Chapter 21: Forcible Entry (Including Knock-Notice)
Chapter Structure
(1) Requirements
(2) Damaging Property
(3) Flashbangs
(4) Motorized Battering Rams
(5) Knock-Notice
Requirements
: Officers may make a forcible entry into a home or other private structure if both of the following circumstances existed:
(1) Grounds for entry: The officers must have had a legal right to enter; i.e., search or arrest warrant, exigent circumstances, parole or probation search.
(2) Reasonable manner: As discussed in the remainder of this chapter, the officers must have entered in a reasonable manner.[1]
Damaging Property
: Only if reasonably necessary.[2]
Flashbangs
Requirements: Judicial authorization to utilize flashbangs is not required if the following circumstances existed:
(1) Minimal explosive power: The explosive power of the flashbang was such that the risk of injury was minimal.
(2) Look inside: Officers could see into the targeted room (presumably to make sure no one would be hurt) before tossing a flashbang inside.[3]
Children inside? Officers must consider whether there are children in the home who might be traumatized by such a violent entry.[4]
Motorized Battering Rams
Highly dangerous: A motorized battering ram (i.e., a police tank) presents a high risk of danger to the occupants and may even cause a building collapse.
Requirements: A motorized battering ram may be used only if the following circumstances existed: (1) a police administrative panel determined that the need for its use outweighed its intrusiveness; (2) the judge who issued the warrant authorized the use of the tank based on facts contained in the affidavit that established probable cause to believe that its deployment was reasonably necessary; and (3), before deploying the tank, officers saw nothing to indicate that such a violent entry was unnecessary.[5]
Knock-Notice
Not an absolute requirement: In the past, many courts ruled that strict knock-notice compliance was required under the Fourth Amendment. In 1995, however, the Supreme Court rejected this idea, concluding that the Fourth Amendment requires only that officers enter in a “reasonable” manner.[6] And, although knock-notice compliance is a relevant circumstance in making this determination, there are several others, such as the manner in which officers entered, the time of day or night they entered, whether they damaged the premises, and whether they saw or heard anything before entering that reasonably indicated that full compliance with the knock-notice rule would be counterproductive. Other circumstances include the seriousness of the crime under investigation, the nature and destructibility of the evidence being sought, how the occupants responded to searches and police encounters in the past, the size and layout of the premises, and the existence of any extraordinary security measures.
Procedure: Officers must comply fully, or at least substantially, with the following requirements:[7]
(1) “Knock”
Purpose: To alert the occupants of the officers’ presence, thus providing some assurance that the occupants will hear the officers’ announcement.[8]
Full compliance: Knock on the door or ring the doorbell.
Substantial compliance: It reasonably appeared that someone in the house was aware of the officers’ presence.[9]
Multiple entry points: If officers entered from two or more points, they may comply with the knock-notice requirements at only one point (presumably the main entry point),[10] but “there may be instances in which the officers’ choice of place to announce is so clearly unreasonable that a second announcement is required at [another] point of entry.”[11]
(2) Announce authority
Purpose: To alert the occupants that the people seeking entry are officers.
Full compliance: “Police officers!” or the functional equivalent.[12]
Substantial compliance: It reasonably appeared that at least one of the occupants knew that the people at the door were police officers.[13] Examples:
Uniform: An officer was in uniform and was visible to the occupants.[14]
Officers were recognized: Officers reasonably believed that the suspect recognized one of the people at the door as an officer.[15]
Shout: An occupant, upon seeing the officers said something that indicated he knew they were officers; e.g., “Jesus Christ, the cops!”[16]
(3) Announce purpose: Officers are not required to explain their purpose. Instead, they are simply required to declare it; e.g., “search warrant,” “parole search,” “arrest warrant.”
Purpose: To notify the occupants of the officers’ purpose.
Full compliance: “Search warrant” or the functional equivalent.[17]
Substantial compliance: It was reasonably apparent that the occupants were aware that the officers intended to search or arrest.[18] Examples:
Running: Occupants ran when the officers announced their identity.[19]
Blocking the door: Occupants attempted to close the door.[20]
Entry to arrest for just-occurred crime: A suspect’s knowledge of the officers’ purpose may be inferred if they were entering to arrest him for a crime that had just occurred, in which case the suspect “may reasonably be expected to know the purpose of the police visit.”[21]
(4) Demand admittance: Officers must demand that the occupants admit them.
(5) Wait for refusal
Generally: In the absence of exigent circumstances, full compliance with the knock-notice rule cannot occur unless it reasonably appears that the occupants do not intend to admit the officers.[22] This is an especially controversial requirement because the occupants have no legal right to refuse entry. In addition, it is notoriously difficult for officers to determine the point at which a “refusal” has actually occurred. In any event, the courts have addressed these issues by ruling that a refusal can occur by either affirmative conduct or inaction.
Types of refusals: A refusal may be express or implied.
Affirmative refusals: Occurs when an occupant takes some action from which a refusal can be inferred; e.g., an occupant ran for the back door when officers at the front door announced their authority and purpose.[23] The most common type of refusal by affirmative conduct occurs when officers hear sounds from inside the house that indicate the occupants are attempting to destroy evidence or flee. See “When compliance is not required” (Destruction of evidence, and Flight, below).
Refusals by inaction: This type of refusal (the most common type[24]) occurs when the occupants fail to admit officers within a reasonable time after they announced their authority and purpose.[25] Although there is no minimum wait time,[26] the following circumstances are relevant in determining whether an expedited entry was lawful:
Premises were occupied: If officers reasonably believed that someone was inside the house, they must give him a reasonable amount of time to open the door.[27]
Size and layout: The larger the structure, the longer it might take the occupants to answer the door.[28]
Time of day: A delay late at night should be expected if it reasonably appeared the occupants had been asleep. Conversely, a delay might be more suspicious in the daytime or early evening.[29]
Good reason for delay: A delay will not justify an expedited entry if officers were aware of circumstances that justified the delay; e.g., officers saw that the occupant was asleep.[30]
Noncompliance with “refusal” requirement: There is authority for dispensing with the refusal requirement when all of the following circumstances existed:
(a) Knock: Officers knocked or otherwise took reasonable steps to get the attention of an occupant.
(b) Announce: Officers announced their authority and purpose, or their authority and purpose were apparent.
(c) No damage: Entry was made peacefully and without damage.[31]
When compliance is not required
No-knock warrants: When executing a search or arrest warrant, officers may make a no-knock entry if it was authorized by the judge who issued the warrant. Consequently, if the affiant reasonably believed that a no-knock entry was necessary, he may request the judge to authorize it. See Chapter 35 Search Warrant Special Procedures (No-Knock Warrants).
Open doors: The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to knock and announce their presence before entering an open door.[32] But because an unannounced entry through an open door may also result in a violent response, it is almost always better to announce before entering.
Exigent circumstances: Officers may dispense with the knock-notice procedure if they were aware of facts that constituted “reasonable suspicion” that compliance would be dangerous or would result in the destruction of evidence.
Destruction of evidence: If officers were executing a search warrant, or were securing the premises pending issuance of a warrant, an expedited entry is permitted if they reasonably believed there was destructible evidence on the premises that would be destroyed if they delayed making entry.[33] See this endnote for examples of relevant circumstances.[34]
Level of proof: Reasonable suspicion.[35]
Reliable information required: Officers must be able to point to specific facts that contain at least some element of reliability.[36]
No generalizations: Officers may not make blanket assumptions that certain types of criminals will necessarily attempt to destroy evidence or arm themselves when they become aware that a search was imminent.[37] But because drugs are the quintessential disposable contraband, not much additional information is needed.[38]
Danger: Officers reasonably believed they or someone else would be harmed unless they made an immediate entry.[39] See this endnote for examples.[40]
Officer already inside: There is authority for making an immediate entry if an undercover officer was already inside. See Chapter 18 Entry to Arrest (Exceptions, “Consent Once Removed”).
Flight: Compliance with the knock-notice procedure is not required if officers reasonably believed that the occupants had already started to flee. See this endnote for examples.[41]
Tricks and ruses: Officers with a warrant need not comply with the knock-notice requirements if an occupant consented to their entry—even if the officers lied about who they were or what they wanted. This is because the objective of giving notice of an imminent entry would have been achieved when the occupant consented to their entry.[42] But also see Chapter 16 Consent Searches (Consent to Enter Home by trickery). See this endnote for examples.[43]
Unoccupied structures: Compliance is not required if officers were aware that the premises were unoccupied.[44]
Opening gates, climbing fences: Compliance is not required before opening a gate leading to a residence or before climbing a fence surrounding it.[45]
Opening inner doors: Officers with a search warrant who have complied with the knock-notice requirements before entering a house are not required to knock and announce before making a non-forcible entry into interior rooms,[46] except, possibly, if the residence was unusually large or the warrant authorized a search of only that room.[47]
Suppression of evidence: A failure to comply with the knock-notice procedure does not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, a failure to comply will not result in the suppression of evidence if the officers’ entry was otherwise reasonable.[48]
Notes
[1] USSC: Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 US 927, 934 [“the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling [is] among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure”]. NOTE: In making this determination, the courts will consider the totality of circumstances. Howell v. Polk (9C 2008) 532 F3 1025, 1026-27.
[2] USSC: US v. Ramirez (1998) 523 US 65, 71 [“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment”]; US v. Banks (2003) 540 US 31, 36 [“police in exigent circumstances may damage premises so far as necessary”]; Dalia v. US (1979) 441 US 238, 247 [“officers constitutionally may break and enter to execute a search warrant where such entry is the only means by which the warrant effectively may be executed.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Ankeny (9C 2007) 502 F3 829, 837 [“The record is unclear with respect to whether and why it was necessary to shoot out so many windows and break down so many doors.”]. OTHER: US v. Weinbender (8C 1997) 109 F3 1327, 1330 [minimal damage to portion of drywall was lawful because suspect was known to have hiding places].
[3] CAL: Langford v. Superior Court (1987) 43 C3 21, 29 [“At their present reduced explosive power, and under current LAPD guidelines requiring that officers detonate them only after they have seen fully into a targeted room, the flashbangs appear from the record to present a minimal risk of injury”].
[4] OTHER: US v. Myers (10C 1997) 106 F3 936, 940 [“The use of a ‘flashbang’ device in a house where innocent and unsuspecting children sleep gives us great pause.”].
[5] CAL: Langford v. Superior Court (1987) 43 C3 21, 29–32. NOTE: Judges and officers must consider “the reliability of the ram under the specific circumstances as a rapid and safe means of entry, the seriousness of the underlying criminal offense, the strength of law enforcement suspicions that evidence will be destroyed, and the availability of alternative means less violative of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at p. 31.
[6] USSC: Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 US 927, 934 [“the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling [is] among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness”]. CAL: P v. Mays (1998) 67 CA4 969, 973 [knock-notice “is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the [Fourth Amendment].”]. 9th CIR: US v. Combs (9C 2005) 394 F3 739, 743 [“Since Wilson, the Court has reiterated that the knock and announce principle is a part of the reasonableness inquiry rather than a prerequisite for constitutional entry.”].
[7] CAL: Pen. Code §§ 844, 1531. NOTE: While Penal Code §§ 844 and 1531 have different text, courts assess reasonableness under totality, not strict technicality. Substantial compliance satisfies the knock-notice rule if its objectives were achieved. See P v. Hoag (2000) 83 CA4 1198, 1208; P v. Peterson (1973) 9 C3 717, 723; P v. LaJocies (1981) 119 CA3 947, 953; Hart v. Superior Court (1971) 21 CA3 496, 501; P v. Tacy (1987) 195 CA3 1402, 1415–16; P v. Trujillo (1990) 217 CA3 1219, 1227; US v. Spikes (6C 1998) 158 F3 913, 925.
[8] CAL: Duke v. Superior Court (1969) 1 C3 314, 319; P v. Mays (1998) 67 CA4 969, 973; P v. Macioce (1987) 197 CA3 262, 271; P v. Brownlee (1977) 74 CA3 921, 929.
[9] CAL: P v. Tacy (1987) 195 CA3 1402, 1406; P v. Brownlee (1977) 74 CA3 921, 929; P v. James (1971) 17 CA3 463, 468; P v. Franco (1986) 183 CA3 1089, 1094 fn.5. 9th CIR: US v. Peterson (9C 2003) 353 F3 1045, 1049; US v. Combs (9C 2005) 394 F3 739.
[10] 9th CIR: US v. Bustamante-Gamez (9C 1973) 488 F2 4, 10 [“officers are not required to announce at every place of entry; one proper announcement is sufficient.”]; US v. Crawford (9C 1981) 657 F2 1041, 1045.
[11] QUOTE FROM: US v. Bustamante-Gamez (9C 1973) 488 F2 4, 10.
[12] CAL: Pen. Code § 1531; P v. Maita (1984) 157 CA3 309, 322.
[13] CAL: P v. Peterson (1973) 9 C3 717, 723; P v. Lopez (1969) 269 CA2 461, 469; P v. Negrete (1978) 82 CA3 328, 338.
[14] USSC: Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 US 385, 395–96. CAL: P v. James (1971) 17 CA3 463, 468; P v. Galan (1985) 163 CA3 786, 795.
[15] CAL: P v. Limon (1967) 255 CA2 519, 521–22; Brown v. Superior Court (1973) 34 CA3 539, 543; In re William C. (1977) 70 C3 570, 580–582.
[16] EXAMPLE FROM: P v. Bigham (1975) 49 CA3 73, 80.
[17] CAL: Pen. Code § 1531; P v. Maita (1984) 157 CA3 309, 322; P v. Mayer (1987) 188 CA3 1101, 1115; P v. Mays (1998) 67 CA4 969, 973.
[18] USSC: Miller v. US (1958) 357 US 301, 310. CAL: P v. Mayer (1987) 188 CA3 1101, 1112; P v. Bigham (1975) 49 CA3 73, 80; P v. Franco (1986) 183 CA3 1089, 1094; P v. Garnett (1970) 6 CA3 280, 290.
[19] CAL: P v. Mayer (1987) 188 CA3 1101, 1112.
[20] CAL: P v. Vasquez (1969) 1 CA3 769, 775.
[21] QUOTE FROM: P v. Hall (1971) 3 C3 992, 997. CAL: P v. Superior Court (Reilly) (1975) 53 CA3 40, 46; P v. Cockrell (1965) 63 C2 659, 666.
[22] CAL: Pen. Code §§ 844, 1531; P v. Alaniz (1986) 182 CA3 903, 906 fn.2; P v. Schmel (1975) 54 CA3 46, 51; P v. Hirsch (1977) 71 CA3 987, 991.
[23] USSC: Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 US 385, 395. CAL: P v. Morales (1968) 259 CA2 290, 297; P v. Thompson (1979) 89 CA3 425, 431; P v. Bencomo (1985) 171 CA3 1005, 1018; P v. Pipitone (1984) 152 CA3 1112, 1116; P v. Stegman (1985) 164 CA3 936, 946; P v. Mayer (1987) 188 CA3 1101, 1112; P v. Hill (1970) 3 CA3 294, 299–300.
[24] 9th CIR: McClure v. US (9C 1964) 332 F2 19, 22 [“The refusal of admittance contemplated by the [knock-notice] statute will rarely be affirmative, but will oftentimes be present only by implication.”].
[25] USSC: US v. Banks (2003) 540 US 31, 42 [“Absent exigency, the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to infer one.”]. CAL: P v. Elder (1976) 63 CA3 731, 739; P v. Peterson (1973) 9 C3 717, 723; P v. Hobbs (1987) 192 CA3 959, 964; P v. Gallo (1981) 127 CA3 828, 838; P v. Neer (1986) 177 CA3 991, 996; P v. Trujillo (1990) 217 CA3 1219, 1225. 9th CIR: Martin v. City of Oceanside (9C 2004) 360 F3 1078, 1083; US v. Chavez-Miranda (9C 2002) 306 F3 973, 980.
[26] USSC: US v. Banks (2003) 540 US 31, 36 [“we have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case”]. CAL: P v. Byers (2016) 6 CA5 856, 867; P v. Trujillo (1990) 217 CA3 1219, 1225; P v. Hobbs (1987) 192 CA3 959, 964; P v. Neer (1986) 177 CA3 991, 996. 9th CIR: US v. Chavez-Miranda (9C 2002) 306 F3 973, 980. ALSO SEE: Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 US 586, 590.
[27] CAL: P v. Gallo (1981) 127 CA3 828, 838–39; P v. Montenegro (1985) 173 CA3 983, 989; P v. McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 906; P v. Hobbs (1987) 192 CA3 959, 963–66; P v. Elder (1976) 63 CA3 731, 739; P v. Nealy (1991) 228 CA3 447, 450–51.
[28] USSC: US v. Banks (2003) 540 US 31 [small apartment; 2 p.m.; 15–20 second wait]. CAL: P v. Hoag (2000) 83 CA4 1198, 1212; P v. Drews (1989) 208 CA3 1317, 1328. 9th CIR: US v. Chavez-Miranda (9C 2002) 306 F3 973, 980.
[29] CAL: Greven v. Superior Court (1969) 71 C2 287, 295 [ten–15 seconds insufficient at 1 a.m. in a large house].
[30] CAL: P v. Abdon (1972) 30 CA3 972, 978; Jeter v. Superior Court (1983) 138 CA3 934, 937; P v. Gonzales (1989) 211 CA3 1043.
[31] CAL: P v. Bustamante (1971) 16 CA3 213, 218–19; P v. Tacy (1987) 195 CA3 1402; P v. Uhler (1989) 208 CA3 766; P v. LaJocies (1981) 119 CA3 947, 953–54. ALSO SEE: Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 US 927, 934.
[32] OTHER: US v. Sherrod (8C 2020) 966 F3 748, 753 [“The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to knock and announce their presence before entering an open door.”].
[33] USSC: US v. Banks (2003) 540 US 31, 40; Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 US 385, 396. CAL: P v. Martinez (2005) 132 CA4 233. 9th CIR: US v. Chavez-Miranda (9C 2002) 306 F3 973, 980. ALSO SEE: cases cited in Banks fn.5.
[34] EXAMPLES: Circumstances indicating an immediate threat to evidence justifying immediate entry:
• Search warrant for drugs. Door cracked, suspect saw uniformed officer, slammed door. Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 US 385, 395.
• Search warrant for drugs. Suspect had history of flushing evidence. P v. Alaniz (1986) 182 CA3 903, 906.
• Arrest for drug sales. Suspect vowed to destroy evidence if police appeared. P v. Gonzales (1971) 14 CA3 881.
• Search warrant for drugs. Occupants in a “heavily barricaded” house began running after announcement. P v. Mayer (1987) 188 CA3 1101, 1112.
• Arrest for drug sales. Officer heard “very fast movements” to the rear. P v. Temple (1969) 276 CA2 402, 413.
• Search warrant for drugs. “Footsteps running in the wrong direction.” McClure v. US (9C 1964) 332 F2 19, 22.
• Search warrant for drugs. Defendant moved toward the rear. P v. Pacheco (1972) 27 CA3 70, 78.
• Probation search. Running sounds; movement seen in kitchen. P v. Pipitone (1984) 152 CA3 1112, 1116.
• Arrest parolee-at-large. Suspect jumped through screened window after announcement. P v. Lopez (1969) 269 CA2 461, 468.
• Arrest for drug sales. Reliable informant: suspect would destroy evidence. Guerrero v. Superior Court (1969) 2 CA3 136.
• Probation search. Officers saw suspect cutting heroin; he ran toward “easily flushable” heroin. P v. Negrete (1978) 82 CA3 328, 336.
• Children yelled “Mama” after announcement; info that “Mama” knew of heroin sales. P v. Vargas (1973) 36 CA3 499.
• Felon with alias, steel door, loaded handgun, large amount of crack inside. US v. Stowe (7C 1996) 100 F3 494, 499.
• Fortress-like house; defendant tried to close gate. P v. Thompson (1979) 89 CA3 425.
• Tried to close door; marijuana odor present. P v. Baldwin (1976) 62 CA3 727, 739; see also P v. Morales (1968) 259 CA2 290, 297.
• “Shrill female sounds” and running footsteps after knock-announce at home of woman involved in drug sales. P v. Freeny (1974) 37 CA3 20, 26, 33.
• Officer saw two dealers cutting heroin over a toilet; one had previously tried to dispose of drugs. P v. Colvin (1971) 19 CA3 14.
[35] USSC: US v. Ramirez (1998) 523 US 65, 73; Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 US 385, 394 [“This showing [reasonable suspicion] is not high”].
[36] CAL: P v. Valdivia (1980) 114 CA3 24, 27. 9th CIR: US v. Granville (9C 2000) 222 F3 1214, 1219; US v. Hudson (9C 1996) 100 F3 1409, 1417. ALSO SEE: P v. Gastelo (1967) 67 C2 586, 588–89.
[37] USSC: Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 US 385, 388. CAL: P v. Neer (1986) 177 CA3 991, 995; P v. Rosales (1968) 68 C2 299, 305; P v. Bruce (1975) 49 CA3 580, 588.
[38] USSC: Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 US 385, 394 [“felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry”]. 9th CIR: US v. Bynum (9C 2004) 362 F3 574, 581; US v. Peterson (9C 2003) 353 F3 1045, 1050.
[39] USSC: Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 406–07; US v. Banks (2003) 540 US 31, 37. CAL: P v. Galan (1985) 163 CA3 786, 795; P v. Kizzee (1979) 94 CA3 927, 935.
[40] EXAMPLES: Circumstances indicating an immediate threat to officers justifying immediate entry:
• Armed prison escapee vowed not to “do federal time.” US v. Ramirez (1998) 523 US 65, 71.
• Drug warrant; suspect previously displayed firearms and behaved unpredictably while armed. US v. Bynum (9C 2004) 362 F3 574, 581.
• Arrest suspect in police-officer murder. P v. Gilbert (1965) 63 C2 690, 707.
• Arrest suspect in fresh double murder. P v. Goldbach (1972) 27 CA3 563, 571.
• Drug warrant; prior assaultive behavior, guns, altercation with officer. P v. Henderson (1976) 58 CA3 349, 356.
• Drug warrant; reliable informant: suspect usually armed at door. P v. Dumas (1973) 9 C3 871, 878–79; see also US v. Hudson (9C 1996) 100 F3 1409, 1417–18.
• Arrest for armed robbery minutes earlier; untested informant warned of danger. P v. Amos (1977) 70 CA3 562, 567.
• Drug warrant; suspect expressed willingness to use firearms; access to guns. US v. Turner (9C 1991) 926 F2 883, 887.
• Steel door; loaded handgun; large amount of crack. US v. Stowe (7C 1996) 100 F3 494, 499.
• Meth lab with cameras, flood lights, papered windows. US v. Combs (9C 2005) 394 F3 739, 745.
• Drugs-for-weapons deal inside; undercover inside. P v. Cornejo (1979) 92 CA3 637.
• House believed being burglarized. P v. Solario (1977) 19 C3 760; P v. Green (1984) 163 CA3 239.
• Probable cause for murder; occupants believed armed. P v. Braun (1973) 29 CA3 949, 969.
• Suspect customarily carried a gun; prior seizure of handguns; running footsteps heard. Brown v. Superior Court (1973) 34 CA3 539, 544.
• Armed-robbery suspect likely armed. P v. De La Plane (1979) 88 CA3 223, 235–36.
• Arrest for armed robbery; defendant known gun user. P v. Taylor (1968) 267 CA2 505, 508.
• Arrest for rape; rapist used knife; gun seen nearby; running footsteps heard. P v. Tribble (1971) 4 C3 826, 833.
• Probable explosives inside; occupant opened, saw SWAT, slammed door. US v. Peterson (9C 2003) 353 F3 1045, 1049–50.
• Drug search; arrest record shows assaultive behavior and firearms. P v. Henderson (1976) 58 CA3 349, 356.
• Violent fugitive likely inside; companion outside yelled “run.” US v. Reilly (9C 2000) 224 F3 986.
• Hot pursuit of burglary suspect into house. P v. Patino (1979) 95 CA3 11, 21.
[41] EXAMPLES: Flight excusing knock-notice:
• Rape arrest; running footsteps heard; gun nearby. P v. Tribble (1971) 4 C3 826, 833.
• Violent fugitive; outside arrestee yelled “run.” US v. Reilly (9C 2000) 224 F3 986.
• Hot pursuit of burglary suspect into house. P v. Patino (1979) 95 CA3 11, 21.
[42] CAL: P v. Thompson (1979) 89 CA3 425, 432; P v. Cohen (1976) 59 CA3 241, 246–47; P v. Kasinger (1976) 57 CA3 975, 978.
[43] EXAMPLES: Ruses satisfying knock-notice:
• Postal uniform; consent to deliver letter. P v. Rudin (1978) 77 CA3 139.
• “It’s Jim, I want to talk to Gail” (occupant/suspect). P v. Constancio (1974) 42 CA3 533, 546; also P v. McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 906; P v. Ramirez (1970) 4 CA3 154, 157; P v. Thompson (1979) 89 CA3 425, 432.
• Wife admitted undercover posing as welfare carpet installer. P v. Veloz (1971) 22 CA3 499.
• Dealer admitted undercover sent by “Pete” to buy. P v. Evans (1980) 108 CA3 193, 196.
[44] USSC: Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 US 927, 935. CAL: P v. Medina (1968) 265 CA2 703, 708; P v. Ford (1975) 54 CA3 149, 154; Hart v. Superior Court (1971) 21 CA3 496, 504; P v. Sanchez (1969) 2 CA3 467, 473–74.
[45] CAL: P v. Bencomo (1985) 171 CA3 1005, 1015; P v. Mayer (1987) 188 CA3 1101, 1109.
[46] CAL: P v. Mays (1998) 67 CA4 969, 976; P v. Pompa (1989) 212 CA3 1308; P v. Aguilar (1996) 48 CA4 632, 639; P v. Castaneda (1976) 58 CA3 165, 170. 9th CIR: US v. Crawford (9C 1981) 657 F2 1041, 1044. NOTE: Older contrary inner-door cases: P v. Webb (1973) 36 CA3 460; P v. Glasspoole (1975) 48 CA3 668; P v. Pipitone (1984) 152 CA3 1112, 1119. See critique in P v. Howard (1993) 18 CA4 1544, 1550; followed in P v. Mays (1998) 67 CA4 969, 974; P v. Aguilar (1996) 48 CA4 632, 639.
[47] CAL: P v. Howard (1993) 18 CA4 1544, 1554–55 [repeated knock-notice may be required for unusually large residences, when outer door does not reach place to be searched, or when only a single room is authorized].
[48] USSC: Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 US 586, 594; Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 US 927, 934. CAL: P v. Mays (1998) 67 CA4 969, 973. 9th CIR: US v. Combs (9C 2005) 394 F3 739, 743; P v. Byers (2016) 6 CA5 856, 869; In re Frank S. (2006) 142 CA4 145, 152. OTHER: US v. Diaz-Ortiz (8C 2019) 927 F3 1028, 1030; US v. Garcia-Hernandez (1C 2011) 659 F3 108, 112–13; US v. Pelletier (1C 2006) 469 F3 194, 201.