Chapter 59: Standing

[1] CAL: P v. Tolliver (2008) 160
CA4 1231, 1236, fn.8 ["'Legitimate' and 'reasonable' are
interchangeable terms in expectation of privacy analysis."].

[2] OTHER: US v. Lewis (7C 2022)
38 F4 527, 533-34 ["Two lines of precedent govern whether officer
conduct amounts to a search. Under the property-based approach, a
search occurs when an officer enters a constitutionally protected
area, such as the home, for the purpose of gathering evidence
against the property owner. Alternatively, under the privacy-based
approach, courts ask whether a person has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in a given situation," edited.]. ALSO SEE:
US v. Jones (2012) 565 US 400, 409 ["The
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test."].

[3] USSC:
Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 143, fn.12
["Obviously, a legitimate expectation of privacy by definition
means more than a subjective expectation of not being
discovered."]; Hudson v. Palmer (1984) 468 US 517, 525
["The applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether the
person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a
reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been
invaded by government action."]; New York v. Class (1986)
475 US 106, 112 ["the State's intrusion into a particular area,
whether in an automobile or elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth
Amendment violation unless the area is one in which there is a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy"];
California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 US 35, 39 ["An
expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment
protection, however, unless society is prepared to accept that
expectation as objectively reasonable."]. CAL:
P v. Camacho (2000) 23 C4 824, 830-31 ["The defendant's
expectation of privacy must have been objectively reasonable;
i.e., it is one that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable."]; P v. St. Amour (1980) 104 CA3 886, 891 ["it
is absolutely essential that the person affected exhibit a
reasonable expectation (as opposed to mere subjective, personal
desire) that the activity in question be so protected"];
P v. Scheib (1979) 98 CA3 820, 827 ["The issue is not
simply whether a [suspect] has exhibited a 'hope' of privacy or a
desire to avoid detection but instead the issue is whether he has
a reasonable expectation of privacy."]. 9th CIR:
US v. SDI Future Health, Inc. (9C 2009) 568 F3 684, 695
["[to say that a party lacks [standing] is to say that his
reasonable expectation of privacy has not been infringed"].

[4] USSC:
Collins v. Virginia (2018) __ US __ [138 S.Ct. 1663, 1670]
["When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the
curtilage to gather evidence, a search has occurred." Edited.];
Florida v. Jardines (2013) 569 US 1, 11 ["That the officers
learned what they learned only by physically intruding on
Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that
a search occurred."]; US v. Jones (2012) 565 US 400, 406,
fn. 3 ["Where, as here, the Government obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a
search has undoubtedly occurred."]. CAL:
P v. Robinson (2012) 208 CA4 232, 244, fn. 12 ["Jones
held that a [Fourth Amendment] violation also could be established
under the common-law trespassory test."];
P v. Robinson (2012) 208 CA4 232, 244, fn. 12 ["The high
court [in Jones] did not question the validity of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test for finding a violation of
the Fourth Amendment; instead, Jones held that a violation also
could be established under the common-law trespassory test."].
9th CIR: US v. Perea-Rey (9C 2012) 680 F3 1179,
1184-85 [partially-enclosed carport was within curtilage and,
therefore, an officer's entry into the carport constituted a
search]; US v. Oaxaca (9C 2000) 233 F3 1154,
1157; US v. Lundin (9C 2016) 817 F3 1151, 1160 ["the scope
of the license to approach a home and knock is limited not only to
a particular area but also to a specific purpose"]. OTHER:
US v. McKenzie (2C 2021) 13 F4 223, 233 [McKenzie "has not
shown that the officers violated anyone's property rights when
they entered [the hallways of a storage facility].

[5] USSC:
Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 143, fn.12 [Court
notes it "has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts"
in determining the whether an expectation of privacy was
reasonable]; Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 US 98, 105
["[We have] emphatically rejected the notion that 'arcane'
concepts of property law ought to control the ability to claim the
protections of the Fourth Amendment."];
US v. Salvucci (1980) 448 US 83, 91 ["legal possession of a
seized good is not a proxy for determining whether the owner had a
Fourth Amendment interest"]; Oliver v. US (1984) 466 US
170, 183 ["The existence of a property right is but one element in
determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate."].
CAL: P v. McPeters (1992) 2 C4 1148, 1172 ["A claim
of ownership in property seized does not necessarily signify a
legitimate expectation of privacy, although it is one factor to be
considered in the analysis."]. 9th CIR:
Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp. (9C 1987) 823 F2
1328, 1333 ["Fourth Amendment privacy interests do not turn on
property interests."]. OTHER: Gardner v. US (7C
2012) 680 F3 1006, 1010 [defendant "had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his own person and clothing."];
US v. Rahme (2C 1987) 813 F2 31, 34 ["Ownership is neither
in itself sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of
privacy nor a substitute if the requisite legitimate expectation
of privacy is lacking."].

[6] USSC: Rakas v.
Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 134, 134 ["A person who is
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the
introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third
party's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed."]. CAL: P v.
Madrid (1992) 7 CA4 1888, 1897; P v.
Root (1985) 172 CA3 774, 777. 9th CIR: US
v. Pulliam (9C 2005) 405 F3 782, 787-88 [notes
repudiation of the "target" theory]. NOTE: California used
to be a "target theory" state, meaning that a defendant could
challenge the admissibility of any evidence that prosecutors
wanted to use against him. But that changed in 1982 when the
voters passed Proposition 8 (the Victims' Bill of Rights) which,
among other things, eliminated California's "vicarious
exclusionary rule" and prohibited the suppression of evidence
unless the defendant had standing. In re Lance W. (1985) 37
C3 873, 885-89]; In re Rudy F. (2004) 117 CA4 1124, 1131
["Since the adoption of Proposition 8, California's prior
adherence to the vicarious exclusionary rule… is no longer
applicable"]; P v. Workman (1989) 209 CA3 687, 695
["Proposition 8 abrogated the vicarious exclusionary rule"].

[7] USSC: US v.
Salvucci (1980) 448 US 83, 90 ["a prosecutor may
simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the
seized good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation
without legal contradiction"]; Rawlings v.
Kentucky (1980) 448 US 98, 105. OTHER: US
v. Chaves (11C 1999) 169 F3 687, 690 ["Garcia
advances no facts to support any claim of an expectation of
privacy in the van other than a claim that the contraband in the
van belonged to him. This, however, cannot establish that Garcia's
Fourth Amendment rights were implicated by the search of the
van."].

[8] USSC: US v.
Padilla (1993) 508 US 77; US v.
Leon (1984) 468 US 897, 910; Alderman v.
US (1969) 394 US 165, 171-72. CAL: P v.
Workman (1989) 209 CA3 687, 696.

[9] USSC: Byrd v. US (2018) __ US
__ [138 S.Ct. 1518, 1522] ["legitimate presence on the premises of
the place searched, standing alone, is not enough to accord a
reasonable expectation of privacy"]; Rakas v.
Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 141-48; Minnesota
v. Carter (1998) 525 US 83, 90. OTHER:
US v. Hollis (11C 2015) 780 F3 1064, 1068-69 ["the subject
of an arrest warrant cannot challenge the execution of that
warrant and the later discovery of evidence in a third-party's
home"].

[10] USSC: US v.
Karo (1984) 468 US 705, 714 ["At the risk of belaboring the
obvious, private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not
authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable."]; Kyllo
v. US (2001) 533 US 27, 40 ["the Fourth Amendment
draws a firm line at the entrance to the house"]; Payton
v. New York (1980) 445 US 573, 585 ["[the physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed"]. CAL:
In re Rudy F. (2004) 117 CA4 1124, 1134 ["It would be
intrusive, unwise, and impractical to make expectation of privacy
against government intrusion turn on the various family uses of
different areas in the home."]. OTHER: Guest
v. Leis (6C 2001) 255 F3 325, 333 ["Home owners
would of course have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
homes and in their belongings"].

[11] USSC: Minnesota v.
Olson (1990) 495 US 91, 99 ["The houseguest is there with
the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and
his privacy with his guest."]. CAL: P v.
Henderson (1990) 220 CA3 1632, 1641-42 ["Henderson and Bub
were authorized to stay at the condo for at least three or four
days, enjoyed unencumbered access to the premises"]; P
v. Hamilton (1985) 168 CA3 1058, 1066 ["While
defendant could not reasonably expect to exclude [his host] from
the room, he could reasonably expect the room to remain free from
governmental intrusion."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Davis (9C 2003) 332 F3 1163, 1168 [defendant had standing
to challenge a search of his gym bag in a bedroom in which he was
an overnight guest]; Espinosa v.
City of San Francisco (9C 2010) 598 F3 528, 533 ["An
overnight guest in a home staying with the permission of the host
has a reasonable expectation of privacy"]. OTHER:
US v. Maxi (11C 2018) 886 F3 1318, 1326 ["Mr. Maxi paid
rent, had a key, and has been living at the duplex intermittently
for three to six months."]; US v. Bain (1C 2017) 874 F3 1,
13 ["Bain's status as an overnight guest endowed him with
Katz's protection of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the unit."]. COMPARE: P v. Hernandez (1988)
199 CA3 1182, 1189-90 [no standing to challenge search of a
bedroom in a home in which the defendant was an overnight guest in
another bedroom]. NOTE: A person who is an overnight guest
in a home or apartment may lack standing if his presence was in
violation of the protective order.
US v. Cortez-Dutrieville (3C 2014) 743 F3 881, 885 ["a
person legally prohibited from entering a particular place cannot
reasonably expect to use that place as a "private repository for
his personal effects"]. ALSO SEE: US v. John (1C
2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 1495554] ["John left his case for a
prolonged period without permission or agreement in a home in
which he was entirely unwelcome and had no right to enter."].

[12] USSC: Rakas v.
Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 134, 134 ["A person who is
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the
introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third
party's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed."]; Minnesota v. Carter (1998)
525 US 83, 86 ["Carter and Johns were not overnight social guests
but temporary out-of-state visitors, they were not entitled to
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment against the
government intrusion into the apartment."]. CAL: P
v. Rios (2011) 193 CA4 584, 592 [defendant "was
seated inside [the house] on a couch" was merely a "casual,
temporary visitor" who "had no legitimate expectation of privacy"
in the premises]; P v. Welch (1999) 20 C4 701,
747-48 [defendant was merely "a transient guest"]; P v.
Ayala (2000) 24 C4 243, 279 ["Occasional presence on the
premises as a mere guest or invitee is insufficient to confer such
an expectation [of privacy]"]; P v.
Dimitrov (1995) 33 CA4 18, 27-28 ["[appellant testified he
did not live in apartment 301, had no key to the apartment, had no
clothes there, had no possessions there, and had no expectation of
privacy while he was in the apartment because people were always
'coming and going'"]. OTHER: US v. Bearden (8C 2015)
780 F3 887, 892-93; US v. Williams (8C 2008)
521 F3 902, 906 ["Mere visitors to someone else's hotel room do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy."]; US
v. Sturgis (8C 2001) 238 F3 956, 958 ["Sturgis, by
his own account, did not rent the motel room" and he "actually
told the federal agents that he was merely visiting"].

[13] CAL: P v. Moreno (1992) 2
CA4 577, 587 [a person has a "protectable expectation of privacy"
if he is "a permissive occupant who temporarily controls a
residence, while performing functions recognized as valuable by
society"]; P v. Stewart (2003) 113 CA4 242, 252 ["appellant
clearly had permissive temporary control over the premises
searched"]; P v. Cowan (1994) 31 CA4 795, 800 [although
defendant had a "standing invitation" to visit, he failed to prove
"he had authority to be in the apartment alone, to enter without
permission, to store anything there"]; P v.
Magee (2011) 194 CA4 178, 188 ["though defendant might have
had a legitimate expectation of privacy had he been paying a
social visit when the police entered, he did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy where he entered the house simply to escape
their pursuit. The reasons supporting the legitimacy of a social
guest's expectation of privacy do not support defendant's claimed
expectation of privacy."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Sarkisian (9C 1999) 197 F3 966, 987 ["a defendant who
merely possesses the authority to access a storage rental room but
does not use it, without more, lacks [standing]"]. OTHER:
US v. Haydel (5C 1981) 649 F2 1152, 1155 [homeowner's adult
son who had a key to the premises had standing to challenge a
search of an area in which he was permitted to store his things];
US v. Chaves (11C 1999) 169 F3 687, 691 ["While possession
of a key, without more, might not be sufficient to establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy, Chaves seems to have had the
only key and, what is more, he also kept personal and business
papers at the warehouse."].

[14] USSC: US v. Dunn (1987) 480
US 294, 301. OTHER: US v. Coleman (6C 2019) 923 F3
450, 456.

[15] USSC:
Florida v. Jardines (2013) 569 US 1, 11 ["we need not
decide whether the officers' investigation of Jardines' home [the
driveway] violated his expectation of privacy"].

[16] OTHER: US v. Coleman (6C
2019) 923 F3 450, 456 ["the Coleman driveway was in fact shared
with other families and other condo residents."].

[17] CAL: P v. Robinson (2012)
208 CA4 232, 246 ["we need not determine whether testing the key
in the lock was a search because, even assuming it was a search,
the search was not unreasonable"]. 9th CIR:
US v. Dixon (9C 2020) 984 F3 814, 819 [search resulted when
officer inserted key in door of residence to determine in parolee
lived there]. OTHER: US v. Bain (1C 2017) 874 F3 1,
16 ["a search occurred when the police placed and turned a key in
the lock of the door to unit D"]. COMPARE:
US v. Thompson (7C 2016) 842 F3 1002, 1008 ["the privacy
interest in the information held by a lock (i.e., the verification
of the key owner's address) is so small"];

[18] OTHER: US v. Cowan (8C
2012) 674 F3 947, 955-57 ["Cowan did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the identity of his car."];
US v. Correa (7C 2018) 908 F3 208, 217 [use of garage door
opener to locate suspect's house did not require a warrant because
the location of a home is not within the protected curtilage of
the Fourth Amendment].

[19] OTHER: US v. Correa (7C
2018) 908 F3 208, 221 ["We do not address here what would happen
if the agents had used the openers to open a private garage in
which a residence had a reasonable expectation of privacy and then
used what they saw to pursue further inquiries."].

[20] USSC: Hoffa v.
US (1966) 385 US 293, 301 ["A hotel room can clearly be the
object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an
office."]. 9th CIR: US v. Bautista (9C
2004) 362 F3 584, 589 [Fourth Amendment "extends to such places as
hotel or motel rooms"]. OTHER: US v.
Arch (7C 1993) 7 F3 1300, 1302 ["Motel guests enjoy the
same constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures as do occupants of a private residence."]; US
v. Williams (8C 2008) 521 F3 902, 906 ["individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their hotel room"];
US v. Gordon (10C 1999) 168 F3 1222, 1226
["we have required a defendant to demonstrate that he was the
registered occupant of the room or that he was sharing it with the
person to whom the room was registered"].

[21] CAL: P v.
Szabo (1980) 107 CA3 419, 429 [apartment garage];
P v. Arango (1993) 12 CA4 450 455 [open carport
area]; P v. Superior Court (Reilly) (1975) 53
CA3 40 [walkway in front of motel rooms]; P v.
Seals (1968) 263 CA2 575, 577 ["police officers in
performance of their duty may, without doing violence to the
Constitution, enter upon the common hallway of an apartment
building without warrant or express permission to do so"];
P v. Terry (1969) 70 C2 410, 425-28 [garage under an
apartment building]; P v. Kilpatrick (1980) 105 CA3
401, 409 ["The open carport area was used commonly by all motel
tenants and thus was not a private, constitutionally protected
space."]; P v. Galan (1985) 163 CA3 786, 793 ["it
has been held that the garage of a condominium apartment which is
available to all tenants and readily accessible by the members of
the general public, does not fall within the protective umbrella
of the Fourth Amendment"]; P v. Shaw (2002) 97 CA4
833, 840 [defendant "introduced no evidence of any right to
exclude others from the common area of the apartment complex"];
P v. Robinson (1986) 185 CA3 528, 531; P v.
Campobasso (1989) 211 CA3 1480, 1482-83 [officer looked
into the hallway of a storage facility containing "dozens of
rental lockers"]; P v. Ortiz (1995) 32 CA4 286,
290-91 [hotel hallway]; P v. Petersen (1972) 23 CA3
883, 894 ["the dynamite was apparently in plain sight in a garage
used in common by all the apartment tenants, so that any
expectation of privacy on the part of appellant in placing it
there, would have been unreasonable"]; P v.
Willard (1965) 238 CA2 292, 307 ["The structure was a
duplex and although the record does not spell it out, it is a
reasonable inference that other occupants of the building had use
of the area around it."]. 9th CIR: US v.
Nohara (9C 1993) 3 F3 1239, 1242 ["an apartment dweller has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the
building"]. OTHER: US v. Lewis (2C 2023) __ F4 __
[2023 WL 2577208] ["the porch was not locked or closed off and
could be easily used by other individuals visiting the building"];
US v. Sweeney (7C 2016) 821 F3 983, 902, ["there is
generally no reasonable expectation of privacy in shared and
common areas in multiple-dwelling residential buildings"];
US v. Jackson (4C 2013) 728 F3 367, 375 ["the trash can was
sitting in the common area of the apartment complex courtyard,
which included the grass areas and common sidewalks, readily
accessible to all who passed by"]; US v.
Brooks (8C 2011) 645 F3 971, 975-76 [no reasonable
expectation of privacy in outside staircase leading to common area
of a multi-family building]; US v. Fields (2C
1997) 113 F3 313 [no reasonable expectation in "fenced-in" side
yard in an apartment complex because other tenants "were entitled
to use the side yard"].

[22] OTHER: US v. Coleman (6C
2019) 923 F3 450, 453 ["Though the condominium complex had a
"PRIVATE PROPERTY" sign at its entrance, anyone could drive into
the complex."].

[23] OTHER: US v.
Maestas (10C 2011) 639 F3 1032, 1036-37 [entry into a
tri-plex's enclosed garbage storage area]; US v.
Fields (2C 1997) 113 F3 313, 322 ["the defendants here
could have no such legitimate expectations, because the building
in which they conducted their operations contained other
apartments whose tenants were entitled to use the side yard
without giving notice or having the defendants' permission"].

[24] CAL: P v.
Arango (1993) 12 CA4 450, 455 ["But even if climbing over
the fence [surrounding the apartment complex] was a simple
trespass it would not invalidate their subsequent observations."];
P v. Howard (1976) 63 CA3 249, 254 ["we do not
believe that the locked outside door [to an apartment building]
established the same sanctity for the hallways and common areas as
is established for individual apartments by the door to those
apartments"]; P v. Shaw (2002) 97 CA4 833 [officers
entered through a "break in the fencing"]; P v.
Seals (1968) 263 CA2 575, 577. 9th CIR:
US v. Barajas-Avalos (9C 2004) 377 F3 1040.
OTHER: US v. Correa (3C 2011) 653 F3
187, 190-91 ["a resident lacks an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the common areas of a multi-unit
apartment building with a locked exterior door"].

[25] OTHER: US v. Mastin (11C
2020) 972 F3 1230, 1236 ["A hotel room—though not what ordinarily
comes to mind when one pictures a 'house'—qualifies as a place in
which people remain secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures."].

[26] 9th CIR:
Patel v. City of Montclair (9C 2015) 798 F3 895, 900 [entry
into public area of motel]. OTHER: US v. Lewis (7C
2022) 38 F4 527, 536 ["While it is true that hotel guests have
some legitimate expectations of privacy, they cannot exclude
others from entering a hallway—particularly where, as here, an
exterior hallway is accessible from a staircase leading directly
to the parking lot."].

[27] OTHER: US v. Sesay (8C
2019) 937 F3 1146, 1152 [Samann "had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the identification card that he provided when
registering at the motel"].

[28] OTHER:
US v. SDI Future Health, Inc. (9C 2009) 568 F3 684, 699
["Of course, Kaplan and Brunk do have standing to challenge the
admission of any evidence obtained from their own personal,
internal offices"]; US v. Shelton (7C 2021) 997 F3 749, 760
["Shelton's office was her own private, fully-enclosed work space;
although business invitees visited it for limited purposes, she
did not share her office or her desk with anyone else."].

[29] 9th CIR: US v.
Taketa (9C 1991) 923 F2 665, 673 ["even private business
offices are often subject to the legitimate visits of coworkers,
supervisors, and the public, without defeating the expectation of
privacy"]; Schowengerdt v.
General Dynamics, Inc. (9C 1987) 823 F2 1328, 1335
["Schowengerdt would enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in
areas given over to his exclusive use"]. OTHER: US
v. Anderson (10C 1998) 154 F3 1225, 1230 ["It is
well established that an employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office."].

[30] 9th CIR: Schowengerdt
v. General Dynamics, Inc. (9C 1987) 823 F2 1328,
1335; US v. Taketa (9C 1991) 923 F2 665,
672-3; Veda-Rodriguez v.
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. (1C 1997) 110 F3 174, 180 ["PRTC
notified its work force in advance that video cameras would be
installed and disclosed the cameras' field of vision."].
ALSO SEE: City of Ontario v.
Quon (2010) 560 US 746, 761 ["Quon was told that his
messages were subject to auditing."].

[31] QUOTE FROM: O'Connor
v. Ortega (1987) 480 US 709, 717. 9th CIR:
US v. Taketa (9C 1991) 923 F2 665, 673
[standing in private office may be lost if it "is so open to
fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable"].

[32] USSC: Maryland v.
Macon (1985) 472 US 463, 469 ["The officer's action in
entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were
intentionally exposed to all who frequent the place of business
did not infringe a legitimate expectation of privacy and hence did
not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."].

[33] CAL:
Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v.
County of Sacramento (1996) 51 CA4 1468, 1482 [sheriff's
deputy could not reasonably expect privacy in the jail's "release
office" because the office "was not exclusively assigned to him"
and it was "accessible to any number of people, including other
jail employees"]. 9th CIR: US v.
SDI Future Health, Inc. (9C 2009) 568 F3 684, 696 ["mere
access to, and even use of, the office of a co-worker does not
lead us to find an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy"]; US v. Taketa (9C 1991) 923 F2 665,
671 ["the fact that Taketa had access to [O'Brien's office], and
used it for his own illegal activities in conspiracy with O'Brien,
does not lead us to find an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy."].

[34] USSC: O'Connor v.
Ortega (1987) 480 US 709, 716. OTHER: US v.
Anderson (10C 1998) 154 F3 1225, 1231 ["It may be
significant, therefore, that this item is a personal possession of
the defendant and not something connected with the operation of
the business."].

[35] 9th CIR: US v.
Heckenkamp (9C 2007) 482 F3 1142, 1146 ["the act of
attaching his computer to the network did not extinguish his
legitimate, objectively reasonable privacy expectations"].

[36] OTHER: US v.
King (11C 2007) 509 F3 1338, 1342 ["King's files were
exposed to thousands of individuals with network access"].

[37] USSC: Dow Chemical Co.
v. US (1986) 476 US 227, 236 ["The intimate
activities associated with family privacy and the home and its
curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between
structures and building of a manufacturing plant."];
Donovan v. Dewey (1981) 452 US 594,
598-99 ["the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial
property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the
sanctity accorded an individual's home"]. OTHER:
Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico telephone Co.
(1C 1997) 110 F3 174, 178-79 ["Generally speaking, business
premises invite lesser privacy expectations than do residences.
Still, deeply rooted societal expectations foster some cognizable
privacy interests in business premises."]; US v.
Reed (8C 1984) 733 F2 492, 501 ["there was no indication
that the back parking lot was 'private' to the owners or to those
specifically authorized to use it"]; US v Hall (11C
1995) 47 F3 1091, 1096 ["the owner of commercial property has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas immediately
surrounding the property only if affirmative steps have been taken
to exclude the public"]; US v. Edmonds (5C
1980) 611 F2 1386, 1388 [no reasonable expectation of privacy in
loading dock/parking lot area of a business].

[38] USSC: Brendlin v.
California (2007) 551 US 249. CAL:
Brewer v. Superior Court (2017) 16 CA5 1019, 1023 [even if
the passenger did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area where the evidence was found, he may challenge the
admissibility of the evidence on grounds that it was the fruit of
an unlawful seizure]. 9th CIR: US v.
Diaz-Castaneda (9C 2007) 494 F3 1146, 1150. OTHER:
US v. Torres-Ramos (6C 2008) 536 F3 542, 549
["even in cases where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists,
a passenger may still challenge the stop and detention"].

[39] OTHER:
US v. Ruiz-Zarate (8C 2012) 678 F3 683, 689.

[40] USSC:
Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 148;
Byrd v. US (2018) __ US __ [138 S.Ct. 1518, 1522 ["One who
owns and possesses a car almost always has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it," edited.].

[41] CAL: P v. Leonard (1987)
197 CA3 235, 239 ["A person who has the owner's permission to use
a vehicle and is exercising control over it has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in it."]; P v. Carvajal (1988) 202
CA3 487, 495 ["Montoya was driving the vehicle with the owner's
permission, and apparently possessed keys to the ignition and
camper shell when detained by police. We find these facts
sufficient to confer standing."]; US v. Terry (4C 2018) 909
F3 716, 720 [defendant had standing because he was the driver and
sole occupant of the car that was searched]. NOTE: The
Eighth Circuit ruled that a suspect who borrowed a CI's car to
deliver drugs, could not reasonably expect that CCI had not
consented to the installation of a tracking device in the vehicle.
US v. Dewilfond (8C 2022) 54 F4 578, 580 ["Dewilfond had no
property interest or expectation of privacy in the vehicle when CS
consented to installation of a GPS tracking device before
Dewilfond borrowed the car."].

the owner of the vehicle

[42] OTHER: US v.
Bouffard (1C 1990) 917 F2 673, 676-77.

[43] USSC: Rakas v.
Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 148 [passengers "made no
showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they
were merely passengers."]. CAL: P v.
Valdez (2004) 32 C4 73, 122 ["As a passenger, defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area under the
driver's side seat and thus cannot challenge the seizure of the
gun."]; P v. Jackson (1992) 7 CA4 1367, 1370
["Appellant was merely a guest-passenger"]; P v.
Nelson (1985) 166 CA3 1209, 1214 [petitioners "made no
showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they
were merely passengers"]. 9th CIR: US v.
Pulliam (9C 2005) 405 F3 782, 786 ["As a passenger with no
possessory interest in the car Richards was driving, Pulliam has
no reasonable expectation of privacy"]; US v.
Twilley (9C 2000) 222 F3 1092, 1095 [no standing to
challenge search of car when third party rented the car for
defendant's wife]. OTHER: US v. Russell (6C 2022) 26
F4 371, 377 ["Russell has no property interest in the car because
he has no ownership or possessory interest in it. The record is
clear that he wasn't driving, and that the car belonged to [the
driver]."]; US v. Davis (8C 2019) 943 F3 1129, 1132 ["As a
passenger without a property or possessory interest, Davis did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle"];
US v. Santillan (2C 2018) 902 F3 49, 62-63 [suspect lacked
standing to challenge search of girlfriend's vehicle based on her
consent]; US v. Dixon 11C 2018) 901 F3 1322, 1339 [no
standing because the defendant "had no legal interest in the
vehicle and, at the time of the search, was a passenger with no
power to control the vehicle or exclude others from it."];
US v. Russell (8C 2017) 847 F3 616, 618-19 [passenger had
no standing when the car "was rented by his girlfriend];
US v. Covarrubias (7C 2017) 847 F3 556, 558 [no standing to
challenge search a hidden compartment in a vehicle that a car
hauler was delivering to defendant; the car had been "turned over
to the shipping company, which had a key to the car and permission
to drive the car on and off the trailer"];
US v. Barber (11C 2015) 777 F3 1303, 1306 [passenger had
standing to challenge the search of a bag on the passenger's side,
and the officer "believed" the bag belonged to the passenger];
US v. Smith (7C 2012) 697 F3 625, 639 ["Smith, though, was
a mere passenger in the car and there is absolutely no evidence
indicating that he had any ownership interest in the car. And
there is no other basis to conclude that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the car."]; US v. Symonevich (1C
2012) 688 F3 12, 19-22 [passenger lacked standing to challenge
search of can under passenger seat]; US v.
Crippen (8C 2010) 627 F3 1056, 1063 [passenger had no
reasonable expectation of privacy under the seats]; US
v. Marquez (8C 2010) 605 F3 604, 609 ["Acosta
neither owned nor drove the Ford and was only an occasional
passenger therein."]; US v. Lee (11C 2009)
586 F3 859, 865 [passenger lacked standing because he "asserted no
property or possessory interest in the Lexus"]; US
v. Barragan (8C 2004) 379 F3 524, 530 ["mere
passenger"]; US v. Allen (10C 2000) 235 F3
482, 489 ["Mere presence is not sufficient"]; US v.
Betancur (10C 1994) 24 F3 73, 77 ["While Betancur testified
that someone named 'Tio' gave him the pickup truck, there was no
evidence presented which would establish ownership in 'Tio' or a
linkage between "Tio" and Nava."].

[44] CAL: P v.
Leonard (1987) 197 CA3 235, 239 ["A person who has the
owner's permission to use a vehicle and is exercising control over
it has a legitimate expectation of privacy in it."]; P v.
Carvajal (1988) 202 CA3 487, 495 ["Montoya was
driving the vehicle with the owner's permission, and apparently
possessed keys to the ignition and camper shell when detained by
police. We find these facts sufficient to confer standing."].
OTHER: US v. Walton (7C 2014) 763 F3 655, 662
et seq.; US v, Rubio-Rivera (10C 1990)
917 F2 1271, 1275 ["Where the defendant offers sufficient evidence
indicating that he has permission of the owner to use the vehicle,
the defendant plainly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the vehicle and standing to challenge the search of the
vehicle."]; US v. Soto (10C 1993) 988 F2
1548, 1554 ["Because defendant presented evidence that he was in
lawful possession of the car at the time of the stop, his
expectation of privacy in the contents of the car was objectively
reasonable. "].

[45] USSC: Byrd v. US (2018) __
US __ [138 S.Ct. 1518, 1524] ["as a general rule, someone in
otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental
agreement does not list him or her as an authorized driver"].
OTHER: US v. Cohen (11C 2022) 38 F4 1364, 1369 ["the
record demonstrates that he had permission from the renter listed
on the agreement to drive the vehicle"]; US v. Bettis (8C
2020) 946 F3 1024, 1028 ["Daniels testified that Bettis had
permission to drive the Toyota, so Bettis has standing to
challenge the search."]; US v. Walker (7C 2001) 237 F3 845,
849 ["a person listed as an approved driver on a rental agreement
has an objective expectation of privacy in the vehicle due to his
possessory and property interest in the vehicle"];
US v. Hunter (10C 2011) 663 F3 1136, 1144 ["Ms. Isaacson
was legally driving the rental car, with a legal driver's license,
and she was as entitled, apparently or in fact, as Mr. Hunter to
consent to a search of the car."]; US v. Bouffard (1C 1990)
917 F2 673, 676-77. COMPARE: US v. Lyle (2C 2019)
919 F3 716, 729 [no standing because person did not have a
license]; US v. Eckhart (10C 2009) 569 F3
1263, 1275 ["A defendant does not have standing to contest a
search where he does not establish a link between himself and the
registered owner."]; US v. Betancur (10C
1994) 24 F3 73, 77 [defendant lacked standing where the vehicle
registration showed it was owned by someone other than the person
the defendant claims was the lender, and the defendant failed to
present evidence linking the alleged lender and registered owner].

[46] OTHER: US v. Daniels (4C
2022) 41 F4 412, 415 ["an unauthorized driver of a rental car only
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a car when (1) they
possess the rental car and (2) that possession is lawful"].
ALSO SEE: Byrd v. US (2018) __ US __ [138 S.Ct.
1518, 1531 ["The Court leaves for remand two of the Government's
arguments: that one who intentionally uses a third party to
procure a rental car by fraudulent scheme for the for the purpose
of committing a crime is no better situated than a car thief"].

[47] CAL: P v.
Melnyk (1992) 4 CA4 1532, 1533 ["an auto thief, like a
second-story man apprehended in the victimized premises, has no
standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
stolen car"]; P v. Carter (2005) 36 C4 1114, 1141
["To accept defendant's assertion that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy while driving a stolen vehicle would be to
overlook the word 'unreasonable' in the Fourth Amendment's
proscription against 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'"];
P v. Shepherd (1994) 23 CA4 825, 828 ["defendant had
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the stolen truck"].
OTHER: US v. Tropiano (2C 1995) 50 F3
157, 161 ["we think it obvious that a defendant who knowingly
possesses a stolen car has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the car"].

[48] USSC: Cardwell v.
Lewis (1974) 417 US 583, 591 [examination of tire tread and
taking paint scrapings]. OTHER: US v. Sanchez (8C
2020) 955 F3 669, 678 ["Separating the undercarriage from the rest
of the vehicle's exterior necessarily entails defining a
subjective dividing line that will vary in each situation and
leave officers little guidance as to the limits of their
authority."]; US v. Class (8C 2018) 883 F3 734, 738 ["There
is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of
an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by
either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers."].

[49] OTHER: US v. Richmond (5C
2019) 915 F3 352, 358-59; Taylor v. City of Saginaw (6C
2019) 922 F3 328, 336].

[50] 9th CIR: US v.
Diaz-Castaneda (9C 2007) 494 F3 1146, 1150-51.

[51] OTHER: US v.
Bynum (8C 2007) 508 F3 1134, 1137 ["The act of looking
through a car window is not a search"].

[52] USSC: Hudson v.
Palmer (1984) 468 US 517, 525-26 ["[We] hold that society
is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective
expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison
cell"]. CAL: P v. Zepeda (2001) 87 CA4 1183,
1194 ["defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
jail cell"]; P v. Boulter (2011) 199 CA4 761,
770 [jail visitor has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
locker he was required to, and did, store prohibited articles
[such as cellphone s] before entering]. OTHER: US
v. Prevo (11C 2006) 435 F3 1343, 1346 ["corrections
facilities are volatile places, brimming with peril, places where
security is not just an operational nicety but a matter of life or
death importance"]. ALSO SEE: P v. Golden (2017) 19
CA5 905, 912 [no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell of
inmate in maximum-security psychiatric hospital housing mostly
sexually violent predators]. NOTE: In US v.
Cohen (2C 1986) 796 F2 20, the Second Circuit invalidated a
warrantless cell search because it was initiated by a prosecutor
to see if there was anything in the cell that might help him
prepare his case for trial. Although Cohen is commonly
cited, it is plainly inconsistent with the US Supreme Court's
ruling in Hudson v. Palmer (1984) 468 US 517,
525-26 ["we hold that society is not prepared to recognize as
legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner
might have in his prison cell"]. Also, the California Supreme
Court has questioned whether Cohen is still good law.
P v. Loyd (2002) 27 C4 997, 1009, fn.16 ["It is far
from certain that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would have
reached the same result after [Turner v.
Safley (1987) 482 US 78] announced its more deferential
test."].

[53] CAL: P v. M.S. (2019) 32
CA5 1177, 1187 [the officers "were dressed in plain clothes, the
hospital door was open, a nurse was present at some point, and the
detectives knocked and announced their presence. Under the
circumstances, the hospital room was within the joint domination
of the hospital and M.S."]. OTHER: US v. Clancy (6C
2020) 979 F3 1135, 1139 [Do patient's have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a hospital room? "Maybe yes; maybe
no—and perhaps more likely no in an emergency room"];
US v. Mattox (8C 2022) 27 F4 668, 674 [no reasonable
expectation of privacy in busy emergency room where suspect was
being treated for gunshot wound].

[54] 9th CIR: US v. Caymen (9C
2003) 404 F3 1196, 1200; US v. Wong (9C 2003) 334 F3 831.

[55] CAL: P v. Pride (2019) 31
CA5 133, 141 ["Pride assumed the risk that the account for one of
his 'friends' could be an undercover profile for a police
detective or that any other 'friend' could save and share the
information with government officials"]. OTHER:
US v. Hoeffener (8C 2020) 950 F3 1037, 1044 ["A defendant
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in [computer] files made
available to the public through peer-to-peer file sharing
networks."]; US v. Morel (1C 2019) 922 F3 1, 10 [defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy as to files containing
child pornography that he uploaded to a website].

[56] CAL: P v. Evensen (2016) 4
CA5 1020, 1030. OTHER: US v. Shipton (8C 2021) 5 F4
933, 936 ["a defendant has no objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy in files he shares over a peer-to-peer network,
including those shared anonymously with law enforcement
officers"].

[57] CAL: P v. Nishi (2012) 207
CA4 954, 963 [no standing where "defendant was a trespasser on
public land, and occupied the campsite without authority in bad
faith"]; P v. Hughston (2008) 168 CA4 1062, 1068-69
[defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an aluminum
frame covered with tarps in a site on land specifically set aside
for camping during a music festival"]. 9th CIR: US
v. Gooch (9C 2007) 6 F3 673, 677 [tent in campground
where defendant was "legally permitted to camp"]. OTHER:
US v. Ruckman (10C 1986] 806 F2 1471, 1474 ["Where an
individual resides in a temporary shelter on public property
without a permit or permission and in violation of a law which
expressly prohibits what he is doing, he does not have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy."].

[58] OTHER: US v. Thomas (DCC
1989) 864 F2 843, 845 ["A warrantless search or seizure of
property that has been 'abandoned' does not violate the fourth
amendment."]; US v. Basinski (7C 2000) 226 F3 829, 836 ["no
person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item
that he has abandoned"]; US v. Hoey (8C 1993) 983 F2 890,
892-93 [the issue "is not abandonment in the strict property right
sense, but rather, whether the defendant in leaving the property
has relinquished her reasonable expectation of privacy so that the
search and seizure is valid"].

[59] QUOTE FROM: P v. Daggs,
(2005) 133 CA4 361, 365. CAL: P v. Parson (2008) 44
C4 332, 347 ["Abandonment is primarily a question of the
defendant's intent, as determined by objective factors such as the
defendant's words and actions."]; In re Baraka H. (1992) 6
CA4 1039, 1048 ["Appellant is therefore mistaken in contending
that abandonment does not occur unless the actor intends to
permanently relinquish control over the object."]. OTHER:
US v. Harrison (3C 2012) 689 F3 301, 309 ["the only issue
before us is whether the police officers' belief that the house
was abandoned justified their warrantless entry"];
US v. Tugwell (8C 1997) 125 F3 600, 602 [abandonment
depends on "the objective facts available to the investigating
officers, not on the basis of the owner's subjective intent."];
US v. Alexander (7C 2009) 573 F3 465, 472 ["We consider
only the external manifestations of the defendant's intent as
judged by a reasonable person possessing the same knowledge
available to the searching officer."].

[60] CAL:
P v. Stanislawski (1986) 180 CA3 748, 757 ["It is settled
that a disclaimer of proprietary or possessory interest in the
area searched or the evidence discovered terminates the legitimate
expectation of privacy over such area or items."]; P v.
Dees (1990) 221 CA3 588, 594-95 ["a total disclaimer of any
interest in the area or item searched at the time of the search
… will preclude a successful challenge to the legality of
that search"]. OTHER: US v. Fernandez (10C 2021) 20
F4 1298.

[61] EXAMPLES: The following
constituted denials of any interest:

• "Crumble initially denied any knowledge of the wrecked
Buick, evincing his intent to abandon the vehicle and its
contents."
US v. Crumble (8C 2018) 878 F3 656, 660.

• "Appellant continued to pretend that the bag had nothing to
do with him. That being so, officers had no obligation to treat it
as being clothed with an expectation of privacy."
In re Baraka H. (1992) 6 CA4h 1039, 1048. Also see
US v. Amaral-Estrada (7C 2007) 509 F3 820, 827 [no standing
to challenge a search of a car because the suspect "denied any
knowledge of the car"]; US v. Wise (5C 2017) 877 F3 209,
222, fn.9 ["Wise forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy
in the backpack when he voluntarily disclaimed ownership or
recognition of the backpack."].

• Defendant said "he had never seen the bag before."
P v. Mendoza (1986) 176 CA3 1127, 1129, 1133.

• When contacted by officers in a bus, the passenger
(defendant) denied that any of the luggage on the bus belonged to
him.
US v. Fernandez (10C 2021) 20 F4 1298, 1308 ["And there was
further evidence that Mr. Fernandez was trying to disassociate
himself from the bag. The court noted that the bus was not
crowded, yet the bag was located several rows behind"].

• "When asked about the briefcase, Decoud claimed that it did
not belong to him and that he did not know how to open it."
US v. Decoud (9C 2006) 456 F3 996, 1007-8.

• "Appellant testified he did not live in apartment 301, had
no key to the apartment, had no clothes there, had no possessions
there, and 'had no expectation of privacy while [he was] in the
apartment' because people were always 'coming and going.'"
P v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 CA4 18, 27-28.

• The defendant said "she did not own the bag, did not know
who the bag belonged to, did not have any interest in what
happened to the bag, and even claimed that she had never seen the
bag before."
US v. Easley (10C 2018) 911 F3 1074, 1083.

[62] USSC: Rakas v.
Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 142 ["a person can have a
legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home"].
CAL: P v. Allen (1993) 17 CA4 1214, 1223
["defendant's one statement that he lived at a different address
should not foreclose him from establishing an expectation of
privacy at the Lyell Avenue address based on other
considerations"]. 9th CIR: US v. Lopez-Cruz (9C
2013) 730 F3 803, 808-809 [Lopez told Agent Soto that the phones
belonged to a friend, but he did not disclaim use of them or
otherwise disassociate himself from them]. OTHER:
US v. Hawkins (11C 1982) 681 F2 1343, 1346 ["a disclaimer
of ownership, while indeed strong indication that a defendant does
not expect the article to be free from government intrusion, is
not necessarily the hallmark for deciding the substance of a
fourth amendment claim"].

[63] CAL: P v.
Daggs (2005) 133 CA4 361, 365 ["It is well established that
property is abandoned when a defendant voluntarily discards it in
the face of police observation, or imminent lawful detention or
arrest, to avoid incrimination."]; P v. Brown (1990)
216 CA3 1442, 1451 ["b]efore making a last-ditch effort to evade
the police," defendant dropped a paper bag containing rock
cocaine.]; P v. Haines (1981) 123 CA3 861, 868 [when
he saw the officers, the suspect hid the evidence in a storage bin
in his carport]; P v. Thompson (1988) 205 CA3 1503,
1508 [defendant kicked bindles of cocaine underneath a counter in
a liquor store]; P v. Taylor (1986) 178 CA3 217, 230
[defendant tossed jewelry to the ground just before he was
apprehended]. OTHER: US v. Symonevich (1C 2012) 688
F3 12, 18-22 [car passenger put can containing drugs under the
seat when an officer lit up the vehicle]; US v.
Smith (8C 2011) 648 F3 654, 660 [when officers made a car
stop on a bank robbery suspect, he jumped out of the car and fled
on foot]; US v. Thomas (DCC 1989) 864 F2 843,
846 [officers approached, the suspect he stopped "busying himself
with the contents of the gym bag" and left the bag "on the floor
of a public hallway"]; US v. Tugwell (8C
1997) 125 F3 600, 603 [having seen that a drug-sniffing dog has
alerted to his suitcase, a bus passenger made an "abrupt
departure"].

[64] CAL: In re Baraka H. (1992)
6 CA4 1039, 1045-46 [while selling drugs on the street, defendant
would leave his drugs in a paper bag in the grass about ten feet
away, thus giving himself "deniability"];
P v. Roybal (1998) 19 C4 481, 507 [defendant hid stolen
jewelry "in a wall adjacent to neighboring properties"];
P v. Ketchum (1975) 45 CA3 328, 330 ["The box, however, was
found in a stranger's yard where Ketchum had attempted to hide
it."]; P v. Shaw (2002) 97 CA4 833, 839 [defendant put
drugs in a hole in the ground in the common area of an apartment
complex]. OTHER: US v. Juszczyk (10C 2017) 844 F3
1213, 1214 [when he saw officers approaching him, defendant tossed
bag containing drugs onto roof of house]; US. v. Hayes (2C
2008) 551 F3 138 [defendant left drugs in a bag hidden in scrub
brush on his property, but 65 feet from his house in an unfenced
area]; US v. McKennon (11C. 1987) 814 F2 1539, 1543
[defendant transferred drugs to an associate and "refused to
publicly associate with her on her journey, and instructed her
that he would proceed to Kansas City without her in the event that
she was detained"]; US v. Paradis (1C. 2003) 351 F3 21, 31
[defendant hid the evidence in the common area of a multi-family
building]. COMPARE: Smith v. Ohio (1990) 494 US 541,
543. [suspect did not abandon evidence when, after a plainclothes
officer told him "come here a minute," he threw the bag on the
hood of his car and turned to face the officer];
P v. Haines (1981) 123 CA3 861, 867 [no abandonment when,
upon seeing officers approach, the suspect put his drugs in a
storage bin in his carport].

[65] CAL: P v.
Ayala (2000) 24 C4 243. 279 [at the murder scene, defendant
left containers with his fingerprints]; P v.
Daggs (2005) 133 CA4 361 [defendant accidentally dropped
his cellphone (which was subsequently searched by officers) at the
scene of a robbery he had committed]; P v.
Shepherd (1994) 23 CA4 825 [defendant left her purse in a
stolen car]. OTHER: US v. James (8C
2008) 534 F3 868, 873 [defendant left proceeds of bank robbery at
scene of rape].

[66] USSC: Abel v. US (1960) 362
US 217, 241 ["There can be nothing unlawful in the Government's
appropriation of such abandoned property"];
Hester v. US (1924) 265 US 57, 58 [abandoned moonshine].
CAL: P v. Juan (1985) 175 CA3 1064, 1069 [defendant
left the evidence in a jacket that he had "left draped over a
chair at an empty table in a restaurant open to the public."].
OTHER: US v. Alewelt (7C 1976) 532 F2 1165, 1167
[leaving an item unattended in a public place evidences a
"relinquishment of any reasonable expectation of privacy and
security in regard to it"].

[67] CAL: P v.
Gallego (2010) 190 CA4 388, 395 [suspect did not have
standing to challenge the seizure and subsequent DNA testing of a
cigarette he discarded on a sidewalk]; P v.
Thomas (2011) 132 CA4 338, 342 [detainee had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in DNA sample he left on PAS device].

[68] USSC: California v.
Greenwood (1988) 486 US 35, 40-41 ["having deposited their
garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspection,
respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the inculpatory items that they discarded," edited].
9th CIR: US v. Carswell (7C 2021) 996 F3 785, 790,
792 [search was authorized where the trash bags were located "at
the end of the driveway for pick-up"]. OTHER:
US v. Leonard (7C 2018) 884 F3 730, 734 ["individuals lack
a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in a public
alley or on a curbside"]; US v. Scott (1C
1992) 975 F2 927, 929 [defendant put shredded documents in a
garbage can outside his home]; US v.
Hall (11C 1995) 47 F3 1091, 1096 [shredded documents left
in commercial dumpster].

[69] OTHER: US v. Thompson (8C
2018) 881 F3 629, 632 ["Thompson's trash was readily accessible to
the public"]; US v. Bruce (6C 2005) 396 F3
697, 706 ["people cannot reasonably expect privacy as to garbage
that was removed by a waste removal company and subsequently
searched by officers. This is true even though the company
segregated the suspect's garbage at the request of officers."].

[70] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of forfeiture of standing by transferring it to a third
person:

• Defendant "dumped" drugs into the purse of a woman he had
known for only a few days. Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448
US 98, 105.

• Defendant left his clothing in a friend's car.
P v. Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 979.

• Defendant left an unsealed bag containing drugs in a drug
buyer's car. P v. Root (1985) 172 CA3 774, 778.

• Defendant put drugs in a friend's package of cigarettes.
P v. Guajardo (1994) 23 CA4 1738.

• Defendant put an incriminating letter in the pocket of a
fellow jail inmate. P v. Burns (1987) 196 CA3 1440, 1453

• Defendant gave a murder weapon to his cousin to hold for
him "knowing it would be kept by [his cousin] in a place both
unknown to him and over which he had no control."
P v. McPeters (1992) 2 C4 1148, 1172.

[71] OTHER: US v. Edwards (7C
2022) 34 F4th 570, 583 ["Edwards ditched the Outlander (which was
not registered in his name) after a high-speed car chase the night
of the O'Reilly Auto Parts robbery when he fled on foot, and he
was a fugitive at the time Detective Johnson entered the vehicle.
A reasonable person would conclude that Edwards abandoned the
vehicle."]; US v. Small (4C 2019) 944 F3 490, 503 ["the
evidence before the district court depicts a fleeing suspect
tossing aside personal items while attempting to evade capture"];
US v. Crumble (8C 2018) 878 F3 656, 659 [defendant bailed
out after crashing, left cellphone in vehicle];
US v. Nowak (8C 2016) 825 F3 946, 948 [passenger ran,
leaving backpack behind]; US v. Vasquez (7C 2011) 635 F3
889, 894 ["The search issue is a dead-bang loser. For one thing,
the Bonneville was abandoned, and it's hard to see, under the
circumstances here, how Vasquez could argue with a straight face
that he maintained an expectation of privacy in it after he
ditched it and bolted off on the run."]; US v. Chavez (10C
2021) 985 F3 1234, 1241 ["The authority we have located relies on
the car's being abandoned in a public place, not on private
property outside the defendant's residence."];
US v. Edwards (5C 1971) 441 F2 749, 751 ["Defendant's right
to Fourth Amendment protection came to an end when he abandoned
his car to the police, on a public highway, with engine running,
keys in the ignition, lights on, and fled on foot."];
US v. Allen (10C 2000) 235 F3 482, 489. COMPARE:
US v. Baker (9C 2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 1095359]
[detainee's denial that he possessed a car did not constitute
abandonment of the vehicle which was parked nearby].

[72] 9th CIR: US v. Yang (9C
2020) 958 F3 851, 861 [abandonment resulted when "rental contract
provided that vehicles not returned by the due date will be
reported stolen"].

[73] OTHER: US v. Fisher (8C
2022) 56 F4 673, 687 ["Defendants' failure to ensure that [a
certain friend] recovered the devices before the home was sold,
and their subsequent failure to take any additional action, is
sufficient to support a finding of abandonment"].

[74] OTHER: US v. Harrison (3C
2012) 689 F3 301, 311 ["It was a known drug den. There were no
furnishings other than a single mattress on the top floor, human
waste filled the bathtub and toilets, and there was no evidence of
running water or electricity. During his prior entries, Officer
McCarthy observed squatters, who claimed no right to be there. The
house was so dilapidated that the officers believed it was not fit
for human habitation."].

[75] OTHER: US v. Mathis (6C
2013) 738 F3 719, 731 [2013 WL 6726933] [defendant "did not post
any signs, erect a fence or other barrier, hire a security guard,
or monitor the site to exclude others. On at least one side of the
property, anyone could simply step from the sidewalk onto the
site"].

[76] 9th CIR: US v. Dorais (9C
2001) 241 F3 1124, 1128 ["mere expiration of the rental period, in
the absence of affirmative acts of repossession by the lessor,
does not automatically end a lessee's expectation of privacy"].
OTHER: US v. Kitchens (4C 1997) 114 F3 29, 32, fn.3
[defendant had not abandoned his hotel room because "the hotel, as
most hotels do, had a pattern or practice of allowing guests some
leeway regarding the checkout time."].

[77] USSC: Abel v. US (1960) 362
US 217, 241 [defendant checked out of his hotel room leaving the
evidence behind]. CAL: P v. Satz (1998) 61 CA4 322
[motel manager asked police "to assist in appellant's eviction"];
P v. Long (1970) 6 CA3 741, 748 ["The manager had been
advised that defendant was leaving. She had seen him packing. The
room was observed from the outside to have been vacated."];
P v. Parson (2008) 44 C4 332, 346 [defendant vacated his
hotel rooms without checking out, leaving some items behind];
P v. Ingram (1981) 122 CA3 673, 680 ["All appearances
created by defendant himself pointed to the fact that the room had
been vacated by him and the room and box simply had been
abandoned."]; P v. Bennett (1998) 17 C4 373, 391, fn.6
["Ordinarily, a suspect has no expectation of privacy with regard
to items left in a motel room after a tenancy has expired, and the
police may search such items with the consent of the owner of the
motel."]; P v. Superior Court (York) (1970) 3 CA3 648, 657
["a landlord who has evicted his tenant for nonpayment of rent has
the authority to consent to an entry by the police into the
premises in order to seize contraband discovered by the landlord
in the course of the eviction"];
P v. Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 CA3 69, 80 ["The
manager apparently believed the shed had been abandoned and, in
reliance upon that belief, placed his own padlock on the door.
When Officer Pendleton arrived, the manager took him to the shed,
unlocked the door, and let him enter to examine the interior ...
Officer Pendleton could reasonably have believed that he had
authority from the manager to enter."]; P v. Roman (1991)
227 CA3 674, 680 ["no evidence of eviction or abandonment that
would give the landlord the authority to consent to entry"];
P v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 CA4 1183, 1200
["the owners of property may consent to a police search thereof as
long as no other persons are legitimately occupying that
property"]; P v. Superior Court (Evans) (1970) 3 CA3 648,
652-57 [officers reasonably believed a lawful eviction of the
tenants was underway and the premises were now in the possession
of the landlord]; P v. Robinson (1974) 41 CA3 658, 666
[landlady handed a jacket containing a gun to an officer saying
"she had put defendant's belongings on the porch because he had
not paid her for staying at her home as he had promised."];
P v. Remiro (1979) 89 CA3 809, 834 [reasonable belief in
abandonment was sufficient]. 9th CIR:
Eisentrager v. Hocker (9C 1971) 450 F2 490, 491-92
["Moreover, the presence of the hidden corpse was the strongest
possible evidence to lead [the defendant's landlady] to believe
that Eisentrager had abandoned the apartment, regardless of what
personal effects he may have left behind."]. OTHER:
US v. James (8C 2008) 534 F3 868;
Finsel v. Cruppenink (7C 2003) 326 F3 903, 907 ["motel and
hotel tenancy is ordinarily short-term. If the tenancy is
terminated for legitimate reasons, the constitutional protection
may vanish"]; US v. De Parias (11C 1986) 805 F2 1447, 1458
[defendant left the evidence in an apartment after moving out];
US v. Ruiz (10C 2012) 664 F3 833, 841 ["Mr. Ruiz's letter
to Mr. Oraskovich explicitly stated that, as of January 31, 2010,
he would no longer be renting the home."]; US v. Curlin (7C
2011) 638 F3 562, 565-66 [defendant had been evicted but refused
to leave]; US v. Akin (7C 1977) 562 F2 459, 464 [defendant
had abandoned his motel room because the door "was wide open and
there was neither luggage nor suits in the room" and the "rent
from the prior day had not been paid and there was neither an
indication of occupancy nor arrangements for an extension of the
rental period."].

[78] 9th CIR: US v. Dorias (9C
2001) 241 F.3d 1124, 1130 ["Dorais proved that the hotel did not
enforce its checkout time strictly ... it was not normal hotel
policy to issue trespass notices to overstaying guests immediately
at noon but, rather, that the standard practice was to ask guests
at noon when they would be leaving"]. OTHER:
US v. Kitchens (4C 1997) 114 F.3d 29, 32 ["A guest may
still have a legitimate expectation of privacy even after his
rental period has terminated, if there is a pattern or practice
which would make that expectation reasonable."];
US v. Owens (10 C 1986) 782 F2 146, 150 [no abandonment
because motel policy permitted guests to stay past checkout time,
plus defendant had stayed overtime in the past with no problems].

[79] 9th CIR: US v.
Cunag (9C 2004) 386 F3 888, 895 ["even if the occupant of a
hotel room has procured that room by fraud, the occupant's
protected Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy is not finally
extinguished until the hotel justifiably takes affirmative steps
to repossess the room"]; US v. Young (9C
2009) 573 F3 711, 716-17 ["Young maintained a reasonable (although
fraudulent) expectation of privacy in his hotel room and the
luggage he left in the hotel room, because hotel staff had not
evicted him from the room."]; US v. Bautista (9C
2004) 362 F3 584, 590 ["The critical determination is whether or
not management had justifiably terminated Bautista's control of
the room through private acts of dominion."]; US v.
Dorais (9C 2001) 241 F3 1124, 1128 ["mere expiration of the
rental period, in the absence of affirmative acts of repossession
by the lessor, does not automatically end a lessee's expectation
of privacy"]; US v. Molsbarger (8C 2009) 551
F3 809, 812 ["Any right Molsbarger had to be free of government
intrusion into the room ended when the hotel manager, properly
exercising his authority, decided to evict the unruly guests and
asked the police to help him do so."]. ALSO SEE:
P v. Satz (1998) 61 CA4 322, 326 ["Here, the innkeeper
properly called upon the police to assist in the eviction."].

[80] CAL: P v.
Minervini (1971) 20 CA3 832, 840 ["A breach of [an implied]
covenant gives the proprietor a right to treat the contract of
occupancy as terminated."]; P v. Satz (1998) 61 CA4
322 [motel manager asked police "to assist in appellant's
eviction"]. 9th CIR: US v. Cunag (9C
2004) 386 F3 888, 895 ["a justifiable affirmative act of
repossession by the lessor is the factor that finally obliterates
any cognizable expectation of privacy a lessee might have"];
US v. Dorais (9C 2001) 241 F3 1124, 1128 ["a
defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
hotel room when the rental period has expired and the hotel has
taken affirmative steps to repossess the room"]. OTHER:
US v. Creighton (10C 2011) 639 F3 1281,
1286-88 [entry after motel management had informed the renter that
the rent was overdue and told him to pay or vacate].
COMPARE: US v. Young (9C 2009) 573 F3
711, 716-17 ["The hotel had not taken any affirmative act that was
a clear and unambiguous sign of eviction."]. ALSO SEE:
US v. Melucci (1C 1989) 888 F2 200 [defendant
lacked standing to challenge search of storage locker he obtained
with a false name and failed to pay rent].

[81] OTHER: US v. Thomas (7C
2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 2998355] ["And using an alias to sign a
lease, as Thomas did, does not by itself deprive a tenant of a
legitimate expectation of privacy."]; US v.
Domenech (6C 2010) 623 F3 325, 330 ["Only to the motel is
the Domenech brothers' invalid registration a legal concern."];
US v. Pitts (7C 2003) 322 F3 449, 459 ["There
is nothing inherently wrong with a desire to remain anonymous when
sending or receiving a package"].

[82] CAL: P v.
Munoz (2008) 167 CA4 126, 133 ["we cannot infer that Munoz
actually knew she was passing counterfeit currency" and thus "we
cannot conclude she intended to defraud the motel"].

[83] USSC: US v. Miller (1976)
425 US 435, 443 [bank customer has no reasonable expectation of
privacy as to documents sent to the bank]; "This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence places in a third party will not be
betrayed."].

[84] OTHER: US v.
McIntyre (8C 2011) 646 F3 1107, 1111-12 ["when [McIntyre]
used power in his home, he voluntarily conveyed that information
to [power company]. As a result, he had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his power records"].

[85] CAL: P v.
Workman (1989) 209 CA3 687, 696 [documents sent from one
co-conspirator to another].

[86] OTHER: US v.
Gordon (10C 1999) 168 F3 1222, 1228 ["Thus, once a letter
is sent to someone, the sender's expectation of privacy ordinarily
terminates upon delivery."]; US v. King (6C
1995) 55 F3 1193, 1196 ["[Defendant's] expectation of privacy in
the letters terminated upon delivery of the letters to his
wife."].

[87] CAL: P v.
Reyes (2009) 178 CA4 1183, 1190 [information on person who
rented post office box]. 9th CIR: US v.
Hernandez (9C 2002) 313 F3 1206, 1209-10 ["Although a
person has a legitimate interest that a mailed package will not be
opened and searched en route, there can be no reasonable
expectation that postal service employees will not handle the
package or that they will not view its exterior."]; US
v. Hinton (9C 2000) 222 F3 664, 674 [ A "mail cover"
is a term of art within the postal system by which a nonconsensual
record is made of any data appearing on the outside cover of any
letter or package. Although Post Office regulations require
reasonable grounds and compliance with a certain procedure for
obtaining mail cover authorization, a failure to comply does not
render the information inadmissible because there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to such information."]. OTHER:
US v. King (6C 1995) 55 F3 11931196 ["if a
letter is sent to another, the sender's expectations of privacy
ordinarily terminates upon delivery. This is true even though the
sender may have instructed the recipient to keep the letters
private."].

[88] USSC:
Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 US 98, 105 [defendant
dumped "thousands of dollars worth of illegal drugs" into the
purse of a woman he had known for "only a few days"]. CAL:
P v. Guajardo (1994) 23 CA4 1738 [defendant hid the
evidence in a friend's package of cigarettes];
P v. McPeters (1992) 2 C4 1148, 1172 [defendant "gave the
gun to his cousin Sabrina, asking her to hold it for him"];
P v. Burns (1987) 196 CA3 1440, 1453 [defendant placed the
evidence in the pocket of a fellow jail inmate];
P v. Root (1985) 172 CA3 774, 778 [defendant left an
unsealed bag containing drugs in drug buyer's car]. OTHER:
US v. Crowder (7C 2009) 588 F3 929, 935 [defendant turned
his car over to a shipper who had the keys; "it was clear that the
driver was authorized to act in direct contravention to Crowder's
privacy interest"].

[89] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of forfeiture of standing by transferring it to a third
person:

• Defendant "dumped" drugs into the purse of a woman he had
known for only a few days. Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448
US 98, 105.

• Defendant left his clothing in a friend's car.
P v. Clark (1993) 5 C4 950, 979.

• Defendant left an unsealed bag containing drugs in a drug
buyer's car. P v. Root (1985) 172 CA3 774, 778.

• Defendant put drugs in a friend's package of cigarettes.
P v. Guajardo (1994) 23 CA4 1738.

• Defendant put an incriminating letter in the pocket of a
fellow jail inmate. P v. Burns (1987) 196 CA3 1440, 1453

• Defendant gave a murder weapon to his cousin to hold for
him "knowing it would be kept by [his cousin] in a place both
unknown to him and over which he had no control."
P v. McPeters (1992) 2 C4 1148, 1172.

[90] CAL: P v.
Ybarra (1991) 233 CA3 1353, 1362 ["defendant's padlocking
of his toolbox [which he had placed in a friend's motel room]
presents even stronger evidence of defendant's expectation of
privacy in that particular object"]. OTHER: US
v. Most (D.C.C. 1989) 876 F2 191, 197 ["defendant
did not abandon his bag simply by entrusting it to the care of the
store clerks"]; US v. Basinski (7C 2000) 226
F3 829, 837 ["he entrusted the locked briefcase to a life long
friend"].

[91] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1546(f) [the
definition of "electronic device" "does not include the magnetic
strip on a driver's license or an identification card issued by
the state or a driver's license or equivalent identification card
issued by another state"]. OTHER: US v. Hillaire (1C
2017) 857 F3 128, 130; US v. Turner (5C 2016) 839 F3 429,
436 ["We thus join the other courts that have considered this
issue and conclude that society does not recognize as reasonable
an expectation of privacy in the information encoded in a gift
card's magnetic stripe."]; US v. Bah (6C 2015) 794 F3 617,
631-32 ["A privacy expectation in the account information on
credit and debit cards' magnetic strips—separate and beyond the
credit and debit cards themselves—is thus not objectively
reasonable."].

[92] USSC: Steagald v.
US (1981) 451 US 204, 209 [the Government may lose its
right to contest standing if "it has failed to raise such
questions in a timely fashion during the litigation"]. CAL:
P v. Nottoli (2011) 199 CA4 531, 561 ["Since
the prosecutor failed… to assert that Barry had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or cell phone,
the People have forfeited that issue on review of the suppression
ruling."]; P v. Henderson (1990) 220 CA3 1632, 1641
["Failure to raise the issue of standing in the court hearing ...
operates as a waiver."].

[93] USSC: US v.
Matlock (1974) 415 US 164, 178 ["[the controlling burden of
proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than
proof by a preponderance of the evidence"]. CAL: Evid. Code
§ 115.

[94] USSC: Rakas v.
Illinois (1978) 439 US 128, 130, fn.1; Rawlings v.
Kentucky (1980) 448 US 98, 104 ["Petitioner, of course,
bears the burden of proving not only that the search of Cox's
purse was illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in that purse."]. CAL:
P v. Jenkins (2000) 22 C4 900, 972 ["A defendant has the
burden at trial of establishing a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the place searched or the thing seized."]; P v.
McPeters (1992) 2 C4 1148, 1172 ["Defendant bears the
burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy."].

[95] USSC: Illinois v.
Andreas (1983) 463 US 765, 771. CAL:
In re Baraka H. (1992) 6 CA4 1039, 1044.

[96] CAL: P v.
Contreras (1989) 210 CA3 450, 456 ["The trial judge acted
well within her discretion in requiring the prosecution to proceed
first."]; P v. Williams (1992) 3 CA4 1535, 1539,
fn.2 ["A trial court has the discretion to determine whether
standing should be determined prior to entertaining evidence
addressed solely to the reasonableness of the search."].

[97] CAL: P v.
Dees (1990) 221 CA3 588, 595 ["And, while the defendant has
the burden of persuasion on the issue of his or her privacy
expectations, this burden can be met by the prosecution's
evidence."]; P v. Williams (1992) 3 CA4 1535,
1539-43.

[98] USSC: Simmons v.
US (1968) 390 US 377, 393 ["when a defendant testifies in
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him
at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection"].

[99] USSC: US v.
Salvucci (1980) 448 US 83, 94 ["That issue need not be and
is not resolved here"].

[100] USSC: US v.
Beltran-Gutierrez (9C 1994) 19 F3 1287, 1289-90.