Chapter 19: Exigent Circumstances

[1] QUOTES FROM: Michigan v. Tyler (1978) 436 US 499, 509; US v. Williams (6C 2003) 354 F3 497, 503; In re Sealed Case (DCC. 1998) 153 F3 759, 766; Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 331. ALSO SEE: US v. Almonte-Baez (1C 2017) 857 F3 27, 31 [“The exigent circumstances doctrine reflects an understanding and appreciation of how events occur in the real world. Police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”].

[2] QUOTE FROM: US v. Collins (7C 2007) 510 F3 697, 699. ALSO SEE: US v. Rodriguez-Pacheco (1C 2020) 948 F3 1, 7 [exigent circumstances is “a fancy way of saying there is an emergency or other urgent need”].

[3] USSC: Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392.

[4] USSC: Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 US 433, 441 [officers must “engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”]; Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 US 32, 37 [“we have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to serve ‘special needs,’ beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” edited; Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 330 [“When faced with special law enforcement needs, the Court has found that certain general, or individual circumstances may render warrantless search or seizure reasonable,” edited]. 9th CIR: Henderson v. Simi Valley (9C 2002) 305 F3 1052, 1057 [“special needs” searches serve an interest “beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”]; US v. Erickson (9C 1993) 991 F2 529, 531 [“In addition to being an enforcer of the criminal law, a police officer is a jack-of-all-emergencies.”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Rohrig (6C 1996) 98 F3 1506, 1519 [“we must be mindful of the needs of the community and society’s expectation of the legitimate role of police”]; US v. Dunavan (6C 1973) 485 F2 201, 204 [“particularly in big city life, the Good Samaritan of today is more likely to wear a blue coat than any other.”]; US v. Finsel (7C 2003) 326 F3 903, 907 [“But in addition to chasing criminals, law enforcement officers have another role in out society, a community caretaking function.”]; 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,§ 1-1.1(c) at 18 (2nd ed. 1986 [“those aspects of police function that relate to minimizing the likelihood of disorder … are equal in their importance to the police function in identifying and punishing wrongdoers.

[5] USSC: Caniglia v. Strom (2021) __ US __ [141 S.Ct. 1596]. CAL: P v. Ovieda (2019) 7 C5 1034, 1053 [“the community caretaking exception asserted in the absence of exigency is not one of the carefully delineated exceptions to the residential warrant requirement recognized by the United States Supreme Court”].

[6] USSC: Maryland v. King (2013) 569 US 435, 461 [“The government interest must outweigh the degree to which the search invades an individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy.”]; Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 331 [“we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable”]; Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 540 US 419, 426 [“in judging reasonableness, we look to the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty”]; Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 US 325, 331 [“Our cases show that in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”]. CAL: P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 605 [the emergency aid exception “requires an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid”]; P v. Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136, 1160 [“the relevant inquiry remains whether, in light of all the circumstances, there was an objectively urgent need to justify a warrantless entry”]; P v. Gemmill (2008) 162 CA4 958, 970 [“the degree of intrusion a warrantless search entails in a particular case should inform our determination of whether the search was justified by exigent circumstances”]. 9th CIR: Hopkins v. Bonvicino (9C 2009) 573 F3 752, 763 [“the reasonable grounds [requirement] … remains the core of the analysis”]; US v. Snipe (9C 2008) 518 F3 947, 952 [the issue is whether “law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm”]; US v. Black (9C 2007) 482 F3 1035, 1041, fn1 [court notes that the “objective reasonableness test [used in community caretaking situations] is essentially the same as the one courts use to determine whether police action is justified under the exigent circumstances exception”]. OTHER: Castagna v. Jean (1C 2020) 955 F3 211, 221 [“In determining whether the officers’ actions are protected by the community caretaking exception, we also must balance the need for the caretaking activity and the affected individuals’ interest in freedom from government intrusions to determine if the officers’ actions were reasonable.”]; Graham v. Barnette (8C 2020) 970 F3 1075, 1088 [“But, as with other police functions, all seizures—whether brief detentions or arrests—made in the community caretaking context are governed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness balancing test. As a result, the greater the intrusion on a citizen, the greater the justification required for that intrusion to be reasonable. Thus, if the detention evolves into an arrest, it must be justified by probable cause. This balancing test, ever attuned to the nature and quality of the intrusion, comports with the Supreme Court’s instruction that reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.”]; Mora v. City of Gaithersburg (4C 2008) 519 F3 216, 224 [“As the likelihood, urgency, and magnitude of a threat increase, so does the justification for and scope of police preventive action.”]; US v. Rodriguez-Morales (1C 1991) 929 F2 780, 785 [“In community caretaking cases, as elsewhere, reasonableness has a protean quality. The term embodies a concept, not a constant.”]. NOTE: Before the courts adopted the balancing test, a threat could qualify as an exigent circumstance only if officers had probable cause to believe that an emergency existed. The problem with requiring probable cause was that, by focusing exclusively on whether it existed, the courts were required to disregard the overall reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. For example, a judge who was only interested in whether there was probable cause to believe that some harm was about to occur would overlook such seemingly important circumstances as the magnitude of the harm, the likelihood that it would materialize, and whether the officers’ response to the situation was proportionate to the threat. The balancing test addressed this problem because it requires that the courts consider all relevant circumstances. See P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 607 [“We decline to resolve here what appears to be a debate over semantics. Under either approach [i.e., reasonableness vs. probable cause] our task is to determine whether there was an objectively reasonable basis [for the entry].”]; US v. Quarterman (8C 2017) 877 F3 794, 800 [“If officers have an objectively reasonable basis that some immediate act is required to preserve the safety of others or themselves, they do not also need probable cause.”].

[7] CAL: P v. Lujano (2014) 229 CA4 175, 183 [“But to fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, an arrest or detention within a home or dwelling must be supported by both probable cause and the existence of exigent circumstances.”]; P v. Strider (2009) 177 CA4 1393, 1399 [“The United States Supreme Court has indicated that entry into a home based on exigent circumstances requires probable cause to believe that the entry is justified by one of [the investigative emergency] factors”]; P v. Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 680 [“when the entry of a house for officer safety is based on exigent circumstances, the officers must have probable cause to believe that a dangerous person will be found inside.”]; P v. Ormonde (2006) 143 CA4 282, 292 [“an exigency excusing the warrant requirement does not also excuse the requirement that probable cause exists for searching a home for evidence or suspects”]. 9th CIR: US v. Alaimalo (9C 2002) 313 F3 1188, 1193 [“Even when exigent circumstances exist, police officers must have probable cause to support a warrantless entry into a home.”]. OTHER: US v. Brown (6C 2006) 449 F3 741, 745 [“To justify a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances, there must also be probable cause to enter the residence.”].

[8] USSC: Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 US 266, 273-74 [“We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”]. CAL: P v. Lindsey (2007) 148 CA4 1390, 1397 [“the conduct of shooting a gun on a residential street posed a grave and immediate risk to anyone nearby.”]; P v. Coulombe (2000) 86 CA4 52, 58 [report of man with a gun “in a throng of thousands of New Year’s Eve celebrants”]; P v. Profit (1986) 183 CA3 849, 883 [“the seriousness of the offense involved is a highly determinative factor in any evaluation of police conduct, edited. 9th CIR: Ames v. King County (9C 2017) 846 F3 340, 348 [“the “magnitude of the potential threat” is the ‘most important’ factor”].

[9] CAL: P v. Bradford (1972) 28 CA3 695, 704 [“In testing reasonableness of the search we might ask ourselves how the situation would have appeared if the fleeing gunman armed with a shotgun had shot and possibly killed other officers or citizens while the officers were explaining the matter to a magistrate.” ]; P v. Superior Court (Peebles) (1970) 6 CA3 379, 382 [“One way of testing the reasonableness of the search is to ask ourselves what the situation would have looked like had another bomb exploded, killing a number of people”]; P v. Duncan (1986) 42 C3 91, 98-99 [“It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer to fail to investigate under circumstances suggesting a crime in progress.”]; P v. Gonzales (1960) 182 CA2 276, 279 [“A failure [to attempt to ID the victim] would subject the officer to severe censure.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Black (9C 2007) 482 F3 1035, 1040 [“This is a case where the police would be harshly criticized had they not investigated”].

[10] CAL: P v. Blackwell (1983) 147 CA3 646, 652 [“Imminent essentially means it is reasonable to anticipate the threatened injury will occur in such a short time that it is not feasible to obtain a search warrant.”]; P v. Ovieda (2019) 7 C5 1034, 1049 [“The line falls between the mere inchoate possibility that an emergency could exist and the officer’s articulation of facts that make it reasonable, even if uncertain, to believe an emergency does exist.”]; P v. Koch (1989) 209 CA3 770, 782 [“the government must establish that because of the urgency of the situation a warrant could not be obtained in time”]; P v. Camilleri (1990) 220 CA3 1199, 1206 [“Implicit in this burden is a showing there was insufficient time to obtain a warrant.”]. 9th CIR: Bailey v. Newland (9C 2001) 263 F3 1022, 1033 [“the presence of exigent circumstances necessarily implies that there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant”]. COMPARE: G.C. v. Owenboro Public Schools (6C 2013) 711 F3 623, 631 [search of a student’s cellphone was unreasonable because, although the stated purpose of the search was to determine if the student was still suicidal, there was no reason to believe so].

[11] CAL: Tamborino v. Superior Court (1986) 41 C3 919, 924 [“Although unhurried reflection might have led another officer to conclude that Tamborino should have been questioned before even a superficial search was conducted, Officer Klein could reasonably have concluded that he did not enjoy that luxury, and that immediate action was warranted.”]. OTHER: US v. Evans (11C 2020) 958 F3 1102, 1106 [“we look to the entirely of the circumstances to see whether a reasonable officer, confronted with those circumstances, could have objectively believed that an immediate search was necessary to safeguard potential victims”]; Baker v. City of Trenton (6C 2019) 936 F3 523, 532 [“We must analyze the actions of those officers on the scene by reference to a reasonable understanding of the information that they actually received.”]; US v. Klump (2C 2008) 536 F3 113, 117-18 [“The core question is whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer to believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action.”].

[12] CAL: P v. Ovieda (2019) 7 C5 1034, 1052 [“But just as an officer’s venial motives will generally not undermine an otherwise valid search, a benign intent cannot save an invalid one.”]. OTHER: US v. Richardson (7C 2000) 208 F3 626, 629 [“a police officer’s subjective belief that exigent circumstances exist is insufficient to make a warrantless search. Instead, the test is objective”]; US v. Arch (7C 1993) 7 F3 1300, 1304 [“An officer’s subjective belief that an injured person might be inside does not justify a warrantless entry”].

[13] USSC: Florida v. JL (2000) 529 US 266, 273-74 [“We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”]. CAL: P v. Wells (2006) 38 C4 1078, 1083 [“a citizen’s tip may itself create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a temporary vehicle stop or detention, especially if the circumstances are deemed exigent by reason of possible reckless driving or similar threats to public safety.”]. OTHER: US v. Simmons (2C 2009) 560 F3 98, 105 [“We agree with our sister circuits that an anonymous 911 call reporting an ongoing emergency is entitled to a higher degree of reliability and requires a lesser showing of corroboration than a tip that alleges general criminality.”]; US v. Hicks (7C 2008) 531 F3 555, 558-59 [what is required is an ongoing emergency as opposed to “general criminality”]; US v. Holloway (11C 2002) 290 F3 1331, 1339 [“when an emergency is reported by an anonymous caller, the need for immediate action may outweigh the need to verify the reliability of the caller”]; US v. Wheat (8C 2001) 278 F3 722, 732, fn.8 [“The rationale for allowing less rigorous corroboration of tips alleging erratic driving is that the imminent danger present in this context is substantially greater (and more difficult to thwart by less intrusive means) than the danger posted by a person in possession of a concealed handgun.”]; US v. Nelson (3C 2002) 284 F3 472, 483 [the courts “may take into account reports of an active threat, including the presence and use of dangerous weapons”]. BUT ALSO SEE: P v. Jordan (2004) 121 CA4 544, 563, 563, fn.11 [“Many of the cases that consider the level of danger created by erratic or drunk driving nonetheless require some indicia of reliability to support allegations of reckless driving in a telephone tip.” Citations omitted].

[14] 9th CIR: US v. Russell (9C 2006) 436 F3 1086, 1090 [“Given the substantial confusion and conflicting information, the police were justified in searching the house”].

[15] CAL: P v. Coddington (2000) 23 C4 529, 575. 9th CIR: Hopkins v. Bonvicino (9C 2009) 573 F3 752, 764.

[16] USSC: Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 US 249, 260 [Court notes that the officers’ subjective motivation is irrelevant; what matters is “the intent of the police as objectively manifested”]; Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 404 [“It therefore does not matter here whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence.”]. CAL: P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 605 [“The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent”]. 9th CIR: US v. Arellano-Ochoa (9C 2006) 461 F3 1142, 1145 [“the officer’s entry must be evaluated objectively”]; US v. Snipe (9C 2008) 515 F3 947, 952 [“law enforcement’s subjective motivations are irrelevant in determining whether the emergency doctrine applies”]. OTHER: US v. Najar (10C 2006) 451 F3 710, 718 [court notes that Brigham City rejected the requirement that “the search must not be motivated by an intent to arrest or seize evidence”]. ALSO SEE: Whren v. US (1996) 517 US 806, 812 [officer’s motivation for making a traffic stop is irrelevant if the stop is based on probable cause]; Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 US 32, 45-46 [“Whren reinforces the principle that, while subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis, programmatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.”]. NOTE: In P v. Ray (1999) 21 C4 464, 477 [disapproved on other grounds in P v. Ovieda (2019) 7 C5 1034, 1048] the California Supreme Court said: “courts must be especially vigilant in guarding against subterfuge, that is, a false reliance upon the personal safety or property protection rationale when the real purpose was to seek out evidence of crime,” emphasis added. Unless the court was referring to personal safety and property protection in the context of community caretaking—and not emergency aid—this statement appears to be inconsistent with its ruling in Troyer and subsequent rulings by the Supreme Court, above. It is likely that the comment in Ray referred only to community caretaking because the case pertained only to community caretaking.

[17] USSC: Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 US 141, 149 [“To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances.”]; Ryburn v. Huff (2012) 565 US 469, 476-77] [“The majority looked at each separate event in isolation and concluded that each, in itself, did not give cause for concern. But it is a matter of common sense that a combination of events each of which is mundane when viewed in isolation may paint an alarming picture.”]. CAL: P v. Ortiz (1995) 32 CA4 286, 293 [“the determination of exigent circumstances turns upon all of the facts of a particular case,” edited]; 9th CIR: US v. Arellano-Ochoa (9C 2006) 461 F3 1142, 1145 [“Whether exigent circumstances exist in a given case is a fact-specific inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances.”].

[18] 9th CIR: US v. Snipe (9C 2008) 515 F3 947, 952 [court repudiates the “Cervantes” test].

[19] QUOTE FROM: US v. Black (9C 2007) 482 F3 1035, 1040. 9th CIR: US v. Snipe (9C 2008) 515 F3 947, 953-54 [“the police will routinely be summoned for matters that are not, in some objective sense, real emergencies. We will not impose a duty of inquiry on the police to separate a true cry for help from a less deserving call for attention because the delay may cost lives”].

[20] USSC: San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015) 575 US 600, 615 [“Courts must not judge officers with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”]; Ryburn v. Huff (2012) 565 US 469, 475 [“The panel majority—far removed from the scene and with the opportunity to dissect the elements of the situation—confidently concluded that the officers really had no reason to far for their safety”]; US v. Sharpe (1985) 470 US 675, 686-87 [“A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished.”]. CAL: P v. Osuna (1986) 187 CA3 845, 855 [“Of course, from the security of our lofty perspective, and despite our total lack of practical experience in the field, we might question whether or not those who physically confronted the danger in this instance, selected the ‘best’ course of action available]; P v. Wilson (1997) 59 CA4 1053, 1063 [“Appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized it is inappropriate for judges to second-guess on-the-spot decisions of officers in the field under these [exigent] circumstances.”]; Tamborino v. Superior Court (1986) 41 C3 919, 924 [“People could well die in emergencies if the police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process.” Quoting from Wayne v. US (DCC 1963) 318 F2 205, 212 (conc. opn. Burger, C.J.). 9th CIR: US v. Russell (9C 2006) 436 F3 1086, 109 [“It is unreasonable to expect the police to piece together a perfectly coherent picture in the scant minutes they had to digest the constantly-updated and conflicting information.”]. OTHER: Mora v. City of Gaithersburg (4C 2008) 519 F3 216, 225 [“The balance is struck with due deference for the difference in perspective between an officer who must make snap judgments in minutes or seconds, and a judge who has the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”]; US v. Socey (DCC 1988) 846 F2 1439, 1446 [“This standard does not permit a court to judge the reasonableness of an officer’s belief on the basis of hindsight.”].

[21] QUOTE FROM: P v. Riddle (1978) 83 CA3 563, 572. USSC: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 539 [“The most basic function of any government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.”]. 9th CIR: Ames v. King County (9C 2017) 846 F3 340, 348 [“whether there is an immediate threat to the safety of the arresting officer or others—is the most important” factor]. OTHER: Mora v. City of Gaithersburg (4C 2008) 519 F3 216, 228 [“protecting public safety is why police exist”].

[22] EXAMPLES: Imminent threats to people:

Child being beaten: Anonymous 911 caller said that a child was being beaten by her parents. When officers arrived they heard a man shouting inside the house; the man “bombarded” the officer with a “slew of profanities.” Schreiber v. Moe (6C 2010) 596 F3 323, 330-31.

Shooting victim inside a home: A shooting that occurred just outside the home may be deemed an exigent circumstance if there was reason to believe that a victim had gone inside; e.g., there were bloodstains on the door indicating that a victim had entered. P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 607. Also see P v. Hill (1974) 12 C3 731, 755 [officers were notified that the victim of a shooting had been taken to the hospital by friends. Officers who were dispatched to a house in which the shooting occurred could see blood on the floor. When no one responded to their knocking, they made a forcible entry. Court: “Although only one casualty had thus far been reported, others may have been injured and hay have been abandoned on the premises”]; US v. Janis (8C 2004) 387 F3 682, 687-88 [victim of accidental shooting arrived at a hospital; officers go to victim’s home (the scene of the shooting) and see “a puddle of blood in the driveway and a trail of blood leading all the way to the door of the house”]; P v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 CA4 1004, 1013; US v. Schmidt (7C 2012) 700 F3 934, 938 [the officers reasonably believed “that people in the backyard area may have recently been shot and in need of immediate aid”].

Fight in progress: From outside the house, officers saw a fistfight in progress. Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 399 [“Here, the officers were confronted with ongoing violence occurring within the home.”].

Possible rape victim: At 4 a.m., a man broke into a woman’s apartment, attempted to rape her, then fled. Officers heard TV sounds coming from the apartment next door. When no one answered the door, they entered. P v. Cain (1989) 216 CA3 366 [“it was in the early-morning hours when most people are asleep, the officers were aware of a recent brutal attack on a defenseless elderly woman next door, the search was close in time to the attack, and they relied on their substantial experience in finding the situation unusual.”]. Also see P v. Wharton (1991) 53 C3 522.

Irrational or violent person: Officers entered the room of a mentally disturbed woman who had just threatened to kill a social worker and officers; pepper spray was ineffective and the woman, still holding a knife, “kept coming at the officers until she was only a few feet away; at this point, the use of potentially deadly force was justified,” edited.] San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015) 575 US 600, 613; Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 US 45, 48 [when officers arrived “they encountered a tumultuous situation in the house [and] signs of a recent injury, perhaps from a car accident, outside,” and they saw Fisher “screaming and throwing things”]; US v. Arch (7C 1993) 7 F3 1300, 1304-5 [Defendant, a guest in a motel room, appeared to be “irrational, agitated, and bizarre”; he displayed “a violent streak”; he had been carrying two knives; his motel room was “in disarray, with furniture overturned, beds torn apart, and the floor littered with syringes”].

Captives: Officers reasonably believed that illegal aliens were being held by captors in a house. US v. Reyes-Bosque (9C 2010) 595 F3 1017, 1029.

Sick person: Officers “heard several moans or groans” coming from within an apartment; they had been told that one of the occupants of the apartment “had not worked often and was sickly.” P v. Roberts (1956) 47 C2 374.

Unconscious man: An unconscious man who was frothing at the mouth was discovered inside a parked car. An officer searched his pockets because “we were attempting to find out who he was and what might be wrong with him.” P v. Gomez (1964) 229 CA2 781. Also see US v. Haley (8C 1978) 581 F2 723 [an officer who discovered an unconscious man on the street, searched the man’s pockets and briefcase for ID or medical alert cards]; US v. Dunavan (6C 1973) 485 F2 201 [after an unconscious man, foaming at the mouth, was transported to a hospital, officers searched his motel room to “see if we could find some identification or information or something to give the hospital about [the man]”]

Overdose: Officers received an anonymous call that Gallegos had overdosed on heroin. The officers who were dispatched to the call were aware that Gallegos was a heroin addict. When they arrived, a “small girl” answered the door said the Gallego was in bed but that she could not awaken him. P v. Gallegos (1970) 13 CA3 239, 243. Also see P v. Zabelle (1996) *, 1287-88 [heroin overdose”]; Ames v. King County (9C 2017) 846 F3 340, 350 [overdose].

Compare vehicle running in driveway: P v. Smith (2020) 46 CA5 375, 387 [vehicle in driveway with engine running did not warrant entry into home to look for sick or injured person].

[23] EXAMPLES

Sufficient indications of burglary:

• “A citizen informant reported hearing breaking glass and footsteps from an upstairs apartment, the subject of two recent burglaries, the occupant of which was not home. One 12" X 12" glass pane was broken out of the door.” P v. Bradley (1982) 132 CA3 737, 743. Also see P v. Superior Court (Haflich) (1986) 180 CA3 759 [robbery in progress]; Hunsberger v. Wood (4C 2009) 570 F3 546, 555 [sufficient circumstantial evidence of burglary in progress].

• At mid-morning, a silent burglary alarm was activated in the residence. An employee of the alarm company phoned the occupants but received no response. Officers found no signs of forced entry but one of the doors was unlocked. He opened it and yelled but no one responded. He then entered. US v. Tibolt (1C 1995) 72 F3 965.

• At 2:20 p.m., a neighbor reported seeing people crawling through the window of a nearby home. Officers discovered a broken kitchen window. No one answered the officers’ knocking. A woman was observed inside; she said she lived there but she did not have a key to the door. She said she and a man were the only people inside. Officers saw other women inside. After detaining the man and woman, officers entered “to make sure no one else was inside.” US v. Johnson (6C 1994) 9 F3 506, 509 [“Upon arrival at defendant’s residence, [the officers] discovered a broken window and two individuals inside. One of these individuals was unable to satisfy the officers that she lived there. This same individual lied to the officers regarding the number of people inside the residence,” edited].

• The officer who entered the premises testified that “he found an open window with a television and other articles beneath it. He thought the suspects were still inside because ‘they put the contraband sitting on the outside. Usually if they’re going to be gone, they’d take it with them so there is a possibility that they are still collecting more loot.” Court: “It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer to fail to investigate under circumstances suggesting a crime in progress.” P v. Duncan (1986) 42 C3 91, 98-99.

• Officers had sufficient reason to enter a residence based on a report from neighbors that “the door has been open all day and it’s all a shambles inside.” P v. Ray (1999) 21 C4 464, 478 [disapproved on other grounds in P v. Ovieda (2019) 7 C5 1034, 1048.

Insufficient indications of burglary:

• A person who saw two men dragging a large bag from a neighbor’s house, called police and expressed concern the men might have been burglars. When officers arrived, they saw no sign of forced entry, and the house appeared secure. The officers entered the house without knocking or otherwise attempting to speak with the occupants. US v. Erickson (9C 1993) 991 F2 529.

• An officer entered a cabin because he believed the owner of an illegally-parked car might have been inside, and because he thought the cabin might have been burglarized because it was unlocked. US v. Moss (4C 1992) 963 F2 673, 679 [“To the extent the entry was for the purpose of verifying a break-in, it is hard to see how more than a look from the doorway was needed.”]. Also see US v. Buted (10C 1994) 43 F3 531, 539 [“We simply cannot accept the notion that an open door of a commercial building at night is, in and of itself, an occurrence that reasonably and objectively creates the impression of an immediate threat to person or property as to justify a warrantless search of the premises.”].

[24] EXAMPLES: The following are examples of exigent circumstances based on a threat to officers:

• Responding to multiple calls of a “family dispute” and “a man with a gun,” officers saw a man carrying a rifle who, when he saw the officers, ran into a house. The officers followed him. P v. Jordan (1976) 55 CA3 965.

• Officers arrested a robber-murderer after he was ordered out of his girlfriend’s house. The officers reasonably believed someone inside posed a danger to them because they were aware that the suspect worked with accomplices. P v. Maier (1991) 226 CA3 1670, 1675 [“An accomplice on another floor is surely no more dangerous than one on the other side of a window, or a door.”].

• Having grounds to believe that an uncuffed detainee had just hid a deadly weapon behind the screen door of his home, officers were justified in opening the screen door to confirm. US v. Richmond (7C 2019) 924 F3 404, 417.

• When officers knocked on the motel room door of a suspected car thief, the car swung open and they saw the suspect “reaching under one of the two beds.” Said the court, the officer’s “conduct in taking a step over the threshold so he could more clearly see defendant as she was reaching under one of the beds met the Fourth Amendment objective standard of reasonableness.” P v. Wilson (1997) 59 CA4 1053, 1061. BUT ALSO SEE P v. Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 660 [“the presence of a handgun in a dwelling, in and of itself, obviously does not constitute an exigent circumstance justifying entry. However, the evidence is that the officers reasonably believed [that the fugitive] was secreted inside and was aware of the reason for their presence. They were not obliged to wait and see if he or Dyke would reach for the handgun or otherwise try to escape.”]; P v. Kizzee (1979) 94 CA3 927, 935 [“The front door of the residence was standing wide open. They were told that a woman was still inside and they knew that a woman had participated in the crime [in which a gun was used].”]

• FBI agents received information that a carjacker who was also a serial bank robber was staying at a certain motel room with a woman. During surveillance, they saw the woman drive up in a car taken in a carjacking, As the agents approached her, she yelled, “Run, Buddy!” Agents kicked in the door to the motel room and arrested “Buddy.” US v. Reilly (9C 2000) 224 F3 986, 991 [“The officers reasonably suspected that dangerous weapons might be on the premises. Furthermore, Lange’s unexpected and vocal reaction to being taken into custody could have tipped Reilly off to the agents’ presence and given him adequate time to arm himself or attempt to escape.”].

• Officers in “fresh” pursuit of an armed robber, lawfully entered his house and arrested him. Because they did not know if he had an accomplice or whether there were others in the house who posed a threat, they conducted a search for weapons. Warden v. Hayden (1967) 387 US 294, 298-99 [“Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape.”]. Also see Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 US 325, 337.

• Responding to a report of screams coming from inside a house, an officer knocked on the door. The man who opened the door “appeared to be nervous, looked over his shoulder and—without explanation—moved toward the bedroom in a seemingly hasty fashion.” The officer went in after him because he was concerned about his safety and the safety of anyone else in the house. P v. Frazier (1977) 71 CA3 690, 694. Also see Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326; P v. Bennett (1998) 17 C4 373, 384.

• Officers who had surrounded a house from which one of two suspects in a just-occurred robbery had emerged, heard, from inside the closed garage, a “very loud noise” which “sounded like a heavy object being dropped on the floor or someone jumping from a height onto the floor” which caused the officers “to run for cover.” US v. Oaxaca (9C 1978) 569 F2 518, 521-22.

• Having received information that the occupants of a house might be illegal aliens and possibly involved in drug trafficking, officers were talking with one of them on the front steps when the defendant quickly slammed the door shut, made a “quick dodge behind the door,” and closed the blinds. These actions “made it reasonable for the officers to conclude there was a likelihood of danger.” US v. Arellano-Ochoa (9C 2006) 461 F3 1142, 1146.

[25] OTHER: US v. Davis (10C 2002) 290 F3 1239, 1244 [“granting unfettered permission to officers to enter homes, based only upon a general assumption domestic calls are always dangerous, would violate the Fourth Amendment”]; Smith v. Kansas City Police Department (8C 2009) 586 F3 576 [entry to arrest domestic violence suspect in the home of a third person was unwarranted under exigent circumstances].

[26] 9th CIR: US v. Martinez (9C 2005) 406 F3 1160, 1164 [“The volatility of situations involving domestic violence make them particularly well-suited for an application of the emergency doctrine.”]. OTHER: US v. Quarterman (8C 2017) 877 F3 794, 798 [“This court has recognized that domestic disturbances are highly volatile and involve large risks.]; Tierney v. Davidson (2C 1998) 13 F3 189, 197 [the courts “have recognized the combustible nature of domestic disputes, and have accorded great latitude to an office’s belief that warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances.”].

[27] EXAMPLES: The following are examples of exigent circumstances resulting from a report of domestic violence:

•An 11-year old reported that her mother and boyfriend “were fighting really bad” and that she “needed someone to come. US v. Sanders (8C 2021) 4 F4 672, 678 [the child’s mother “had visible injuries consistent with a physical altercation. [She] expressed concern for her daughter and directed the officers not to tell [the suspect] that her daughter was the one that reported the disturbance. A child was seen in an upstairs window acting excitedly and gesturing at the first responding officer”].

• A woman reported that she and her boyfriend had just had a “heated” argument, the boyfriend forced her out of his apartment but her daughter was still inside and that the boyfriend was carrying a pistol in a holster; upon knocking, the officers saw the boyfriend on a sofa and he was “moving his hands quickly and kind of scooting over or trying to stand up from the couch in a hurry. US v. Quarterman (8C 2017) 877 F3 794.

• At about 12:10 p.m., Officers were dispatched to a report of a “screaming woman” and the sound of “distressed moaning” at a certain address. The officers heard the “very loud” sounds of arguing inside the house. Although the officers knocked and announced several times, no one answered the door. Finally, a man opened the door and the officers told him that they needed “to come in and look at the apartment to make sure everybody was okay.” When the man refused to admit them, they entered and conducted a protective sweep. P v. Pou (2017) 11 CA5 143, 152 [“it was reasonable for the officers to enter defendant’s house without a warrant” and it was “objectively reasonable for the police to continue with their emergency search because they had yet to find the screaming woman”].

• At about 11 p.m., officers were dispatched to an anonymous report of a domestic disturbance involving “a man shoving a woman around.” No one responded to their knocking, but they saw a man inside the residence and then heard a “shout.” They knocked again, and a woman answered the door. “She was breathing heavily and appeared extremely frightened, afraid, very fidgety, and very nervous.” The officers also noticed a “little red mark” under one eye and “slight darkness under both eyes.” The woman tried to explain away the officers’ concern by saying that she was injured when she fell down some stairs, and that the noise from the fall might have prompted someone to call the police. She said that she was alone, that her boyfriend had already left. At this point, the officers decided to forcibly enter the premises because of the following circumstances: the woman’s demeanor, her false claim that she was alone, and the officers’ knowledge that “battered woman commonly deny being abused.” In ruling that the officers’ entry was justified, the court said, “Viewed objectively, these circumstances justified the officers’ actions to ensure [the woman’s] safety.” P v. Higgins (1994) 26 CA4 247.

• An officer was dispatched to a 911 “domestic violence” call involving an “out of control” male. The phone was disconnected before the call was completed, and the officer had previously responded to a domestic violence call at that address. In that incident, “the female had a ‘fat lip’ because the male subject had hit her.” Upon arrival, the officer saw a woman outside “very upset, crying.” He also heard “angry, hostile” yelling inside the house, although he could not determine what the person was saying. The officer entered “in order to make sure that the person yelling was not injured, that someone else in the house was not being injured, and to make sure the individual yelling was not going to come out of the house with weapons.” US v. Martinez (9C 2005) 406 F3 1160, 1165.

• 911 caller reported hearing sounds indicating a woman in the next motel room was being beaten; a man opened the door and admitted there had been a disturbance and that a woman was in the bathroom; officers could hear a woman crying in the bathroom; the motel room was in “total disarray.” US v. Brooks (9C 2004) 367 F3 1128, 1135.

• 911 call from a woman who said that Black had beaten her and that she needed officers to stand by while she removed clothing from the apartment they shared. When officers arrived a few minutes later, they found Black but not the woman. Fearing that she had returned and had been beaten or shot by Black, they entered. The court ruled the officers’ entry was justified “because they feared that [the woman] could have been inside the apartment, badly injured and in need of medical attention.” The court added, “This is a case where the police would be harshly criticized had they not investigated and [the woman] was in the apartment.” US v. Black (9C 2007) 482 F3 1035.

• Responding to a report of a domestic dispute at about midnight, officers found the victim outside her home. Her face and nose were read, she was “very upset” and “crying uncontrollably.” She said her husband, who was inside the house, “had hit her a few times in the face.” The husband opened the door when the officers knocked, but he then “attempted to close the door.” The officers entered. P v. Wilkins (1993) 14 CA4 761, 772 [“The victim was outside the house and obviously in need of shelter. It was reasonable for the officers to conclude her reentry into the home or even her continuing presence on the premises outside the home would spark further violence by defendant. The officers could not abandon the matter and expose the victim to further harm simply because defendant refused them admittance,” edited.].

• COMPARE: P v. Ormonde (2006) 143 CA4 282, 291 [no reason to enter because officers knew that the victim “was safely away from the premises”]; Hawkins v. Mitchell (7C 2013) 756 F3 983, 994 [“lack of weapons, threats, or physical aggression from” the husband. Bonivert v. City of Clarkston (9C 2018) 883 F3 865, 877 [insufficient reason to enter because the victim “assured the officers that there were no weapons in the house and that Bonivert did not pose a danger to himself,” and officers “sent a ‘Code 4’ message”].

[28] EXAMPLES: Children in danger:

• While investigating a malicious mischief report, officers saw two young boys walk out of the suspect’s trailer home. The suspect said the boys were not his children. When one of the officers made eye contact with the boys, they walked back into the trailer. The officer asked the suspect if he had ever been arrested; he said he had been arrested for “indecency with a child.” The officer entered the trailer to “get the children out of the trailer and find out who their parents were.” Laney v. Texas (Tex. App. 2003) 117 SW3 854, 864 [“Although there was no immediate threat to the child’s safety or well-being, had the boy been left alone in the trailer while deputies took appellant away, there would have been a substantial risk of harm to the child.”]. Also see P v. Payne (1977) 65 CA3 679, 683 [officers lawfully entered the defendant’s home because they reasonably believed he was presently molesting a young boy]; P v. Neighbors (1990) 223 CA3 1115, 1123 [the deputies’ “decision to kick in the door was premised on the reasonably perceived need to protect the child inside”]; In re Dawn O. (1976) 58 CA3 160, 163; P v. Miller (1999) 69 CA4 190, 199; P v. Keener (1983) 148 CA3 73, 77.

• Report of “two small children left” alone at an apartment. No one answered door. Woman arrived and started to enter. Officer saw considerable trash and dirty clothes strewn about the kitchen area.” The woman was drunk. P v. Sutton (1976) 65 CA3 341 [“the facts reasonably indicating that an infant child may be unattended constitute such a substantial threat, and that such risk is not dissipated by the return of a custodial parent in a state of obvious intoxication”].

• COMPARE: Child lonely: At about 4 p.m. a woman reported that a 6-year old girl who lived in her apartment building was on the apartment steps crying; the girl said she “had hurt her knee while dancing,” that she had been alone in her apartment but did not want to stay there because she was ‘lonesome.'” Using a passkey, the officer entered the girl’s apartment. P v. Smith (1972) 7 C3 282, 285-86 [“The solicitude of the police for the girl’s safety and welfare was of course commendable. But the police must also be concerned with the interest of her parent in the security and privacy of her home”]. ALSO SEE: US v. Sanders (8C 2021) 4 F4 672, 678 [the child’s mother “had visible injuries consistent with a physical altercation. [She] expressed concern for her daughter and directed the officers not to tell [the suspect] that her daughter was the one that reported the disturbance. A child was seen in an upstairs window acting excitedly and gesturing at the first responding officer.”].

[29] CAL: P v. Suarez (2020) 10 C5 116, 151.

[30] 9th CIR: Fisher v. City of San Jose (9C 2009) 558 F3 1069, 1071 [“We hold that, during such a standoff, once exigent circumstances justify the warrantless seizure of the suspect in his home, and so long as the police are actively engaged in completing his arrest, police need not obtain an arrest warrant before taking the suspect into full physical custody.”].

[31] OTHER: In re Terrorist Bombings (2C 2008) 552 F3 157; Mora v. City of Gaithersburg (4C 2008) 519 F3 216, 223 [“Police must be entitled to take effective preventive action when evidence surfaces of an individual who intends slaughter. This is the lesson of a variety of recent school cases in which students have made Columbine-style threats”].

[32] CAL: P v. Duncan (1986) 42 C3 91, 105 [“The extremely volatile nature of chemicals, including ether, involved in the production of drugs such as PCP and methamphetamine creates a dangerous environment, especially when handled unprofessionally by residential manufacturers of illicit drugs.”]; P v. Avalos (1988) 203 CA3 1517, 1523 [fire occurred in residence in which there was “apparatus consistent with methamphetamine laboratory”]; P v. Blackwell (1983) 147 CA3 646, 649 [strong fumes associated with PCP]; P v. Patterson (1979) 94 CA3 456, 464 [officer testified that a PCP lab is “one of the most dangerous operations there is”]; P v. Stegman (1985) 164 CA3 936, 943 [officers reasonably believed there was an operating PCP lab on the premises]; P v. Messina (1985) 165 CA3 937, 943 [“the types of chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamines are extremely hazardous to health”]; P v. Abes (1985) 174 CA3 796, 805 [“very, very strong odor of ether” plus occupant fled and appeared to be under the influence of PCP]. 9th CIR: US v. Cervantes (9C 2000) 219 F3 882, 891-91 [“sickening chemical odor” that “might be associated with methamphetamine production”]; US v. Ojeda (9C 2002) 276 F3 486. OTHER: US v. Clarke (8C 2009) 564 F3 949, 959 [“Because the officers had probable cause to believe methamphetamine was being produced in Clarke’s home, the officers reasonably concluded there was a potential threat”]; US v. Atchley (6C 2007) 474 F3 840, 851 [court notes “the dangers associated with the cooking of methamphetamine and the storage of chemicals used to make methamphetamine”]; US v. Scroger (10C 1997) 98 F3 1256, 1259 [“strong odor of methamphetamine production”]. COMPARE: P v. Baird (1985) 168 CA3 237, 245 [insufficient evidence of an emergency]. NOTE: In P v. Dickson (1983) 144 CA3 1046, 1057-58 (one of the most verbose opinions in the history of California jurisprudence) the court opined that ether is not really dangerous in the amounts commonly used to manufacture PCP. See, especially, pp.1067-68. The “logic” behind this court’s conclusions has been thoroughly repudiated, and Dickson has routinely been distinguished, ignored, or disapproved. See P v. Duncan (1986) 42 C3 91, 103-4; P v. Osuna (1986) 187 CA3 845, 851; P v. Baird (1985) 168 CA3 237, 244; P v. Stegman (1985) 164 CA3 936, 944; P v. Abes (1985) 174 CA3 796, 808; P v. Messina (1985) 165 CA3 937, 944, fn.2. NOTE: Entry by additional officers: Officers who have made an emergency entry into premises where a drug lab is operating may request the assistance of other officers, such as experts in the dismantling of drug labs, who may enter without a warrant for the purpose of abating the emergency. P v. Duncan (1986) 42 C3 91, 99. COMPARE: P v. Cook (1978) 22 C3 67.

[33] CAL: P v. Duncan (1986) 42 C3 91, 103 [“there is no absolute rule that can accommodate every warrantless entry into premises housing a drug laboratory. It is manifest that the emergency nature of each situation must be evaluated on its own facts.”].

[34] CAL: P v. Remiro (1979) 89 CA3 809, 831 [“The known presence in the house of bombs and volatile substances created an emergency situation that justified a warrantless entry.”]; P v. Gurtenstein (1977) 69 CA3 441, 449 [grounds to believe a package contained a bomb]; P v. Scheib (1979) 98 CA3 820, 828 [presence of explosives “constituted a dangerous condition, comparable to a fire”]. 9th CIR: US v. Peterson (9C 2003) 353 F3 1045, 1049 [“The third source told police not merely that Peterson possessed explosives, but that he had claimed a readiness ‘to blow some shit up'”]. OTHER: US v. Haldorson (7C 2019) 941 F3 284, 296 [“there was a legitimate concern that other homemade explosives were potentially unstable and therefore dangerous to others.”]; US v. Johnson (6C 1993) 9 F3 506, 510.

[35] OTHER: US v. Infante (1C 2012) 701 F3 386, 395 [“In light of a substantiated report of a recent explosion involving a volatile gas in the residence, this danger was not speculative.”].

[36] USSC: Michigan v. Tyler (1978) 436 US 499, 509 [“A burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry ‘reasonable.'”]; Michigan v. Clifford (1984) 464 US 287, 297. CAL: P v. Remiro (1979) 89 CA3 809, 830 [“Officials may enter a structure without a warrant to extinguish a fire”]; P v. Ramsey (1969) 272 CA2 302, 311 [the officer “could have entered at [the fire fighters’] invitation and searched the premises if his entry and search bore some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the firemen entered, namely, to deal with the emergency presented by the fire”]; P v. Glance (1989) 209 CA3 836, 844 [“That McDermott was a police officer and not a fire official does nothing to alter our analysis.”]. OTHER: US v. Buckmaster (6C 2007) 485 F3 873, 877 [“A cause-and-origin search, conducted within a reasonable timeframe after the fire has been extinguished requires that investigators substantially disrupt the effects of a private individual’s home. Drawers and cabinets may be opened, samples of carpet or upholstery may be seized, and so on,” edited]; US v. Klump (2C 2008) 536 F3 113, 118 [DEA agents lawfully entered a warehouse they reasonably believed was on fire].

[37] CAL: P v. Wharton (1991) 53 C3 522, 578 [“Because there existed the possibility that the victim was still alive, we cannot fault the officers’ decision to investigate further.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Stafford (9C 2005) 416 F3 1068, 1074 [“a report of a dead body can easily lead officers to believe that someone might be in need of immediate aid”]. OTHER: US v. Richardson (7C 2000) 208 F3 626 [officers testified that “in their experience, laypersons without medical knowledge are not in a position to determine whether a person is dead or alive”]; Wayne v. US (DCC 1963) 318 F2 205, 213, 241 [“Acting in response to reports of ‘dead bodies,’ the police may find the ‘bodies’ to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or distressed cardiac patients. Even the apparently dead often are saved by swift police response,” edited].

[38] CAL: Gov. Code§ 27491.1 [coroner shall notify law enforcement agency regarding possible death by criminal means]; § 27491.2 [upon notification of a death, coroner shall immediately proceed to the location of the body, examine it, make inquiry into the circumstances and order its removal; it is a misdemeanor for another to move the body without permission of the coroner]; § 27491.3, subd. (b) [coroner may deliver any “property or evidence” related to the investigation or prosecution of a crime to the law enforcement agency or district attorney]; Gov. Code§§ 27491.2, 27491.3; Health & Saf. Code§ 7102, 102850, 102855, 102860. ALSO SEE: P v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 CA4 1004, 1023 [“this evidence would have been lawfully discovered independently, i.e., by the coroner in the normal course of his legal duties.”].

[39] EXAMPLES: The following are examples of warrantless entries into homes based on shots fired:

• Sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to a reported shooting at Russell’s home—it was unclear whether it was accidental. When they arrived, they found Russell outside the house and saw that he had been shot. Russell’s account of the incident was inconsistent, so, officers entered the house, looking for additional victims. Court: “Given the substantial confusion and conflicting information, the police were justified in searching the house in order to determine whether there were other injured persons.” US v. Russell (9C 2006) 436 F3 1086. Also see US v. Laurent (2C 2022) 33 F4 63, 95 [“At the time they entered Laurent’s locked room, the officers knew that only minutes before a shot had been fired from the locked room into the neighboring room. The district court did not err in finding that exigency justified the officers’ entry into the room and cursory investigation of the areas of the room that were out of view, where an injured person or a person representing a threat of harm could be.”].

• Responding to a call of “shots fired” inside a residence, officers heard a sound as if a shotgun was being chambered. P v. Stamper (1980) 106 CA3 301, 306.

• Officers were notified that the victim of a shooting had been taken to the hospital by friends. Officers who were dispatched to a house in which the shooting occurred could see blood on the floor. When no one responded to their knocking, they made a forcible entry. Court: “Although only one casualty had thus far been reported, others may have been injured and hay have been abandoned on the premises.” P v. Hill (1974) 12 C3 731, 755.

• Officers received a corroborated report that someone in a certain apartment had repeatedly fired a shotgun from a window; officers detained the occupant outside the house, and he denied shooting the gun. No one answered the door. Court: It was reasonable for the officers “to enter the apartment without a warrant to secure the shotgun and to discern if the shooter or any victims in need of medical attention remained inside.” US v. Valencia (8C 2007) 499 F3 813, 816

• Someone in an apartment fired a shot into the floor, injuring an occupant of the lower apartment; officers entered the upper apartment to “for other victims” Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 US 321, 325.

• Officers “reasonably concluded that an injured person in need of prompt attention might be within the house based on a report of gunshots in the house”; no one answered the door but the officers heard a noise inside the house that sounded “like a shotgun being chambered.” P v. Stamper (1980) 106 CA3 301.

• Anonymous 911 call reporting a shooting at a residence; officers saw “a bullet hole and found a slug in the door jamb” of the residence. P v. Galan (1985) 163 CA3 786.

• Officers responded to a report of a shooting inside a house. No one met them when they arrived, there were two cars in the driveway, the house was dark but the lights outside were on. When no one answered the door, the officers went in through a window. Said the court, “there were ample exigent circumstances within the meaning of the preserving-life necessity exception to the warrant requirement to justify the officers’ entry”]. P v. Soldoff (1980) 112 CA3 1. Also see US v. Goodrich (8C 2014) 739 F3 1091, 1096 [“Here, a witness told arriving police that a gun had been fired. Police captured one of the suspects with a firearm. Based on the circumstances, the police could have reasonably believed that a shooting victim or an additional armed suspect might be in the house.”]; US v. Valencia (8C 2007) 499 F3 813, 816 [entry was justified based on 911 calls “that a deadly weapon had been fired multiple times by someone from that location,” and “pellets from one or more of those shells landed across the street”]; US v. Janis (8C 2004) 387 F3 682, 687-88 [victim of accidental shooting arrived at a hospital; officers go to victim’s home (the scene of the shooting) and see “a puddle of blood in the driveway and a trail of blood leading all the way to the door of the house”]; US v. Collins (8C 2003) 321 F3 691 [“shots fired” call near a certain intersection; arriving officers found a car in the area, two men in the front seat were “slumped over”].

[40] CAL: P v. Rubio (2019) 43 CA5 342, 349 [“Missing in this case are specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude shots fired outside defendant’s garage apartment required breaking down the door to rescue someone inside his home.”].

[41] USSC: Florida v. JL (2000) 529 US 266, 272 [“Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions. But an automatic firearm exception would rove too far.” Edited]. CAL: P v. Ovieda (2019) 7 C5 1034, 1043; P v. Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 660 [“The presence of a handgun in a dwelling, in and of itself, obviously does not constitute an exigent circumstance justifying entry.”]; P v. Ramey (1976) 16 C3 263, 276 [“there was no reason for Detective Garcia to assume the weapon was available for immediate use”]. 9th CIR: Bailey v. Newland (9C 2001) 263 F3 1022, 1033 [“the presence of a firearm alone is not an exigent circumstance”]. OTHER: US v. Quarterman (8C 2017) 877 F3 794, 798 [“The presence of a weapon in a home does not necessarily constitute exigent circumstances”]; US v. Gordon (10C 2014) 741 F3 64, 72 [court rejects argument that “police can always seize and indefinitely keep any weapon they find when responding to a family violence complaint”]; US v. Jones (5C 2001) 239 F3 716, 720 [“This Court has consistently held that the presence of a firearm alone does not create an exigency without reason to believe that a suspect is aware of police surveillance.”]; US v. Moore (10C 1996) 91 F3 96, 98 [“The mere statement that firearms are present, standing along, is insufficient.”].

[42] CAL: P v. Dyke (1990) 224 CA3 648, 660 [officers contacted a man at the door of his motel room because they had reason to believe a fugitive was in the room; the entered to seize a gun in plain view]; P v. Mitchell (1990) 222 CA3 1306, 1313-14 [“The officers clearly had a right to fear for their safety and those of the general public given Mitchell’s intoxicated state, his prior threat of murder, and the proximity of a [shotgun].”]. 9th CIR: Mora v. City of Gaithersburg (9C 2008) 519 F3 216, 227 [officers arrested a suicidal person outside his home; the man had threatened to kill co-workers and was armed; officers entered to secure any other weapons; it was “a situation rife with potential for tragic consequences”]. OTHER: US v. Quarterman (8C 2017) 877 F3 794, 798 [exigent circumstances exist if “officers reasonably believe a gun or an armed individual presents a danger to others or themselves”]; US v. Adams (6C 2009) 583 F3 457, 466 [officer searched an “unusually heavy” jacket in a suspected drug house occupied by several visitors; the court ruled that these circumstances demonstrated a “risk of danger to the police”]; US v. Janis (8C 2004) 387 F3 682, 687-88 [accidental shooting in residence, victim at hospital; the officer “testified he entered the victim’s house for safety reasons, that an unsafe weapon was still out in the open, still at the scene, and was still loaded”]. COMPARE: P v. Bennetto (1974) 10 C3 695, 701 [“the information relied upon by the police established nothing more than that at some time in the past defendant had possessed a gun and that he presently possessed a rifle”]; P v. Vollheim (1978) 87 CA3 538, 541 [“unannounced entry cannot be justified by a presumption that all owners of weapons will use them against approaching officers”].

[43] USSC: Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 US 433, 448 [search of car trunk OK when officers reasonably believed a gun was inside and the gun “was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals”].

[44] EXAMPLES: The following are examples of mental instability exigent circumstances:

• Warrantless entry into a motel room was justified because motel employees reported that the defendant, a guest in a motel room, appeared to be “irrational, agitated, and bizarre”; he displayed “a violent streak”; he had been carrying two knives; his motel room was “in disarray, with furniture overturned, beds torn apart, and the floor littered with syringes and a bloody rag.” US v. Arch (7C 1993) 7 F3 1300, 1304-5.

• A middle school student told her principal that she had been having suicidal thoughts; that when she saw guns and knives at her home, it “made her want to hurt herself.” An officer detained her. Machan v. Olney (6C 2020) 958 F3 1212, 1214 [the officer had “ample grounds to think that [the minor] posed a danger to herself, and thus provided probable cause for [the officer] to take [the minor] into protective custody for a mental evaluation”].

• A hotline operator notified police at about 1:00 p.m. that she had just spoken with a caller named Anthony Mora who said he was suicidal, that he had weapons in his apartment, that he could “understand shooting people at work,” and that “I might as well die at work.” After officers were dispatched to the apartment, an officer phoned Mora’s employer who advised that his threats “should be taken seriously.” When officers arrived they saw Mora outside his apartment loading suitcases and gym bags into a van. They handcuffed him and, after finding a handgun in the luggage, they entered his apartment to make sure that he had not created a dangerous situation by taking steps to carry out his threat. In ruling that the action was reasonable, the court noted pointed out that a credible threat to commit mass murder must, of course, be taken seriously, especially in light of tragic events that have shocked the country. As the court observed, “At Columbine High School in Littleton, in Blacksburg, Omaha, and Oklahoma City, America has had to learn how many victims the violence of just one or two outcasts can claim.” Mora v. Gaithersburg Police Department (4C 2008) 519 F3 216.

• COMPARE: An anonymous person phoned 911 and said that a man inside a certain house was mentally ill, that he was “off his medication,” and that he was “acting crazy and possibly had a gun.” When the man opened the door for the officers, they allegedly forcibly entered. In ruling that the entry was unjustified, the court pointed out that the officers “had no corroborating evidence of the alleged danger” and, therefore, their belief that a forcible entry was necessary was not reasonable. Kerman v. City of New York (2C 2001) 261 F3 229.

[45] OTHER: Hanson v. Dane County (7C 2010) 608 F3 335, 337 [“A lack of an answer on the return of an incomplete emergency call implies that the caller is unable to pick up the phone—because of injury, illness (a heart attack, for example), or a threat of violence.”]; Johnson v. City of Memphis (6C 2010) 617 F3 864, 869 [“We hold that the combination of a 911 hang call, an unanswered return call, and an open door with no responses from within the residence is sufficient to satisfy the exigency requirement.”]. COMPARE: US v. Martinez (10C 2011) 643 F3 1292, 1297-98 [911 call in which the dispatcher hears only static does not warrant the same concern as a call in which the caller hung up].

[46] OTHER: US v. Najar (10C 2006) 451 F3 710, 720 [“Even more alarming, someone was answering the phone but immediately placing it back on the receiver.”].

[47] CASE REFERRED TO: US v. Snipe (9C 2008) 515 F3 947 [a “very hysterical sounding” man phoned the police at 5 a.m. and shouted, “Get the cops here now!” After he gave his address the phone was disconnected; the front door was ajar.

[48] OTHER: Hanson v. Dane County (7C 2010) 608 F3 335, 338 [“Her obviously false statements, plus her nervous demeanor, led the police to think she had been threatened or feared retaliation should she give honest answers.”].

[49] EXAMPLES: The following are examples of missing person exigent circumstances:

• Officers were notified that a woman was missing after she and her husband “were in a physical fight” in their apartment, and “he did strike her.” After the fight, which occurred the night before, a relative had “been trying to get in contact with” her, but was unsuccessful. When officers arrived, the apartment was “completely dark” and no one responded to repeated knocking and announcing. Officers entered through an unlocked window. P v. Hochstraser (2009) 173 CA4 883, 899 [“a reliable missing person report was made under circumstances known to the investigating officers which strongly suggested that the missing person was injured or worse”].

• A woman notified San Diego police that a friend named Beatrice had been missing under suspicious circumstances. The woman explained that Beatrice was living with Ramon Rogers in an apartment complex in San Diego that he managed, and that Beatrice and Rogers had a five-year old daughter. But even though Beatrice had been missing for three weeks, Rogers was refusing to file a missing person’s report. This was especially suspicious because the woman had heard him threaten to lock Beatrice inside a storage room located in the basement of the apartment building. A missing person investigator, Det. Richard Carlson, phoned Rogers who claimed that Beatrice had been missing only a week or so, at which point Rogers said he “had to go” and quickly hung up. Later that day, Carlson and uniformed officers drove to the apartment but Rogers wasn’t there. Carlson then spoke with a tenant who said that she had not seen Beatrice for several weeks, and she confirmed that Rogers has a storage room in the basement. Just then, Rogers arrived. Carlson asked him how long Beatrice had been missing and Rogers said “a week and a half,” adding that he thought she had gone to Mexico “with someone.” Carlson told Rogers that he knew about his threat to lock Beatrice in the storage room, at which point Rogers’ neck “began to throb.” Having noticed that Rogers had not denied making the threat, Carlson asked if he could look in the storage room, just to confirm that she was not being held there. Rogers said no. By now, Carlson was “very concerned” about Beatrice’s welfare and was “feeling more and more convinced” that she was confined in the storage area. He told Rogers that he could not understand his refusal to permit a welfare check on his child’s mother, but Rogers remained firm that he would not permit Carlson to enter the room. So Carlson broke in and saw evidence in plain view that indicated that a violent crime had occurred there. Court: The officer acted reasonably mainly because of Rogers’ “noticeable lack of concern over the whereabouts of his child’s mother” and his “physical reaction” when Carlson mentioned his threat to lock Beatrice in the storage room. P v. Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136.

• The reporting parties said that Mr. and Mrs. Macioce, who regularly attended church services, missed church the previous Sunday; that the reporting parties had “made numerous attempts” to contact the Macioces by telephone and by knocking on the door; Mr. Macioce had been scheduled for knee surgery one day earlier but did not appear; the Macioces’ car was parked in the carport; mail had accumulated in the Macioces’ mailbox; the Macioces were not likely to be out of town because they were extremely poor. About 20 minutes earlier, they had knocked on the door again but, as before, received no response. Using a key from the apartment manager, the officers entered and discovered the body of Mr. Macioce. P v. Macioce (1987) 197 CA3 262. Also see: Vitek v. State (Ind. 2001) 750 NE2 346, 349 [“there can be reasonable belief that a person may be in need of aid with a premises when the occupant has been missing. Most cases upholding this exception have found that a person’s absence, combined with other circumstances, have created the exigent circumstances necessary for a warrantless search”].

• Officers learned that an 8-year old girl who had been missing for several hours was last seen talking with a man outside defendant’s apartment. When officers first knocked on the door, a TV set in the apartment was on but no one answered. When they returned the TV had been turned off, “which indicated someone may have been in the apartment.” Court: The entry was justified. P v. Panah (2005) 35 C4 395.

• Officers had probable cause to believe that two kidnapped girls were inside the suspect’s mobile home. P v. Coddington (2000) 23 C4 529, 577.

• Two girls were reported missing after they went to play in a park near their homes. While the search was underway, a home across the street from the park caught fire. Officers entered the house after firefighters discovered a large bloodstain on the living room carpet. In ruling that the officers’ entry was justified by exigent circumstances, the court said, “The girls, their bodies, or clues to their location might be somewhere in the burning house.” P v. Lucero (1988) 44 C3 1006, 1017. Also see P v. Payne (1977) 65 CA3 679 [“The police officers reasonably believed that [the child] was in need of their assistance. The potential crimes for which appellant was being investigated [i.e., child molestation] were particularly heinous and dangerous.”]; P v. Ammons (1980) 103 CA3 2030-31 [employer reports Ammons did not show up for work; he was normally reliable and punctual, neighbors said they had not seen him for days, a dog was locked in the house, the neighbor who usually cared for the dog when Ammons was away had not been told by him that he had planned to leave; Ammons had a heart condition]; P v. Wharton (1991) 53 C3 522, 577-78 [person missing for two weeks; mail accumulating in mailbox, neighbors heard “someone banging” on the door, the door was unlocked].

[50] CAL: P v. Gemmill (2008) 162 CA4 958 [through a window, an officer saw “an infant playing with a plastic bag near its face and a nonresponsive adult”]; P v. Sutton (1976) 65 CA4 341, 352-53 [facts “reasonably indicating that an infant child may be unattended” constitute “a substantial threat”]; P v. Miller (1999) 69 CA4 190, 199. 9th CIR: US v. Bradley (9C 2003) 321 F3 1212, 1215.

[51] USSC: Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 US 740, 753 [“an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made”]; Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 US 91, 100 [“in assessing the risk of danger, the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the suspect is armed should be considered”]; Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 336 [“The evidence at issue here was of crimes that were jailable,” distinguishing Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 US 740, 754]. CAL: P v. Torres (2012) 205 CA4 989, 995 [“a belief that evidence of a nonjailable offense will be imminently destroyed is not sufficient to justify a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances”]; P v. Hua (2008) 158 CA4 1027, 1035-36 [entry unreasonable to prevent destruction of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana]; P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 820-25; P v. Sirhan (1972) 7 C3 710, 739 [“The crime was one of enormous gravity, and the gravity of the offense is an appropriate factor to take into consideration.”]; P v. Herrera (1975) 52 CA3 177, 182 [“The more serious the crime under investigation, the greater the governmental interest in its prevention and detection.”]; P v. Higgins (1994) 26 CA4 247, 252 [“If the suspected offense is extremely minor, a warrantless home entry will almost inevitably be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”]. 9th CIR: US v. Johnson (9C 2001) 256 F3 895, 908 [the fact the crime was a misdemeanor “does not definitely preclude a finding of exigent circumstances, [but] it weighs heavily against it.”]; Hopkins v. Bonvicino (9C 2009) 573 F3 752, 764 [straight DUI not sufficiently serious, but court ignored Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 331 [destruction of drugs for personal use “involves a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need”]. OTHER: US v. Socey (DCC 1988) 846 F2 1439, 1444 [“the gravity of the underlying offense will have a great influence on the presence of exigent circumstances”]. NOTE: In US v. Johnson (9C 2001) 256 F3 895, 908 the Ninth Circuit interpreted Welsh (supra) to mean that exigent circumstances cannot exist if the underlying crime was merely a misdemeanor. This is incorrect. Welsh was based on the fact that the underlying offense was not even a “crime.”

[52] USSC: Whren v. US (1996) 517 US 806, 811 [“But only an undiscerning reader would regard these [discussed] cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause”].

[53] USSC: Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 US 452, 469 [“the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment”]. OTHER: US v. Hurtt (3C 2022) 31 F4 152, 160 [“This police-created exigency doctrine prevents the government from deliberately creating its own exigent circumstances to justify otherwise unconstitutional intrusions.”]; US v. Hendrix (10C 2011) 664 F3 1334, 1339. COMPARE: US v. Daniels (5C 2019) 930 F3 393, 402 [knocking “vigorously” did not constitute a police-initiated exigency].

[54] USSC: Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 US 452, 465 [“whenever law enforcement officers knock on the door of premises occupied by a person who may be involved in the drug trade, there is some possibility that the occupants may possess drugs and may seek to destroy them,” but the officer’s knocking on the door is not a fabricated exigency in the absence of a threat by officers to enter the premises without a warrant].

[55] QUOTE FROM: US v. Santana (1976) 427 US 38, 43.

[56] QUOTE FROM: Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 US 740, 743.

[57] CASE REFERRED TO: P v. Patino (1979) 95 CA3 11, 20 [“the facts demonstrate that the officers were in hot pursuit of the burglary suspect even though an hour had elapsed after they were first chasing the suspect”].

[58] CAL: P v. Bradford (1972) 28 CA3 695.

[59] USSC: Lange v. California (2021) __ US __ [141 S.Ct. 2011] (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J) [“Importantly, however, the Court’s opinion [in Lange] does not disturb the long-settled rule that pursuit of a fleeing felon is itself an exigent circumstance justifying warrantless entry into a home.”]; US v. Santana (1976) 571 US 38, 42-43.

[60] USSC: Lange v. California (2021) __ US __ [141 S.Ct. 2011] [“The flight of a misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home. An officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency.”].

[61] EXAMPLES: The following are examples of cases decided prior to Lange v. California. Most are probably still good:

• Responding to a report of a domestic dispute, officers found the victim outside her home. Her face and nose were red, she was “very upset” and “crying uncontrollably.” She said her husband, who was inside the house, had “hit her a few times in the face.” The husband opened the door when the officers knocked, but then tried to close the door. The officers entered. P v. Wilkins (1993) 14 CA4 761. Also see Lange v. California (2021) __ US __ [141 S.Ct. 2011] [court noted “Many perpetrators of domestic violence are charged with misdemeanors, despite the harmfulness of their conduct.”].

• Officers converged on a house in which drugs had just been sold to an undercover officer. As they arrived, they saw the owner of the house standing at the front door. She ran inside, the officers ran in after her. US v. Santana (1976) 427 US 38 [“a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place by the expedient of escaping to a private place,” edited]. Also see US v. Faust (1C 2017) 853 F3 39, 47 [suspect fled into neighboring apartment].

• An officer staking out a stolen car saw Lee, a known auto burglar, walk up to the driver’s side and reach down “as if to open the door.” When Lee saw the officer, he ran into his home nearby. The officer chased him inside and arrested him. P v. Superior Court (Quinn) (1978) 83 CA3 609, 615-16 [“Because Lee disregarded [the officer’s] order to halt, [the officer] had no reasonable choice but to pursue him wherever he went to effect the arrest.”].

• An officer who was investigating a report of a “very strong odor of ether” coming from an apartment, saw Luna step out of the apartment and he appeared to be under the influence of PCP. When the officer shouted at her to “come down the stairs,” Luna went back into the apartment and closed the door. The officer went in after her. P v. Abes (1985) 174 CA3 796.

• Officers were dispatched late at night to a silent burglary alarm at a bar. As they arrived, they saw a man “backing through the front door carrying a box.” When he saw the officers, he dropped the box and ran. The officers chased him but he got away. About an hour later, the officers saw him walking around, and the chase resumed, with the man eventually running into an apartment. The officers went in after him and encountered Patino who was eventually arrested for obstructing. Patino contended that the officers’ entry was unlawful, but the court disagreed, saying, “The facts demonstrate that the officers were in hot pursuit of the burglary suspect even though an hour had elapsed after they were first chasing the suspect.” P v. Patino (1979) 95 CA3 11.

• An officer attempted to make a traffic stop but the driver disregarded the officer’s red light and siren and drove to his home. When he arrived. he went inside; the officer followed him in and arrested him. P v. Lloyd (1989) 216 CA3 1425. Also see P v. Ngaue (1992) 8 CA4 896; In re Lavoyne M. (1990) 221 CA3 154.

[62] CAL: P v. Escudero (1979) 23 C3 800, 808 [“The cases have recognized that in appropriate circumstances the fresh pursuit of a fleeing felon may constitute a sufficiently grave emergency to justify an exception to the warrant requirement.”].

[63] USSC: Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 US 91, 100 [consider “gravity of the crime”]. CAL: P v. Williams (1989) 48 C3 1112, 1139 [“There was no unjustified delay by the investigating officers during which time an arrest warrant for the homicide could have been obtained.”]; P v. Escudero (1979) 23 C3 800, 811 [same]; P v. Lanfrey (1988) 204 CA3 491, 509 [“There does not appear to have been any unjustified delay by the officers during which probable cause had jelled and a warrant could have been obtained.”]; P v. Benton (1978) 77 CA3 322, 327 [in the area where officers lost sight of two fleeing armed robbers, they saw that the screen door of an apartment “had been ripped off its mount”]; P v. Manderscheid (2002) 99 CA4 355, 363-64 [entry into backyard was lawful in connection with the arrest of a “potentially armed parolee” who was “hiding in a residential neighborhood; i.e., near families and children.”]. COMPARE: US v. Johnson (9C 2001) 256 F3 895, 907 [“After Officer Kading lost sight of Smith in the woods, he waited for a half hour for backup to arrive.”]; P v. White (1986) 183 CA3 1199, 1209 [entry unlawful because witness told officers that the suspect had not gone inside].

[64] EXAMPLES: The following are examples of lawful “fresh” pursuits that resulted in the search of the suspect’s home:

[65] USSC: Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 US 452, 460 [“to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search”]; Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 US 141, 149 [“we have also recognized that in some circumstances law enforcement officers may conduct a search without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence”]. CAL: P v. Tran (2019) 42 CA5 1, 34-35 [destruction of data in Event Data Recorder, a.k.a. “Black box” or “Sensing and Diagnostic Module”].

[66] USSC: Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 331-32 [“the police had probable cause to believe that McArthur’s trailer home contained evidence of a crime and contraband, namely, unlawful drugs”]. CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 820-22 [“The imminent destruction of evidence is an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a residence to effect an arrest.”]; P v. Torres (2012) 205 CA4 989, 994. 9th CIR: US v. Alaimalo (9C 2002) 313 F3 1188, 1193 [“Even when exigent circumstances exist, police officers must have probable cause to support a warrantless entry into a home.”].

[67] USSC: Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 US 326, 331-32.

[68] CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 820-25 [“Under the exigent circumstances exception, officers may enter a residence without a warrant if they have an objectively reasonable belief that evidence is about to be destroyed.”]; P v. Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676 [“Exigent circumstances are present when a reasonable person would believe that entry…was necessary to prevent…the imminent destruction of evidence.”]; P v. Werner (2012) 207 CA4 1195, 1207 [officer lawfully entered to prevent defendant from swallowing methamphetamine]; P v. Higgins (1994) 26 CA4 247, 251 [“The possibility of imminent destruction of evidence is sufficient to justify a warrantless entry.”].

[69] 9th CIR: US v. Johnson (9C 2011) 256 F3 895, 908 [no evidence that suspect was aware of police presence or was likely to destroy evidence]; US v. Reeves (9C 2010) 396 F3 100, 106 [“Officers must have specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that evidence is being destroyed.”]; US v. Ojeda (9C 2002) 276 F3 486 [same].

[70] USSC: Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 US 452, 470 [“The critical point is that in each of these cases, the police did not create the exigent circumstances by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.”]; Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 404 [“An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.”].

[71] CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 820-22 [officers acted reasonably to prevent destruction of cocaine base]; P v. Higgins (1994) 26 CA4 247, 252 [“the possibility that evidence will be destroyed or removed if police wait for a warrant justifies immediate action”].

[72] USSC: Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 404 [“We have rejected the subjective approach, holding that ‘the Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.'”].

[73] CAL: P v. Tran (2019) 42 CA5 1, 34-36 [“Where officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe evidence is about to be destroyed, the exigent circumstances doctrine applies.”]; P v. Werner (2012) 207 CA4 1195, 1207 [“Reasonable belief of imminent destruction of evidence justifies immediate entry.”]; P v. Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676.

[74] 9th CIR: US v. Hendrix (10C 2011) 664 F3 1334, 1339 [“The police-created exigency doctrine prevents officers from relying on exigent circumstances of their own making.”]; US v. Hurtt (3C 2022) 31 F4 152, 160 [same principle reaffirmed].

[75] CAL: P v. Taylor (1975) 46 CA3 513, 523 [“Officers acted reasonably when they entered to prevent the imminent destruction of narcotics evidence after hearing toilets flushing.”]; P v. White (1986) 183 CA3 1199, 1209 [“Exigent circumstances justified entry when the defendant attempted to dispose of evidence upon police announcement.”].

[76] OTHER: US v. Williams (8C 2004) 431 F3 1115, 1120 [“Evidence may be destroyed in seconds; exigent circumstances exist if officers reasonably believe delay will lead to loss of evidence.”]; US v. Rodriguez (1C 2003) 414 F3 837, 843 [same].

[77] USSC: Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 US 452, 471 [“When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not to respond or to speak, they do not create exigent circumstances simply by being there.”]; US v. Jenkins (9C 2015) 594 F3 1032, 1041 [entry invalid where no evidence of destruction or danger].

[78] CAL: P v. Werner (2012) 207 CA4 1195, 1208 [“Officers reasonably entered when suspect was actively attempting to swallow contraband.”]; P v. Tran (2019) 42 CA5 1, 35-36 [imminent data destruction justified limited entry].

[79] OTHER: US v. Holloway (6C 1999) 290 F3 1331, 1337 [“Reasonable belief of imminent evidence destruction validates immediate entry without a warrant.”].

[80] CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 820-25 [recognizing the imminent destruction of evidence as a well-established exigency justifying entry].

[81] 9th CIR: US v. McGregor (9C 2005) 435 F3 1071, 1075 [“Where officers have specific, articulable facts supporting belief that delay will result in evidence destruction, entry is reasonable.”]; US v. Ojeda (9C 2002) 276 F3 486.

[82] CAL: P v. Torres (2012) 205 CA4 989, 994 [“The possibility of imminent evidence destruction is sufficient exigency for entry.”].

[83] USSC: Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 US 141, 149 [“While natural dissipation of alcohol supports exigency, warrantless searches require case-by-case analysis based on totality of circumstances.”].

[84] CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 825 [“Once exigency passes, further search requires a warrant or consent.”]; P v. Torres (2012) 205 CA4 989, 996 [same].

[85] USSC: Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 393 [“The mere fact that law enforcement is conducting a homicide investigation does not itself create exigent circumstances.”]; Flippo v. West Virginia (1999) 528 US 11, 14.

[86] CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 825 [“Once the exigency has dissipated, officers must obtain a warrant to continue any further search or seizure.”]; P v. Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 678 [“When the emergency justifying entry no longer exists, the police must promptly cease their activities.”].

[87] USSC: Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 404 [“An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.”]; Kentucky v. King (2011) 563 US 452, 464 [“The reasonableness of a search does not depend on the officer’s subjective intent but on whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.”].

[88] CAL: P v. Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136, 1142 [“An officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant if the circumstances objectively justify the action.”]; P v. Werner (2012) 207 CA4 1195, 1207 [same principle applied in exigent entry case].

[89] USSC: Katz v. US (1967) 389 US 347, 357 [“Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”]; Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 393.

[90] CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 824 [“The exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrow and must be applied cautiously to prevent erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”]; P v. Ramey (1976) 16 C3 263, 275 [“The sanctity of the home is at the core of the Fourth Amendment, and exceptions must be carefully limited.”].

[91] USSC: Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 US 443, 455 [“The burden is on those seeking exemption from the warrant requirement to show that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.”]; McDonald v. US (1948) 335 US 451, 456.

[92] CAL: P v. Celis (2004) 33 C4 667, 676 [“The burden rests on the prosecution to show that the search or seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.”]; P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 820-21 [same].

[93] USSC: Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 403-04 [“The Fourth Amendment recognizes the need to render emergency aid and protect life or prevent serious injury as one of the ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'”].

[94] CAL: P v. Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136, 1141 [“Police officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency aid if they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.”]; P v. Hochstraser (2009) 173 CA4 883, 899 [same principle].

[95] 9th CIR: US v. Martin (9C 2008) 509 F3 1211, 1217 [“The emergency aid exception applies when officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that someone inside is in need of immediate assistance.”]; US v. Black (9C 2008) 482 F3 1035, 1040.

[96] CAL: P v. Gemmill (2008) 162 CA4 958, 970 [“The emergency aid exception is limited to circumstances where officers reasonably believe that someone within is in need of immediate aid.”]; P v. Panah (2005) 35 C4 395, 464.

[97] USSC: Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 US 385, 393-94 [“We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would otherwise be illegal absent exigent circumstances.”]; Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 US 45, 47-48.

[98] CAL: P v. Panah (2005) 35 C4 395, 464 [“Exigent circumstances justified the entry where officers had probable cause to believe the missing child might be injured or deceased inside the home.”]; P v. Gemmill (2008) 162 CA4 958, 970 [same].

[99] OTHER: US v. Martinez (10C 2011) 643 F3 1292, 1298 [“Officers may enter a residence to ensure that no one inside is injured, in danger, or otherwise in need of aid.”]; US v. Najar (10C 2006) 451 F3 710, 720 [“The ultimate question is whether officers reasonably believed that entry was necessary to assist a person threatened with serious harm.”].

[100] CAL: P v. Rogers (2009) 46 C4 1136, 1141 [entry into basement justified by fear that victim was locked or injured inside]; P v. Lucero (1988) 44 C3 1006, 1017 [entry into burning house reasonable where missing children suspected to be inside].

[101] CAL: P v. Ray (1999) 21 C4 464, 471 [“The community caretaking exception recognizes that police perform a wide variety of community functions apart from investigating crime.”]; P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 608 [“An officer may enter a dwelling without a warrant to check on the welfare or safety of the occupants if there are articulable facts suggesting an emergency.”].

[102] USSC: Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 US 433, 441 [“Local police officers frequently engage in ‘community caretaking functions,’ totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”]; Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 US 398, 403.

[103] CAL: P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 608 [“Because the window blinds were closed, [the officer] could not peek inside to verify whether anyone needed aid, so entry was reasonable.”]; P v. Ray (1999) 21 C4 464, 471 [“Police are expected to act in aid of community safety even when there is no probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.”].

[104] 9th CIR: US v. Bradley (9C 2003) 321 F3 1212, 1215 [“Before the officers entered the house, they knocked, spoke with a neighbor, and attempted less intrusive methods to check on the occupant’s welfare.”]; US v. Murdock (9C 1995) 54 F3 1437, 1442 [same].

[105] CAL: P v. Macabeo (2016) 1 C5 1206, 1213 [“Community caretaking must be divorced from the detection of crime; otherwise it becomes a subterfuge.”]; P v. Morton (2008) 159 CA4 239, 248 [same].

[106] USSC: Caniglia v. Strom (2021) __ US __ [141 S.Ct. 1596] [“The community caretaking exception that applies to motor vehicles does not extend to the home.”]; CAL: P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 609 [entry must be justified by an objectively reasonable emergency, not general caretaking].

[107] OTHER: US v. Smith (8C 2015) 820 F3 356, 360 [“Caniglia narrowed the community caretaking doctrine; entry into a home must now fit within an exigent circumstance such as emergency aid.”]; State v. Huber (Wis 2021) 962 NW2 450, 458 [same].

[108] CAL: P v. Thompson (2006) 38 C4 811, 826 [“The emergency aid doctrine, not community caretaking, governs warrantless entries into homes when the purpose is to render aid or prevent harm.”]; P v. Troyer (2011) 51 C4 599, 610 [same].

[109] USSC: Michigan v. Tyler (1978) 436 US 499, 511 [“A burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry reasonable.”]; Michigan v. Clifford (1984) 464 US 287, 293.

[110] CAL: P v. Glance (1989) 209 CA3 836, 845 [“When police come upon the scene of a fire, they may enter affected structures as soon as it is reasonably safe and remain a reasonable time to ascertain the cause.”]; P v. Avalos (1988) 203 CA3 1517, 1523 [same].

[111] USSC: Michigan v. Clifford (1984) 464 US 287, 298 [“A warrant is required to search a fire-damaged home once the exigencies have ended and the owners have reasserted privacy.”]; CAL: Cleaver v. Superior Court (1979) 24 C3 297, 304 [distinguishing between immediate post-fire entry and later reentry after scene was vacated].

[112] 9th CIR: US v. Buckmaster (6C 2007) 485 F3 873, 876 [“Fire officials may remain to ensure the residence is safe for return but must obtain a warrant for investigative reentry.”]; US v. Rahman (7C 2015) 805 F3 822, 833 [same principle applied].