Chapter 20: Financial Records

Notes

[1] QUOTE FROM: Gov. Code§
7465(a). NOTE re credit card records: Re the
confidentiality of credit card company account records, see
P v. Blair (1979) 25 C3 640, 652; P v.
Nosler (1984) 151 CA3 125, 131.

[2] CAL: Civ. Code§ 1785.1
et seq. OTHER: 15 USC§ 1681 et seq.

[3] CAL: Civ. Code§§
1785.11(a)(1)-(2). OTHER: 15 USC§§ 1681b(1)-(2).

[4] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7460
et seq.

[5] OTHER: 12 USC 3401 et seq.

[6] USSC: Carpenter v. US (2018)
__ US __ [138 S.Ct. 2206, 2220] [“We do not call into
question… conventional surveillance techniques and tools,
such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business records
that might incidentally reveal location information.”]. OTHER:
US v. Gratkowski (5C 2020) 964 F3 307, 312 [Carpenter
did not create a reasonable privacy interest in a customer’s bank
records because this information “does not provide agents with an
intimate window into a person’s life,” but merely provides
“information about a person’s virtual currency transactions”].
ALSO SEE: Guest v. Leis (6C 2001) 255 F3 325, 336
[“A bank customer does not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the information that he or she has conveyed to the
bank; by placing the information under the control of a third
party, the customer assumes the risk that the bank will convey the
information to the government.”].

[7] CAL: P v.
Huston (1989) 210 CA3 192, 222; P v.
Meyer (1986) 183 CA3 1150, 1163.

[8] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7480(j).

[9] QUOTE FROM: Gov. Code§
7480(a).

[10] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7475.

[11] NOTE: Although the Penal Code
contains no express authority by which a warrant may be served on
the custodian of records, there is comparable authority permitting
service of a subpoena duces tecum on the custodian. See Ev. Code
§ 1560(b).

[12] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7475.

[13] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7475.

[14] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7475
[nondisclosure order financial institutions is permitted “upon a
finding that such notice would impede the investigation”].
OTHER: 12 USC§ 3409 [financial records].

[15] NOTE: The following is an example
of language that may be used to seek and obtain a nondisclosure
order:

Request for Nondisclosure Order: The evidence to be seized
pursuant to this warrant includes financial records in the
possession of [name of financial institution] pertaining to [name
of suspect] who, as explained earlier, is a customer of said
financial institution. Also as explained earlier, said records
constitute evidence in an ongoing criminal investigation. Affiant
is aware that under California law the customer may be notified by
the institution that this warrant has been executed. Based on my
training and experience, I believe there is probable cause that
such notification would impede this criminal investigation by
alerting [name of suspect] of the progress and focus of this
investigation. Therefore, I request an order directing the
institution not to disclose to any person any information
regarding the existence or execution of this warrant.

Nondisclosure Order: Having determined there is probable
cause to believe that disclosure of the existence or execution of
this warrant would impede a criminal investigation, it is ordered
that, pending further order of this court, the [name of
institution] on whom this warrant is served, and its officers,
employees, and agents shall not disclose to any person any
information regarding the existence or execution of this warrant.

[16] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7475.

[17] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7475.

[18] NOTE: The affidavit and the search
warrant should contain the following:

Affidavit: The affidavit should contain a brief explanation
of why an extension is necessary; e.g., I have been informed by
[name of institution official] of [name of institution] that
because of the number and nature of the records to be seized the
listed records cannot reasonably be produced within the ten days
required pursuant to Government Code§ 7475. I therefore
request an order extending the compliance date of this search
warrant to [date records are to be produced].

Warrant: The warrant should contain the court’s order
granting the extension; e.g., Good cause appearing in the
affidavit in support of this warrant that the listed records
cannot reasonably be made available within ten days after the
warrant is served, the records may be produced on or before
[insert compliance date].

[19] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7470;
P v. Rogers (1986) 187 CA3 1001, 1007 [“it is more
accurate to say that the warrant must be sufficiently definite so
that the officer executing it can identify the property sought
with reasonable certainty”]. OTHER: US v.
Leary (10C 1988) 846 F2 592, 600, fn.12 [“The common theme
of all descriptions of the particularity standard is that the
warrant must allow the executing officer to distinguish between
items that may and may not be seized.”].

[20] CAL: Gov. Code§
7470(d); P v. Nece (1984) 160 CA3 285, 290 [“The
criterion for the institution’s decision, should it be inclined to
make same, is that it believe itself to be a victim of a crime.”];
P v. Blair (1979) 25 C3 640, 652 [“We recognized [in
Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 C3 238,
245] that if the bank is not neutral in the matter as for example,
where it is itself a victim of the depositor’s alleged
wrongdoing—the accused’s right of privacy will not prevail.”];
P v. Nosler (1984) 151 CA3 125, 132 [“the bank had a
vested interest in the court of the criminal investigation”];
P v. Hole (1983) 139 CA3 431, 438 [“The so-called
‘bank as victim’ exception was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Burrows“]. OTHER: State v.
Parker (La. App. 1996) 661 S2 603,609 [no violation of
California’s RFPA because “defendant had filed numerous fraudulent
credit card applications and had defrauded American Express of
more than $34,000.”]. NOTE: The purpose of this statute is
“to allow the disclosure of normally private information to the
police, by a financial institution, when the latter has a genuine
reason to suspect that a crime has or is being committed, and/or
that it may suffer as a victim thereof.” P v.
Nece (1984) 160 CA3 285, 291-92; P v.
Nosler (1984) 151 CA3 125, 132 [bank may disclose only
“relevant financial records.”].

[21] CAL: Pen. Code§§ 476a, 484e;
Com. Code§§ 4301, 4302; P v. Nosler (1984) 151
CA3 125, 131 [“Typically, in the criminal cases that have
concluded the bank is a victim, the defendant is charged with
passing bad checks.”]; P v. Johnson (1975) 53 CA3
394, 396-97 [“In utilizing a check drawn on a closed account in
that bank, defendant attempted to defraud the bank and placed it
in a position of potential liability for the amount of the check.
[Thus] the bank was at liberty to disclose that information in
response to the informal request of law enforcement officers.”];
P v. Hole (1983) 139 CA3 431, 438 [“Where a
defendant attempts to pass a check in violation of Pen. Code§
476a, the drawee bank is a ‘victim of the crime’ regardless of
whether or not it has suffered financial loss.”]. ALSO SEE: P v. Nosler (1984) 151 CA3 125, 131 [Bank
of America was a “victim” of a crime because the defendant, who
used his bank credit card to buy an instrumentality of the crime,
would be able to maintain his innocence only if he denied making
the charge, thereby making the bank a potential victim].
NOTE: In two cases decided before the RFPA was enacted,
P v. Johnson (1975) 53 CA3 394, 396-97 and
P v. Superior Court (Abrahms) (1976) 55 CA3 759, 772
the courts ruled that when a customer writes bad checks on his
account, his bank is not “neutral” and, therefore, does not
violate Burrows when it furnishes officers with information
about his account. This is mainly because the bank is potentially
liable if it honors the check].

[22] CAL: P v.
Nosler (1984) 151 CA3 125, 131 [“the disputed credit card
charge directly implicates Owens in the theft and his innocence
can only be maintained if he disaffirms making the charge”].

[23] CAL: P v.
Muchmore (1979) 92 CA3 32, 36 [“There is no need under such
circumstances to notify the customer in advance; any objections he
might have to disclosure are secondary to the interests of
society.”].

[24] CAL: Gov. Code§
7480(b).

[25] NOTE: It appears the purpose of
this section was to create an exception to language in Gov.
Code§ 7471(c) that seemed to make it unlawful for officers to
initiate contact with a suspect’s financial institution; i.e., the
institution must have initiated contact. In 1984, however, the
court in P v. Nece (1984) 160 CA3 285, 292 ruled
that the language in Gov. Code§ 7471(c) “deserves an
interpretation much less strict than advanced by appellant,” and
ruled that this requirement is satisfied so long as the
police-initiated contact was, as here, not “random” or
“unwarranted.”

[26] CAL: P v.
Muchmore (1979) 92 CA3 32, 35 [“Here the police sent a form
letter to Bank which says the signatory certifies “a crime report
has been filed alleging the fraudulent use of checks drawn upon
your back against the account of [defendant].”].

[27] CAL: P v.
Muchmore (1979) 92 CA3 32, 36.

[28] CAL: Gov. Code§
7480(b).

[29] CAL: Gov. Code§
7480(b).

[30] CAL: Gov. Code§
7471(b); P v. Nece (1984) 160 CA3 285, 291 [the
relevant RFPA provisions “are intended to allow the disclosure of
normally private information to the police, by a financial
institution, when the latter has a genuine reason to suspect that
a crime has or is being committed, and/or that it may suffer as a
victim thereof.”]. NOTE: Although this section contains
language that could be construed as requiring that the institution
initiate contact with officers, “a contextual reading of same
belies said construction.” Furthermore, such a construction “would
have the effect of honoring form over substance.” P v.
Nece (1985) 160 CA3 285, 292.

[31] CAL: Gov. Code§ 7470,
7473.

[32] CAL: Gov. Code§
7473(d); P v. Meyer (1986) 183 CA3 1150, 1163.