Chapter 36: Executing Search Warrants

[1] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1534(a).
ALSO SEE: P v. Larkin (1987) 194 CA3 650, 656
["The purpose of the 10-day requirement is to insure probable
cause still exists at the time of execution."].

[1] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1534(a). OTHER: Fed. Rules
Crim. Proc. Rule 41. NOTE: The reason for the 10-day
requirement is to help prevent situations in which (1) probable
cause for the warrant was compromised after the warrant was issued
but before it was executed, and (2) the evidence on the premises
has been removed to another location or destroyed. P v.
Head (1994) 30 CA4 954, 958; P v.
Larkin (1987) 194 CA3 650, 656; P v.
Kibblewhite (1986) 178 CA3 783, 785; US v.
Skaff (7C 1969) 418 F2 430, 433 ["The passage of an undue
amount of time between the issuance and execution of a warrant
raises the danger that the property described in the affidavit
would no longer exist on the premises to be searched"].

[2] CAL: P v. Hernandez (1974) 43
CA3 581, 591. OTHER: US v. Garcia (10C 2013) 707 F3
1190, 1195-96.

[3] CAL: P v.
Zepeda (1980) 102 CA3 1, 7 ["the warrant was actually
served when the search began"].

[4] CAL: P v.
Clayton (1993) 18 CA4 440, 445.

[5] CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 99 ["Wahl
expeditiously executed the warrant by visually searching Nasmeh's
vehicle the day after the warrant issued. To complete the search,
the authorities needed to conduct an examination of the vehicle's
interior for evidence not visible to Wahl. Wahl inadvertently
misplaced the vehicle's key, and evidently, rather than simply
breaking into Nasmeh's car and damaging it, the authorities
secured the services of a towing company to gain entry to the
vehicle's interior. Despite all of these factors, the search was
completely executed 12 days after the warrant issued.].
OTHER: US v. Jarman (5C 2017) 847 F3 259, 264
["Jarman was not entitled to suppression based on the Government's
delay in completing its search of the evidence because [the
officers] acted reasonably under the circumstances"];
US v. Correll (DDC 2004) 360 F.Supp.2 48, 55, fn.5 ["The
warrant did not limit the amount of time in which the government
was required to complete its off-site forensic analysis of the
seized items and the courts have not imposed such a prophylactic
constraint on law enforcement."]; US v.
Triumph Capital Group, Inc. (D. Conn. 2002) 211 FRD 31, 66
["computer searches are not, and cannot be subject to any rigid
time limit because they may involve much more information than an
ordinary document search, more preparation and a greater degree of
care in their execution"]; US v. Syphers (1C
2005) 426 F3 461, 469 [some delay may be permissible "because of
the complexity of the search"] ["A delay in execution of the
warrant under Rule 41 does not render inadmissible evidence
seized, absent a showing of prejudice to the defendants resulting
from the delay."].

[6] OTHER: US v. Garcia (10C
2013) 707 F3 1190, 1196 ["Given this move away from interpreting
'forthwith' as a substantive command, we read the term instead as
a belated echo of a medieval royal command."].

[7] CAL: P v.
Zepeda (1980) 102 CA3 1, 7 ["Once that execution began, it
was unreasonable to require its cessation merely because the hour
reached 10 p.m."]; "]; P v. Maita (1984) 157 CA3
309, 322. OTHER: US v. Squillacote (4C 2000) 221 F3
542, 556 ["Because the search of the Appellants' home was
commenced in the daytime, as required by the warrant, the FBI
agents reasonably could have believed that it was proper to
continue the search into the night," edited.].

[8] CAL: Rodriguez v.
Superior Court (1988) 199 CA3 1453, 1470; P v.
Swan (1986) 187 CA3 1010, 1017. OTHER:
Rodriguez v. Beninato (1C 2006) 469 F3 1, 7
[entry at 5:50 a.m. was "close enough to the 6:00 a.m. hour to
make any deviation from the warrant de minimis"].
ALSO SEE US v. Brewer (7C 2019) 915 F3 408, 414 [not
a Fourth Amendment violation to continue tracking a suspect into
another state even though the warrant stated that it was
applicable only as to in-state tracking].

[9] CAL: Tidwell v.
Superior Court (1971) 17 CA3 780, 786-87. ALSO SEE:
Civ. Code§ 3510 ["When the reason of a rule ceases, so
should the rule itself."].

[10] CAL: P v.
Swan (1986) 187 CA3 1010, 1016.

[11] CAL: P v.
Rodriguez-Fernandez (1991) 235 CA3 543, 553-54.
9th CIR: US v. Martinez-Garcia (9C
2005) 397 F3 1205, 1211-12. OTHER: US v.
Bonner (1C 1986) 808 F2 864, 868-69 ["Courts have
repeatedly upheld searches conducted by law enforcement officials
notified by telephone or radio once the search warrant was
issued."].

[12] CAL: P v.
Rodriguez-Fernandez (1991) 235 CA3 543, 533.
9th CIR: Guerra v. Sutton (9C 1986)
783 F2 1371, 1375.

[13] CAL: P v.
Bradford (1997) 15 C4 1229, 1306-7 ["The record does not
demonstrate that the officers had not been briefed or prepared as
to the objects of the search"]. 9th CIR: Marks
v. Clarke (9C 1996) 102 F3 1012, 1030 ["each officer
was informed in some way by authorized personnel regarding the
scope of the search"]; Motley v. Parks (9C en
banc 2005) 432 F3 1072, 1081-82 ["when conducting a search
pursuant to a warrant, the officers involved should familiarize
themselves with the nature and scope of the search authorized by
the warrant." Overruled on other grounds in US v. King (9C
2012) 687 F3 1189]; US v. Whitten (9C 1983) 706 F2 1000,
1009-1010 ["Officers executing a search should read the warrant or
otherwise become fully familiar with its contents, and should
carefully review the list of items which may be seized."].
OTHER: US v. Heldt (DCC 1981) 668 F2 1238, 1261
["Warrants are not self-executing; they require agents to carry
them out. In order for a warrant's limitations to be effective,
those conducting the search must have read or been adequately
apprised of its terms."]; US v. Wuagneux (11C
1982) 683 F2 1343, 1352 ["In conducting a search of this
complexity and magnitude the agents should be familiar with the
general nature of the crimes that are charged and the list of
items they are authorized to seize, either through reading of the
warrant or through adequate instructions or supervision from those
in charge."]. COMPARE: Guerra v. Sutton (9C 1986)
783 F3 1371, 1375 [the agents "were not given an advance briefing
as to the source and extent of their authority to enter, search,
and arrest"].

[14] CAL: Hart v.
Superior Court (1971) 21 CA3 496, 502 ["In many situations
calling for the use and execution of a search warrant, it will
even be contemplated that the premises will not be occupied."].
OTHER: US v. Sims (7C 2009) 553 F3
580, 584 [officers "are not required to wait until someone is at
home to conduct the search"].

[15] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1530 [warrant
may be served "by any of the officers mentioned in its
directions"].

[16] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1530 ["A
search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers
mentioned in its directors, but by no other person,
except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being
present and acting in its execution"].

[17] OTHER: US v. Castro (6C
2018) 881 F3 961.

[18] USSC: Wilson v.
Layne (1999) 526 US 603, 611-12 ["the presence of third
parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property has
long been approved by the Court"]. CAL: Pen. Code§
1530; P v. Superior Court (Meyers) (1979) 25 C3 67,
76, fn.9; P v. Tockgo (1983) 145 CA3 635, 645;
P v. Carpenter (1997) 15 C4 312, 364. OTHER:
US v. Gregoire (8C 2011) 638 F3 962, 967.

[19] OTHER: US v. Bach (8C 2002)
310 F3 1063, 1067 [relevant circumstances include "the fact that
no warrant was physically served, no persons or premises were
searched in the traditional sense, and there was no confrontation
between Yahoo! technicians and Bach"; also important were "(1) the
actual physical presence of an officer would not have aided the
search (in fact may have hindered it); (2) the technical expertise
of Yahoo!'s technicians far outweighs that of the officers; (3)
the items seized were located on Yahoo!'s property];
Bellville v. Town of Northboro (1C 2004) 375 F3 25, 33
["There is no indication that [the provider's experts]
participated in the searches to further their own personal ends,
nor is there a suggestion in the record that [the officer] could
have delayed his search and obtained the necessary technical
assistance from another officer."]. ALSO SEE:
Wilson v. Layne (1999) 526 US 603, 611-12 ["the presence of
third parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property
has long been approved by the Court"].

[20] USSC:
Horton v. California (1990) 496 US 128, 138 ["The fact that
an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects
to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its
seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the
terms of the warrant"]. CAL: P v.
Carrington (2009) 47 C4 145, 168 ["the police did not
exceed the scope of the search authorized by the warrant, and they
observed [the victim's] property in plain view in defendant's
home"]; P v. Williams (1988) 198 CA3 873, 887 ["the
officers did not move articles to get serial numbers or other
indicia of ownership to any greater degree than one might expect
in looking for hidden drugs pursuant to the warrant"].
COMPARE: P v. McGraw (1981) 119 CA3 582, 602 ["It is
clear that [the officer] was not on the premises to help execute
the search warrant. In fact, he never even read the warrant,"
edited.]. P v. Albritton (1982) 138 CA3 79 [auto theft
investigator assisting with search for drugs conducted an illegal
search when he searched for VIN numbers of suspected stolen cars].

[21] CAL: P v.
Russell (1987) 195 CA3 186, 190.

[22] USSC: Wilson v.
Layne (1999) 526 US 603, 614 ["We hold that it is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of
the media or other third parties into a home during the execution
of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home
was not in aid of the execution of the warrant."].

[23] USSC: Wilson v.
Layne (1999) 526 US 603, 613 ["it might be reasonable for
police officers to videotape home entries as part of a 'quality
control' effort to ensure that the rights of homeowners are being
respected, or even to preserve evidence"]. CAL:
P v. Smith (1994) 21 CA4 942, 951, fn.3;
P v. Hines (1997) 15 C4 997, 1041-42.
9th CIR: Marks v. Clarke (9C 1996) 102
F3 1012, 1032, fn.37 ["we have assumed without deciding that
videotaping of the execution of a valid search warrant is
lawful"]. OTHER: US v. Stowe (7C 1996) 100 F3
494, 499 [videotape of search useful to court in determining
whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner];
US v. Myers (8C 1994) 21 F3 826, 828
[officers made a videotape of the search of a farm on which
marijuana was growing, "showing the setup of the farm and the
seizure of approximately 393 marijuana plants and large amount of
marijuana-growing equipment"].

[24] CAL: Oziel v.
Superior Court (1990) 223 CA3 1284, 1294.

[25] USSC: Michigan v.
Summers (1981) 452 US 692, 702-3 ["The risk of harm to both
the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers
routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation."];
Bailey v. US (2013) 568 US 186, 195 ["When law enforcement
officers execute a search warrant, safety considerations require
that they secure the premises"]; Los Angeles County
v. Rettele (2007) 550 US 609, 615. OTHER:
US v. Fountain (6C 1993) 2 F3 656, 663 ["When
police obtain a warrant to search the home of a citizen, they
concomitantly receive certain limited rights to occupy and control
the property."].

[26] USSC: Muehler v.
Mena (2005) 544 US 93, 100 ["The duration of the detention
can, of course, affect the balance of interests. However, the 2-
to 3-hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh
the government's continuing safety interests," edited.];
County of Los Angeles v. Rettele (2007) 550 US 609, 614-15.
CAL: P v. Gabriel (1986) 188 CA3 1261, 1265
[two-hour detention not unreasonable since there was no reason to
believe the officers "in any way delayed the search"];
P v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 374 ["the officers may
constitutionally detain him or her for the period of time required
and in the manner necessary to make those determinations and to
protect the safety of all present during the detention"].
9th CIR: Franklin v. Foxworth (9C
1994) 31 F3 873, 876 ["A detention conducted in connection with a
search may be unreasonable if it is unnecessarily prolonged,".
OTHER: US v. Bullock (7C 2011) 632 F3
1004, 1011 [detention pending completion of search was permitted
because "officers had articulable basis for suspecting that
Bullock was engaged in drug activity from that residence"];
Croom v. Balkwill (11C 2011) 645 F3 1240,
1250-51 [two-hour detention was reasonable]. COMPARE:
Meredith v. Erath (9C 2003) 342 F3 1057, 1062 [handcuffing
not justified because there was "no reason to believe that the
occupants were dangerous"];
Heitschmidt v. City of Houston (5C 1998) 161 F3 834, 838
["Heitschmidt was then detained in pain without a restroom break
for more than four hours"]; Burchett v. Kiefer (6C 2002)
310 F3 937, 945 [detainee was confined in a police car with the
windows rolled up in 900 heat for three hours];
Ganwich v. Knapp (9C 2003) 319 F3 1115, 1120 ["it was not
at all reasonable to condition the [detainee's] release on their
submission to interrogation"].

[27] USSC: Bailey v. US (2013)
568 US 186, 197 ["And, where there are grounds to believe the
departing occupant is dangerous, or involved in criminal activity,
police will generally not need Summers to detain him at
least for brief questioning, as they can rely instead on
Terry."].

[28] USSC: Bailey v. US (2013)
568 US 186, 195 [securing premises "may include detaining current
occupants"]; Muehler v. Mena (2005) 544 US
93, 100 ["An officer's authority to detain incident to a search is
categorical; it does not depend on the quantum of proof justifying
detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the
seizure."]; Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 US 692,
705 ["a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted"].
CAL: P v. Gabriel (1986) 188 CA3 1261, 1264
["a search warrant carries with it limited authority to detain
occupants of a residence while a proper search is conducted"];
P v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 368 [there is a
legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the
event incriminating evidence is found and if "there is reason to
suspect the person of involvement in the criminal activities on
the premises"]; P v. Thurman (1989) 209 CA3
817, 823 ["that appellant's posture, at that moment, was
nonthreatening does not in any measure diminish the potential for
sudden armed violence that his presence within the residence
suggested"]. 9th CIR: Ganwich v.
Knapp (9C 2003) 319 F3 1115, 1120 [detention of employees
"prevented any of [them] from fleeing in the event that
incriminating evidence was found."]; US v.
Davis (9C 2008) 530 F3 1069, 1081 [because of the visitor's
apparent connection to the premises, his detention was justified
"in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is
found"]. OTHER: US v. Fountain (6C
1993) 2 F3 656, 663 [the concerns that justify the detention of
people inside a house being searched for drugs "are the same
regardless of whether the individuals present in the home being
searched are residents or visitors"]; US v.
Sanchez (10C 2009) 555 F3 910, 918 ["the authority to
detain relates to all persons present on the premises"];
US v. Johnson (8C 2008) 528 F3 575, 579
["Because a neutral magistrate has already found probable cause to
search the home, there is naturally an articulable and
individualized suspicion of criminal activity that justifies the
detention of the home's occupants."]; Burchett v.
Kiefer (6C 2002) 310 F3 937, 943 ["the Supreme Court's
discussion of 'occupants' in Summers included nonresidents
who are present at the scene of a search when police arrive"].

[29] USSC: Bailey v. US (2013)
568 US 186, 193-94 [citing the transcript of oral argument in
Summers, the Court noted that Summers "was detained on a
walk leading down from the front steps of the house"].
OTHER: Croom v. Balkwill (11C
2011) 645 F3 1240, 1250 [detainee was in the front yard after
signing for a package addressed to the occupant]; US
v. Sanchez (10C 2009) 555 F3 910, 918 ["Although Mr.
Sanchez may not have been inside the home, he was on the premises
to be searched (which included the home's curtilage). He was
clearly not just a passerby"].

[30] USSC: Ybarra v.
Illinois (1979) 444 US 85, 91-93. CAL: P v.
Ingram (1993) 16 CA4 1745, 1752-53 ["when executing a
search warrant at a business open to the public, law enforcement
officers may detain those persons on the premises when the
circumstances create a reasonable suspicion"].

[31] CAL: P v.
Huerta (1990) 218 CA3 744, 749 ["When defendant entered the
residence without knocking or announcing his presence the officers
executing the warrant had reason to believe defendant was directly
connected to the premises in some way."];
P v. Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 374 ["When, in the course of
initiating a search under warrant of a private residence for
illegal drugs or related items, police officers encounter on the
premises a person whose identity and connection to the premises
are unknown and cannot immediately be determined without detaining
the person, the officers may constitutionally detain him or her
for the period of time required and in the manner necessary to
make those determinations and to protect the safety of all present
during the detention."]; P v. Tenney (1972) 25 CA3 16, 20
["defendant opened [the door], looked inside for a few seconds,
turned around and ran from the premises"]; P v.
Fay (1986) 184 CA3 882, 892-93 ["Once Totah had entered the
apartment building and was seen standing in front of the apartment
about to insert keys into the lock, the officers had reasonable
grounds to believe that he was a resident of the apartment"];
P v. Roach (1971) 15 CA3 628, 632 [when an officer answered
the door, the suspect walked right in]. 9th CIR:
US v. Davis (9C 2008) 530 F3 1069, 1081 ["Davis had passed
through an electric gate which was closed, and to which only a
limited number of parties had the code"]. OTHER: US
v. Denny (7C 1985) 771 F2 318, 322 [suspect drove up
to the house at a "high rate of speed"]; Burchett
v. Kiefer (6C 2002) 310 F3 937, 943-44 [officers may
detain a person "who approaches a property being searched pursuant
to a warrant, pauses at the property line, and flees when the
officers instruct him to get down"]; US v.
Hauk (10C 2005) 412 F3 1179, 1192 [the suspect's "apparent
entry into Mr. Hauk's house without knocking or requiring
permission to enter gave the police reason to think that [he] was
either the householder or a close associate"]; US
v. Bohannon (6C 2000) 225 F3 615, 617 ["James showed
every intention of walking into the house"];
US v. Jennings (7C 2008) 544 F3 815, 818-19 [just before
the search began, defendant drove up to the premises and parked
within the SWAT team's security perimeter]. NOTE: In
P v. Gallant (1990) 225 CA3 200, 211 the court said, "Thus,
while the police are free to question a visitor, such as
defendant, to ascertain his connection to the premises, they
cannot detain him to do so unless they have specific, articulable
facts indicating such a connection." This is nonsense. If they had
such facts, they wouldn't need to question him. See
P v. Samples (1996) 48 CA4 1197, 1206 ["because the factual
circumstances present [in Gallant] are so similar to those
in Glaser that the later and unanimous decision of our
Supreme Court in that case seems to us to substantially eclipse
the authority of Gallant."].

[32] USSC: Bailey v. US (2013)
568 US 186, 201 ["A spatial constraint defined by the immediate
vicinity of the premises to be searched is therefore required for
detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant."].
OTHER: US v. Freeman (8C 2020) 964 F3 774, 777
[detention of occupants of vehicle parked in driveway of target
house]. NOTE: In determining whether a suspect was in the
immediate vicinity of the premises, the courts may consider "the
lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was within the
line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the
occupant's location, and other relevant factors."
Bailey v. US (2013) 568 US 186, 201.

[33] USSC: Bailey v. US (2013)
_568 US 186, 196 [Bailey was "apparently without knowledge of the
search" and he "posed little risk to the officers at the scene"].

[34] USSC: Michigan
v. Summers (1981) 452 US 692, 702 ["the execution of
a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that
may give rise to sudden violence"]. CAL: P v.
Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 367 ["The police interest in
protecting against violence during the search of a home for
narcotics has been widely recognized."]; P v.
Thurman (1989) 209 CA3 817, 822 ["where police officers are
called upon to execute a warranted search for narcotics within a
private residence they have the lawful right to conduct a limited
Terry patdown search for weapons upon the occupants present
while the search is in progress"]; P v. Roach (1971)
15 CA3 628, 632 ["Defendants' self-induced presence at an
apartment where dangerous drugs were sold provided rational
support for [the officer's belief that they were dangerous"].
OTHER: US v. Stowe (7C 1996) 100 F3
494, 499 ["Guns and drugs together distinguish the millions
of homes where guns are present from those housing potentially
dangerous drug dealers—an important narrowing factor."].

[35] CAL: P v.
Glaser (1995) 11 C4 354, 365 [detainee "appeared to be more
than a stranger or casual visitor"]; P v.
Huerta (1990) 218 CA3 744, 750 ["It was reasonable to
believe a person entering a residence of illicit drug activity
might be armed."]; P v. Galant (1990) 225 CA3 200;
P v. Roach (1971) 15 CA3 628; P v.
Samples (1996) 48 CA4 1197.

[36] 9th CIR:
Meredith v. Erath (9C 2003) 342 F3 1057 ["detaining a
person in handcuffs during the execution of a warrant to search
for evidence is permissible, but only when justified by the
totality of the circumstances"].

[37] USSC: Muehler v.
Mena (2005) 544 US 93, 100 ["this safety risk inherent in
executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify
the use of handcuffs"].

[38] 9th CIR: Franklin
v. Foxworth (9C 1994) 31 F3 873, 876 ["A detention
conducted in connection with a search may be unreasonable if it is
unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged, or if it involves
an undue invasion of privacy."]. OTHER:
Heitschmidt v. City of Houston (5C 1998) 161 F3 834, 839
["Once the premises were secure and police were proceeding with
their work without interference, there was no justification for
prolonging the physically intrusive aspect of [the suspect's]
detention."].

[39] CAL: P v.
McCarter (1981) 117 CA3 894, 908 ["no
Ramey violation as to Shope could have occurred under the
present facts since the police had judicial authorization to enter
her home via a validly issued and executed search warrant"];
P v. Palmquist (1981) 123 CA3 1, 15 ["Since the
officers had authorization to enter the home to search, the arrest
inside was of no constitutional significance."]; P v.
Lewis (1999) 74 CA4 662, 672 ["The ability and authority to
enter for purposes of searching appear to mean that the interest
behind the Payton-Ramey rule in preserving the sanctity of
the home as already been compromised."].

[40] CAL: P v.
Gallegos (2002) 96 CA4 612, 628, fn.13.

[41] 9th CIR: Hells Angels
v. City of San Jose (9C 2005) 402 F3 962. 976
["despite a week to plan for the entry, the officers developed no
realistic plan other than shooting the dogs"].

[42] QUOTE FROM: Nunes
v. Superior Court (1980) 100 CA3 915, 935-36;
P v. Calabrese (2002) 101 CA4 79, 84-85.
ALSO SEE: Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 US 213, 236
["the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or
search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive
police conduct"].

[43] USSC: US v.
Grubbs (2006) 547 US 90, 99 [neither the Fourth Amendment
nor Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require
that officers must present the warrant to the property owner upon
entry].

[44] USSC:
Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 251 ["The scope of a
search is generally defined by its expressed object."];
US v. Ross (1982) 456 US 798, 821 ["a warrant that
authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also
provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and
containers in which the weapon might be found"]; Maryland
v. Garrison (1987) 480 US 79, 84-85 ["probable cause
to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van
will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase"]. CAL:
P v. Berry (1990) 224 CA3 162, 167 ["officers may
lawfully search all of the residents' personal effects which are
plausible repositories of the contraband described in the
warrant"]; P v. Gallegos (2002) 96 CA4 612, 626
["The officers did not seek an elephant in a breadbox."];
P v. Senkir (1972) 26 CA3 411, 420 [search for
indicia: minute search OK]; P v.
Superior Court (Meyers) (1979) 25 C3 67, 77 ["The warrant
itself authorized a search which would explore into every corner
and cranny which might conceal items as small as a jewelry pin."];
P v. Smith (1994) 21 CA4 942, 950 ["Officer Giese
testified that cocaine 'can be hidden anywhere. Buried on a piece
of property. Can be hidden in barns, under the house, attics,
sheds, buildings. Anywhere you can put anything, it can be
hidden.'"]; Skelton v. Superior Court (1969)
1 C3 144, 158 ["Since the warrant mandated a search for and
seizure of several small and easily secreted items, the officers
had the authority to conduct an intensive search of the entire
house, looking into any places where they might reasonably expect
such items to be hidden."]; P v. Kibblewhite (1986)
178 CA3 783, 785 ["A search of the residence authorizes the search
of all areas of the residence, including containers therein, which
could hold the contraband described in the warrant."];
P v. Sanchez (1972) 24 CA3 664, 679 ["The authorization to
search for heroin necessarily included an authorization for a
search of any place in which peyote or barbiturates might be
hidden."]; P v. Minder (1996) 46 CA4 1784, 1788
[safe near back porch]. 9th CIR: US v.
Gomez-Soto (9C 1983) 723 F2 649, 655 ["A briefcase would be
a logical container for any of the many things specifically
described in the warrant."]. OTHER: US v. Evans (7C
1996) 92 F3 540, 543 [if officers are looking for a "canary's
corpse," they may search "a cupboard, but not a locket," and if
they are looking for an "adolescent hippopotamus," they may search
"the living room or garage but not the microwave oven"];
US v. Darr (8C 2011) 661 F3 375, 379 ["The cooler and tin
could have held the items specified in the first warrant"];
US v. Rogers (1C 2008) 521 F3 5, 9-10 ["as a
general proposition, any container situated within residential
premises which are the subject of a validly-issued warrant may be
searched if it is reasonable to believe that the container could
conceal items of the kind portrayed in the warrant"].

[45] CAL: P v. Kraft (2000) 23
C4 978, 1043 [the officers "merely looked in a spot where the
specified evidence of crime plausibly could be found, even if it
was not a place where photographs normally are stored"];
P v. Smith (1994) 21 CA4 942, 950 [drug dealers "usually
attempt to secrete contraband where the police cannot find it"].

[46] QUOTE FROM: US
v. Rogers (1C 2008) 521 F3 5, 10. CAL: P v.
Minder (1996) 46 CA4 1784, 1788 [warrants must be
interpreted "in a commonsense and realistic fashion"];
P v. Balint (2006) 138 CA4 200, 207 ["officers
executing a search warrant are required to interpret it, and they
are not obliged to interpret it narrowly"];
P v. Rangel (2012) 206 CA4 1310, 1315-16;
P v. Nguyen (2017) 12 CA5 574, 582. OTHER:
US v. Aljabari (7C 2010) 626 F3 940, 947 ["The execution of
a warrant will often require some interpretation of the warrant's
terms. A warrant that seems unambiguous to a magistrate in the
confines of the courthouse may not be so clear during the
execution of the search, as officers encounter new information not
available when they applied for the warrant."].

[47] CAL: P v. Gallegos (2002)
96 CA4 612, 624 [suppression of all evidence is not required
"unless the officers flagrantly disregard the scope of the
warrant"]; P v. Bradford (1997) 15 C4 1229, 1306 ["Assuming
that the remedy of total suppression is required when police
conduct is in flagrant disregard of the limits of the warrant, the
application of that extreme remedy was not warranted," edited.].
OTHER: US v. Ganis (2C 2014) 755 F3 125, 136 ["The
Government effects a 'widespread seizure of items' beyond the
scope of the warrant when the Government's search resembles a
general search."]; US v. Garcia (6C 2007) 496 F3 495, 507
["A search pursuant to a valid warrant may devolve into an invalid
general search if the officers flagrantly disregard the
limitations of the search warrant."]; US v.
Kimbrough (5C 1995) 69 F3 723, 728 ["Blatant disregard by
executing officers of the language of a search warrant can
transform an otherwise valid search into a general one and, thus,
mandate suppression of all evidence seized during the search."].

[48] 9th CIR: US v. Whitten (9C
1983) 706 F2 1000, 1010. OTHER: US v. Aljabari (7C
2010) 626 F3 940, 947.

[49] CAL:
P v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 97 ["a
valid warrant to search a vehicle brings with it authorization to
seize it for the time reasonably needed to undertake the lawful
search"]. OTHER: US v. Hill (8C 2021) 8 F4 757, 760
["A vehicle found on a premises (except, for example, the vehicle
of a guest or other caller) is considered to be included within
the scope of a warrant authorizing a search of that premises."].

[50] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1546.1(d).

[51] NOTE: The term "single living
unit" is loosely defined as a place that is occupied by relatives
or roommates who generally have express or implied authority to
enter most or all rooms in the building, at least temporarily. See
P v. Gorg (1958) 157 CA2 515, 523 [Here, the living unit
was one distinct unit occupied by three persons."]; P v.
Govea (1965) 235 CA2 285, 300 [court indicates that
a house does not become a multi-occupant building merely because
the owner has permitted a family to temporarily occupy a separate
bedroom]; Hemler v. Superior Court (1975) 44
CA3 430, 433 ["The rule that a search warrant for one living unit
cannot be used to justify a search of other units within a
multiple dwelling area does not apply where all of the rooms in a
residence constitute one living unit."].

[52] CAL: P v. Barbarick (1985)
168 CA3 731, 740-41 [garden area]; P v. Garnett (1970) 6
CA3 280, 285 ["the object of the authorized search was clearly the
whole building, and not any specific portion thereof"].
9th CIR: US v. Becker (9C 1991) 929 F2 442, 446
[yard]; US v. Gorman (9C 1996) 104 F3 272, 274 [yard].
OTHER: US v. Ferreras (1C 1999) 192 F3 5, 10-11
["the attic was not independent from the second floor living
quarters"].

[53] CAL: P v. Gorg (1958) 157
CA2 515, 523 [after finding drugs in the named suspect's bedroom,
the officers "acted as reasonable and prudent men in searching the
other two bedrooms that were unlocked and an integral part of the
same living quarters"]; Hemler v. Superior Court (1975) 44
CA3 430, 433 ["At most, the evidence shows that three individuals
lived in the residence, sharing the living room, bathroom, kitchen
and hallways, and that defendant's bedroom opened onto the other
rooms and was not locked."]. 9th CIR:
US v. Ayers (9C 1990) 924 F2 1468, 1480 ["A search warrant
for the entire premises of a single family residence is valid,
notwithstanding the fact that it was issued based on information
regarding the alleged illegal activities of one of several
occupants of the residence."]; US v.
Whitten (9C 1983) 706 F2 1000, 1006 ["But a warrant may
authorize a search of an entire street address while reciting
probable cause as to only a portion of the premises if they are
occupied in common rather than individually, if a multiunit
building is used as a single entity, if the defendant was in
control of the whole premises, or if the entire premises are
suspect."]. OTHER: US v. Darr (8C 2011) 661 F3 375,
379 ["officers did not exceed [the warrant's] scope by searching
Darr's bedroom, even though the warrant was issued based on
information about activities of Darr, Sr."];
US v. Kyles (2C 1994) 40 F3 519, 524 ["The FBI agents had
no reason to believe that Geoffrey's room was a separate
residence"].

[54] CAL: P v. Nguyen (2017) 12
CA5 574, 583 ["the record holds no evidence Nguyen's residence was
used in connection with the main house, or that it served as
anything else besides a separate residence for Nguyen," edited];
P v. Grossman (1971) 19 CA3 8, 12 [cabinet in
carport]; P v. Smith (1994) 21 CA4 942, 949-50
[barn]; P v. Barbarick (1985) 168 CA3 731, 740
[yard]. 9th CIR: US v. Cannon (9C 2001) 264 F3 875,
880 [the storage rooms "are curtilage of the main house and within
the embrace of the warrant"]; US v.
Gorman (9C 1996) 104 F3 272, 274 ["The curtilage is simply
an extension of the residence's living area, and we have
previously held that such extensions become part of the residence
for purposes of a search warrant."]; US v.
Frazin (9C 1986) 780 F2 1461, 1467 [attached garage];
US v. Becker (9C 1991) 929 F2 442, 444
[yard]). OTHER: US v. Paull (6C 2009)
551 F3 516, 523 ["a warrant for the search of a specified
residence or premises authorizes the search of auxiliary and
outbuildings within the curtilage"]; US v.
Principe (1C 1974) 499 F2 1135 [cabinet three to six feet
from entrance to apartment]; US v.
Ferreras (1C 1999) 192 F3 5, 10 [attic];
US v. Aljabari (7C 2010) 626 F3 940, 947 [no obvious
boundary between searchable apartment and loading dock];
US v. Asselin (1C 1985) 775 F2 445, 447 [birdhouse].

[55] CAL: P v. Dumas (1973) 9 C3
871, 881, fn.5 ["a warrant to search 'premises' located at a
particular address is sufficient to support the search of
outbuildings and appurtenances in addition to a main building when
the various places searched are part of a single integral unit"];
P v. Mack (1977) 66 CA3 839, 859 ["The word
'premises' as used in the warrant embraces both the house and
garage."]; P v. Weagley (1990) 218 CA3 569, 573
[warrant authorizing the search of certain "premises" authorized a
search of a mailbox]; P v. McNabb (1991) 228 CA3
462, 469 ["The word 'premises' in a search warrant describing a
house with a detached garage has been held to embrace both the
house and the garage."]; P v. Minder (1996) 46 CA4 1784,
1788-89 [search of "premises" impliedly authorized search of safe
"near the back porch of the house and about one to two feet
outside an outer wall"]; P v. Grossman (1971) 19 CA3 8, 12
[warrant to search "the premises located and described as 13328
Merkel Ave., Apt. A" impliedly authorized a search of a cabinet in
the carport marked "A"]. OTHER: US v.
Bonner (1C 1986) 808 F2 864, 868 ["In the present case, the
word 'properties' was used in the warrant instead of 'premises';
these words are sufficiently synonymous to be considered
interchangeable."]; US v. Paull (6C.2009) 551 F3 516, 523
[implied authorization to search garage].

[56] CAL: P v. MacAvoy
(1984) 162 CA3 746, 754 [warrant was void because it would allow
the officers to search every part of the fraternity house, while
probable cause existed to search only appellant's room];
P v. Estrada (1965) 234 CA2 136, 146 [warrant for
apartment house or building is void unless there is probable cause
to search each unit]; P v. Joubert (1983) 140 CA3 946,
949-52 [warrant authorizing search of several buildings on a
28-acre parcel was overbroad because, among other things, "the
existence of multiple roads going to and from each of the
residences and the existence of multiple dwellings" indicated
there were several separate parcels]. 9th CIR: Mena
v. Simi Valley (9C 2000) 226 F3 1031, 1038.
OTHER: US v. Kyles (2C 1994) 40 F3
519, 524. ALSO SEE: US v. Evans (7C 1996) 92 F3 540,
544 [warrant to search the suspect's garage in an apartment
building does not permit the search of all cars in the garage].

[57] USSC:
Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) 444 US 85, 92, fn.4 ["a warrant
to search a place cannot normally be construed to authorize a
search of each individual in that place"];
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 US 295, 303;
US v. Di Re (1948) 332 US 58. CAL:
P v. Reyes (1980) 223 CA3 1218, 1225-26; P v.
Tenney (1972) 25 CA3 16, 22; Lohman v.
Superior Court (1977) 69 CA3 894, 900; P v.
McLean (1961) 56 C2 660, 663; Pen. Code§ 1525
[affidavit must contain the name or description of the person].
OTHER: US v. Micheli (1C 1973) 487 F2 429, 431 ["A
search of clothing currently worn is plainly within the ambit of a
personal search and outside the scope of a warrant to search the
premises."].

[58] OTHER: US v. Shabazz (11C
2018) 887 F3 1204, 1215 ["the pockets of [an unworn] pair of pants
are a reasonable place to look for debit cards"].

[59] CAL: P v.
Bracamonte (1975) 15 C3 394, 401 ["the warrant was not
intended to authorize intrusions beyond the surfaces of their
bodies"]; Jauregui v. Superior Court (1986)
179 CA3 1160, 1164 ["While the prosecution argues the magistrate
intended to issue a warrant authorizing a body intrusion, it
concedes the warrant is defective for failing to so specify."].

[60] OTHER: US v.
Pennington (8C 2002) 287 F3 739, 745 ["a vehicle found on a
premises (except, for example, the vehicle of a guest or other
caller) is considered to be included within the scope of a warrant
authorizing a search of that premises"]; US v.
Patterson (4C 2002) 278 F3 315, 318 ["Where a warrant
authorizes the search of an entire property or premises, the scope
of the warrant includes automobiles on the property or premises
that are owned by or are under the dominion and control of the
premises owner or which reasonably appear to be so controlled."];
US v. Evans (7C 1996) 92 F3 540,
543-44 ["Although the police happen to know that the car they were
searching was Fort's, it does not matter whose it is unless it
obviously belonged to someone wholly uninvolved in the criminal
activities going on in the house."].

[61] CAL: P v.
Gallegos (2002) 96 CA4 612, 626 [warrant to search
"premises" authorized a search of a motor home and truck on the
premises].

[62] CAL: P v.
Childress (1979) 99 CA3 36, 42-43. COMPARE:
P v. Dumas (1973) 9 C3 871, 880.

[63] CAL: P v.
Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 97
["taking Nasmeh's seized vehicle to the crime laboratory to search
for and conduct a scientific analysis of trace items did not
offend the Fourth Amendment"]. ALSO SEE: P v.
Kibblewhite (1986) 178 CA3 783, 785-86 [OK to impound
locked safe to have it opened by a locksmith].

[64] CAL: P v.
McCabe (1983) 144 CA3 827, 830 [officers "may lawfully
search the personal effects of a resident of the premises"];
P v. Saam (1980) 106 CA3 789, 794 [officers may
search personal property which is reasonably believed to belong to
a resident].

[65] CAL: P v.
Frederick (2006) 142 CA4 400, 411 ["The bag contained no
identifying marks and officers were not required to believe
Frederick's statement that the bag belonged to her."];
P v. McCabe (1983) 144 CA3 827, 830 ["The police may
ordinarily assume that all personal property which they find while
executing a search warrant is the property of a residence of the
premises subject to search."]; P v. Saam (1980) 106
CA3 789, 794 [officers may search personal property which is
reasonably believed to belong to a resident]. OTHER:
US v. Gray (1C 1987) 814 F2 49, 51 ["the
jacket itself was bereft of any external indicia of ownership"];
US v. Evans (7C 1996) 92 F3 540, 543
["unless it is apparent that the trunk does not belong to anyone
connected with the illegal activity—a condition that will rarely
be satisfied—the police can search the trunk and if it happens to
contain evidence that the guest is a criminal after all, albeit
innocent of any involvement in the criminal activities of his
host, he is out of luck"]. COMPARE: P v.
Reyes (1990) 223 CA3 1218, 1224 ["there is simply no basis
for concluding that the officers had actual knowledge of
defendant's status."].

[66] CAL: P v. Berry (1990) 224
CA3 162, 169 [officers lawfully searched a visitor's purse because
they found it on a chair in the bedroom where a large quantity of
methamphetamine had been found]; P v.
Frederick (2006) 142 CA4 400, 411 [defendant was not a
casual visitor, as she "ate meals and stayed there from time to
time. The duffel bag was on the bed in the bedroom in which she
stayed as a guest. Thus, she had more than just a temporary
presence in the residence."]. OTHER:
US v. Micheli (1C 1973) 487 F2 429, 432 [as co-owner of the
suspect premises, defendant "had a special relation to the
place"]; US v. Gray (1C 1987) 814 F2 49, 51 [defendant "was
discovered in a private residence, outside of which a drug deal
had just 'gone down' at the unusual hour of 3:35 a.m."].

[67] CAL: P v.
Frederick (2006) 142 CA4 400, 411 [suspect "ate meals and
stayed there from time to time. The duffel bag was on the bed in
the bedroom in which she stayed as a guest. Thus, she had more
than just a temporary presence in the residence."]. OTHER:
US v. Simmermaker (8C 2021) 998 F3 1008, 1010 ["A visitor's
privacy interest is complicated when the visitor is connected to
the illegal activity at the location that creates the basis for
the search warrant"; here the connection was a valid factor
because officers found the visitor "on the couch, asleep, with a
meth pipe next to her"].

[68] OTHER: US v.
Giwa (5C 1987) 831 F2 538, 544-45 [OK to search visitor's
flight bag where the visitor was an overnight guest who was alone
in the residence when officers arrived]; US v.
Gray (1C 1987) 814 F2 49, 51-52 [OK to search a visitor's
jacket where the visitor was alone in the house "outside of which
a drug deal had just 'gone down,' at the unusual hour of 3:35
a.m."].

[69] QUOTE FROM:
P v. McCabe (1983) 144 CA3 827, 830.

[70] CAL: P v. Suarez (2020) 10
C5 116, 153 ["Because the warrant authorized a search of this
residence, it also authorized without so stating the search of the
resident's curtilage."]. ALSO SEE: US v.
Reilly (2C 1996) 76 F3 1271, 1281 ["the boundaries of
curtilage are naturally and necessarily imprecise"].

[71] CAL: P v.
Estrada (1965) 234 CA2 136 [garbage can outside the
apartment building]; P v. Weagley (1990) 218 CA3 569
[mailbox]. 9th CIR: US v. Cannon (9C
2001) 264 F3 875, 880 ["If a search warrant specifying only the
residence permits the search of closets, chests, drawers, and
containers therein where the object searched for might be found,
so should it permit the search of similar receptacles located in
the outdoor extension of the residence"].

[72] CAL: P v.
Kibblewhite (1986) 178 CA3 783, 785 ["A safe, by
definition, is a very secure container."].

[73] CAL: P v.
Kibblewhite (1986) 178 CA3 783, 785-86. OTHER:
US v. Church (6C 2016) 823 F3 351, 357 ["Here, the police
did not break open the safe capriciously: they had probable cause
to believe there might be drugs inside; Church refused to provide
the safe's combination; and thus the police had no choice but to
open it by force."]. NOTE: If, at the request of officers,
the owner states the combination to the safe, the owner's
statement may be suppressed if he was "in custody" at the time and
had not waived his Miranda rights. P v.
Pompa (1989) 212 CA3 1308, 1312-13.

[74] CAL: P v. Gallegos (2002)
96 CA4 612, 626 ["Documents may be stored in many areas of a home,
car, motor home or garage. It is not unusual for documents to be
stored in drawers or closets, on shelves, in containers, or even
in duffle bags." Edited]; P v. Eubanks (2011) 53 C4 110,
135 [officers who were searching for indicia "were entitled to
search through trash cans and to look at any paper items inside
the home"]. OTHER: US v. Romo-Corrales (8C 2010) 592
F3 915, 920 [indicia "can obviously fit into small spaces and
containers and, therefore, could be hidden in numerous locations
in a residence."].

[75] USSC: Andresen v.
Maryland (1976) 427 US 463, 482, fn.11 ["In searches for
papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be
examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they
are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized."].
CAL: US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3 71, 100
["traditional searches for paper records, like searches for
electronic records, have always entailed the exposure of records
that are not the objects of the search at least superficial
examination order to identify and seize those records that are"];
P v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 C3 551, 575; P v.
Alcala (1992) 4 C4 742, 799 ["law enforcement officers
would be unable to conduct a search for a rental receipt were they
prohibited from reading papers found during the course of an
authorized search."]. OTHER: US v. Moon (11C 2022)
33 F4 1284, 1297 ["When a warrant authorizes the seizure of
documents, an officer acting pursuant to such a warrant is
entitled to examine any document he discovers, in order "t
perceive the relevance of the documents to the crime."];
US v. Bruce (6C 2005) 396 F3 697, 710 ["the officers were
entitled—and, in fact obligated—to review any papers they found
during the search, at least to the extent necessary to determine
whether they showed ownership and/or control of illegal drugs"];
US v. Santarelli (11C 1985) 778 F2 609,
615-16 ["the agents were entitled to examine each document to
determine whether it constituted evidence they were entitled to
seize under the warrant," edited]. COMPARE:
US v. Garcia (6C 2007) 496 F3 495, 511
[because warrant did not authorize a seizure of documents,
officers could not read any unless, by merely glancing at the
document, they determined that probable cause existed].

[76] CAL: P v.
Britton (1984) 156 CA3 689, 701 [officers are not required
to accept as true a suspect's representations that would
effectively limit the scope of a search];
P v. Icenogle (1977) 71 CA3 576, 585; P v.
Reynolds (1976) 55 CA3 357, 365. 9th CIR: US
v. Tamura (9C 1982) 694 F2 591, 595 ["all items in a
set of files may be inspected during a search, provided that
sufficiently specific guidelines for identifying the documents
sought are provided in the search warrant and are followed by the
officers conducting the search"]. OTHER: US
v. Riley (2C 1990) 906 F2 841, 845 ["few people keep
documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked 'drug
records'"]; US v. Turner (1C 1999) 169 F3 84,
86, fn.2 ["we doubt seriously whether his deceptive labeling of an
individual container (e.g., 'Flour') would preclude a consensual
search, provided the container was capable of holding whatever
contraband was the target"].

[77] OTHER: US v.
Santarelli (11C 1985) 778 F2 609, 616 ["The district court
estimated that a brief examination of each document would have
taken several days. Under these circumstances, we believe that the
agents acted reasonably when they removed the documents to another
location for subsequent examination."]; US v.
Horn (8C 1999) 187 F3 781, 788 ["Since we think [the
officers] could not practically view more than 300 videos at the
search site, we hold that the officers did not exceed the scope of
the warrant by seizing Mr. Horn's video collection in its entirety
for examination elsewhere."]; US v.
Alexander (8C 2009) 574 F3 484, 490 ["Furthermore, it would
have been difficult, and possibly more intrusive to Alexander's
privacy, for law enforcement to conduct an on-site review of each
of more than 600 photographs to determine whether they were
evidence of illegal conduct."].

[78] CAL: P v. Kraft (2000) 23
C4 978, 1045 ["at the time of the search it may have appeared the
binder could contain information showing who was in possession of
the car, information indicating some relationship between the
victim and defendant, or information concerning a motive for
murder"]. 9th CIR: US v. Beusch (9C
1979) 596 F2 871, 876 [court rejects the argument that "pages in a
single volume of written material must be separated by searchers
so that only those pages which actually contain the evidence
sought may be seized."]; US v. Hay (9C 2000)
231 F3 630, 637. OTHER: US v.
Wuagneux (11C 1982) 683 F2 1343, 1353 ["It was also
reasonable for the agents to remove intact files, books and
folders when a particular document within the file was identified
as falling within the scope of the warrant. To require otherwise
would substantially increase the time required to conduct the
search, thereby aggravating the intrusiveness of the search."];
Marvin v. US (8C 1984) 732 F2 669,
675.

[79] 9th CIR:
Hells Angels v. City of San Jose (9C 2005) 402 F3 962.
972-74. ALSO SEE: US v. Ulbricht (2C 2017) 858 F3
71, 100 ["And in many cases, the volume of records properly
subject to seizure because of their evidentiary value may be
vast."].

[80] CAL: P v. Sandoval
(1966) 65 C2 303, 308; P v. Ledesma (2006) 39 C4
641, 704 [officers "had reason to believe that the incoming call
would be from defendant and that, by answering it, they would
obtain information leading to his imminent capture."];
P v. Drieslein (1985) 170 CA3 591, 599-602;
P v. Vanvalkenburgh (1983) 145 CA3 163, 167.
OTHER: US v. Stiver (3C 1993) 9
F3 298, 302-3. NOTE: The caller's statements may be
admissible as circumstantial evidence that the premises were being
used for an illegal purpose. P v. Morgan (2005) 125
CA4 935.

[81] CAL: P v.
Gabriel (1986) 188 CA3 1261, 1265 ["the record is devoid of
any evidence that the officers engaged in any misconduct or in any
way delayed the search"]; P v. Gallegos (2002) 96
CA4 612, 625 ["while the search lasted approximately seven hours,
this was not necessarily unreasonable given that officers searched
the residence, truck, garage, and motor home. It goes without
saying that the review of even a box of documents can take
substantial time [moreover] the garage was cluttered, making a
search more time consuming," edited]; P v.
Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 CA4 85, 98-99
[holding car for 12 days for scientific testing was reasonable].
OTHER: Walker v. Weatherspoon (7C 2018) 900 F3 354,
358 ["It took a while for the officers to sort through the debris,
locate the gun, search for drugs, and determine whether T lived in
or used the house. It cannot be called unreasonable to take two
hours to accomplish these things."]; US v.
Squillacote (4C 2000) 221 F3 542, 557 [six-day search not
excessive "given the number and type of items that can be evidence
of espionage-related activities"]. ALSO SEE: US
v. Bach (8C 2002) 310 F3 1063, 1067 ["If a practice
substantially increases the time required to conduct the search,
thereby aggravating the intrusiveness of the search, then it may
be reasonable to avoid that practice."].

[82] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Torres (10C 1981) 663 F2 1019, 1027. OTHER:
US v. Snow (2C 1995) 44 F3 133, 135 ["The
word 'search' carries a common meaning to the average person.
Dictionary definitions furnish some guide: 'to go over or look
through for the purpose of finding something; explore, rummage;
examine,' 'to examine closely and carefully; test and try; probe,'
'to find out or uncover by investigation'"]. ALSO SEE:
Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 500 US 248, 251-52;
P v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 CA4 1403, 1415 ["a
consent search, to be effective, must be thorough"].

[83] USSC: US v.
Ramirez (1998) 523 US 65, 71 ["Excessive or unnecessary
destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the
Fourth Amendment"]; Dalia v. US (1979) 441 US
238, 258 ["officers executing search warrants on occasion must
damage property in order to perform their duty"]; US
v. Ross (1982) 456 US 798, 818 [noting that in
Carroll v. US (1924) 267 US 132 the Court
ruled that prohibition agents did not violate the Fourth Amendment
by ripping open the upholstery of Carroll's car because they had
probable cause to believe contraband was hidden under the
upholstery]. CAL: P v. Kibblewhite (1986) 178
CA3 783, 786 [OK to damage safe to get it open]. 9th CIR:
Mena v. Simi Valley (9C 2000) 226 F3 1031,
1041 ["only unnecessary destructive behavior, beyond that
necessary to execute a warrant effectively violates the Fourth
Amendment"]; Liston v. County of Riverside
(9C 1997) 120 F3 965, 979 ["other circuits have held that only
unnecessarily destructive behavior, beyond that necessary to
execute a warrant, effectively violates the Fourth Amendment"];
US v. Becker (9C 1991) 929 F2 442, 446 [using a jackhammer
to break up a recently-poured slab of concrete in the suspect's
backyard was reasonable because officers had "ample reason to
believe that the concrete slab was being utilized to hide the very
evidence they were legally on the premises to find"].
ALSO SEE: Cybernet v. David (4C 2020) 954 F3 162,
168 ["A degree of latitude is fitting—in fact, necessary—because
not all searches are alike: What is reasonably necessary to
execute a search warrant tracks the nature and quantity of the
evidence to be seized. Illegal substances often will be hidden;
stolen goods may be stored to escape the eye; and the relevance of
complex business records may not be obvious at first blush.
Because the needs of any given search will vary, some flexibility
in the execution of a warrant is appropriate."].

[84] USSC: Arizona v.
Hicks (1987) 480 US 321, 327.

[85] 9th CIR: US v.
SDI Future Health, Inc. (9C 2009) 568 F3 684, 699 ["We
consider an affidavit to be part of a warrant, and therefore
potentially curative of any defects, only if (1) the warrant
expressly incorporated the affidavit by reference and (2) the
affidavit either is attached physically to the warrant or at least
accompanies the warrant while agents execute the search."].

[86] CAL: P v. Balint (2006) 138
CA4 200, 208 ["In determining whether seizure of particular items
exceeds the scope of the warrant, courts examine whether the items
are similar to, or the functional equivalent of, items enumerated
in the warrant, as well as containers in which they are reasonably
likely to be found."]. OTHER: US v. Dargan (4C 2013)
738 F3 643, 648 [court rejects argument that "only items listed by
name may be seized during the execution of a search warrant. That
would require officers possessed of incomplete knowledge to
identify ex ante every item of evidence that will be relevant and
the precise form that it will take-a plainly unrealistic
expectation. The officers in the instant case may not have
foreseen that indicia of occupancy located at the residence would
take the form of a sales receipt but, once faced with precisely
that scenario, they were entitled to seize the receipt under a
commonsense reading of the warrant's terms."];
US v. Aguirre (5C 2011) 664 F3 606, 614 ["We have upheld
searches as valid under the particularity requirement where a
searched or seized item was not named in the warrant, either
specifically or by type, but was the functional equivalent of
other items that were adequately described."].

[87] USSC: US v.
Grubbs (2006) 547 US 90, 98 [leaving a copy of the warrant
is not a constitutional requirement]. CAL: P v.
Cesear-Calabrese (2002) 101 CA4 79, 84 ["The United States
Supreme Court accordingly has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment
as requiring suppression of evidence as a remedy for failure to
display the warrant or provide defendant a copy of it."].
9th CIR: US v. Celestine (9C 2003) 324 F3 1095,
1100; US v. Hector (9C 2007) 474 F3 1150,
1154 ["regardless of whether the failure to serve a copy of the
warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary
rule should not be applied in this case"]. OTHER:
US v. Pulliam (10C 2014) 748 F3 967, 973-75; US
v. Sims (7C 2009) 553 F3 580, 584 ["nothing in the
[Fourth] amendment requires that the warrant be shown to the
person whose premises are to be searched"].

[88] QUOTE FROM: US v.
Sims (7C 2009) 553 F3 580, 584.

[89] 9th CIR: US v. Smith (9C
2005) 424 F3 992, 1008 ["the warrant without the affidavit was
facially valid standing alone. The failure to attach the affidavit
does not require suppression."]; US v.
SDI Future Health, Inc. (9C 2009) 568 F3 684, 701.
OTHER: US v. Pulliam (10C 2014) 748 F3 967. 974-75.

[90] 9th CIR: US v.
Celestine (9C 2003) 324 F3 1095.

[91] CAL: Pen. Code§ 1535.
NOTE: In West Covina v.
Perkins (1999) 525 US 234, 240 the Supreme Court ruled that
officers who seized property pursuant to a warrant must "take
reasonable steps to give notice that the property has been taken
so the owner can pursue available remedies for its return." It
seems clear that leaving an inventory as required by Pen.
Code§ 1535 would comply with this requirement.

[92] CAL: Pen. Code§§ 1534, 1537.

[93] CAL: P v.
Clayton (1993) 18 CA4 440, 445.

[94] CAL: P v. Stevenson
(1976) 62 CA3 915.

[95] USSC:
Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 US 433, 449 ["As these items
were constitutionally seized, we do not deem it constitutionally
significant that they were not listed in the return of the
warrant."]. CAL: P v. Larkin (1987) 194 CA3
650, 656; P v. Bowen (1982) 137 CA3 1020, 1034
["Even were we to find a violation of section 1534, it would not
raise an issue of constitutional magnitude and would not result in
the suppression of evidence absent a showing of prejudice to the
defendant."]; P v. Clayton (1993) 18 CA4 440, 446.
9th CIR: US v. Towne (9C 1993) 997 F2
537 542, fn.3 ["California courts uniformly recognize that
statutory provisions covering the filing and return of a search
warrant are ministerial in nature, the violation of which does not
in itself invalidate an otherwise lawful search or require
suppression of evidence seized thereby, at least in the absence of
demonstrated prejudice to the defendant."].

[96] CAL: P v.
James (1990) 219 CA3 414, 420 [the Penal Code "does not
preclude the issuance of several inventories pursuant to a single
search"]; P v. Schroeder (1979) 96 CA3 730, 733 ["A
partial return was presented to the magistrate as to each warrant
within the statutory time and supplemental returns were filed a
few days later when the responding banks had collected the
documents called for."].

[97] CAL: P v.
James (1990) 219 CA3 414, 418-20.

[98] OTHER: US v. Castro (6C
2018) 881 F3 961 ["After law enforcement seizes a device and finds
that it contains incriminating information, a suspect loses the
device to police custody, as the phone and its contents become
evidence for a future prosecution."].

[99] 9th CIR: US v.
Giberson (9C 2008) 527 F3 882, 88 ["it was reasonable for
the officers to believe that seizable items were stored on
Giberson's computer, and to secure the computer and obtain a
specific warrant and search it"]. OTHER:
US v. Galpin (2C 2013) 720 F3 436, 453 ["there is ample
evidence that investigators sought evidence beyond the scope of
the one crime that was particularized in the warrant
application"]; US v. Burgess (10C 2009) 576
F3 1078, 1095 [the officer "immediately closed the gallery view
when he observed a possible criminal violation outside the scope
of the warrant's search authorization and did not renew the search
until he obtained a new warrant"].

[100] OTHER: US v. Garcia (10C
2013) 707 F3 1190, 1197 ["Obtaining a corrected warrant may have
been the better choice, particularly since there was ample time to
do so."].

[101] USSC:
Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 US 79, 85 ["Plainly, if the
officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there
were two separate dwelling units on the third floor they would
have been obligated to exclude respondent's apartment from the
scope of the requested warrant," edited.]. COMPARE:
Mena v. City of Simi Valley (9C 2000) 226 F3 1031, 1037
[although the warrant inaccurately described the place to be
searched as a single-family residence (several families lived in
separate bedrooms), the court noted there was "absolutely no
evidence in the record sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact that [the officers] knew or should have known prior
to the application of the warrant that the Mena residence was a
multi-unit building."].