapons”]; P v. Shandloff (1985) 170 CA3 372, 384 [“Once the voluntary consent to search the suitcases was given, the officers were authorized to search all of the compartments and containers within the suitcases,” edited.]. OTHER: US v. Guillen (10C 2021) 995 F3 1095, 1107 [suspect took “no special steps to protect the backpack or nightstand in his room from scrutiny. The door to [his] bedroom was wide open when the agents arrived, and neither the backpack nor the nightstand was locked or otherwise secured”]; US v. Meada (1C 2005) 408 F3 14 [woman who lived with the defendant for two months had apparent authority to authorize a search of containers in the kitchen]; US v. Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 649 [consenting co-occupant had authority to consent to a search of a gun case and closet in common area].

[65] OTHER: US v. Turner (1C 1999) 169 F3 84, 86, fn.2 [“we doubt seriously whether his deceptive labeling of an individual container (e.g., ‘Flour’) would preclude a consensual search, provided the container was capable of holding whatever contraband was the target of the search”].

[66] QUOTE FROM: US v. Strickland (11C 1990) 902 F2 937, 941 [“When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless. Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass.”].

[67] QUOTE FROM: US v. Torres (10C 1981) 663 F2 1019, 1027 CAL: P v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 CA4 1403, 1415 [“consent search, to be effective, must be thorough”]; P v. Williams (1980) 114 CA3 67, 72-74. OTHER: US v. Coleman (4C 2009) 588 F3 816 [consent to “complete search” authorized a search under a mattress]; US v. Snow (2C 1995) 44 F3 133, 135 [“the term ‘search’ implies something more than a superficial, external examination” and it “entails ‘looking through,’ ‘rummaging,’ ‘probing,’ scrutiny,’ and ‘examining internally,” edited]; US v. Strickland (11C 1990) 902 F2 937, 941-42 [“an individual consenting to a vehicle search should expect that search to be thorough”].

[68] EXAMPLE FROM P v. Cantor (2007) 149 CA4 961, 965. CAL: P v. Cruz (1964) 61 C2 861, 866 [“The general consent given by Ann and Susan that the officers could ‘look around’ did not authorize [them] to open and search suitcases and boxes”]. OTHER: US v. Wald (10C 2000) 216 F3 1222, 1228 [where officers asked to “take a quick look” inside the suspect’s car, they exceeded the permissible scope when they searched the trunk]; US v. Quintero (8C 2011) 648 F3 660, 670 [the officer “falsely told Michelle he only wanted to take ‘a quick peek around'”]; US v. Plasencia (11C 2018) 886 F3 1336, 1342-43 [“A reasonable person would understand that giving ‘complete’ consent to a search of his boat, in this context, would include consenting to the search of a GPS on board”].

[69] USSC: Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 251-52 [“It is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.”]. OTHER: US v. Osage (10C 2000) 235 F3 518, 522 [“before an officer may actually destroy or render completely useless a container which would otherwise be within the scope of a permissive search, the officer must obtain explicit authorization, or have some other lawful basis upon which to proceed”]; US v. Strickland (11C 1990) 902 F2 937, 941-42 [“a police officer could not reasonably interpret a general statement of consent to search an individual’s vehicle to include the intentional infliction of damage to the vehicle or the property”]. COMPARE: P v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 CA4 1403, 1415 [the officer “did not rip the vent from the door; he merely loosened a screw with a screwdriver and removed it”]; US v. Gutierrez-Mederos (9C 1992) 965 F2 800, 804 [the officer “did not pry open or break into the side panel, but instead used the key”].

[70] CAL: P v. Cantor (2007) 149 CA4 961, 965 [consent to a “real quick” search of a car did not authorize one lasting 15 minutes]; P v. $48,715 (1997) 58 CA4 1507, 1515 [the suspect should have known it would take time for the deputies to “inspect the contents of the seed bags and the suitcases”].

[71] QUOTE FROM: US v. Carter (6C en banc 2004) 378 F3 584, 589. USSC: Lewis v. US (1966) 385 US 206, 210 [officers did not “see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated [by the consenting person].”].

[72] CAL: P v. Williams (1979) 93 CA3 40, 58 [consent to “enter” a residence did not authorize officers to walk “to the back of the home and into a bedroom”].

[73] OTHER: US v. Gandia (2C 2005) 424 F3 255, 262 [“when police have gained access to a suspect’s home through his or her consent, there is a concern that generously construing [the protective sweep rules] will enable and encourage officers to obtain that consent as a pretext for conducting a warrantless search of the home”].

[74] CAL: In re Johnny V. (1978) 85 CA3120, 130 [“A right to enter for the purpose of talking with a suspect is not consent to enter and effect an arrest.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Johnson (9C 1980) 626 F2 753 [agents immediately arrested the suspect after obtaining consent to “talk” with him]. ALSO SEE: Chapter 18 Entry to Arrest (Exceptions, Consensual entry).

[75] CAL: Mann v. Superior Court (1970) 3 C3 1; P v. Hoxter (1999) 75 CA4 406; P v. Ramirez (1970) 4 CA3 154, 158. OTHER: US v. Iverson (2C 2018) 897 F3 450.

[76] CAL: P v. $48,715 (1997) 58 CA4 1507, 1516 [“use of the trained dog to sniff the truck, although not reasonably contemplated by the exchange between the officer and the suspect, did not expand the search to which the [suspect] had consented”]; P v. Bell (1996) 43 CA4 754, 770-71, fn.5 [“Obviously, this is not a case in which the defendant says, ‘Yes, you can search, but only if you don’t use a drug-sniffing dog.'”]. 9th CIR: US v. Perez (9C 1994) 37 F3 510, 516 [“Using a narcotics dog to carry out a consensual search of an automobile is perhaps the least intrusive means of searching”]. OTHER: US v. Gonzalez-Basulto (5C 1990) 898 F2 1011, 1013. NOTE: If the dog was visible to the consenting person when he gave consent, it can be argued that he impliedly authorized a dog search. See P v. Bell (1996) 43 CA4 754, 772 [“Officer David’s patrol car was clearly marked ‘K-9.’ Thus, defendant had reason to know Officer David had a dog with him, and hence to expect that the search would be carried out with the assistance of a dog.”].

[77] OTHER: US v. Gandia (2C 2005) 424 F3 255, 262 [“there is concern that generously construing [the law pertaining to sweeps] will enable and encourage officers to obtain that consent as a pretext for conducting a warrantless search of the home”]; US v. Gould (5C 2004) 364 F3 578, 589; US v. Scroggins (5C 2010) 599 F3 433, 443 [protective sweep OK because grounds for search developed upon entry]; US v. Crisolis-Gonzalez (8C 2014) 742 F3 830, 836 [protective sweep OK because grounds for search developed upon entry].

[78] QUOTE FROM: P v. Valencia (2011) 201 CA4 922, 937.

[79] OTHER: US v. Williams (3C 2018) 898 F3 323, 330 [“it is the subject of a consensual search who decides the terms of the search”]; US v. Jachimko (7C 1994) 19 F3 296, 299 [“if Jachimko attempted to withdraw his consent after [the DEA informant] saw the marijuana plants, he could not withdraw his consent.”]; US v. Booker (8C 1999) 186 F3 1004, 1006 [“the seizure was valid, because at the time the consent was revoked the officers had probable cause to believe that the truck was carrying drugs.”].

[80] EXAMPLES

Examples of unambiguous withdrawal of consent:

• An officer who had just received consent by Woolfork to search her apartment was about to open a bedroom door. Just then, Woolfork “raced in front of the officer and started to close the partially open door to the bedroom.” Said the court, “The attempt to shut the door of the bedroom by Woolfork was direct, positive and capable of only one interpretation. She did not want the officers to enter the bedroom.” P v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058.

• When asked for the keys to the trunk of his car, the consenting suspect threw the keys into some bushes. P v. Escollias (1968) 264 CA2 16, 18. Also see P v. Currier (1965) 232 CA2 103, 110-1.

• A man caught burglarizing an apartment consented to a search of his home, but the address he gave the officers was that of a house he had vacated two months earlier. P v. Faris (1965) 63 C2 541, 545 [“His attempt to mislead the officers with a false address clearly demonstrates that he did not consent to a search of the South Ellendale Street apartment.”]. BUT ALSO SEE: P v. Ibarra (1980) 114 CA3 60, 65 [“Efforts to mislead the police, though, do not necessarily violate consent freely given.”]; P v. Shelton (1964) 60 C2 740, 745.

• After a suspect consented to a search of his home, the officer went outside to call for backup; while she was on the radio, the suspect shut and locked the front door. In re Christopher B. (1978) 82 CA3 608, 615.

• After the search began, the suspect said, “Leave me alone.” Crofoot v. Superior Court (1981) 121 CA3 717, 726.

Examples of ambiguous—and thus ineffective—withdrawal of consent:

• The consenting person’s words “only constituted manifestations of irritation and not statements indicating that he was withdrawing the consent he had conferred.” US v. Williams (3C 2018) 898 F3 323, 331.

• A suspect in a hate crime who had consented to a search of his home initially tried to mislead officers as to the location of his home, but he eventually admitted he lived at the home that was searched. P v. MacKenzie (1995) 34 CA4 1256, 1273-74.

• A person who had consented to a search of his home said he was uncertain as to his address. P v. Garcia (1964) 227 CA2 345, 351.

• Suspect consented to a search of a suitcase but denied it was his. P v. Gurtenstein (1977) 69 CA3 441, 451 [“defendant did not refuse to help the officer open the suitcase [but] only told the officer that the suitcase was not his. He did not refuse to let the officer open it up himself.”].

• Suspect verbally consented but refused to sign a consent form. P v. Gurtenstein (1977) 69 CA3 441, 451.

• The driver who consented to a search of his car claimed he had lost his keys. P v. Nelson (1985) 166 CA3 1209, 1214; P v. Botos (1972) 27 CA3 774, 779.

• The driver of a car who had consented to a search of his car did not immediately hand the keys to the officer. P v. Carvajal (1988) 202 CA3 487, 496. Also see P v. MacKenzie (1995) 34 CA4 1256, 1273; US v. Torres (10C 1981) 663 F2 1019, 1026-27 [suspect merely said he did not want his car “torn apart”].

• After the occupants of a car consented to a search of it, they refused to tell officers how to open a hidden compartment they had discovered. US v. Barragan (8C 2004) 379 F3 524.

[81] CAL: P v. Botos (1972) 27 CA3 774, 779 [“Although actions inconsistent with consent may act as a withdrawal of it, these actions, if they are to be so construed, must be positive in nature.”]; P v. Ibarra (1980) 114 CA3 60, 65 [“Efforts to mislead the police do not necessarily vitiate consent freely given.”]; P v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058, 1068; P v. Nelson (1985) 166 CA3 1209, 1214. OTHER: US v. Williams (3C 2018) 898 F3 323, 331 [“a reasonable person would not understand certain equivocal acts or statements to convey a suspect’s desire to withdraw consent”]; US v. Beckmann (8C 2015) 786 F3 672, 679 [“Where a suspect provides general consent to search, only an act clearly inconsistent with the search, an unambiguous statement, or a combination of both will limit the consent.”]; US v. Lopez-Mendoza (8C 2010) 601 F3 861, 867 [withdrawal of consent “must be an act clearly inconsistent with the apparent consent to search, an unambiguous statement challenging the officer’s authority to conduct the search, or some combination of both”]. ALSO SEE: Davis v. US (1994) 512 US 452, 459 [“if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.”]; P v. Stitely (2005) 35 C4 514, 535.

[82] OTHER: US v. Williams (3C 2018) 898 F3 323, 331 [“Williams told the troopers that they did not have consent to search is speakers and his cellular phones. The search of those areas then stopped.”].

[83] USSC: Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 US 177, 179 [consent is sufficient if it was given by “a third party who possesses common authority over the premises”]; US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 170 [“the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared”]. CAL: P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 971 [search may be reasonable “if a person other than the defendant with authority over the premises voluntary consents to the search”]; P v. Woods (1999) 21 C4 668, 675 [“a consent-based search is valid when consent is given by one person with common or superior authority over the area to be searched”].

[84] QUOTE FROM: US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 171.

[85] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 114 [“Each cotenant has the right to use and enjoy the entire property as if he or she were the sole owner.”].

[86] USSC: Frazier v. Cupp (1969) 394 US 731, 740 [“Since Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he clearly had authority to consent to its search.”]; US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 171 [“joint use of the bag rendered the cousin’s authority to consent to its search clear”]. CAL: P v. Catlin (2001) 26 C4 81, 163 [“Although [the consenting person] stated that he predominantly used one side of the garage/shop, the evidence established that [he] and defendant had common authority over the entire garage, including the cabinet.”]; P v. Schmeck (2005) 37 C4 240, 281 [co-occupant consented to a search of three bags containing clothing that defendant had left there, knowing that the consenting person also stored clothing in the bags]. OTHER: US v. Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 648 [“mutual use”]; US v. Buckner (4C 2007) 473 F3 551, 554 [“mutual use”]].

[87] USSC: Fernandez v. California (2014) 571 US 292, 300 [“consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search”]; US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 171, fn.7 [“a person may have common authority if he has joint access or control for most purposes”]. CAL: P v. Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 481 [“there must be some objective evidence of joint control or access to the places or items to be searched”]; P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 978 [“it was objectively reasonable to conclude Diane Jenkins had authority to consent to the search of defendant’s briefcase, because it was reasonable for the officers to believe she had exercised control over the briefcase”]; P v. Schmeck (2005) 37 C4 240, 281 [the consenting person “had access to defendant’s personal effects sufficient to endow her with authority to consent to the search”]; P v. Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 979 [“objects left in any area of common use or control may be within the scope of the consent given by a third party”]; P v. Welch (1999) 20 C4 701, 748 [“The person in control of the premises may consent to a search thereof.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Ruiz (9C 2005) 428 F3 877, 882 [“if Boswell had access to or control over the container, he would have had actual authority to consent to its search”]. OTHER: US v. Duran (7C 1992) 957 F2 499, 505 [“the mere fact that Karen neither used the old farmhouse nor left any of her personal effects there does not bear on whether [Mr. Duran] maintained exclusive dominion over the structure. One can have access to a building or a room but choose not to enter.”].

[88] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 122 [“it would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent”]; Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 US 177, 185 [an officer’s belief in common authority must “always be reasonable”]. CAL: P v. Ledesma (2006) 39 C4 641, 703 [“To establish consent, the prosecution was required to prove that the officers reasonably and in good faith believed that [the consenting person] had the authority to consent to their entry into the apartment.”]; P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 980 [officer must have a “reasonable basis for believing”]; P v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 CA4 1183, 1199 [officers must “reasonably believe that the person is empowered to give that consent”]; P v. Oldham (2000) 81 CA4 1, 10 [“even if the consenting cotenant, in fact, lacks authority, officers may rely on his or her apparent authority”]. 9th CIR: US v. Davis (9C 2003) 332 F3 1163, 1170 [“the relevant question is whether the officers reasonably believed that Smith had authority to consent to a search of Davis’ bag”]; US v. Ruiz (9C 2005) 428 F3 877, 881 [officers reasonably believed the consenting person had common authority over a container in a common area]; US v. Meada (1C 2005) 408 F3 14 [woman who lived with the defendant for two months had apparent authority to authorize a search of containers in the kitchen]; US v. Dearing (9C 1993) 9 F3 1428, 1429 [“When the facts do not support a finding of actual authority, a search is reasonable if the consent-giver apparently had actual authority.”]. OTHER: US v. Cross (8C 2018) 888 F3 985, 989 [“A third party has apparent authority when the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises”]; US v. Richards (7C 2014) 741 F3 843, 851 [“It is unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority is apparent.”]; US v. Taylor (6C 2010) 600 F3 678, 681 [“The apparent-authority doctrine excuses otherwise impermissible searches where the officers conducting the search reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has contented to the search had the authority to do so.”]; US v. Dilley (5C 2007) 480 F3 747, 750 [“If a reasonable officer could believe that Dilley had authority to consent to a search of the storage unit, the search was reasonable”]; US v. Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 649 [“An officer is entitled to conduct a search without further inquiry if the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises.”]; US v. Clark (8C 2005) 409 F3 1039, 1044 [“The officer’s conclusion that the consenting individual had authority to consent need not always be correct, but must always be reasonable.”]; US v. Meada (1C 2005) 408 F3 14, 22 [“What matters is whether, based on the information in the officers’ possession, they reasonably believed that Bowering had authority to invite them into the apartment.”]; US v. Jenkins (6C 1996) 92 F3 430, 436 [“The critical facts are not the actual relationship between the consenter and owner, but how that relationship appears to the officer who asked for consent.”].

[89] QUOTE FROM: US v. Whitfield (DCC 1991) 939 F2 1071, 1074 [“Officers may of course proceed on the basis of the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”]. CAL: Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1970) 8 CA3 1048, 1054 [court based its ruling on “the ordinary rules regulating the relationship of parent and minor child.”]. OTHER: US v. Almeida-Perez (8C 2008) 549 F3 1162, 1171 [reasonable to infer that consenting person was an occupant of the premises because he “had been seen going into and out of the house without knocking, he was reposing on the front porch, he invited the officers in without asking anyone’s leave, and he preceded them in without knocking.”].

[90] OTHER: US v. Wright (7C 2016) 838 F3 880, 887.

[91] USSC: Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 US 177, 188 [“Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.”]. CAL: P v. Cruz (1964) 61 C2 861, 867 [the officer “failed to make such simple inquiries”]; P v. Ortiz (1969) 276 CA2 1, 4 [“it is not necessary for the police to file a quiet title suit to ascertain ownership whenever a property owner calls the police by telephone to check on his property. All that is required is a reasonable good faith belief that the caller had the authority to consent to enter.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Sealey (9C 1987) 830 F2 1028, 1031 [both detectives “questioned Julie about her access and control over the property.”]. OTHER: US v. Romero (10C 2014) 749 F3 900, 907 [“Once officers reasonably believe that an individual has the authority to consent, we do not require them to keep investigating merely because one can imagine some way that additional facts might alter their analysis.”]; US v. Whitfield (DCC 1991) 939 F2 1071, 1075 [“The agents’ superficial and cursory questioning of [the third party] did not disclose sufficient information to support a reasonable belief.”]; US v. Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 648 [“law enforcement officers have a duty to inquire further as to a third party’s authority to consent to a search if the surrounding circumstances make that person’s authority questionable”]; US v. Gillis (6C 2004) 358 F3 386 [the consenting person provided the officers with “detailed information about the premises, including the locations where Gillis had drugs hidden on the property].

[92] USSC: US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 171, fn.7 [the other parties “have assumed the risk that one of their number might [consent].”]. CAL: P v. Haskett (1982) 30 C3 841, 856 [“law enforcement authorities need not seek the consent of all co-occupants before searching their commonly held property: any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection and the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched”]; P v. Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 980 [“the consent of other interested parties is unnecessary.”].

[93] CAL: P v. Veiga (1989) 214 CA3 817, 827 [“We discern no justification for a rule that would require an occupant with rights in the premises either to remain in the presence of objectionable and potentially dangerous illegal activity in order to be in a position to open the door when the police arrive. If one has common authority over the premises, it is not surrendered when he or she steps into the street.”]; P v. Wilkins (1993) 14 CA4 761, 775; P v. Boyer (1989) 48 C3 247, 276.

[94] USSC: US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 169 [“the voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant”]; Fernandez v. California (2014) 571 US 292, 303. CAL: P v. Duren (1973) 9 C3 218, 241 [“since a wife normally exercises as much control over the property in the home as the husband, police officers may reasonably assume that she can properly consent to a search thereof”]. 9th CIR: US v. Morning (9C 1995) 64 F3 531, 534 [defendant and consenting person, who lived together in house, “had an at least equal interest in the use and possession of the house”]; US v. Nichols (8C 2009) 574 F3 633, 636 [co-occupant]. OTHER: US v. Stabile (3C 2011) 633 F3 219, 231 [“an unmarried cohabitant has authority to consent to a search of shared premises”]; US v. Penney (6C 2009) 576 F3 297, 309-10 [co-occupant when the relationship was going well]; US v. Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 649 [the consenting partner “had a key to the apartment, possessions within the apartment, and represented that she lived there on-and-off and frequently cleaned and did household chores in the home”]; US v. Robinson (7C 1973) 479 F2 300, 302 [“A defendant’s paramour may give valid consent to the search of premises they jointly occupy.”].

[95] CAL: P v. Bishop (1996) 44 CA4 220, 237 [“While they are both living in the premises the equal authority does not lapse and revive with the lapse and revival of amicable relations between spouses.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Tosti (9C 2013) 733 F3 816, 824, fn.3 [“Even if [the FBI agent] knew that the couple were estranged, “Ms. Tosti continued to live in the home and to have access to the devices she turned over to the Government”].

[96] CAL: P v. Bishop (1996) 44 CA4 220, 239 [defendant “did not have exclusive right of possession of the house. They were still married and, at least at that point, appellant had no legal right to exclude her”]. 9th CIR: US v. Long (9C 1975) 524 F2 660, 661 [“It cannot be convincingly argued that Mrs. Long as a joint owner of the house did not have the right to enter the house. Her husband was not her lessee who had the exclusive right of possession of the house.”]. OTHER: US v. Weston (8C 2006) 443 F3 661, 668 [although the suspect and consenting spouse were divorced, the officer knew they had “remained close despite their divorce,” he had seen the consenting spouse at the house three times in four years, and the consenting spouse was home alone when he consented].

[97] CAL: P v. Reynolds (1976) 55 CA3 357, 372 [“This type of arrangement [a workroom used solely by the husband] is not uncommon in a family home, but does not lead to the conclusion, as between a husband and wife, that such areas are beyond either spouse’s control.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Sealey (9C 1987) 830 F2 1028, 1031 [wife had common authority over the family garage even though she told the officers that she “needed her husband’s permission to go into the garage”]. OTHER: US v. Mojica (7C 2017) 863 F3 727, 732 [“Agent Martinez knew that Sonia rarely entered the garage, he could reasonably believe that she, as a spouse, had access to the garage but simply chose not to enter regularly.”]; US v. Duran (7C 1992) 957 F2 499, 505 [“one can have access to a building or a room but choose not to enter”]; US v. Clark (8C 2005) 409 F3 1039, 1044 [“Sherry’s statement that [her husband] hid things in the closet did not establish that she lacked access to the space or that [her husband] had exclusive access to it.”]; US v. Buckner (4C 2007) 473 F3 551, 555 [“the officers knew that the computer was located in a common living area of the Buckner’s marital home, they observed that the computer was on”]; US v. Morgan (6C 2006) 435 F3 660. 663-64 [wife consented to search of computer used by both].

[98] 9th CIR: US v. Tosti (9C 2013) 733 F3 816, 824 [“the computer and electronic media were neither password protected nor encrypted”]. OTHER: US v. Wright (7C 2016) 838 F3 880, 885 [although the desktop computer belonged to the non-consenting partner, “it functioned as a family computer”]; US v. Nichols (8C 2009) 574 F3 633, 636 [“She had unrestricted and joint access to the entire residence, including complete access to the computer and the computer disk that officers searched.”]; US v. Stabile (3C 2011) 633 F3 219, 233; US v. King (3C 2010) 604 F3 125, 137; US v. Thomas (11C 2016) 818 F3 1230, 1241 [“We find it particularly significant that Thomas did not protect his Internet history from [his wife] by maintaining a separate login name and password or by encrypting his files.”]; US v. Buckner (4C 2007) 473 F3 551, 555 [“the officers did not have any indication from Michelle, or any of the attendant circumstances, that any files were password-protected”]; Trulock v. Freeh (4C 2001) 275 F3 391, 403 [“Although Conrad had authority to consent to a general search of the computer, her authority did not extend to Trulock’s password-protected files.”]; US v. Morgan (6C 2006) 435 F3 660, 663-64 [wife consented to search of computer that she and her husband used]. BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Wright (7C 2016) 838 F3 880, 886 [although the consenting person did not know the password, her children did “which strongly suggests that [the defendant] made not attempt to keep it from her.”].

[99] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 108 [“No question has been raised, or reasonably could be, about the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence”]. CAL: P v. Wilkins (1993) 14 CA4 761, 775-76 [pre-Randolph case upholding entry to arrest over husband’s objection]. NOTE: The Third Circuit ruled in US v. King (3C 2010) 604 F3 125, 137 that a suspect’s objection to a search of personal property that the consenting person had given them did not implicate Randolph.

[100] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 120 [there must be an “express refusal of consent”]. 9th CIR: Bonivert v. City of Clarkston (9C 2018) 883 F3 865, 875 [“Bonivert expressly refused entry when he locked the side door to his house.”]; US v. Moore (9C 2014) 770 F3 809, 813 [“Randolph requires an express, not implicit, refusal.”]. OTHER: US v. Alama (8C 2007) 486 F3 1062, 1067 [“there is no evidence that Alama objected to the search after his arrest and before the search occurred”]; US v. Caldwell (6C 2008) 518 F3 426 [Randolph did not apply where the consenting spouse said “You’ll have to ask [non-consenting spouse, it’s her room.”]; US v. Williams (8C 2008) 521 F3 902 [consent valid even though the non-consenting spouse slammed the door shut as officers were about to enter].

[101] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 122 [officers need not “take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant”]. OTHER: US v. Thomas (11C 2016) US v. Lopez (2C 2008) 547 F3 397, 400 [“the marshals had no duty to ask Lopez whether he consented to the search, no matter how easy or convenient it might have been to do so”]; US v. Parker (7C 2006) 469 F3 1074, 1079 [“That Parker was not asked for his consent and did not have an opportunity to object to the search does not render invalid Johnson’s voluntary consent.”]; US v. DiModica (7C 2006) 468 F3 495, 500 [the officers “never asked DiModica for permission to search his house”]; US v. Uscanga-Ramirez (8C 2007) 475 F3 1024, 1028 [“Randolph is clearly distinguishable. There is no evidence that Uscanga-Ramirez expressly refused the officers’ entry into the home at any time.”].

[102] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 106 [the rule requires “a physically present inhabitant”]; Fernandez v. California (2014) 571 US 292, 306 [Randolph “applies only when the objector is standing in the door saying ‘stay out’ when officers propose to make a consent search”]. CAL: P v. Byers (2016) 6 CA5 856, 868 [“In order to countermand an occupant’s consent to a search, the objecting co-occupant must be present at the door (or, we assume, at the point of entry for the search) to express his refusal.”]; P v. Ledesma (2006) 39 C4 641, 704, fn.16 [“[Randolph] does not change the legal standards applicable to the present case, in which defendant was not present when the police received consent”]. 9th CIR: Smith v. City of Santa Clara (9C 2017) 876 F3 987. OTHER: US v. Coleman (8C 2018) 909 F3 925, 930 [“Here, Coleman did not object until after [the officer] entered the residence with [co-resident’s] consent to investigate her report of domestic violence.]; US v. Thomas (11C 2016) 818 F3 1230, 1240 [Randolph not applicable because suspect was asleep when his wife gave consent]; US v. Shrader (4C 2012) 675 F3 300, 306 [“to defeat a cotenant’s consent, the defendant must be both present and objecting”]; US v. Stabile (3C 2011) 633 F3 219, 231 [“Stabile’s absence distinguishes this case from [Randolph]”]; US v. Penney (6C 2009) 576 F3 297, 309 [suspect was in jail]; US v. Henderson (7C 2008) 536 F3 776, 777 [Randolph “applies only when the defendant is both present and objects to the search of his home.”]; US v. DiModica (7C 2006) 468 F3 495, 500 [unlike the situation in Randolph, “DiModica and his wife were not standing together at the doorway”]; US v. Hudspeth (8C 2008) 518 F3 954, 959 [“Throughout the Randolph opinion, the majority consistently repeated it was Randolph’s physical presence and immediate objection to Mrs. Randolph’s consent that distinguished Randolph from prior case law.”]; US v. Parker (7C 2006) 469 F3 1074, 1077 [“There is no evidence that Parker was asked for his consent to search the house and that he refused of that he objected… The absence of such evidence removes this case from the purview of [Randolph].”]; US v. Uscanga-Ramirez (8C 2007) 475 F3 1024, 1028 “[Randolph is clearly distinguishable. There is no evidence that Uscanga-Ramirez expressly refused the officers’ entry into the home at any time.”].

[103] USSC: Fernandez v. California (2014) 571 US 292, 302 [consent will not be invalidated on grounds that officers removed the nonconsenting spouse from the premises if their decision to remove him was “objectively justified”]. 9th CIR: US v. Brown (9C 2009) 563 F3 410, 417 [“there was no evidence that Brown’s arrest was motivated by any purpose other than removing from the streets of Spokane a felon wanted on an outstanding warrant”]. OTHER: US v. Morales (11C 2018) 893 F3 1360, 1370 [“there is nothing to indicate that the officers removed Morales from the entrance so that he could not refuse consent to search”]; US v. Shrader (4C 2012) 675 F3 300 [because officers had a warrant for the suspect’s arrest, his “removal from the premises could not be considered a pretext” to prevent him from objecting]; US v. Henderson (7C 2008) 536 F3 776, 782; US v. Alama (8C 2007) 486 F3 1062, 1066 [“Alama was arrested and removed from the scene. At this point, he was like the co-occupant under arrest in a nearby squad car whose consent to search was not required in Matlock.”]; US v. DiModica (7C 2006) 468 F3 495, 500 [“The officers did not remove DiModica to avoid his objection; they legally arrested DiModica based on probable cause that he had committed domestic abuse.”]; US v. Parker (7C 2006) 469 F3 1074, 1078 [there was no evidence “that the police had taken [defendant] into custody as a mechanism for coercing Johnson’s consent”]; US v. Wilburn (7C 2007) 473 F3 742, 745 [“Wilburn was validly arrested and he was lawfully kept in a place—the back seat of a squad car—where people under arrest are usually held.”]. NOTE: The Court’s ruling in Fernandez v. California effectively abrogated the Ninth Circuit’s controversial rule in US v. Murphy (9C 2008) 516 F3 1117 that consent given by a spouse is invalid if the suspect was no longer at the door because he had been lawfully arrested.

[104] OTHER: US v. Hudspeth (8C 2008) 518 F3 954, 960-61 [the officer’s “failure to advise Mrs. Hudspeth of her husband’s earlier objection to a search of the home computer did not consent an otherwise reasonable search into an unreasonable one”].

[105] CAL P v. Frye (1998) 18 C4 894, 990 [“It may be inferred from the fact [that the consenting roommate] and defendant resided together in the apartment that she possessed authority to consent to the officers’ entry.”]; P v. Ledesma (2006) 39 C4 641, 703 [“a guest who has the run of the house in the occupant’s absence has the apparent authority to give consent to enter an area where a visitor normally would be received”].

[106] USSC: US v. Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 177-78 [search of diaper bag in shared bedroom]; Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 US 177, 181. CAL: P v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058, 1067 [“It does not appear from the record that [the nonconsenting roommate] had the right to exclude [the consenting roommate] from the bedroom.”]; P v. Reed (1967) 252 CA2 994, 995-96 [“under a sofa” is a common area]; P v. Boyer (1989) 48 C3 247, 276 [search of shared bedroom closet]; P v. Engel (1980) 105 CA3 489, 501-2; P v. Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 979; P v. McClelland (1982) 136 CA3 503, 507 [renter of apartment could consent to a search of a closet in a common area in which a temporary occupant kept his clothing]; P v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058, 1067 [renter of apartment could consent to a search of a bedroom in which the defendant was temporarily present]. 9th CIR: US v. Rodriguez-Preciado (9C 2005) 399 F3 1118, 1126 [officers reasonably believed that the only person in a motel room could consent to a search of it]; US v. Kimoana (10C 2004) 383 F3 1215, 1223 [man who had a key to a motel room and who was staying there, could consent to an entry even though he was not registered]. OTHER: US v. Goins (7C 2006) 437 F3 644, 649 [search of gun case and closet in common area]; US v. Meada (1C 2005) 408 F3 14, 21-22; US v. Rodriguez (8C 2005) 414 F3 837, 844 [co-occupant of a motel room “was the only person currently living in the room, thereby possessing at least commonly authority over the room”].

[107] CAL: P v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058, 1067 [“It does not appear from the record that [the nonconsenting roommate] had the right to exclude [the consenting roommate] from the bedroom.”].

[108] CAL: Beach v. Superior Court (1970) 11 CA3 1032, 1035-36 [“Nothing Mrs. Nichols said led the police to believe she shared the bedroom in common with her brothers, nor had she led the officers to think she had authority to allow a search of her brothers’ room and personal effects.”]; P v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058, 1067; P v. Veiga (1989) 214 CA3 817, 821. 9th CIR: US v. Davis (9C 2003) 332 F3 1163, 1169 [roommate lacked common authority over suspect’s separate bedroom]; US v. Dearing (9C 1993) 9 F3 1428 [caretaker did not have authority to consent to his employer’s bedroom]. OTHER: US v. Duran (7C 1992) 957 F2 499, 504-505 [“Two friends inhabiting a two-bedroom apartment might reasonably expect to maintain exclusive access to their respective bedrooms, without explicitly making this expectation clear to one another.”]; US v. Almeida-Perez (8C 2008) 549 F3 1162, 1172 [“if part of a dwelling is appropriated for the exclusive use of one occupant, other inmates of the house have no right to consent to police entry of the space”]; US v. Jimenez (1C 2005) 419 F3 34, 40 [roommate did not have common authority over locked bedroom used exclusively by other roommate]. BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Enslin (9C 2003) 327 F3 788 [officers reasonably believed the consenting person was the homeowner, and that she could consent to a search of the back bedroom occupied by Enslin because her consent was unlimited and there was no indication she did not have common authority over the bedroom].

[109] OTHER: US v. McGee (2C 2009) 564 F3 136, 141 [“The question in each case turns on the meaning of the locked door. The objective of the locked door in this case was only to separate [the consenting person] from her baggage,” edited.].

[110] CAL: In re D.C. (2010) 188 CA4 978, 985 [“Given the legal rights and obligations of parents toward their minor children, common authority over the child’s bedroom is inherent in the parental role.”]; In re Robert H. (1978) 78 CA3 894, 898 [“Where the police search a minor’s home, the courts uphold parental consent on the premise of either the parents’ right to control over the minor, or their exercise of control over the premises.”]; Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1970) 8 CA3 1048, 1055 [“a father has full access to the room set aside for his son for purposes of fulfilling his right and duty to control his son’s social behavior and to obtain obedience”]. OTHER: US v. Guillen (10C 2021) 995 F3 1095, 1106 [“When a child—even an adult child—lives in a parent’s home, the parent is presumed to have control for most purposes over the property and therefore actual authority to consent to a search of the entire home.”]; US v. DiPrima (1C 1973) 472 F2 550, 551 [“even if a minor child, living in the bosom of a family, may think of a room as ‘his,’ the overall dominance will be in his parents”]. ALSO SEE: Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 US 868, 876 [“By way of analogy, one might contemplate how parental custodial authority would be impaired by requiring judicial approval for search of a minor child’s room.”]. BUT ALSO SEE: US v. Whitfield (DCC 1991) 939 F2 1071, 1075 [“When a minor child’s room is involved, agents might reasonably assume that the child’s mother, in the performance of her parental duties, would not only be able to enter her child’s bedroom but also would regularly do so. But we are aware of no basis for such an assumption when the child is, as here, 29 years old.”].

[111] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 114 [“Unless the people living together fall within some hierarchy, like a household of parent and child, there is no societal understanding of superior and inferior,” edited.]. CAL: In re D.C. (2010) 188 CA4 978, 989 [“Randolph does not require the police to defer to an objecting minor child over a consent to search by his or her parent.”].

[112] OTHER: US v. Casey (1C 2016) 825 F3 1, 16 [although there was evidence that defendant “paid rent whenever he was working,” this circumstances was overridden by testimony from defendant’s grandparents, with whom he lived, that they could come and go into his room at will]; US v. Rith (10C 1999) 164 F3 1323, 1331; US v. Whitfield (DCC 1991) 939 F2 1071, 1075 [“A landlord-tenant type of arrangement between a parent and an older child might indicate that the child has been given greater autonomy in the house, that his room is his private enclave, a place no one else may enter without his permission.”].

[113] CAL: P v. Daniels (1971) 16 CA3 36, 44 [“Parents with whom a son is living, on premises owned by them, do not ipso facto relinquish exclusive control over that portion thereof used by the son. To the contrary, the mere fact the son is permitted to use a particular bedroom, as such, does not confer upon him exclusive control thereof.”]; P v. Oldham (2000) 81 CA4 1, 10 [“there was nothing to show Oldham had exclusive control over the bedroom he used or its contents”]. OTHER: US v. Casey (1C 2016) 825 F3 1, 16 [“there was an arrangement in the house whereby [defendant’s grandparents] could come and go from Casey’s room at will”]; US v. Romero (10C 2014) 749 F3 900, 905 [“the government showed that the defendant lived with his parents, thereby creating a presumption of control for most purposes by defendant’s parents over the entire home”]; US v. Block (4C 1978) 590 F2 535, 541 [“[Block’s] mother had the normal free access that heads of household commonly exercise in respect of the rooms of family member occupants. She therefore clearly had authority to permit inspection of this room.”]; US v. Lewis (2C 2004) 386 F3 475, 481 [defendant’s mother had authority to consent to a search of her son’s bedroom because she “had permission to access his room, and had actually entered it a number of times to clean it.”].

[114] CAL: P v. Oldham (2000) 81 CA4 1, 10 [“there was nothing to show Oldham had exclusive control over the bedroom he used or its contents”]; P v. Egan (1967) 250 CA2 433, 436 [“[The stepfather] claimed no right, title, or interest in the kit bag. He made it abundantly clear that it was not his”]; Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1970) 8 CA3 1048, 1055 [“a father has full access to the room set aside for his [19-year old] son for purposes of fulfilling his right and duty to control his son’s social behavior and to obtain obedience”]. OTHER: US v. Lewis (2C 2004) 386 F3 475, 481 [defendant’s mother had authority to consent to a search of her son’s bedroom because she “had permission to access his room, and had actually entered it a number of times to clean it”].

[115] CAL: P v. Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 483 [“As a child advances in age she acquires greater discretion to admit visitors on her own authority.”]; P v. Hoxter (1999) 75 CA4 406, 412 [“many California 16-year-olds are mature enough to be left in charge of their homes. Certainly police officers confronted by a young woman of that age who appears to have such authority may reasonably forego knock-notice in reliance upon the likelihood her parents have made that decision”]; In re Reginald B. (1977) 71 CA3 398, 403 [consent to enter given by 14 or 15 year old boy who answered the door]; P v. Rodriquez (1969) 274 CA2 770, 774 [entry lawful when 6-year old opened door for officers who asked if parent was home; child then “opened the door for them and gestured toward the interior”]. OTHER: US Gutierrez-Hermosillo (10C 1998) 142 F3 1225, 1231 [officers reasonably believed that a 14-year old who answered the door of a motel room had the authority to admit them]; US v. Sanchez (10C 2010) 608 F3 685 [defendant’s 15-year old daughter who was home alone had the authority to consent to a visual inspection of the premises].

[116] CAL: P v. Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472; P v. Santiago (1997) 55 CA4 1540, 1544.

[117] USSC: Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 112 [“but no one would reasonably expect [an 8-year old] to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom”]. CAL: P v. Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 482 [an 11 year-old could not effectively consent to search of her stepfather’s bedroom]; Raymond v. Superior Court (1971) 19 CA3 321, 326 [“Here the policeman could not in good faith believe that the [12-year old] boy had authority to fetch a sample of his father’s [marijuana].”].

[118] CAL: P v. Jacobs (1987) 43 C3 472, 483 [“Exceptional circumstances also may justify a search that otherwise would be illegal. For example, some courts have upheld searches made at the request of a child or when a child is the victim of or a witness to a crime.”]; P v. Santiago (1997) 55 CA4 1540, 1544 [10-year old validly consented to limited search of items used by her guardian (not a legal guardian) to beat her; she was “in charge of the household approximately 40 hours per week”].

[119] USSC: Stoner v. California (1964) 376 US 483, 489 [“the police had [no] basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner’s room”]; Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 US 103, 112 [“A person on the scene who identifies himself, say, as a landlord or a hotel manager calls up no customary understanding of authority to admit guests without the consent of the current occupant.”]; Chapman v. US (1961) 365 US 610, 612 [“the landlord and the officers forced open a window to gain entry”]. CAL: P v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 CA4 1183, 1212 [university officers lacked common authority to consent to search of dorm room]; Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 C3 418, 422 [“By registering as a guest petitioner impliedly consented to motel employees entering his room in the performance of their duties. He did not consent, however, impliedly or otherwise to those employees allowing police officers to enter his room to search for contraband.”]; P v. Joubert (1981) 118 CA3 637, 648 [“Although a hotel guest should reasonably expect that maids, janitors and repairmen might enter his room in the performance of their duties, he would not reasonably anticipate that the police would enter to search.”]; P v. Jacquez (1985) 163 CA3 918, 929 [“While policemen are not required to be experts in the law of landlord and tenant, we do not believe an experienced policeman could reasonably believe a multiple listing broker or agent is authorized to permit entry and inspection by anyone known to the agent or broker not to be interested in the purchase of the property.”]; P v. Roman (1991) 227 CA3 674, 680 [“The officer’s assumption that [the landlord] had the right to have law enforcement inspect his property was not reasonable.”]; P v. Verbiesen (1970) 6 CA3 938, 942 [“The garage doors were locked and the landlord had no key, indicating that the defendant had the exclusive right to the possession”]; P v. Brown (1989) 210 CA3 849, 855 [man who sublet the back bedroom did not have common authority over it]; P v. Baker (1970) 12 CA3 826, 836 [“The officers could not rely upon the consent of the manager of the bowling alley as authorizing the search of the locker or the handbag.”]; P v. Escudero (1979) 23 C3 800, 807-8 [“the tenant is generally deemed to give implied consent to reasonable entries by the owner or his agents, but only for certain narrowly limited purposes relating to the owner’s interest in the property”]. 9th CIR: US v. Warner (9C 1988) 843 F2 401, 403 [“a best, the landlord had permission to enter the property for the limited purpose of making specified repairs”]. OTHER: US v. Thomas (7C 2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 2998355] [“Thomas’s landlord could not… consent to a warrantless search of his condo.”].

[120] CAL: P v. Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 979 [“As the owner of the searched car, Smith unquestionably had a possessory interest in it. By leaving his clothes readily displayed on the seat of Smith’s car, defendant assumed the risk that Smith would consent to a search of the car and its contents,” edited.]; P v. Woods (1999) 21 C4 668, 675. OTHER: US v. Guzman (8C 2007) 507 F3 681, 687 [“An owner of a vehicle may consent to its search even if another person is driving the vehicle.”]. OTHER: US v. Jenkins (6C 1996) 92 F3 430, 438 [“The driver had complete control of the tractor part of the rig, and almost always has keys to the trailer.”].

[121] CAL: P v. Baker (2008) 164 CA4 1152, 1159-60 [“Although the officer testified that he did not know who the purse belonged to when he searched it, there was no reasonable basis to believe the purse belonged to anyone other than the sole female passenger.”]; P v. Cruz (1964) 61 C2 861, 866 [“The general consent given by Ann and Susan that the officers could ‘look around’ did not authorize [the officers] to open and search suitcases and boxes that he had been informed were the property of third persons.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Welch (9C 1993) 4 F3 761, 764 [“there is simply nothing in the record demonstrating that McGee had use of, let alone joint access to or shared control over, Welch’s purse.”]. OTHER: US v. Munoz (8C 2010) 590 F3 916, 923 [search of defendant’s backpack in a stopped vehicle was unlawful because there was no evidence that the consenting person had joint control over it, and the officer testified “he did not know whose it was”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Barber (11C 2015) 777 F3 1303, 1305 [“ownership of the bag was not established until after the search occurred, plus the bag “was in easy reach” of the driver].

[122] OTHER: US v. Harris (11C 2008) 526 F3 1334.

[123] CAL: In re D.M.G. (1981) 120 CA3 218, 226 [consenting person had the car keys]; P v. Carvajal (1988) 202 CA3 487, 495-97 [consenting person borrowed the car]; P v. Nelson (1985) 166 CA3 1209, 1214 [car was owned by driver’s mother]. OTHER: US v. Crowder (7C 2009) 588 F3 929, 934-35 [consent by shipper who had complete, albeit temporary, control over defendant’s car].

[124] OTHER: US v. Alexander (7C 2009) 573 F3 465, 475 [“The facts known by these officers were sufficient to support a reasonable belief that [the repossessor] had such authority [to consent].”].

[125] CAL: P v. Ledesma (2006) 39 C4 641, 705 [“the police may assume, without further inquiry, that a person who answers the door in response to their knock has the authority to let them enter”]; P v. Frye (1998) 18 C4 894, 990; P v. Engel (1980) 105 CA3 489, 499; P v. Santiago (1997) 55 CA4 1540, 1544 [person who authorized officers to enter the premises had authority to do so because her duties “involved more than occasional babysitting; she was in charge of the household approximately 40 hours per week, albeit as a servant”]. OTHER: US v. Crisolis-Gonzalez (8C 2014) 742 F3 830, 835-36.

[126] OTHER: US v. Terry (7C 2019) 915 F3 1141, 1145-46 [officers unreasonably assumed that a person who answered the door in a bathrobe had authority to consent to a search]; US v. Cos (10C 2007) 498 F3 1115, 1129 [“a third party’s mere presence on the premises to searched is not sufficient to establish [apparent authority to search].”].

[127] CASE REFERRED TO: US v. Lindsey (8C 2013) 702 F3 1092, 1097. ALSO SEE: US v. Rodriguez (8C 2005) 414 F3 837, 844 [a woman who was the only person present in a motel room could consent to a search of it].

[128] CAL: P v. Welch (1999) 20 C4 701, 748.

[129] OTHER: US v. Clutter (8C 2012) 674 F3 980, 984-85.

[130] OTHER: US v. Gardner (6C 2018) 887 F3 780, 783-84 [“the third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cellphones all the same, just like other essential ‘effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment”].

[131] OTHER: US v. Flores (8C 2022) 55 F4 614, 619 [“Both the sender and the recipient of a mailed package have a Fourth Amendment interest in a search of the package’s contents. Thus, consent sufficient to search a mailed package may come from the actual sender or recipient, or from an individual that officers reasonably believe to be the sender or recipient.”].

[132] USSC: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 243 [“it would be next to impossible to apply to a consent search the standard of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”].

[133] USSC: Lopez v. US (1963) 373 US 427, 438 [the IRS agent “was not guilty of an unlawful invasion of petitioner’s office simply because his apparent willingness to accept a bribe was not real. He was in the office with [Lopez’s] consent, and while there he did not violate the privacy of the office by seizing something surreptitiously without [Lopez’s] knowledge.”]; Lewis v. US (1966) 385 US 206, 211 [“A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.”]; Hoffa v. US (1966) 385 US 293 [“Partin was in the suite by invitation, and every conversation which he heard was either directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence. [Hoffa], in a word, was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying on the misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing.”]; On Lee v. US (1951) 343 US 747, 752 [“the claim that [the police agent’s] entrance was a trespass because consent to his entry was obtained by fraud must be rejected”]. CAL: Toubus v. Superior Court (1981) 114 CA3 378, 383 [entry to buy drugs was not a “ruse”]; P v. Kasinger (1976) 57 CA3 975, 978 [“Officers who reasonably employ a ruse to obtain consent to enter a dwelling do not violate [the knock-notice statutes], even if they fail to announce their identity and purpose before entering.”]; P v. McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 906 [“Employment of a ruse to obtain consent to enter is immaterial where officers have a right to enter”]; P v. Evans (1980) 108 CA3 193, 196 [“it is clear once officers having probable cause are admitted inside a defendant’s home by use of a nonforceful strategy to gain entry, compliance with the [knock notice rule] is not required”]; P v. Metzger (1971) 22 CA3 338, 341 [“there is nothing inherently unlawful in the use of police deceit for the purpose of suppressing crime. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch for engaged in criminal enterprises,” edited. 9th CIR: Whalen v. McMullen (9C 2018) 907 F3 1139, 1147 [it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment when “a person invites a government agent who is concealing that he is a government agent into her home”]; US v. Bramble (9C 1997) 103 F3 1475. 1478 [“It is well-settled that undercover agents may misrepresent their identity to obtain consent to entry.”]; US v. Michaud (9C 2001) 268 F3 728, 733 [“We have held that there is no constitutional mandate forbidding the use of deception in executing a valid arrest warrant.”]; US v. Mayer (9C 2007) 490 F3 1129, 1136 [“Undercover operations, in which the agent is a so-called ‘invited informer,’ are not ‘searches’ under the Fourth Amendment.”]. OTHER: US v. Thompson (7C 2016) 811 F3 944, 948 [“an informant’s failure to disclose his true identity does not render consent to his presence invalid”]; US v. Bullock (5C 1979) 590 F2 117 [undercover ATF agent obtained consent from Bullock, a Ku Klux Klan member, to enter Bullock’s house to discuss becoming a member of the Klan].

[134] USSC: Lewis v. US (1966) 385 US 206, 210-11. 9th CIR: US v. Bramble (9C 1996) 103 F3 1475, 1478.

[135] CAL: Mann v. Superior Court (1970) 3 C3 1, 9 [“Cases holding invalid consent to entry obtained by ruse or trick all involve some positive act of misrepresentation on the part of officers, such as claiming to be friends, delivery men, managers, or otherwise misrepresenting or concealing their identity.”]; P v. Reyes (2000) 83 CA4 7, 10 [officer identified himself as the driver of a car that had just collided with the suspect’s car outside his home]; P v. Mesaris (1970) 14 CA3 71 [officer identified himself as a friend of the Sears repairman who was working inside the defendant’s home]; In re Robert T. (1970) 8 CA3 990, 993-94 [consent invalid when apartment manger and undercover officer obtained consent to enter to “check the apartment”]; P v. Hodson (1964) 225 CA2 554 [officer claimed to be the apartment manager]. 9th CIR: US v. Garcia (9C 1993) 997 F2 1273, 1280 [consent to undercover narcotics officer to dispose of an empty pop bottle]. OTHER: O’Neil v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (6C 2011) 662 F3 723, 730-31 [officers entered to inspect puppies for sale]. ALSO SEE: Theofel v. Farley-Jones (9C 2004) 359 F3 1066, 1073 [“Not all deceit vitiates consent. The mistake must extend to the essential character of the act itself rather than to some collateral matter which merely operates as an inducement. Unlike the phony meter reader, the restaurant critic who poses as an ordinary customer is not liable for trespass,” edited.].

[136] CAL: P v. Lucatero (2008) 166 CA4 1110; P v. Jaquez (1985) 163 CA3 918, 928 [“A real estate agent’s authority to consent to an entry is not vitiated by some secret, deceptive intent harbored in the mind of the person posing as a potential buyer.”]. NOTE: In P v. De Caro (1981) 123 CA3 454, 466 the court indicated that an undercover officer’s entry into a home for sale was unlawful because, even though the officer had entered with a real estate agent, the officer lied about his interest in buying the house. Apart from the fact that the home owner could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to things in his home that could have been observed by any prospective buyer (regardless of his sincerity), the Lucatero court (above) noted that the De Caro court’s conclusions about the entry were not only dicta, they were unsound.

[137] 9th CIR: US v. Phillips (9C 1974) 497 F2 1131, 1136 [officers lied that they needed to enter the residence to investigate a report of a burglary]; Whalen v. McMullen (9C 2018) 907 F3 1139, 1149-50. OTHER: Pagan-Gonzalez v. Moreno (1C 2019) 919 F3 582, 601 [FBI agents claimed they needed to check a suspect’s computer modem because it was being used to send computer viruses to government facilities in Washington]; US v. Cacace (2C 2015) 796 F3 176, 189 [court refers to case in which consent was invalidated because officers claimed they wanted to enter for the purpose of looking for a missing girl]; US v. Harrison (10C 2011) 639 F3 1273, 1280 [consent to enter was invalid because officers lied that they sought to enter to investigate a report of bombs on the premises]. COMPARE: US v. Smith (1C 2019) 919 F3 1, 14 [officers merely told the consenting person that they were “investigating possible illegal immigrants]; US v. Spivey (11C 2017) 861 F3 1207, 1216 [“Austin knew that she was interacting with criminal investigators who had the authority to act upon evidence of illegal behavior.”].

[138] OTHER: US v. Cacace (2C 2015) 796 F3 176, 189-90 [consent to enter for the purpose of viewing and borrowing photos].