Chapter 33: Search Warrants

[1] CAL: Code Civ. Proc.§ 2003 [“An
affidavit is a written declaration under oath, made without notice
to the adverse party.”]. ALSO SEE:
P v. MacAvoy (1984) 162 CA3 746, 755 [“There is a
fundamental distinction between a warrant and the underlying
affidavit”].

[2] USSC: Shadwick v.
City of Tampa (1972) 407 US 345, 348 [“The Court frequently
has employed the term ‘magistrate’ to denote those who may issue
warrants.”]. CAL: Pen. Code§§ 807, 808; O’Neal
v. Superior Court (1986) 185 CA3 1086, 1094 [“A
magistrate has the limited functions of issuing arrest warrants,
fixing and granting bail to arrestees, conducting preliminary
examinations of defendants charged with felonies, and conducting
peace bond proceedings.”]. ALSO SEE: P v.
Ruiz (1990) 217 CA3 574, 586 [“the office of magistrate is
a different office from that of judge. Consequently, judicial
officers acting as magistrates act independently from the
jurisdiction of the court on which they sit.”].

[3] QUOTE FROM: US v. White (6C
2017) 874 F3 490, 496. OTHER: US v. Gibbs (5C 2005)
421 F3 352, 358 [a “bare bones” affidavit is one that is “so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable”].

[4] CAL: P v.
Hepner (1994) 21 CA4 761, 773-74 [“the concept of breadth
may be defined as the requirement that there be probable cause to
seize the particular thing named in the warrant”];
Thompson v. Superior Court (1977) 70 CA3 101,
110 [“in no event can the description in the warrant be broader
than that justified by the supporting affidavit”]. 9th CIR:
US v. SDI Future Health, Inc. (9C 2009) 568
F3 684, 702 [“Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of
the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant
is based.”]. OTHER: US v. Sanjar (5C 2017) 853 F3
190, 200 [“The warrant must further not be overbroad, meaning
there must be probable cause to seize the particular things named
in the warrant.”].

[5] CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 94 [“The
superior court’s ruling shows that the court conflated two
concepts: overbreadth and particularity”]. 9th CIR:
Millender v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2010)
620 F3 1016, 1024 [“We read the Fourth Amendment as requiring
‘specificity,’ which has two aspects, ‘particularity and
breadth.'”]; US v.
SDI Future Health, Inc. (9C 2009) 568 F3 684, 702 [“The
district court only made one inquiry, which explicitly conflated
particularly and overbreadth.”]; US v.
Kow (9C 1995) 58 F3 423, 426 [“To determine whether a
warrant lacks sufficient specificity, we must examine both the
warrant’s particularity and its breadth.”]; US v.
Banks (9C 2009) 556 F3 967, 972 [“Specificity has two
aspects: particularity and breadth.”].

[6] OTHER: US v. Clark (2C 2011)
638 F3 89, 94 [“Particularity concerns frequently arise in
circumstances where the description in the warrant of the place to
be searched is so vague that it fails reasonably to alert
executing officers to the limits of their search authority.”];
US v. Kimbrough (5C 1995) 69 F3 723, 727
[“The Fourth Amendment prohibits issuance of general warrants
allowing officials to burrow through a person’s possessions
looking for any evidence of a crime.”].

[7] CAL:
P v. Superior Court )Nasmeh (2007) 151 CA4 85, 96 [“A
general warrant offends the Fourth Amendment in part because it
leaves too much to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.”].

[8] CAL: P v.
Fisher (2002) 96 CA4 1147, 1150 [“A search warrant is not
an invitation that officers can choose to accept, or reject, or
ignore. It is an order of the court,” edited.].

[9] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1528(a);
P v. Fleming (1981) 29 C3 698, 703; P v.
Galvan (1992) 5 CA4 866, 870.

[10] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1529.

[11] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1529 [the
warrant must name “every person whose affidavit has been taken”].

[12] OTHER: US v. Purcell (2C
2020) 967 F3 159, 178 [the warrant “must identify the specific
offense for which the police have established probable cause”];
US v. Galpin (2C 2013) 720 F3 436, 446 [“the warrant must
specify the “items to be seized by their relation to designated
crimes”]; US v. Williams 4C 2010) 592 F3 511, 519.

[13] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1526(a);
P v. Egan (1983) 141 CA3 798, 801, fn.3 [“With regard to an
affidavit, the ‘jurat’ is simply a certificate evidencing the fact
that the affidavit was properly made before a duly authorized
officer. Although no particular form is required, a proper and
usual form of jurat is ‘sworn to and subscribed before me,’
followed by the date and the taking officer’s signature.”].
ALSO SEE: P v. Chavez (1972) 27
CA3 883, 886 [failure to strictly comply with this requirement did
not invalidate the warrant where the affiant was outside the
judge’s chambers and could have been questioned if the judge had
so desired]. NOTE: It is arguable that a declaration under
penalty of perjury will suffice even if the oath was not
administered by a judge. See US v.
Bueno-Vargas (9C 2001) 383 F3 1104, 1110 [court rejects
argument that a faxed statement of probable cause under penalty of
perjury was constitutionally deficient “because no one
administered an oath to [the affiant].”].

[14] CAL: Evid. Code§ 1041;
P v. Martinez (2005) 132 CA4 233, 242.

[15] CAL: P v.
Sanchez (1972) 24 CA3 664, 677-78, fn.8.

[16] CAL: Pen. Code§§ 1528(a),
1536. NOTE: Although Pen. Code§§ 1523 and 1529 state
that officers who have seized evidence must bring it to the judge,
Pen. Code§§ 1528(a) and 1536 state that all seized evidence
must be retained by the officers, pending further order of the
court. Because judges seldom want officers to deliver to their
chambers loads of drugs, firearms, stolen property, and other
common items of evidence, it is best that officers retain the
evidence unless instructed otherwise. See P v.
Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 C4 703, 713 [“Law
enforcement officers who seize property pursuant to a warrant
issued by the court do so on behalf of the court, which has
authority pursuant to Pen. Code§ 1536 to control the
disposition of the property.”]; P v.
Superior Court (Loar) (1972) 28 CA3 600, 607, fn.3 [Pen.
Code§§ 1528 and 1536 “prevail[] over conflicting language in
Pen. Code§§ 1523 and 1529”]; Oziel v.
Superior Court (1990) 223 CA3 1292-93 [“an officer seizing
and holding property under a search warrant does so on behalf of
the court; possession by the officer is, in contemplation of the
law, possession by the court”]; P v.
Icenogle (1985) 164 CA3 620, 623 [“An officer who takes
[property via search warrant] does so on behalf of the court for
use in a judicial proceeding, and he must respond, as does any
custodian, to the orders of the court for which he acted.”].
ALSO SEE: P v.
Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 C4 703,713 [“the superior
court possesses inherent power to conduct proceedings and issue
orders regarding property seized from a criminal suspect pursuant
to a warrant issued by the court”]; Oziel v.
Superior Court (1990) 223 CA3 1284, 1292-93 [“possession by
the officer is, in contemplation of the law, possession by the
court.”].

[17] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1524.

[18] USSC: US v.
Ramirez (1998) 523 US 65, 72 [in discussing the federal
knock-notice statute (which excuses compliance under certain
circumstances), the Court noted that the statute “prohibits
nothing. It merely authorizes officers to damage property in
certain instances.”]. OTHER: US v.
Villegas (2C 1990) 89 F2 1324, 1334 [in ruling that a
violation of a federal statute that requires the giving of notice
to a person whose property has been searched pursuant to a
warrant, the court noted that the statute “does not define the
extent of the court’s power to issue a search warrant”].

[19] QUOTE FROM:
Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 US 463, 480. USSC:
Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 US 79, 84; Groh
v. Ramirez (2004) 540 US 551, 557. CAL:
P v. Amador (2000) 24 C4 387, 392 [“It is enough if the
description is such that the officer with a search warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place
intended.”]; P v. Robinson (2010) 47 C4 1104, 1132; Pen.
Code§ 1525. 9th CIR: US v. Gomez-Soto (9C 1984)
723 F2 649, 654 [Since the DEA sought articles it claims are
typically found in the possession of narcotics traffickers, the
warrant could have named or described those particular
articles.”]. OTHER: US v. Blakeney (4C 2020) 949 F3
851, 861 [the particularity requirement “ensures that the search
will be carefully tailored to its justifications rather than
becoming a wide-ranging exploratory search”]. NOTE: In
Marron v. US (1927) 275 US 192, 196 the Supreme Court
seemed to set an almost impossibly high standard for search
warrant descriptions when it said, “As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant.” Over the years, however, most courts have interpreted
this language in a more practical manner. See
P v. Rogers (1986) 187 CA3 1001, 1007 [“but few warrants
could pass [the Marron test] and thus it is more accurate
to say that the warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the
officer executing it can identify the property sought with
reasonable certainty”]; US v. Wuagneux (11C 1982) 683 F2
1343, 1349, fn.4 [“Appellant places considerable emphasis on [the
Marron language]. As this court and others have observed,
however, if this statement were construed as a literal command, no
search would be possible.”]; US v. Leary (10C 1988) 846 F2
592, 600, fn.12 [the Marron language “has been interpreted
in a variety of ‘practical’ ways”]; US v. Riley (2C 1990)
906 F2 841, 844-45 [prohibiting officer-discretion is sometimes
impractical].

[20] CAL: P v.
McNabb (1991) 228 CA3 462, 469 [“As the search warrant
included the street address of the premises, the premises were
adequately identified”]; P v.
Superior Court (Fish) (1980) 101 CA3 218, 225 [“the more
conventional method of identifying a particular residence [is] by
street number”]; P v. Estrada (1965) 234 CA2 136,
149 [a warrant authorizing a search of “the apartment house
occupied by Manuel Estrada, at 18 S. 19th Street, San Jose” was
sufficiently particular]. 9th CIR: Mena v.
City of Simi Valley (9C 2000) 226 F3 1031, 1036 [“1363
Patricia Avenue”].

[21] CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Fish) (1980) 101 CA3 218, 225
[descriptions of the house and its location were necessary because
the homes on the street “did not have house numbers, nor were the
streets described by signs”]; P v. Joubert (1983) 140 CA3
946 [assessor’s lot map attached]. 9th CIR:
US v. Perez-Rey (9C 2012) 680 F3 1179, 1182, fn.2 [“We take
judicial notice of a Google map and satellite image as a source
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, at least for the
purpose of determining the general location of the home.
Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)”]. OTHER: US v. Shaw (6C 2013)
707 F3 666, 667 [the officers “could have checked city records or
for that matter Google Maps to identify which house was the right
one”]; US v. Palega (8C 2009) 556 F3 709, 713 [“photographs
of the residence were included”]; US v. Johnson (DCC 2006)
437 F3 69, 73 [“A physical description of the building accompanied
the street address on the affidavit.”]; US v. Guzman (8C
2007) 507 F3 681, 686 [“in a rural area where houses are not
numbered, the description provided in the warrant [blue colored
house facing south off Eggers Road east of Greenwood] was
sufficient to locate the place to be searched.”].

[22] 9th CIR:
Blight v. City of Manteca (9C 2019) 944 F3 1061, 1067 [“the
property was still under Ford’s common control”].

[23] CAL: P v.
Amador (2000) 24 C4 387, 394-95 [“Nothing in the record
suggests that any other house existed matching the warrant’s
description so closely that there was a reasonable probability it
would be mistakenly searched,” edited.]; P v.
McNabb (1991) 228 CA3 462, 469 [detached garage listed].
OTHER: US v. Villegas (2C 1990) 899 F2
1324, 1335 [“a farmhouse, a barn, two outbuildings, and
surrounding land on Johnycake Road, near Little Falls, Herkimer
County, New York”]. BUT ALSO SEE: US v.
Alexander (9C 1985) 761 F2 1294, 1301 [“a warrant is valid
when it authorizes the search of a street address with several
buildings if the defendants are in control of the whole premises,
if the dwellings are occupied in common, or if the entire property
is suspect”].

[24] CAL: P v.
Dumas (1973) 9 C3 871, 881, fn.5 [“a warrant to search
‘premises’ located at a particular address is sufficient to
support the search of outbuildings and appurtenances in addition
to a main building when the various places searched are part of a
single integral unit”]; P v. Mack (1977) 66 CA3 839,
859 [“The word ‘premises’ as used in the warrant embraces both the
house and garage.”]; P v. Weagley (1990) 218 CA3
569, 573 [warrant authorizing the search of certain “premises”
authorized a search of a mailbox]; P v.
Grossman (1971) 19 CA3 8, 12 [warrant to search “premises”
authorized search of cabinet in adjacent carport]; P v.
McNabb (1991) 228 CA3 462, 469 [“The word ‘premises’ in a
search warrant describing a house with a detached garage has been
held to embrace both the house and the garage.”];
P v. Smith (1994) 21 CA4 942, 949. ALSO SEE:
US v. Bonner (1C 1986) 808 F2 864, 868 [“In
the present case, the word ‘properties’ was used in the warrant
instead of ‘premises’; these words are sufficiently synonymous to
be considered interchangeable.”].

[25] CAL: P v. Nguyen (2017) 12
CA5 574, 583 [“The record holds no evidence Nguyen’s residence was
used in connection with the main house, or that it served as an
outhouse, a storage shed, or anything else besides a separate
residence for Nguyen. Images of the residence show it is not a
‘small building,’ but a sizeable structure nearly as large as the
front house. It was not an outbuilding; it was a separate
residence.”].

[26] OTHER: Hanger v.
US (8C 1968) 398 F2 91, 99 [“Although desirable, a search
warrant otherwise sufficient is not rendered invalid by the
omission of the name of the owner or occupant”].

[27] CAL: P v. Govea
(1965) 235 CA2 285, 300 [court indicates that a house does not
become a multi-occupant building merely because the owner has
permitted a family to temporarily occupy a separate bedroom];
P v. Gorg (1958) 157 CA2 515; Hemler
v. Superior Court (1975) 44 CA3 430, 433 [“The rule
that a search warrant for one living unit cannot be used to
justify a search of other units within a multiple dwelling area
does not apply where all of the rooms in a residence constitute
one living unit.”].

[28] 9th CIR: Mena v.
Simi Valley (9C 2000) 226 F3 1031, 1038 [a single-family
house became a multiple-occupant residence because the bedroom
doors were padlocked from the outside and the bedrooms were “set
up as studio apartment type units, with their own refrigerators,
cooking supplies, food, televisions, and stereos”].

[29] CAL: P v. Estrada (1965)
234 CA2 136, 146 [“the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that a
particular ‘place’ be described in the warrant when applicable to
dwellings means a single living unit, that is to say the residence
of one person or family, and a warrant describing an entire
building issued on probable cause for searching only one apartment
therein is void”]. OTHER: Taylor v. Hughes (7C 2022)
26 F4 419, 429 [“The building at 643–45 W. 62nd Street has four
units on each floor. If the issuing judge had known that the
warrant before him had only a one-in-four chance of listing the
correct address, he surely would not have signed it.”]; US
v. Clark (2C 2011) 638 F3 89, 97 [“the affidavit did
not provide any descriptive facts consistent with the full control
[of the multi-occupant building] allegation”]. Also see
P v. Superior Court (Meyers) (1979) 25 C3 67, 79 [warrant
to search an entire communal residence was permissible “in light
of the type and quantity of items stolen from the victims”].

[30] USSC: Dalia v.
US (1979) 441 US 238, 242, fn.4 [the warrant authorized a
search of “the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of an
enclosed room, approximately 15 by 18 feet in dimension, and
situated in the northwesterly corner of a one-story building
housing Warp-O-Matic Machinery Company, Ltd., and Precise
Packaging, and located at 1105 West St. George Avenue, Linden, New
Jersey”].

[39] EXAMPLES

The following are examples of precise language:

• Drug paraphernalia: In the context of illegal drugs,
the term “paraphernalia” typically refers to items commonly used
to ingest, weigh, store, and package drugs; and documents
identifying buyers and sellers, and recording transactions.
“Paraphernalia” is sufficiently limiting. See US v.
Johnson (8C 1976) 541 F2 1311, 1315 [“In recent years
‘paraphernalia’ has become a standard vocabulary word in the
vernacular of the drug community”] US v.
Trinh (1C 2011) 665 F3 1, 15 [“Several dictionaries
recognize the ordinary, commonsense meaning of ‘paraphernalia’ as
‘equipment and apparatus used in or necessary for a particular
activity.'”].

• Child pornography: The term “child pornography” is
sufficiently particular. See US v. Hay (9C
2000) 231 F3 630, 637; US v. Banks (9C 2009)
556 F3 967, 973 [“child pornography” is “a sufficiently specific
definition to focus the search”]; US v. Simpson (10C
1998) 152 F3 1241, 1247 [a description of documents as “child
pornography” is “adequate”]; US v.
Kimbrough (5C 1995) 69 F3 723, 727-28; US v.
Hall (7C 1998) 142 F3 988, 996-97 [“minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct” was sufficient]. But also see
US v. Miknevich (3C 2011) 638 F3 178, 184
[court ruled it is the “better practice” for the affiant “to
append images or to provide a description of the images sufficient
to enable the magistrate to determine independently whether
probable cause exists”].

• Computer chips: “Synertek 2716 integrated circuits
further described as rectangular objects approximately 1-¼” by ¾”,
having 24 gold colored pins extending downward.” P
v. Lowery (1983) 145 CA3 902, 906.

• Illegal drugs consisting of heroin and marijuana. P
v. Superior Court (Marcil) (1972) 27 CA3 404, 415;
P v. Walker (1967) 250 CA2 214, 216, fn.1.

• Business records: Records relating to loan sharking
and gambling, including pay and collection sheets, lists of loan
customers, loan accounts, line sheets, bet slips, tally sheets,
and bottom sheets. US v. Spilotro (9C 1986)
800 F2 959, 965.

• Business records: “All business records pertaining
to extortionate credit transactions. US v. Santarelli (11C
1985) 778 F2 609, 615.

• Business records: “books and records … which are
the fruits and instrumentalities of violations of 26 USC§
7201.” US v. Cardwell (9C 1982) 680 F2 75, 78

• Business records: “[papers, including currency,
evidencing failures to file currency transactions reports as
required by Title 31 USC.” US v. Gomez-Soto (9C 1984) 723
F2 649, 653-54.

• Financial documents: Documents “pertaining to the
Windward International Bank… [which are] being held in
violation of USC, Title 18, Section 2314.”
US v. Federbush (9C 1980) 625 F2 246, 251-52

• Clothing: Blue plaid long-sleeved flannel shirt.
P v. Kraft (2000) 23 C4 978, 1049.

• Trace evidence: Fingerprints, powder burns, blood,
blood spatters, bullet holes. P v.
Schilling (1987) 188 CA3 1021, 1030-31.

• Vehicles: Vehicles with altered or defaced
identification numbers. US v. Hillyard (9C
1982) 677 F2 1336, 1341.

• Tools: Two sets of 14-inch security hole opener
cutters attached to a hole opener. P v.
Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 CA3 69, 76-77.

• Tools: Oil and water drill bits in sizes from four
inches to 18 inches having altered or defaced serial numbers.
P v. Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 CA3 69, 78.

• Explosives: “Typewriters, tools, wires, shotgun
shells, explosive materials and devices, correspondence, address
books, and other documents which are the instrumentalities and
evidence of crimes in violation of 18 USC§§ 876 and 1716.”
P v. Barnum (1980) 113 CA3 340, 347

The following descriptions were inadequate; i.e., too
general:

• “Stolen property”. Lockridge v.
Superior Court (1969) 275 CA2 612, 625; Thompson
v. Superior Court (1977) 70 CA3 101, 108;
P v. Superior Court (Williams) (1978) 77 CA3 69, 77
[“Without a specific means of identification, the police had no
means of distinguishing legitimate goods from stolen goods.”];
US v. LeBron (8C 1984) 729 F2 533, 537
[“other property, description unknown, for which there exists
probable cause to believe it to be stolen”].

• Personal property, to wit, paraphernalia. P
v. Mayen (1922) 188 C 237, 242; Burrows
v. Superior Court (1974) 13 C3 238, 249.

• Certain personal property used as a means of committing
attempted grand larceny. P v. Mayen (1922)
188 C 237, 242.

• All other property owned by [the victim of a burglary].
P v. Smith (1986) 180 CA3 72, 89.

• Any and all other records and paraphernalia connected with
[the suspect’s business]. Aday v.
Superior Court (1961) 55 C2 789, 795-96.

• “Any & all illegal contraband.” Cassady
v. Goering (10C 2009) 567 F3 628, 635.

• Other evidence. Stern v.
Superior Court (1946) 76 CA2 772, 784. Also see US
v. Spilotro (9C 1986) 800 F2 959, 965 [description
limited only by reference to a statute was labeled “hopelessly
general” because “the only limit on the search and seizure was the
requirement that the items seized be evidence of a violation of
any one of thirteen statutes, some of exceptional scope.”].

[40] USSC: Massachusetts
v. Sheppard (1984) 468 US 981, 988, n.5 [“a warrant
that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional”]. CAL: P
v. Alvarez (1989) 209 CA3 660, 664; P
v. Superior Court (Fish) (1980) 101 CA3 218, 222.

[41] USSC: Illinois v.
Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 235 [“Technical requirements of
elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have
no proper place in this area.”]. CAL: Pen. Code§ 1529
[“reasonable particularity” required]; P v.
Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 95 [“the
requirement that a search warrant describe its objects with
particularity is a standard of ‘practical accuracy’ rather than a
hypertechnical one”]; P v. Amador (2000) 24 C4 387,
392 [“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal
police conduct, not deficient police draftsmanship.”];
P v. Minder (1996) 46 CA4 1784, 1788 [“Technical
requirements of elaborate specificity have no proper place in this
area.”]; P v. Kraft (2000) 23 C4 978, 1049.
9th CIR: US v. Lacy (9C 1997) 119 F3
742, 746, fn.7 [“The warrant need only be reasonably specific,
rather than elaborately detailed”]. OTHER:
US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3 71, 100 [“The Fourth
Amendment does not require a perfect description of the data to be
searched and seized”]; US v. Gendron (1C
1994) 18 F3 955, 966 [“Specificity does not lie in writing words
that deny all unintended logical possibilities. Rather, it lies in
a combination of language and context, which together permit the
communication of clear, simple direction. Any effort to negate all
unintended logical possibilities through the written word alone
would produce linguistic complication and confusion to the point
where a warrant, in practice, would fail to give clear direction
that is its very point.'”]; US v. Haydel (5C
1981) 649 F2 1152, 1157 [the description “need not meet technical
requirements nor have the specificity sought by conveyancers”];
US v. Wuagneux (11C 1982) 683 F2 1343, 1349
[“It is universally recognized that the particularity requirement
must be applied with a practical margin of flexibility”];
US v. Otero (10 2009) 563 F3 1127, 1132 [“A
warrant need not necessarily survive a hypertechnical sentence
diagramming and comply with the best practices of
Strunk & White to satisfy the particularity
requirement.”].

[42] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Gendron (1C 1994) 18 F3 955, 966.

[43] USSC: Maryland v.
Garrison (1987) 480 US 79, 85 [“The validity of the warrant
must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers
disclosed, or had a duty to discover and to disclose, to the
issuing Magistrate.”]. CAL: P v.
Smith (1986) 180 CA3 72, 89 [particularity “is a flexible
concept, reflecting the degree of detail known by the affiant and
presented to the magistrate,”; i.e., “greater specificity is
required in a case where the identity of the objects is known”].
9th CIR: US v. Meek (9C 2004) 366 F3 705, 716 [“The
proper metric of sufficient specificity is whether it was
reasonable to provide a more specific description of the items at
that juncture of the investigation.”]; US v.
Vasquez (9C 2011) 654 F3 880, 884 [“There is no indication
that the government was able to describe these minutes [of a
meeting] in any more detail prior to the search.”]; US
v. Spilotro (9C 1986) 800 F2 959, 966 [“Whether
generic descriptions are adequate depends in part upon the
necessity for their use.”]; Millender v.
County of Los Angeles (9C 2010) 620 F3 1016, 1026
[“warrants may sometimes authorize a search for classes of generic
items if the government was not able to describe the items more
particularly in light of the information available to it at the
time the warrant was issued”] (overturned on other grounds in
Messerschmidt v. Millender (2012) 565 US
535); US v. Holzman (9C 1989) 871 F2 1496,
1509 [“Because the police reasonably could not list all of the
names included on [credit] cards used during the fraud, a generic
description was sufficient.”]; US v.
Giberson (9C 2008) 527 F3 882, 886 [“The warrant also
described the items to be searched and seized as particularly as
could reasonably be expected given the nature of the crime and the
evidence the government then possessed.”]; US v.
Hillyard (9C 1982) 677 F2 1336, 1339-40 [“The particularity
guarantee does not preclude use of generic language. In many cases
officers are unable to specify in advance all seizable evidence on
the premises to be searched.”]; US v.
Raymond Wong (9C 2003) 334 F3 831, 838 [“The government
described the items with as much specificity as possible”];
US v. Hay (9C 2000) 231 F3 630, 637 [“in this
case no more specific description of the computer equipment sought
was possible”]. OTHER: US v. Sanjar (5C 2017) 876 F3
725, 735 [“Generic language may satisfy this ‘particularity’
requirement if describing a more specific item is not possible”];
US v. Wuagneux (11C 1982) 683 F2 1343, 1349 [“It is
universally recognized that the particularity requirement must be
applied with a practical margin of flexibility, depending on the
type of property to be seized, and that a description of property
will be acceptable if it is as specific as the circumstances and
nature of activity under investigation permit.”];
US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3 71, 100 [“Search warrants
covering digital data may contain some ambiguity so long as law
enforcement agents have done the best that could reasonably be
expected under the circumstances, have acquired all the
descriptive facts which a reasonable investigation could be
expected to cover”]; US v. Hanna (6C 2011)
661 F3 271, 281; US v. Young (2C 1984) 745 F2
733, 759 [“Courts tend to tolerate a greater degree of ambiguity
[in the warrant’s description] where law enforcement agents have
done the best that could reasonably be expected under the
circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive facts which a
reasonable investigation could be expected to cover, and have
insured that all those facts were included in the warrant.”];
US v. Reyes (10C 1986) 798 F2 380, 383 [“in
the age of modern technology and commercial availability of
various forms of items, the warrant could not be expected to
describe with exactitude the precise form the records would
take”]; US v. Le (10C 1999) 173 F3 1258, 1275
[“The difference between a valid warrant and an overbroad warrant
lies in whether the government could have phrased the warrant more
specifically.”]. COMPARE: P v. Tockgo (1983) 145 CA3
635, 640 [“The vice of this uncertainty is particularly
objectionable because the procuring officer’s affidavit provided a
ready means for effective description and identification of the
[evidence].”]; US v. Stubbs (9C 1989) 873 F2 210, 211 [“The
IRS knew both what the seizable documents looked like and where to
find them, but this information was not contained in the
warrant.”]

[44] USSC: Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co. (1995) 513 US 561, 562 [“A word is known by the
company it keeps.”]; Andresen v.
Maryland (1976) 427 US 463, 480 [taken in context, “the
challenged phrase must be read as authorizing only the search for
a seizure of evidence relating to the crime of false pretenses
with respect to Lot 13T”]. CAL: P v.
Eubanks (2011) 53 C4 110, 133 [“In considering whether a
warrant is sufficiently particular, courts consider the purposes
of the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and the total
circumstances surrounding the case.”]; P v.
Schilling (1987) 188 CA3 1021, 1031 [the language “must be
read in conjunction with the language which immediately follows”];
P v. Rogers (1986) 187 CA3 1001, 1008 [“whether a
warrant fails the particularity requirement cannot be decided in a
vacuum”]. 9th CIR: US v. Wong (9C
2003) 334 F3 831, 836 [“data as it relates to this case” was
sufficiently specific because it was effectively limited by other
terms in the affidavit]; US v. Gendron (1C
1994) 18 F3 955, 966 [“context helps to provide a word’s
meaning”].

[45] 9th CIR: US v.
Hillyard (9C 1982) 677 F2 1336, 1341 [the agent
“established in his affidavit procedures to differentiate stolen
vehicles from those legally owned”]. OTHER:
US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3 71, 101-102 [agents were
instructed that when they find a [computer] file they must begin
by “cursorily reading the first few” pages to make sure that it
contains relevant information]. COMPARE: US
v. Klein (1C 1977) 565 F2 183, 188 [the government
“failed to establish that there was a large collection of
contraband in defendant’s store and it failed to explain the
method by which it intended to differentiate that contraband from
the rest of defendant’s inventory”]; US v.
Spilotro (9C 1986) 800 F2 959, 965 [“the warrant provides
no basis for distinguishing [the stolen] diamonds from others the
government could expect to find on the premises”]. ALSO SEE:
US v. Hill (9C 2006) 459 F3 966, 978 [“we
look favorably upon he inclusion of a search protocol; but its
absence is not fatal”].

[46] CAL: P v.
Frank (1985) 38 C3 711, 722 [“boilerplate lists” are
“routinely incorporated into the warrant without regard to the
evidence”]. OTHER: US v. Ribeiro (1C
2005) 397 F3 43, 51 [one definition of boilerplate is “stereotyped
or formulaic writing”].

[47] OTHER: US v.
Ribeiro (1C 2005) 397 F3 43, 51 [“Sometimes formulations
become boilerplate because they are so often true and relevant”].

[48] CAL: P v.
Frank (1985) 38 C3 711, 728 [“But nowhere in all these 24
pages was there alleged one single fact that gave probable cause
to believe that any of the boilerplate allegations of the warrant
were true.”]; P v. Holmsen (1985) 173 CA3 1045.
9th CIR: US v. Underwood (9C 2013) 725 F3 1076 [this
case demonstrates the problems that arise when officers use canned
language from other warrants]; Cassady v. Goering (10C
2009) 567 F3 628, 636, fn.5 [the affiant “appeared to use stock
language” and had utilized “a form warrant that could be applied
to almost any crime”].

[49] OTHER:
In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977 (DCC 1977) 572 F2
321, 329; US v. Abrams (1C 1980) 615 F2 541,
547.

[50] CAL: Aday v.
Superior Court (1961) 55 C2 789, 796 [“the various
categories, when taken together, were so sweeping as to include
virtually all personal business property on the premises and
placed no meaningful restriction on the things to be seized”].
9th CIR: US v. Bridges (9C 2003) 344
F3 1010, 1018 [“if the scope of the warrant is not limited to the
specific records listed on the warrant, it is unclear what is its
precise scope or what exactly it is that the agents are expected
to be looking for during the search”]. OTHER:
US v. Cobb (4C 2020) 970 F3 319, 338 [“Any and all other
evidence of any other crimes” was plainly overbroad];
US v. Castro (6C 2018) 881 F3 961 [the government “concedes
that this phrase [any other files, deleted or not involved in this
or any other unlawful activities] sweeps too broadly. But an
infirmity due to overbreadth does not doom the entire warrant.”
The remedy is to sever the offending phrase from the warrant,
suppress any evidence collected under it, and admit the evidence
collected under the valid portions that remain.”];
US v. Kuc (1C 2013) 737 F3 129, 133 [“The phrase
‘including, without limitation’ is certainly not a model of
precise drafting. Nevertheless, it does not make the warrant
constitutionally infirm because it is a transitional phrase
linking to the second, very particular clause, and it must be read
in that context”].

[51] CAL: P v.
Balint (2006) 138 CA4 200, 207 [“the itemized list
following the word ‘including’ may reasonably be interpreted as
nonexclusive and merely descriptive of examples of items likely to
show who occupied the residence”];
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court (2005) 131 CA4 417, 460 [subpoena for
documents including “but are not limited to” was sufficiently
particular because it was linked to language indicating “what
criminal activity was being investigated”]; Toubus
v. Superior Court (1981) 114 CA3 378, 385 [the
phrase permitted a seizure of only those things pertaining to
“dealings in controlled substances”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Washington (9C 1986) 797 F2 1461, 1472.
OTHER: US v. Anderton (5C 2018) 901 F3 278, 287
[“After all, generic language is permissible if it particularizes
the types of items to be seized.”]; US v.
Riley (2C 1990) 906 F2 841, 844 [“In upholding broadly
worded categories of items available for seizure, we have noted
that the language of a warrant is to be construed in light of an
illustrative list of seizable items]; US v.
Abrams (1C 1980) 615 F2 541, 547 [“the general ‘tail’ of
the search warrant will be construed so as not to defeat the
‘particularity’ of the main body of the warrant”]. ALSO SEE:
Andresen v. Maryland (1976)
427 US 463, 479-80 [warrant language: “list of documents
pertaining to Lot 13T] together with other fruits,
instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown”
“must be read as authorizing only the search for and seizure of
evidence relating to ‘the crime of false pretenses with respect to
Lot 13T'”].

[52] CAL: P v. Balint (2006) 138
CA4 200, 206-207. OTHER: US v.
Riley (2C 1990) 906 F2 841, 844 [“In upholding broadly
worded categories of items available for seizure, we have noted
that the language of a warrant is to be construed in light of an
illustrative list of seizable items].

[53] OTHER: US v. Shrum (8C
2023) __ F4 __ [2023 WL 1841193] [“any and all other evidence
related to a sexual abuse/exploitation investigation” was OK
because it was “limited by the phrase ‘related to a sexual
abuse/exploitation investigation,’ and the supporting affidavit
described the specific nature of the investigation at issue”].

[54] CAL: P v.
McNabb (1991) 228 CA3 462, 469. 9th CIR: US
v. Kow (9C 1995) 58 F3 423, 427 [the
affidavit summarized in detail the various locations within
the business where the evidence was located”]. OTHER:
In re Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977 (DCC 1978) 572 F2
321, 324.

[55] 9th CIR: Millender
v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2010) 620 F3 1016, 1026
[“warrants may sometimes authorize a search for classes of generic
items if the government was not able to describe the items more
particularly in light of the information available to it at the
time the warrant was issued”] (overturned on other grounds in
Messerschmidt v. Millender (2012) 565 US
535).

[56] OTHER: US v.
Klein (1C 1977) 565 F2 183, 186 [affiant failed to show how
the officer’s training and experience related to his conclusion
that 8-track tapes appeared to be pirated].

[57] OTHER: US v. Johnson (8C
1976) 541 F2 1311, 1315 [“In recent years ‘paraphernalia’ has
become a standard vocabulary word in the vernacular of the drug
community”].

[58] OTHER: US v. Sigillito (8C
2014) 759 F3 913, 924 [“We have recognized that fraud cases
present unique particularity problems. We have stated that “a
search warrant involving a scheme to defraud is sufficiently
particular in its description of the items to be seized if it is
as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under
investigation permit.””].

[59] 9th CIR: US v.
Meek (9C 2004) 366 F3 705, 714-15. OTHER: US
v. Gleich (8C 2005) 397 F3 608, 611 [the warrant
“identified the computer files to be searched as those, among
other things, that could contain “photographs, pictures, visual
representations or videos in any form that include sexual conduct
by a minor”].

[60] CAL:
Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 C3 238, 249-50
[description was overbroad because it “permitted the seizure of
all of petitioner’s financial records without regard to the
persons which whom the transactions had occurred or the date of
transactions.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Cardwell (9C 1982)
680 F2 75, 78 [“[The IRS] knew exactly what it needed and wanted
and where the records were located. There was no necessity for a
massive re-examination of all records bearing on income and
expenses.”]. OTHER: US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3
71, 99 [“Where, as here, the property to be searched is a computer
hard drive, the particularity requirement assumes even greater
importance,” quoting from US v. Galpin (2013) 720 F3 436,
446]. OTHER: US v. Walser (10C 2001) 275 F3 981, 986
[“Officers must be clear as to what it is they are seeking on the
computer and conduct the search in a way that avoids searching
files of types not identified in the warrant.”];
US v. Leary (10C 1988) 846 F2 592, 603, fn.18 [“Search
warrants for documents are generally deserving of somewhat closer
scrutiny with respect to the particularity requirement because of
the potential they carry for a very serious intrusion into
personal privacy.”]. NOTE: A search for documents may also
implicate sensitive First Amendment concerns if the documents are
sought for the ideas they communicated. If so, the
“particularity” requirement will be enforced more strictly. See
Stanford v. Texas (1965) 379 US 476, 485 [“the
constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly
describe the ‘things to be seized’ is to be accorded the most
scrupulous exactitude when the ‘things’ are books, and the basis
for their seizure is the ideas which they contain”];
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) 436 US 547, 563-64;
US v. Torch (1979) 609 F2 1088, 1089 [“the particularity
requirement is even more stringent where the things to be seized
have the presumptive protection of the First Amendment”];
US v. Hall (7C 1998) 142 F3 988, 996 [“where law
enforcement’s purpose is to seize material presumptively protected
by the First Amendment, the items to be seized must be described
in the warrant with increased particularity”].

[61] QUOTE FROM:
US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3 71, 100. OTHER:
US v. Phillips (4C 2009) 588 F3 218, 225 [“A warrant need
not—and in most cases, cannot—scrupulously list and delineate each
and every item to be seized. Frequently, it is simply impossible
for law enforcement officers to know in advance exactly what
business records the defendant maintains.”].

[62] USSC: Andresen v.
Maryland (1986) 427 US 463, 480, fn10 [“like a jigsaw
puzzle, the whole picture of petitioner’s false-pretense scheme
could be shown only by placing in the proper place the many pieces
of evidence that, taken single, would show comparatively little”].
CAL: P v. Farley (2009) 46 C4 1053, 1102 [“In a
complex case resting upon the piecing together of many bits of
evidence, the warrant properly may be more generalized than would
be the case in a more simplified case resting upon more direct
evidence.”]; P v. Carpenter (1999) 21 C4 1016, 1043 [“In a
complex case resting upon the piecing together of many bits of
evidence, the warrant properly may be more generalized than would
be the case in a more simplified case resting upon more direct
evidence.”]; P v. Hepner (1994) 21 CA4 761, 776-77
[“a complex criminal investigation may require piecing together
like a jigsaw puzzle a number of items of evidence that may not
appear incriminating when taken alone”]; P v.
Bradford (1997) 15 C4 1229, 1291 [“in a complex case
resting upon the piecing together of many bits of evidence, the
warrant properly may be more generalized than would be the case in
a more simplified case resting upon more direct evidence”].
OTHER: US v. Phillips (4C 2009) 588 F3
218, 224 [“In cases of financial fraud, the financial records of a
suspect may well be highly probative of violations of a federal
fraud statute.”]; US v. Wuagneux (11C 1982)
683 F2 1343, 1349 [“complex financial transactions and widespread
allegations of various types of fraud” necessitate “practical
flexibility”]; Kitty’s East v. US (10C 1990)
905 F2 1367, 1374 [“Evidence of conspiracy is often hidden in the
day-to-day business transactions among the involved entities”].

[63] CAL: Burrows v.
Superior Court (1974) 13 C3 238, 249.

[64] OTHER: US v.
Abrams (1C 1980) 615 F2 541, 545.

[65] CAL: Aday v.
Superior Court (1961) 55 C2 789, 795-96.

[66] OTHER US v. Cobb (4C 2020)
970 F3 319, 338.

[67] CAL: P v.
Hepner (1994) 21 CA4 761, 776 [“we note all parties have
relied upon federal cases, specifically those dealing with the
‘permeated with fraud’ approach to overbreadth. Because of the
lack of California cases addressing this concept, we also find
these cases helpful to our analysis,” specifically, “about 90% of
[a physician’s] patient files were of fraud”]. 9th CIR:
US v. Rude (9C 1996) 88 F3 1538, 1551 [the
company’s “central purpose was to serve as a front for defrauding
prime bank note investors”]; US v. Smith (9C
2005) 424 F3 992, 1006 [a “warrant authorizing the seizure of
essentially all business records may be justified when there is
probable cause to believe that fraud permeated the entire business
operation”]; In re Grand Jury Investigation (9C
1997) 130 F3 853, 856 [“a generalized seizure of business
documents may be justified if the government establishes probable
cause to believe that the entire business is merely a scheme to
defraud or that all of the business’s records are likely to
evidence criminal activity”]; US v. Kow (9C
1995) 58 F3 423, 427 [“A generalized seizure of business documents
may be justified if the government establishes probable cause to
believe that the entire business is merely a scheme to defraud or
that all of the business’s records are likely to evidence criminal
activity.”]; US v. Bridges (9C 2003) 344 F3
1010, 1018-19 [insufficient evidence that fraud permeated the
company]. OTHER: US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3 71,
103 [“Here, the crimes under investigation were committed largely
through computers and there was probable cause to believe that
“evidence related to [the fraudulent scheme] likely permeated
Ulbricht’s computer”]; US v. Sanjar (5C 2017) 853 F3 190,
201 [“But the magistrate’s authorization to seize all of
Spectrum’s patient files was supported by evidence of pervasive
fraud”]; US v. Phillips (4C 2009) 588 F3 218,
225 [“especially in cases such as this one—involving complex crime
schemes, with interwoven frauds—courts have routinely upheld the
seizure of items described under a warrant’s broad and inclusive
language”]; Kitty’s East v. US (10C 1990) 905
F2 1367, 1374 [“Evidence of conspiracy is often hidden in the
day-to-day business transactions among the involved entities”];
US v. Oloyede (4C 1992) 982 F2 133, 140 [“the
affidavit need contain only sufficient factual evidence of
fraudulent activity from which a magistrate could infer that those
activities are ‘just the tip of the iceberg'”]; US
v. Bentley (7C 1987) 825 F2 1104, 1110 [“This is the
rare case in which even a warrant stating ‘Take every piece of
paper related to the business’ would have been sufficient.
Universal was fraudulent through and through.”]; US
v. Sawyer (11C 1986) 799 F2 1494, 1508 [telephone
sales “boiler room” permeated with fraud]. ALSO SEE:
Solid State Devices, Inc. v. US (9C 1997) 130 F3 853, 857
[“where a business appears to be engaged in some legitimate
activity, this Court has required a more substantial showing of
pervasive fraud,” edited]; US v. Bentley (7C 1987) 825 F2
1104, 1110 [“if the fraud infects only one part of the business,
the warrant must be so limited—but within that portion of the
business ‘all records’ may be the most accurate and detailed
description possible”].

[68] 9th CIR: US v.
Tamura (9C 1982) 694 F2 591, 596 [“If the need for
transporting the documents is known to the officers prior to the
search, they may apply for specific authorization for large-scale
removal of material, which should be granted by the magistrate
issuing the warrant only where on-site sorting is infeasible and
no other practical alternative exists.”].

[69] OTHER: US v. Ulbricht (2C
2017) 858 F3 71, 101-102 [example of protocol: “Those procedures
included opening and ‘cursorily reading the first few’ pages of
files to ‘determine their precise contents,’ searching for
deliberately hidden files, using ‘key word searches through all
electronic storage areas,’ and reviewing file ‘directories’ to
determine what was relevant”].

[70] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Burgess (10C 2009) 576 F3 1078, 1094.

[71] USSC: Dalia v.
US (1979) 441 US 238, 257 [“the specificity required by the
Fourth Amendment does not generally extend to the means by which
warrants are executed”]. 9th CIR: US v. Schesso (9C
2013) 730 F3 1040, 1047; US v. Hill (9C 2006)
459 F3 966, 978 [“[we look favorably upon he inclusion of a search
protocol; but its absence is not fatal”]. OTHER:
US v. Christie (10C 2013) 717 F3 1156, 1166 [“Computer
files can be misnamed by accident, disguised by intention, or
hidden altogether, leaving investigators at a loss to know
ex ante what sort of search will prove sufficient”];
US v. Burgess (10C 2009) 576 F3 1078, 1094 [“it is folly
for a search warrant to attempt to structure the mechanics of the
search and a warrant imposing such limits would unduly restrict
legitimate search objectives”]; US v. Galpin (2C 2013) 720
F3 436, 451 [“Unlike the Ninth Circuit, we have not required
specific search protocols or minimization undertakings as basic
predicates for upholding digital search warrants”]; US
v. Richards (6C 2011) 659 F3 527, 538 [“the majority
of federal courts have eschewed the use of a specific search
protocol”]; US v. Cartier (8C 2008) 543 F3
442, 447 [“the warrant need not include a search protocol to
satisfy the particularity requirement”]; US v.
Brooks (10C 2005) 427 F3 1246, 1251-52 [“The question of
whether the nature of computer forensic searches lends itself to
predetermined search protocols is a difficult one. Given the
numerous ways information is stored on a computer, openly and
surreptitiously, a search can be as much an art as a science.”].

[72] OTHER: US v. Christie (10C
2013) 717 F3 1156, 1167 [“So even if courts do not specify
particular search protocols up front in the warrant application
process, they retain the flexibility to assess the reasonableness
of the search protocols the government actually employed”].

[73] OTHER: US v. Cobb (4C 2020)
970 F3 319, 330 [“the police could not foretell the murder
evidence that was located on the computer or the location of that
evidence within the contents of the computer”].

the officers “had no way of knowing” the names of the files].

[74] CAL: Bay v.
Superior Court (1992) 7 CA4 1022, 1027 [reference to a
certain crime “would have provided the executing officer with
meaningful limits on the nature of the items to be seized in order
to ensure there was probable cause for all the items seized.”];
Aday v. Superior Court (1961) 55 C2 789, 796.
9th CIR: US v. Kow (9C 1995) 58 F3 423, 427;
Solid State Devices, Inc. v. US (9C 1997) 130 F3
853, 855. OTHER: US v. Cobb (4C 2020) 970 F3 319,
328 [“where a warrant does not otherwise describe the evidence to
be seized, that gap can be filled, at least sometimes, if the
warrant instead specifies the relevant offense”];
US v. Castro (6C 2018) 881 F3 961 [“A warrant that empowers
police to search for something satisfies the particularity
requirement if its text constrains the search to evidence of a
specific crime.”].

[75] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of descriptions based on subject matter that were deemed
sufficiently particular:

• Personnel records for “any and all documents and
correspondence relating to” defendant was not overbroad because he
had killed and wounded several people at his workplace.
P v. Farley (2009) 46 C4 1053, 1101.

• Cellphone records of communications, indicia of use,
ownership, and possession, including “electronic calendars,
address books, e-mails, and chat logs” related to wire fraud,
credit fraud, and identity theft. US v. Bass (6C 2015) 785
F3 1043, 1050.

• Documents “pertaining to the Windward International Bank.”
US v. Federbush (9C 1980) 625 F2 246, 251.

• Documents “indicating true place of residence and
citizenship of [suspect]” US v.
Gomez-Soto (9C 1984) 723 F2 649, 653.

• Documents showing an association between the suspect and
any other person. US v. Washington (9C 1986)
797 F2 1461, 1473.

• Search for “kickback funds” was sufficiently particular
because it also provided details as to how the scheme worked.
US v. Wuagneux (11C 1982) 683 F2 1343.

• “Drug trafficking records, ledgers, or writings identifying
cocaine customers, sources.” US v. Reyes (10C 1986)
798 F2 380, 382.

[76] OTHER: US v.
Wuagneux (11C 1982) 683 F2 1343, 1350.

[77] CAL: Burrows v.
Superior Court (1974) 13 C3 238, 249-50 [the warrant
“permitted the seizure of all of petitioner’s financial records
without regard to the persons with whom the transactions had
occurred or the date of transactions”]. 9th CIR: US
v. Kow (9C 1995) 58 F3 423, 427 [“The government did
not limit the scope of the seizure to a time frame within which
the suspected criminal activity took place, even though [the
affidavit] indicates that the alleged criminal activity began
relatively late in HK Video’s existence.”]; US v.
Rude (9C 1996) 88 F3 1538, 1551 [“post-May 1992
documents”]; US v. Abrams (1C 1980) 615 F2
541, 543, 545 [although officers were aware that the relevant
records pertained to certain dates, “there is no limitation as to
time”].

[78] 9th CIR: Millender
v. County of Los Angeles (9C 2010) 620 F3 1016, 1025
[a warrant for “classes of generic items” may be permissible “if
the warrant establishes standards that are sufficiently specific]
(overturned on other grounds in Messerschmidt v.
Millender (2012) 565 US 535); US v.
Hillyard (9C 1982) 677 F2 1336, 1340 [“When there is
probable cause to believe that premises to be searched contains a
class of generic items or goods, a portion of which are stolen or
contraband, a search warrant may direct inspection of the entire
class of all of the goods if there are objective, articulated
standards for the executing officers to distinguish between
property legally possessed and that which is not.”]; US
v. Holzman (9C 1989) 871 F2 1496, 1509 [“the
circumstances of this case make it highly unlikely that any credit
cards found in the rooms would be legitimately possessed by
appellants.”]. OTHER: US v. Vitali (1C
1967) 383 F2 121, 122 [“Where goods are of a common nature and not
unique there is no obligation to show that the ones sought (here a
substantial quantity of watch bands) necessarily are the ones
stolen, but only to show circumstances indicating this to be
likely.”]; US v. Scharfman (2C 1971) 448 F2
1352, 1354 [“furs, stoles, jackets and other finished fur
products”]; US v. Klein (1C 1977) 565 F2 183,
188 [“the level of particularity required in a warrant may decline
when there is reason to believe that a large collection of similar
contraband is present on the premises to be searched”].
ALSO SEE: Hanger v. US (8C 1968) 398
F2 91, 98 [“We know of no rule of law that does not allow police
officers and Government agents to search for ‘loot’ from a bank
robbery under a valid search warrant based on probable cause.”].

[79] CAL: P v.
Balint (2006) 138 CA4 200, 206 [“The dominion and control
clause at issue here is a standard feature in search warrant
practice.”]; P v. Alcala (1992) 4 C4 742, 799 [“The
warrant also included a standard clause authorizing a
search for [indicia].”] Emphasis added]; P v.
Varghese (2008) 162 CA4 1084, 1102 [“While it is true
dominion and control can be demonstrated by a host of items, and
while the nature of those items allows for relatively broad
searches, establishing dominion and control of a place where
incriminating evidence is found is reasonable and appropriate.”];
P v. Rogers (1986) 187 CA3 1001, 1009 [“common
experience tells us that houses and vehicles ordinarily contain
evidence establishing the identities of those occupying or using
them”]; P v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 C3 551, 575 [
“Similar dominion-and-control clauses in warrants have been upheld
by the courts.”]. 9th CIR: Millender v.
County of Los Angeles (9C 2010) 620 F3 1016, 1030
[“probable cause to search for such ‘indicia of control’ usually
refers to such items as ‘utility company receipts, rent receipts,
cancelled mail envelopes, and keys”] (overturned on other grounds
in Messerschmidt v. Millender (2012) 565 US
535].

[80] CAL: P v.
Balint (2006) 138 CA4 200, 206 [“Houses and vehicles
ordinarily contain evidence identifying those individuals
occupying or controlling them.”]; P v. Alcala (1992)
4 C4 742, 799 [warrant authorized a search for “any articles of
personal property tending to establish the identity of persons in
control of the premises, including but not limited to rent
receipts, cancelled mail envelopes, and keys,” edited].

[81] CAL: P v.
Eubanks (2011) 53 C4 110, [search for items “tending to
show dominion and control” was sufficient because the officers had
probable cause to believe the multiple murders were committed
inside the defendant’s house and they needed to determine the
identities of others who had access to the house]; P v.
Varghese (2008) 162 CA4 1084, 1102 [“While it is true
dominion and control can be demonstrated by a host of items, and
while the nature of those items allows for relatively broad
searches, establishing dominion and control of a place where
incriminating evidence is found is reasonable and appropriate.”];
P v. Rogers (1986) 187 CA3 1001, 1009 [“We cannot
believe the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers with ample
probable cause to believe those in a residence have committed a
felony from searching the residence to discover ordinary indicia
of the identities of the perpetrators.”]; P v.
Rushing (1989) 209 CA3 618, 622 [“the court documents
containing Rushing’s name and signature are circumstantial
evidence of his right to exercise dominion and control over the
premises”]; P v. Williams (1992) 3 CA4 1535, 1542
[“even if the [utility] bill bore only a person’s name, without
any address whatsoever, it would still be circumstantial evidence
that the person resided in the apartment where the bill was
found.”]. OTHER: US v. Bruce (6C 2005)
396 F3 697, 710 [papers “showing ownership and/or control” of
illegal drugs was sufficient].

[82] EXAMPLES: The following are
examples of descriptions of indicia that have been deemed
sufficiently particular:

• “Any articles or personal property tending to establish the
identity of persons who have dominion and control over the
premises.” P v. Bryant (2014) 60 C4 335, 370.

• “Letters, papers, bills tending to show the occupants of
2335 Erickson St. #1.” P v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 C3 551, 575.

• “Any items tending to show dominion and control of the
location, including delivered mail, whether inside the location or
in the mail box, utility bills, phone bills, rent receipts, safe
deposit box keys and receipts, keys and receipts for rental
storage space, keys and receipts for post office box or mail drop
rentals, ignition keys, car door and truck keys, recordation of
voice transmissions on telephone answering machines, audio tapes
and phone message receipts books, and written phone messages, and
photographs tending to show occupation of residence and connection
between co-conspirators, whether identified or unidentified. And
any examples of handwriting including letters, address books,
business records, cancelled checks, notes and/or lists.”
P v. Balint (2006) 138 CA4 200, 204, fn.1.

[83] 9th CIR: US v.
Gomez-Soto (9C 1984) 723 F2 649, 653 [“since the samples
were sought for the limited purpose of handwriting comparison, a
magistrate could not be expected to describe any more particularly
the specific papers to be seized”].